Chapter 22 Chapter 1 History is as pen-like as a knife——The "Cowardly" Admiral Li

The Battle of the Blue Hoof House is over. No matter how complicated the inside story of this battle is, and how much the losses of both sides are, there is an indisputable fact that the Ming army was defeated in the Battle of the Blue Tile Pavilion.The conclusion of this defeat is based on the prior strategic goals of both sides and the final advance and retreat of the two armies.The strategic goal of the Ming army to capture Seoul before the war was not achieved in the end, and it retreated to the front line of the Linjin River, so we judged that the Ming army was defeated. On the Korean battlefield, the Ming army and the Japanese army were essentially guest troops, and the real main army was the Korean army occupying the home field.No matter how strong the Ming army and the Japanese army are, they cannot avoid a congenital defect, that is, the language barrier, the terrain, and the three elements of war: weather, location, and harmony. two o'clock.There are also specific differences between the two. For example, the Japanese army occupied for a long time, and they were better at terrain and city construction than the Ming army. Although the Ming army had Korean troops as guides and translators, the Japanese army also had North Korean troops. excellent.In terms of harmony, the Ming army is superior because of the support of the North Korean government, but unfortunately, this is only reflected in logistics and campaign assistance, and it is not reflected much in each battlefield.

In the Battle of Bichi Pavilion, as a guest army, they lacked the necessary intelligence means and foundation. The Ming army and the Japanese army were blind to each other's true situation and strength.Compared with the long-distance attack of the Ming army as the attacker, the Japanese army had enough time and means to deploy as the defender, and the Ming army was completely at a disadvantage in terms of strength. For the Corps, the defeat was a result without much suspense. However, the North Korean army, as the main army, is actually the same as the Ming and Japanese armies. In its own land, with absolute innate advantages in language and popularity, it is completely unable to provide the Ming army with the most basic necessary information. , and did not provide military support to the Ming army at all. Even when the Ming army and the Japanese army were unable to retreat after two hours of fierce fighting, they turned around and ran without covering or reinforcements. In other words, if If there was any change at that time, it is very likely that the commander-in-chief of the Ming army and all the troops would be wiped out by the Japanese army.This situation makes it impossible for me to comment, because I really don't know what to say.

For the Japanese army, the previous disastrous defeat in Pyongyang made Konishi several army commanders have to exaggerate the results of the Battle of Byekjekan to cover up the previous losses, so that Hideyoshi would not punish and hold them accountable.For the Ming army, this battle was insignificant and did not affect any decision-making at all. Therefore, the Ming side did not pay too much attention to it, either in the records or in the memorandum of the parties involved, and just conducted it as an ordinary encounter. Reporting and Recording. But for the entire country of North Korea, the Ming army changed from a strategic offensive to a confrontation after World War I, and began to restart peace talks, which completely delayed the restoration process of North Korea. North Korea will be ravaged by the Japanese for a few more years, so they put This battle was attributed to the root cause of the strategic change of the Ming army, and it was believed that it was because Li Rusong was overwhelmed by the Japanese army, so he insisted on switching from offense to defense. Therefore, the Koreans began to exaggerate this battle, Li Rusong is directly defined as the sinner of the result that North Korea continued to be trampled by the Japanese in the following years.

In the future, countless historians paid attention to this battle, and most of them focused on the casualties and victory of the battle. In fact, for the Ming army, unless Li Rusong and other Ming army leaders suffered large-scale casualties, it would be a completely insignificant encounter, that's all. The differences between the Ming, North Korea, and Japan on the final evaluation of this battle actually showed the fundamental differences in the positions of the three parties in the Imjin War. The strategic purpose of the Ming army was to drive the Japanese army out of North Korea, but they were always visitors from afar, and their strength was very limited. For example, the total strength of the troops entering North Korea this time was only 48,000. There are only 40,000 at most who have actually entered the front-line battle sequence, so if losses can be avoided, losses will definitely be avoided.

The strategic purpose of the Japanese army was to occupy North Korea and lay a solid foundation for attacking the Ming Dynasty. However, facing the powerful Ming army, they had no idea at all, and like the Ming army, they also came from afar with limited troops, and their replenishment and logistics depended entirely on Shipping by sea is very inconvenient, so efforts are being made to avoid losses.Therefore, the mentality of the Japanese army is similar to that of the Ming army. Both are relatively objective in terms of strategy and tactics, and it can even be said to be cautious. Among these three parties, Li Chao's mentality in North Korea is the worst.On the one hand, they did not have the strength to resist and repel the Japanese army, and they completely relied on the Ming army entering the dynasty. On the other hand, they never forgot to blame the Ming army for their ineffectiveness in fighting. .In the process, they completely ignored the casualties and losses of the Ming army, and stubbornly turned a blind eye to their own problems, attributing all problems and mistakes to Ming's incompetence.In fact, I think they were not only then, but still are today.

When we wrote this book, we not only consulted the historical materials of the three parties at that time, but also consulted many papers of contemporary Korean scholars, but almost without exception, when it comes to the Ming army in the Imjin War, no matter the topic of the paper is What, in the end, they will go astray, and they will talk about how poor the military discipline of the Ming army is, how they harmed the Korean people, how they were unreasonable to North Korean officials, etc., and even deliberately magnified and distorted some strategic and tactical measures of the Ming army, such as Bi The role and nature of the Battle of the Hooves.You can't say anything on the surface, but it can make you feel what they mean in their bones.

I don't like the taste that you can't say anything on the surface, but it can make you feel what they mean in their bones. Although the victory or defeat of the Battle of Bitu Pavilion had no effect on the three-party strategy, it had a considerable impact on the personal feelings and emotions of Li Rusong and several Ming army generals. Li Rusong lost nearly a thousand brothers including Li Yousheng in this frivolous battle.These thousand people are not ordinary Ming army, they are all elite soldiers who have followed the Li family for many years, most of them are servants of several of their Liaodong generals, they are used to fighting, and they are the elite of the Liaodong army's elite.Such losses cannot be recovered in a short time.

That's why Li Rusong was heartbroken and cried bitterly to Li Yousheng's son-in-law all night after the war. On January 28, the 21st year of Wanli, the exhausted Ming army slowly withdrew from the Huiyinling mountain area and returned to Paju, the starting point.As soon as he arrived in Paju, Li Rusong announced immediately that the main force of the Ming army would stay in Paju for a whole day, and then return to the division to station in Kaesong. The decision caught the North Koreans by surprise.It is understandable to rest in Paju, but why return to Kaesong?To the east of Kaesong is the Linjin River, which is not conducive to the swimming of large troops. Putting the main force in Kaesong clearly shows that they do not intend to attack.

