Chapter 65 Section 18 Looting, Killing, and Destruction

When Zhang Xianzhong and Li Zicheng appear in history books, they are always preceded by the word "rogue".People at the time concluded: "Xianzhong and others attacked in Yan'an Prefecture, Shaanxi, and spread throughout the provinces. They looked at the house to eat, and they kept running. They never used the city as their nest, so they are called bandits." There is nothing wrong with this summary.From the third year of Chongzhen (AD 1630) to the seventeenth year of Chongzhen (AD 1644), Zhang Xianzhong spent a full fourteen years of a veritable "rogue" career.In the past 14 years, Zhang's troops have flown back and forth at high speed in Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, and Huguang provinces, spanning tens of thousands of miles, constantly attacking, fleeing, and moving, and never sticking to one place.

The purpose of the movement is twofold, one is to avoid the pursuit of the officers and soldiers, and the other is to "grain", that is, to plunder property to feed the troops.The day when they captured a city was their festival. They plundered their troops, wiped out the rich and powerful families, and returned with a full load.When the officers and soldiers pursued closely, they sneaked into the mountains and endured hard times.All their energies are focused on escaping and making a living, and over time, they go from a bunch of rabble to experts in guerrilla warfare.Their actions were erratic, fighting and leaving, interspersed back and forth among the siege of the officers and soldiers, the waves were magnificent, full of thrills, and extremely exciting.

Mobile combat is a fighting method commonly used by those famous insurgents in Chinese history. From the Huangchao Uprising at the end of Tang Dynasty to the early period of Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, this was the case.To a certain extent, this is the inevitable law of peasant uprising wars.Because at the beginning of the uprising, there was a huge gap between the peasant army and the official army in many aspects. The first is logistics.The soldiers and horses did not move, but the food and grass went first.The role of logistics in war is crucial.The officers and soldiers have strong logistical support, as well as military salaries extracted by the empire through the state machine.Due to the limited quality of the peasant army, even if it occupies a vast territory, it is unable to establish a bureaucratic team with basic management capabilities in a short period of time, and provide them with logistics through taxation.Their logistics supply can only rely on "robbing".The first advantage of mobile operations is that there is no need for logistical preparations.

During the flow, the peasant army grabbed wherever it went, "swimming from east to west for thousands of miles".In this case, the base area is just a burden to them. Although the regular army has the advantage of logistics resources, it is also severely restricted by logistics.Logistical organization and transportation need a process, so naturally there is no "grab" to come quickly.Zhang Fengyi, who served as Minister of the Ministry of War in the Ming Dynasty, summed up the experience and lessons of fighting the peasant army, saying: "Wherever the bandits and soldiers arrive, they will be full of food because of me. Wherever our soldiers arrive, we need to wait for food and grass. You will be embarrassed." Through mobile operations, the Peasant Army turned its logistical disadvantage into an advantage in speed.

In addition to logistical factors, in terms of numbers, weapons and equipment, technical literacy, etc., the rebel army is often at a disadvantage of the official army.They are usually unable to conduct large-scale positional warfare with the official army, so guerrilla warfare has become their inevitable choice when confronting the official army.In the face of a powerful official army, the magic weapon for the peasant army to win is the indeterminate separation and combination, and the impermanence of haunting and haunting.Their combat policy is nothing more than "when the enemy comes, we will go; if the enemy advances, we will retreat; if the enemy is stationed, we will disturb; if the enemy is tired, we will pursue."

From this perspective, mobile combat is the last choice of the peasant army.However, on the other