At the same time that Li Rusong was attacking the Biju Hall, the North Korean army had already assembled.Jin Mingyuan, Liu Chenglong and other military and political ministers gathered near Paju, gearing up to cooperate with the Ming army.The North Korean king Li Yan in the rear even sent someone to set up a living shrine for Li Rusong, and it will open for business once Seoul is restored. Now that the Ming army suddenly announced that it would retreat to Kaesong, it was nothing more than a thunderbolt from the blue sky, which wiped out the complacency of the Koreans. Liu Chenglong, Kim Mingwon, Li Dexin and other North Korean ministers heard the bad news and rushed to Paju to ask Li Rusong face to face.Who knows that Li Rusong never admits that there is such a thing as defeating and retreating. His explanation to these ministers is: "I am not retreating, but temporarily retreating. There is no food or grass in Paju, and the back is against the Linjin River, which is not conducive to defense. The main infantry and artillery of our army haven’t arrived yet. I’ll go back to Kaesong and wait for them.”

Liu Chenglong and others did not believe this set of rhetoric at all.What is bad for defense? We hope Admiral Li will attack and attack again! In order to cooperate with Li Rusong's offensive, North Korea mobilized a large number of officers, rebels, and civilians to gather towards the front line of Seoul. If the Ming army withdrew, these people had to withdraw quickly.However, this is not the key point. The most important thing is that they are about to hit Seoul. Once the Ming army withdraws at this time, they don’t know when they will attack again. The root cause of Jackie Chan's impatient eyes.

Li Rusong saw that the North Koreans were suddenly aggressive, so he casually threw out a statement from the Ministry of War, saying that there were 200,000 Japanese pirates in Seoul, and our army had only 40,000 exhausted troops, and this battle was impossible.Then he pointed to his chest again, saying that my old injury had recurred and I planned to recuperate. Liu Chenglong pointed at the notice with his finger and said that there are only 10,000 Japanese pirates in Seoul, how could there be 200,000, Admiral, you are talking nonsense!Liu Chenglong has always spoken cautiously, and he is very respectful to famous generals, but today he actually said such sharp words to Li Rusong, it can be seen that he was really in a hurry. Li Rusong became a little impatient, and sneered: 200,000 is what your information says, as for 10,000... the tens of thousands of people we met in the Green Hoof Hall are all ghosts (I added this sentence, Liu It was not written in Jackie Chan's book, but I think General Xiao Li must have said it, but Liu Chenglong deliberately ignored it)?Liu Chenglong was dumbfounded, North Korea’s inaccurate intelligence is a consistent problem, he held back for a while and had to stick his neck and say that we have never written like this.Li Rusong said there must be!Liu Chenglong said definitely not!The two of you said something, I said something, Che Jilu talked non-stop, and they were about to quarrel. At this time, a person rushed in from the tent, entered the tent and knelt down on the ground, weeping, begging Li Rusong not to retreat.The generals in Liaodong saw it, and it turned out to be an old acquaintance - Li Xie. Everyone should still remember that the background of Li Xie was very suspicious, and he was suspected of colluding with the Japanese army.This person is also good at drilling camps, and is very good at seizing the opportunity.Now coming out to try hard to persuade Li Rusong, first, it will make the Ming army have a rebellious mentality, and they want to withdraw their troops, which fulfills the wish of the Japanese; , is a great loyal minister. When Zu Chengxun saw his enemy, he didn't show any expression on the sidelines, but instead annoyed his colleague Zhang Shijue.Zhang Shijue was the most staunch advocate of withdrawing troops in the Liaodong Army, and he was also a good buddy of Zu Chengxun. Seeing this kid, new and old grudges were added together, and he became angry.He didn't even say a word, rushed over and kicked Li Xuan to the ground, and then started cursing. All of a sudden, the North Koreans couldn't hold back their faces.The Ming army has always been strong in North Korea, and a chief under Song Yingchang dared to tie up and beat North Korea’s food supervisors—but it’s really a bit strange for a deputy commander to kick a Jiedu envoy in front of several ministers. Too much. Li Xuan was lying on the ground twitching, very miserable.The North Korean ministers who came together immediately shared the same hatred and were passionate.Seeing this, Li Rusong scolded Zhang Shijue symbolically, and then directly announced the adjournment of the meeting. Matters concerning the advance and retreat of the troops will be discussed at another day. Liu Chenglong was a little reluctant, but after thinking about it, it was a great victory to force Admiral Li to stop mentioning the retreat, so several people rushed to help Li Xuan and left the Ming army garrison. After the meeting was over, Li Rusong returned to his big tent and called two people in one after another. The first to come in was the North Korean correspondent who was in charge of the translation.Li Rusong said to him: "Go back and tell Master Liu that I really didn't intend to retreat. It's just that I have a bad year in the first month of this year, and I have to avoid Tai Sui. You see, I fell off my horse several times. Wait until As soon as next month arrives, I will attack immediately." He also took out a detailed attack plan and asked Tong Tong to bring it back to the North Korean ministers to reassure them. This is true, Li Rusong has fallen off his horse four times since he came to North Korea, and he has almost become a habit... Immediately after the North Korean official left, Li Rusong summoned another person, Yang Yuan. Yang Yuan has made great contributions in the Biju Hall, and his own strength loss is relatively small.Li Rusong ordered him to lead part of the Ming army to leave the camp first.Yang Yuan understood and set out overnight. A few days later, North Korean ministers came to pester me again.Li Rusong told them that after the Battle of Bi Tieguan, the Ming army suffered a lot of injuries and illnesses for a period of time, and the war horses of the Ming army were like brothers.Liu Chenglong and the others naturally agreed, as long as Li Rusong didn't leave, they could do anything. Li Rusong took more than half of his troops away from the Paju camp, found an open area, pretended to set up an altar, and burned incense to mourn.Suddenly Li Rusong raised his head to look at the sky, and sent someone to tell Liu Chenglong, "Oh, the sky is a bit cloudy, it might rain. The place in Paju is low-lying, and there are no houses. I'm afraid it will be submerged, so I can't live in it." Liu Chenglong was shocked when he heard the news, and it was already too late when he rushed over.The Ming army had already packed up their tents and retreated towards Kaesong.Liu Chenglong and others saw that the deal was done, they had no choice but to chase after Li Rusong while notifying the North Korean soldiers and civilians to retreat. On February 5th, the Ming army crossed the Linjin River and arrived at Dongpo Station.Here, Li Rusong left Zha Dashou and Wu Chengxuan behind two thousand Ming troops, and swaggered into Kaesong.He lingered in Kaesong for more than half a month, leaving Wang Bidi and other 5,000 infantry behind, and the army withdrew to Pyongyang. At this time, Yang Yuan had already gone far to the rear.He shouldered the mission of Li Rusong, to explain the reasons for the retreat to the North Korean king in the rear and Song Yingchang, the strategist, and tell them the specific situation ahead.In fact, the most important thing is that Li Rusong and Song Yingchang have to reach a consistent strategic plan in the future, and he doesn't care about the North Koreans. King Lee Chan of Joseon met Yang Yuan on February 8th.The latter talked eloquently about the reasons for the retreat, such as the shortage of food and grass, the fact that the Japanese army in Seoul had far more troops than the Ming army, etc. Li Yan was dizzy because he couldn't solve all the problems.But even so, Li Yan was still worried that Song Yingchang would be persuaded by Yang Yuan, and the situation would really be over by then.In short, no matter what, the Ming army cannot be allowed to retreat.In order to prevent this kind of thing from happening, Li Yan first sent Yin Genshou to find Song Yingchang for a theory on the day Yang Yuan arrived in Yizhou. Yin Genshou traveled day and night, and finally arrived in Phoenix before Yang Yuan on February 10, and met Song Yingchang.Song Yingchang gave Yin Geunshou a reassurance, and promised that Pyongyang was the bottom line of the Ming army and would not continue to retreat.He also told Yin Genshou that follow-up reinforcements are already on the way, with a large number of firearms, and they will all be in place by the end of February.The counterattack plan is just around the corner! With Song Yingchang's promise, the North Korean monarchs and ministers breathed a sigh of relief, and in turn became even more dissatisfied with Li Rusong.In their eyes, Li Rusong's image as a famous general collapsed completely.The defeat of the Bishou Pavilion took away all the courage of the admiral, like a bereaved dog who is in a state of panic all day long, only thinking about retreating, retreating and retreating all day long. So Li Rusong's great achievements in Pyongyang also became suspicious.There were rumors in the Korean court that Admiral Li's attack on the city was all due to the Southern Army, and the Northern Army was responsible for all the credit.Some people even analyzed it wisely, saying that Li Rusong has always been a man who only bullys the weak, wins a battle and quits as soon as he sees it, and has no enterprising spirit. Even Li Rusong asked the king of Joseon for a horse, which became a crime. During the Battle of Pyongyang, Li Rusong took the lead in rushing into the city, and his mount was shot to death by the Japanese iron artillery. After that, he changed his horse and continued to charge, but fell into a ditch.After the war, he proposed to the North Korean side, hoping to help him find a good horse.The Joseon court was in ecstasy at the time, and without a word, they picked a black steed and sent it to Pyongyang—but later, Li Rusong fell twice in the Pyokhoe Pavilion. From this point of view, the horse he replaced A North Korean horse is also a bit bad. Now that Li Rusong's image has been shattered, this incident has become a criminal evidence.Someone told Li Yan that Admiral Li liked the horse very much. Li Yan replied bitterly: "I think this Li Rusong is very courageous, and his military use is far worse than that of the ancients. He just captured Pyongyang and hurriedly asked for it." Horses, as for what? Li Rusong claimed that his horse was shot and died, and I think it is pure nonsense in terms of his cowardly character.” ——He forgot who insisted on it for the respected and beloved Li Da The admiral established a shrine. So, did Li Rusong really lose his courage and dare not confront the Japanese again? Before examining Li Rusong's reasons for retreating, let's look at the North Koreans' reasons for continuing to attack. Liu Chenglong recorded in "Punishment Records" that when Li Rusong was about to retreat from the Linjin River to Kaesong, he stopped his horse and gave five reasons why he could not retreat: First, the tomb of the royal family of Joseon is still in the hands of Japanese pirates and must be taken back; second, the people in the occupied areas are waiting for the recovery of the king, and retreating rashly will disappoint them; third, not an inch of North Korea's land can be given up; Relying on the Ming army, once the Ming army withdraws, the North Korean army may be in danger of mutiny and separation; fifth, if the Ming army retreats, the Japanese army will follow up and attack, and even Kaesong and Pyongyang may not be able to defend at that time. These five reasons may seem high-sounding, but if you think about it carefully, you will find that they are all stupid words. There is no real reason other than sprinkling blood and singing high-profile to shirk responsibility. Liu Chenglong is a famous minister of a generation who pays the most attention to practical affairs. How could he write such empty nonsense? There is only one reason. That is, he really couldn't think of any legitimate reason, so he had to say some politically correct empty talk.Because he knew very well in his heart that at this moment, the Ming army did not have the objective conditions to maintain an offensive, and even whether it could hold Paju and Kaesong was a serious problem. On June 15, Dai Chaobian and Shi Rubu crossed the river, with a total of 1,029 people and 1,093 horses; on June 17, Guo Mengzheng and Wang Shouguan joined the generals to cross the river. , led 506 men and 779 horses; on June 19, Zu Chengxun, the Supreme Commander of the Korean Aid Army, led 1,309 soldiers and 1,520 horses. Nineteen horses crossed the Yalu River. Therefore, the total strength of the Ming army in the Battle of Pyongyang was 3,000, and Yang Shaoxun later sent another 500, the total number of Ming troops in North Korea was 3,500.These numbers are clearly written in "Sunjo Records", you can check it.The so-called number of 5,000 actually counted the 500 Yang Shaoxun stationed in Yizhou and the 1,500 people in Jiulian City and other places.This is the total number of troops that Hao Jie promised the North Koreans to send, not the number of people who participated in the war.This has to be made clear. Whether it is "Punishment Records" or "Reconstructing Fan Guozhi", it is calculated according to this large number. This is for political reasons, to boost morale, and to say as much as possible.Later, North Korea recruited volunteer soldiers and told them that Zu Chengxun had 10,000 soldiers. This was all political propaganda—in fact, even these two books never said that Zu Chengxun actually brought five soldiers. Thousands of people entered the DPRK, only 5,000 people were mobilized in Liaodong, and North Korea prepared food and grass according to 5,000 people. And when it comes to food and grass, this matter is very clear.Because before the Battle of Pyongyang, North Korean envoys visited Yang Shaoxun, saying that Zu Chengxun had approached Pyongyang, and hoped that the successor troops of the Ming army would follow up immediately.Yang Shaoxun made it clear that because the amount of food and grass reported by North Korea was too small to meet the needs of 5,000 people, it was impossible to advance troops and could only respond in Uiju and along the Yalu River.This proves that Zu Chengxun brought 3,000 people instead of 5,000 people into the DPRK precisely because North Korea could not raise enough food and grass. In fact, Li Rusong's reasons for withdrawing troops were very simple. There were three reasons in total, all of which had nothing to do with the Battle of Beechee Hall, but were closely related to the North Korean monarchs and ministers.We are too lazy to talk about the comparison of military strength. The Japanese army stationed in Seoul now has more than 50,000 troops who have fought against Li Rusong, far surpassing the total strength of the Ming army of more than 30,000. These three reasons are the war horses of the Ming army, the food and grass of the Ming army, and the security of Pyongyang. In "Punishment Records", Liu Chenglong denounced Li Rusong's escapeist behavior on the first page; on the second page, he suddenly said, "It was raining continuously for days, and the mountains beside the road were burned by thieves. With horse disease, almost ten thousand horses will die in a few days." In the article on February 5th, 26th year of "Xuanzu Shilu", the number is written more clearly: "When the heavenly soldiers came from afar, they were tired, and there was another horse disease. , more than 12,000 horses died." This shocking truth was also confirmed in Yang Yuan's report to Li Yan: "There is not a single bundle of grass in the army, and the number of horses falling to death is eight or nine thousand a day." Even after retreating through the Linjin River, this embarrassment The situation has not yet been alleviated.According to Li Hengfu's report after he went to the front line to inspect, "the army arrived in Linjin and did not eat for two days, and the number of dead horses was unknown." The figure provided by Li Rusong himself was "30,000 troops and horses, and more than half of the dead." At this time, among the 40,000 Ming troops in North Korea, the number of cavalry was about 25,000. Now, because of the horse plague and the lack of forage, the horses were sick and hungry, and they were reduced by more than half in a few days. Waiting for Ruo deprived most of the combat effectiveness of the Liaodong Army.In fact, for a long time thereafter, the war horses of the Ming army continued to die. For the Ming army, losing horses meant losing mobility and combat effectiveness.Especially for Li Rusong and other people from the Liaodong Army, without a horse is almost nothing. If it's just horse casualties, try to think in a good direction, it's a big deal to use cavalry as infantry, although this is unrealistic.But the actual situation was worse than this—the fate of soldiers of the Ming army was not much better than that of war horses.Look at the records of the Koreans themselves, and look at the Ming army who continued to advance to the front of the Linjin River after fighting to the death in Pyongyang.The responsibility, I say without hesitation, lies entirely with North Korea.Because this is their homeland and their home field, they have the responsibility and obligation to provide logistics and supplies for the Ming army who came from afar. Regrettably, after the Japanese army landed in North Korea, officials from all over the country quickly fled to their deaths, staged a life-and-death version of the escape, which led to the complete failure of administrative agencies at all levels.Even now, it is impossible to organize effective actions at all.To put it bluntly, its government agencies have only names and basically no administrative capabilities. The current national strength cannot provide sufficient logistical support for the Ming army, even if it is only 40,000 Ming troops. When the Ming army attacked Pyongyang before, the rear transportation line was already in jeopardy.Now that the front line has advanced several hundred miles to the east, the supply situation is even worse.Although Song Yingchang, Yuan Huang and others worked desperately to transport grain and grass from Liaodong, there were as many as 130,000 shi.However, because the North Korean side could not organize an effective transportation force, these strategic materials were stranded between Yizhou, Zhonghe, and Huangzhou, and they could not keep up with the main force of the Ming army anyway. In this situation, under the command of Li Rusong, the Ming army still rushed all the way without hesitation and advanced quickly, regained Pyongyang, and beat the Japanese army back to Seoul, and stabilized the front line on the Linjin River. But Liu Chenglong and others in the rear searched desperately, scholars and common people were conscripted to transport food, and even the monks and soldiers of Master Xiu Jing were disbanded and incorporated into the civilian team, which was still not enough.If it weren't for the leader of the rebel army, Jin Qianyi, who occupied Jianghua Island and was able to solve part of the supply problem by sea, the Ming army on the front line would have starved to death long ago. In February, after the completion of the Bijou Pavilion, there were only a total of more than 3,000 shi left in Pyongyang's grain storage, and only more than 1,000 shi left of soybeans for horses.In Kaesong, there is no food at all, and it depends entirely on transportation from the rear.In other words, the troops of the Ming army from Kaesong to the defense lines on both sides of the Linjin River can only be maintained by the food and grass transported from the rear every day. The Ming army has been starving for at least two days.In fact, let alone the Linjin River, the transportation capacity of the North Koreans could not even be guaranteed in Pyongyang at that time, so if more than 30,000 Ming troops really entered Seoul and failed to take the Yongsan Dacang completely, it is estimated that more than half of them would starve to death. In order to complain about the inaction of the Ming army, a North Korean minister once reported to Li Yan that there were still more than 40,000 shi of grain in Kaesong.Li Yan took the report and threw it back directly: "You can make up the numbers more reliably, let alone a genius, even I don't believe it!" So, how miserable is the situation of the Ming army on the front line? Please note that we didn't say "distressed" or "terrible" here, but used the word "miserable".Below, I will describe their situation in an objective and peaceful tone as much as possible. Official Cao Juanshu Li Yuanyi once went to Pyongyang for inspection. Before he arrived in Pyongyang, he saw many wounded and sick soldiers from the Ming army lying here and there near Shun'an. They had not eaten for two days and were dying.These Ming soldiers shed their blood for North Korea, and now they are reduced to starving people. Li Yuanyi was very frightened, saying that if the generals saw this scene, they would blame us greatly.As we said before, Li Rusong was furious after knowing this situation, and ordered people to take his flag to beat North Korean officials along the road, asking them to give priority to ensuring the feeding of the Ming army wounded, otherwise they would never end with them. This improved the Ming army wounded situation. The problem of food for the wounded in the Ming army could not be guaranteed. This was the situation before Pyongyang, so what about Pyongyang?The description by Li Chaogong, Cao Zhengying, and Xu Yu let us know that it was even more miserable there: I entered Pyongyang City through the Qixing Gate, but I saw that the Ming soldiers stationed everywhere were very hungry. battlefield.Many people just fell down and died.Because of the lack of food, the Ming army had to kill some of the horses to satisfy their hunger, and the remaining horses were also in a predicament of not being able to provide food and fodder. Because all the vegetation around Pyongyang was burned by the Japanese army, the Ming army had to go out of the city and go deep into the nearby mountains to find them. Feeding the horses with wild grass, what I saw was extremely sad. After passing Pyongyang and moving forward, it was the report of Li Hengfu mentioned above, saying that Li Rusong "the army arrived in Linjin and did not eat for two days, and the number of dead horses is unknown." Song Yingchang’s letter to Shi Xing, Minister of the Ministry of War, said in a letter to Shi Xing, Minister of the Ministry of War, that it has been raining for several days, the roads are muddy and food and grass are not available, and the Japanese army burned and killed before retreating, so that they could not even find a horse grass in Kaesong, which made the horses of the Ming army Many fell dead.Soldiers of the Ming army had nothing to eat, so they could only eat dead horse meat to satisfy their hunger, and because they slept in the ice and snow, they were "both cold and sick; the poisonous disease recurred after eating dead horse meat, and the soldiers were very tired." soldiers, but the Ming army currently only has more than 30,000 soldiers, so Li Rusong repeatedly said, "Please borrow Liao soldiers, as urgent as fire." Such scattered records abound, and it is shocking to read. Knowing that people have no food, horses and grass, soldiers are dying of starvation, more than half of the horses have died of illness, and the Ming army, especially the main Liaodong cavalry army, has lost most of its combat effectiveness, the North Koreans still ask Li Rusong to continue the offensive. I definitely don't think it's just a lack of heart.Their mentality is completely that as long as North Korea can be recovered as soon as possible, they don't feel sorry for how many other people's children die. Before I wrote here, at least twice, I couldn't continue to write, and I couldn't write for a long time. I didn't write a word for a long time.Because my mind was so chaotic, I didn't know how to write or how to express my feelings clearly. Looking at the text on the pages of historical materials, I seemed to see the scene after the fierce war in Pyongyang-the wounded soldiers of the Ming army were everywhere in the ice and snow, and the heavy snow and rain fell on their cold armor. They had nothing to eat and were dying. In the muddy water beside the sleeping road, life is maintained by will.The eyes of these good men and iron-blooded men who are far away from home are full of the light of struggling to survive.This scene is so real, I feel like I am in it, as long as I reach out, I can touch their bony, injured and hungry bodies. But at the same time, I felt extremely illusory, and my heart was filled with a strong sense of powerlessness.Because I can only watch them struggle with injuries and hunger, and even die in the end, but I can't change anything, even a little bit-this is history. History cannot be changed.This once made me feel so helpless and powerless. When I finally finished writing this paragraph, I began to really feel a sense of mission—writing history, can’t change history, but can tell people today what history is like and what happened in our history , there is something we should not and must not forget, some things and some people we must remember and respect - such as these men who left or did not leave their names in history, these four hundred years The Chinese backbones outside the former Yuanshou country. Please always remember them. In the retreat of the Ming army, in addition to the factors of military horses, personnel injuries, and logistical supplies, Li Rusong's withdrawal of the main force to Pyongyang also had another important military consideration.Half of this consideration is for myself, and half is for the good of the North Koreans. President Xiaonishi's First Legion and several other legions are now huddled in Seoul.But don't forget, on the other side of Hamgyong Road, there is also a hungry wolf named Kato Kiyomasa entrenched. After Kato Kiyomasa's Second Army conquered Hamgyong-do last year, they took the medicine of regret one by one.Although he captured the two princes of North Korea and touched the territory of Ming Dynasty, it is a pity that these false names did not bring him any more benefits.Hamgyong Province is the most barren and coldest territory in North Korea. It is winter, and it is very far from the rear. There are Korean rebels everywhere. The life of the Second Army here is miserable.So he was in pain and happy all the way. Happiness was because he walked the farthest, leaving the drug dealer far behind; pain was because life was hard, very hard. Zheng Wenfu and Li Pengshou, the leaders of the two volunteers, fought three consecutive victories around Jizhou Prefecture in November of the 20th year of Wanli, known as the three victories of Beiguan.Although with the support of Kato Kiyomasa, the rebel army was finally repelled, but the price paid by the Japanese army was quite high.From then on, Kato gave up the idea of ​​controlling the whole territory of Hamgyong, and concentrated the main force near Jizhou, which is a little richer.Xian Jingdao has now become a piece of bone in the mouth of the Second Army, which is a pity to discard. On December 20, the 20th year of Wanli, Seoul judged that Hamgyongdo had lost the meaning of sticking to it, and Ishida Mitsunari sent someone to notify Kato Kiyomasa to retreat back to Seoul.After receiving the order, Kato Kiyomasa happily began to pack his luggage, gradually shrinking the line of defense, and retreated from Jizhou along the coast to the south in the direction of Hamhung. On January 28, the 21st year of Wanli, the Second Army officially left Jizhou, and Kato Kiyomasa soon became unhappy.As soon as the Second Army came out of Jizhou, they began to flee eastward from Duanchuan, Xinchang, and Beiqing under the constant pursuit of the rebels and the heavy snow, making this road home a very miserable march.On the way, people kept falling behind or freezing to death, and the people around didn't bother to give a helping hand.This is a world of difference from the high spirits of the Second Army Corps when they entered Hamgyong Road. Kato Kiyomasa and Nabeshima Naoshige arrived in Hamhung on February 17. At this time, the casualty rate of the Second Army Corps exceeded 40%. Hamhung is a very sensitive place. It is located in the east of the Hamhung Plain, on the left bank of the lower reaches of the Seongcheon River, and is only separated from Pyongan Road by a mountain.If Kato Kiyomasa is interested, he can easily go south from the Grassland Hall ninety miles east of Hamhung, cross the mountain pass, drive quickly along the valley path, and enter Dewon and Yangde, which are based on Pyongan Road, and appear in Pyongyang City. north. At that time, Kato Kiyomasa can choose to attack the Anzhou grain and grass accumulation area of ​​the Ming and Korean coalition forces, and cut off the supply line of the Ming army, or cooperate with the Japanese army in Seoul to exert pressure on Pyongyang and Kaesong at the same time.No matter which one you choose, it will be fatal to the Ming and North Korean coalition forces. Regardless of whether Kato Kiyomasa had considered this, as the supreme commander of China and North Korea at that time, Li Rusong could not ignore this possibility.Such things are too common in wars. There is a 99% chance that one thing will not happen, but if there is an exception of 1%, it may lead to the annihilation of the entire army.He can't take that 1% risk.Moreover, this possibility is not 1%, but very large, quite large.As long as the Japanese army in Seoul and the Second Army contacted, they could immediately attack Pyongyang from front to back.In any case, Pyongyang cannot afford to lose, so when he attacked Seoul, he still left two-thirds of his troops in Pyongyang and Kaesong, and the maximum number of troops crossing the river was only 11,000.The reason for this is, of course, that there is not enough food and grass for the army to advance, and the other is that he must always guard against the attack of the Second Japanese Army from the rear. When the North Koreans later questioned Li Rusong’s withdrawal, Li Rusong also explained his concerns to the North Koreans: “Get rid of the thieves in Hamgyong first to avoid the danger of invasion, and then enter Wangjing.” It was handed over to the North Korean army to protect it.However, his consideration, which was not unfounded, was ridiculed by the North Koreans. They said that since the defeat of the Bidouguan, Admiral Li "has made many mistakes, and his momentum has frustrated him, and he wants to withdraw." This is just an excuse for him to retreat. Regrettably, Song Yingchang revealed in his letters to Yuan and Liu, the two chiefs of staff and other officials, that the Ming army had decided to divide its troops into two divisions since Pyongyang, one was stationed in Kaesong along the river, and the other was guarding平壤防止加藤清正背后袭击，此事显然不是如朝鲜人说的那样，是李如松在碧蹄馆被吓破胆了。同时他与李如松更是早早认识到，前方日军将大大超过此刻在朝明军的总兵力，因此两人一而再、再而三地一直向国内兵部催发援军，希望先借点辽军来增援，并催促应到未到的五千川军等部队尽快入朝。宋应昌在平壤大战前后，几乎每封给兵部和石星的信里都要反复催兵，确切地说，不是几乎，而是一定。 后来加藤清正终于没动平安道的心思，直接返回了汉城，这让朝鲜人笑得更厉害了：“看吧，李大提督又在杞人忧天”——这些都是事后诸葛亮。事实上，正是因为李如松及时收缩，才让加藤清正感觉无机可乘，才老老实实返回汉城。这是一因一果的关系。 对李如松的及时回军，宋应昌的评价最准确：欲使咸镜之贼，闻先声而不敢来也。 " 更讽刺的是，别看朝鲜人嘲笑李如松不遗余力，其实最担心加藤清正袭击平壤的，正是他们自己。 早在二月四日，平安岛左防御使李镒便有飞报入朝，说加藤清正撤到了咸兴，有南下平安道的打算，并警告说凭借朝廷在平安道北侧的防守兵力，根本抵挡不住。 对于这个心腹之患，朝鲜国王李昖害怕得不得了。他们在伊川、谷川附近没有任何驻军，如果加藤清正打算在这里动手，朝鲜军将没有任何防备。 他害怕自己会被偷袭，所以无论宋应昌和大臣们如何催促，这位国王打死也不肯驻回平壤，宁可在义州多呆两天。李昖后来被人催得急了，总算说了实话：“北贼未灭，如在人背，万一逾岭向西，与京城之贼相为犄角，截天兵之后，天兵前后受敌，此危道也，而我乃轻入其中，不可也。” 看看，李昖对加藤清正怕成这副样子，连平壤都不敢进，却还有余力嘲笑李如松的稳重用兵。其实嘲笑李如松胆小还是其次，更关键问题是李朝君臣们很清楚地知道，加藤清正“万一逾岭向西，与京城之贼相为犄角，截天兵之后，天兵前后受敌，此危道也”，这是会要大家命的，所以坚决不肯“轻入其中”。那么，明军轻入其中就可以了么？在碧蹄馆大战之后，李朝君臣依然要求李如松不回防，要他继续前进拿下汉城，这是什么心态？ 看看，李昖对加藤清正怕成这副样子，连平壤都不敢进，却还有余力嘲笑李如松的稳重用兵。其实嘲笑李如松胆小还是其次，更关键问题是李朝君臣们很清楚地知道，加藤清正“万一逾岭向西，与京城之贼相为犄角，截天兵之后，天兵前后受敌，此危道也”，这是会要大家命的，所以坚决不肯“轻入其中”。那么，明军轻入其中就可以了么？在碧蹄馆大战之后，李朝君臣依然要求李如松不回防，要他继续前进拿下汉城，这是什么心态？ 在许多历史书中，都把碧蹄馆之后的李如松描绘成是一个怯懦、胆小如鼠的将军，说他白白舍弃了大好局面，没有鼓起剩勇追赶穷寇，反而一味退缩避战，以致战事蹉跎。 事实上只要多看看三方史料，再看看朝鲜地图和三军部署，就可以很清楚地发现，在平壤大胜光辉掩盖之下的，是马疫遍地横行和极端缺衣少食，明军和辽东集团军因此几乎丧失了大半机动能力和战斗力，更兼春雨连绵，道路翻浆，前方有至少一倍于己的敌军驻守在坚城内，还有一支强大的敌主力军团在侧后方虎视眈眈，无论天时、地利、人和均不在明军这边。在如此“大好局面”之下，假如李如松按照朝鲜人的心愿强行突进，饥肠辘辘地冲到汉城之下，下场不用说天知道，我用脚指头想也知道——全军覆灭。 现在我们知道，碧蹄馆之役的胜负，无论在战略上还是战术上，抑或是在壬辰战争史上，都不会改变什么，这只是一场胜败完全无足轻重的遭遇战，除非李如松阵亡，否则其胜负不会影响明军之后任何动向。 李如松轻军突进快速进击汉城，当然有争功的因素在内，但究其关键，一是因朝鲜方面提供的日军数量情报完全失实，与汉城日军实际兵力的差异几乎是一个天上一个地下，客观上导致了他没做太多准备就轻率突进。不过，这依然不是他突进的主要原因。李如松突进的最主要的原因，我认为就因明军没吃的了，他迫切地需要拿下汉城来解决明军的吃饭问题，更确切地说是他看上了龙山仓的粮食，这才是他不顾明军伤病交加缺吃少穿也要冒险，试图以少数兵力快速拿下汉城的真正原因。 同时，来自侧翼已抵达咸兴的加藤清正二军团的威胁，及明军粮草严重不足和马匹大量病疫的严峻现实，也使得李如松当时最好的选择，只能是带着当时战斗力最强、机动力最高的亲兵团突进，快速抢夺汉城。李如松无法带着没吃饱饭甚至连路都走不动的庞大军团去抢汉城，一是根本不可能，仅到临津明军就被足足饿了两天，在如此糟糕的后勤状况下，三万多明军根本用不着到汉城，在半路就得饿死一大批；二是即使以大兵团抢下了汉城，只要龙山仓没拿下，大伙也还是得饿死在那里。 同时，我们从碧蹄馆之战的记录中也可以发现，明军的攻城重火力远没有运送到位，而前锋清一色的骑兵，也从侧面说明了李如松能做的，只能是以骑兵快速突袭拿下汉城和龙山仓，他没有能力也没可能进行耗时日久的攻城战。明军既没有那么多的给养，朝鲜也没这个运输能力把那么多火炮快速运上去，更无可能聚集起足够的攻城兵力。 因此以少量兵力带口粮前进，在最短时间内拿下汉城和龙山仓，解决了后继军团的吃饭问题以后，临津江以东的李如柏军团再进驻汉城，这才是一个真正的优秀指挥官的正确选择。 遗憾的是，李如松抢夺汉城，尤其是夺取龙山仓的这个希望破灭了。我想，他自己也应该很清楚这是一次冒险，但却又是一场他不得不冒的险。碧蹄馆一战后，李如松知道，前面那个朝鲜人说没几个日军的汉城，驻扎着至少五、六万日军主力兵团，这绝不是目前三万多没吃没喝的明军能拿下的。而明军的辎重补状况给显然又不可能在短期内得到改善，因此他只能无奈地转入了战略防守，被迫彻底放弃以武力攻占汉城的计划。 不过，李如松对龙山仓的欲望并没有因此减少哪怕一丁点，反而因此更加炽热起来。犹如一个失恋的少年，他原本迫切想得到龙山仓的那股渴望，变成了求之不得后的怨念。不久之后这股怨念终于爆发出来，遂了李如松我得不到你也别想要的心愿，还意外地解救了一位此后将在朝鲜战场上大放光彩的朝鲜名将。 有意思的是，宋应昌在给明使沈思贤的信中，也直接问到了汉城的龙山粮仓可烧否，和李如松打起了一样的念头，可谓英雄所见略同。当然，这也是当时形势下解除汉城日军威胁的最好战术——让他们和明军一样，断粮。 我想，不管李如松自己在当时、此后做何想和有什么表现，他都肯定没想到以后的史家们会对碧蹄馆这次遭遇战如此关注，并把此战的结果给拔到了这样一个高度，把这战的结果和他本人的态度，以及明军此后的战略变更给联系到了一起，并最后给他扣上了一顶怯弱的帽子，认为此战摧破了李大提督的心志，让他萌生了退意。 这就是李如松以及当时的明军参战将领们，包括当时的明朝文官们都没对碧蹄馆之役留下太多笔墨，也不怎么在意的原因。 并不是所有的进攻都是勇敢的；同样，并不是所有的退却都是怯懦的。 但又为什么在史料中，我们看不到在退兵问题上李如松对朝鲜人不着重提粮草问题，不公开说这一系列困难呢？ 但又为什么在史料中，我们看不到在退兵问题上李如松对朝鲜人不着重提粮草问题，不公开说这一系列困难呢？ 事实上这当然不可能的。无论是杨元还是李如松，抑或宋应昌都在不断地向朝鲜人提这一问题。这关系到明军数万将士的性命，焉能不提。然而，朝鲜方面力主明军和日军决战的中坚分子们，因为异口同声地把李如松退回开城一线的原因，归结为是他在碧蹄馆被日本人打怕了，所以在他们的记载里，大多绝口不提这个原因。也只有这样，才能把脏水泼到李如松身上去。 譬如柳成龙和李如松在退兵前发生的争吵中，李如松就绝无可能不谈这个要命的问题，他又不是傻子。可在柳成龙笔记里，却完全看不到一点痕迹，这显然不符合常识。出现这种情况，除了之前所说的问题外，另一个重要原因，那就是柳成龙本人正是朝鲜方面负责运输和提供粮草的，他也不傻，当然也不会说自己工作没做好，主动露自己的短板。于是在他笔下的李如松，就只能是一付全然理亏而又怯懦的模样。这无疑是他对李如松退兵异常不满的怨念在作怪，因此极力把李如松描绘成了这个样子，好显得他正义凛然。 不过即使这样，在其它那么多私人笔记甚至朝鲜正史中，还是留下了我们前面挖出来的那些零碎资料，能让我们替李如松一洗蒙了几百年的冤。事实终究是事实，是怎么样都掩盖不住的。 比如《宣祖实录》曾经记录下一段朝鲜君臣对话，很具代表性： 上曰:“賊情則然矣,天將之欲和者,何意耶?”元翼曰:“碧蹄一敗之後,畏縮如是。”上曰:“自古,兵家勝敗,不可常也。豈以一跌而如是也?” ……………… 上曰:“天朝糧餉,不用故耶?”元翼曰:“天朝糧餉亦用,亦留兵粍食者,幾一萬六七千,往來之數不在此中。所以難繼也。”上曰:“予意提督雖進,似無可爲。其軍不滿三萬,雖進何能爲也?”元翼曰:“天將亦言其如此,謂曰:'兵少而能有濟耶?不量而請戰,眞是癡朝鮮也。'” 可见朝鲜人自己对于补给问题的短板心知肚明，更知道明军缺乏进攻能力的情况，只不过他们还是坚决认为李如松是“畏缩”，这其中心态，可堪捉摸。 二则是无论是对李如松以及宋应昌来说，没粮草最多就是在临津江一线呆着，等粮草补给上来，战马补充完了再开战就是。宋应昌和李如松又不是朝鲜君臣，他们是明军的大帅和经略，完全不介意朝鲜晚几年解放，他们两人最介意的是明军的伤亡。不过这话，他们是绝对不会对朝鲜人说的。 所以粮草问题提过就可以了，反正大家心里明白，用不着多说。至于其它的，恐怕李如松根本不在乎，随便找个理由搪塞过去就成。我觉得他当时的心态，很可能是老子给你个理由就不错了，哪怕不给理由都没什么，你们能怎么样。因此张世爵当着他面殴打李薲，除了明军将士们因为缺吃少吃病困交加而普遍满腹怨愤之外，很可能也是李如松暗示的。以他那骄横的性格，在国内就敢殴打同僚文官，何况是朝鲜官吏。柳成龙自己工作没做好，居然还敢和他当面叫板，那么让手下给对方点教训这事，他完全干得出来。反正打了也是白打，还可以不再和朝鲜人扯皮，打得好。 至于他在退兵时对朝鲜人耍的一系列手腕，如果真的有这些情节，那么我觉得很大一部分原因和当初祖承训兵败回撤时一样，生怕朝鲜人给他捣乱。譬如万一朝鲜人不知进退甚至故意使坏，乘他及明军还在坡州时，直接向汉城开战，那么明军势必只能和出动的日军决一死战，这类情况是李如松绝不愿意愿意看见的。不过李如松也很清楚，只要他大军开到平壤，没了明军撑腰，这几位朝鲜官员就绝不敢去招惹日本人。In fact, it is true. 再一个可能，就是这些是朝鲜人的屈笔。因为只要故意不提他退兵的理由，不用说其他的，单单李如松转身就走的这个行为，就足以让人觉得他是因为胆子小逃跑了。这个可能性，在我们看来是最大的。因为事实上，朝鲜人这个“辨诬”策略非常成功，几百年来九成九的人都说李如松在碧蹄馆之后退兵，是因为被日本人打破了胆，他们和柳成龙们一样，几乎一致忽视了明军因粮草不足而陷入的惨烈现状，更别说还有侧后一支敌主力军团的窥视和正面几乎一倍于明军的日军了。 可怜的李大提督，从宁夏战场下来还没来得及喘口气，就风尘仆仆赶到异国他乡的朝鲜，一路前进冲到平壤城下，神机妙算身先士卒，仅仅两天半就拿下了平壤坚城。孤军远征悬兵海外，以伤亡三千的代价，杀死杀伤敌军一万多，强攻敌人大军防守的都城一战而下，这在军事史上都可以大书特书一笔了。 碧蹄馆一战，他依然身先士卒，冲锋在前撤退在后，以三千骑兵对日本战国名将统帅的三、四万精锐，与五倍于己的敌军直接交战，部队在野战中坚持了数个时辰不溃，最后以伤亡千余的代价杀伤三千以上日军，重创对手后全身而退。以这两战的表现，称李如松和他所部为亚洲第一强军都一点不过分。 两次战斗，明军总计伤亡四千灭敌万五，在这个数字中，明军死亡不过两千，日军死亡则超过了一万，上限能到一万二、三，如果以死亡数来算战损比的话，高达到一比五至一比六。不夸张地说，这两次战斗明军杀伤的日军数目，在日本国内足以让一个百万石的大名灭国。 如此优秀的一位军事统帅，被一群文人的屈笔抹黑成这样，并足足蒙冤了几百年，真叫人哭笑不得。 在这里要解释一下。Jia Ding is a special military organization that appeared in the middle and late Ming Dynasty. It is an armed group controlled by generals through means of concealment, private service, and recruitment.这些家丁有的名义上属于官军编制，虽然从朝廷开饷，却只听命于将领本人，因为这类家丁大都领有将领给的土地或田产。当将领转任其他地区的时候，这种家丁也被允许跟随，实际上等同于将领的私人部队。像李如松部下的李有升，就是这类。而李如松的老爹李成梁，更是有个大家都熟悉的家丁，那就是清开国汗王努尔哈赤。而明军中也有不少将领是家丁出身，如李宁、李平胡等人原本也是李成梁的家丁。不过，这类家丁是极少部分。 另外还有一种家丁，他们不属于军中编制，但也领有将领们分给的土地或者田产等等。这种家丁不少是少数民族，尤其是辽东将领的家丁，大多为蒙古、女真等游牧民族壮丁，弓马娴熟骁勇善战。 再就是临时招募的家丁。这种家丁本质上属于职业雇佣军，如宋应昌在如朝前给杨元的信中说，要他和其他将领多多招募辽东家丁，“每名给安家银六两，每月月粮银一两八钱。调动之日再给行粮、盐菜、马匹料草。如有事故不必勾取，患平即散，不作正数。”不过实际上，往往这种家丁也是长期跟随将领们的，只不过朝廷给钱，将领们就招他们前来，不给就不招而已。 ... 再把明军撤退时损失的人数考虑进去，是役明军伤亡当在一千余人左右，再怎么多也不可能超过吴惟珊所说的一千五。不过，这些伤亡将士，大多是李如松以下诸将的亲信家丁，辽东军的精华。 李如松说的阵亡家丁两人，明军二百六十四人，很可能汇报的是在编部队的伤亡情况，他和李如柏、张世爵、李宁、孙守廉、祖承训等人不在编的家丁损失未计在内。 在这一战中，辽东将领们带了大批家丁。辽东诸将的家丁，在十二月初九宋应昌催兵时曾有过统计，其云当时未到各将家丁人数为：副将杨元并原任游击戚金下家丁共六百八十二名；见任副总兵李如柏下家丁二百四十五名；原任副总兵祖承训下家丁一百二十三名。另外于正月的统计里，说李宁所部有辽东正兵及家丁一千一百八十九人，其他人的家丁数不明。 以此计算，则光是杨元、李如柏、祖承训三人的家丁就有一千零五十人，其他还有李如松带的数十到一百余人，李宁、李如梅、张世爵、查大受、孙守廉等人家丁也没有具体数字，但可以肯定的是，他们每人的家丁都不会少于百人，因此我认为此战的家丁总计在一千五百到两千人左右。换句话说，即使刨去杨元的家丁，最开始的三千明军里也大约有一半是家丁。 这些家丁里，像李有升这种属于军中编制的是少数，大部分是没有编制的。这些不在编的家丁，如宋应昌所说，“患平即散，不作正数”，本就不算在编制内，自然也谈不上呈报伤亡数字。这里还有另一事要注意，即这些不在编的家丁的伤亡抚恤，是要由将领自己掏腰包的。如宋应昌安抚杨元时曾说，你在平壤一战阵亡的六名家丁，可以报上名来，我想办法给你破格存恤。这“破格”二字，说明这些家丁伤亡，按例朝廷是不管的。李如松心疼家丁伤亡，除个人感情外，这也是一个很大的原因。 不过这么一来，阵亡人数就显然不是报给朝廷的两百六十四人了，那里面的家丁只有两个，是李有升这种有编制的。其他没编制的都没计算在内，这也确实没必要计算。一是按例不计，二是写上去了也领不到抚恤，白写。 这一战的大多记载中多少都强调了明军家丁，原因我想无外两个：要么家丁骁勇过于常人，要么家丁数量众多。但无论那个原因，都可得到家丁伤亡极可能比在编士兵大的结论。如果按在编人员死亡两百六十四人计算，而三千人中有一半家丁，那么此战明军战死人数当倍于战报，大约为五百三十人到六百人左右。如果加上受伤的，明军总伤亡应该在一千人左右。 ... 最后顺便说说咸镜道威胁的解除。 把加藤清正这股威胁解决掉的人，不是朝鲜任何一支部队和将领，依然是明军，准确地说是明军的总参谋长袁黄。 袁黄已经把朝鲜局势研究透了。他仔细地分析了整个战略态势与加藤清正的性格后，准确地判断出第二军团在咸镜道的尴尬地位：加藤清正现在又想占个便宜，又想早日脱离苦海，首鼠两端，左右摇摆，自己都无法作出决断。 袁黄不介意帮加藤清正下一个决心。 他请示过宋应昌之后，派了麾下一位策士冯仲缨，面授机宜，带了十几个人直奔咸镜道。 已经被吓破了胆的朝鲜人根本不相信这十来个人能阻挡第二军团的兵锋，屡屡提出质疑，对此冯仲缨解释道：“用兵诡道。平壤城刚刚被攻克，倭寇完全不清楚我军虚实。咸镜道那些人现在胆战心惊，怕大明怕得要命，十几个人足以唬住他们了。” 结果日军的反应不出袁黄所料。当听说明军派来使者谈判时，加藤清正以下的日军将领个个笑逐颜开，忙不迭地在安边扫洒馆舍，准备热情接待。 冯仲缨是个有胆量的人，他在二月二十五日到了安边以后，把其他人留在外围，自己单骑赴会，独闯倭营。加藤清正等人没想到他一个人来，不由得感叹说公万骑之中单骑入来，可谓唐突。冯仲缨没跟加藤清正废话，劈头就把他训斥了一顿，加藤清正居然不敢回嘴，唯唯诺诺。 在接下来的会谈中，冯仲缨告诉加藤清正两个很重要的信息： 第一个信息是明军在北境的动向：明军已经从平壤抽调了一部分南兵炮手，又从第二批入朝明军中分出万人，协助李镒防御平安道。李如松提督也已提兵返回平壤。 第二个信息，小西行长一直在跟大明暗通款曲要求封贡。 这两个信息对加藤清正的刺激相当大。第一条信息，让他彻底绝了偷袭平壤的念头；第二条信息，让他更迫切地早日返回汉城，免得被药贩子抢功。 袁黄虽然对日本国情不甚了了，可对这种二士争功的套路，可见得太多了，稍微一撩拨，便能起到离间之效。 冯仲缨分析完局势，加藤清正赶紧把自己的团花战袍脱下来，给冯仲缨披上，跟他歃血为盟，发誓早日返回王京，好重启谈判。临到告别，他还把两位被俘的朝鲜王子叫出来，跟冯仲缨见了一面，报个平安以示诚意。 冯仲缨一看加藤清正从善如流，便多加勉励了几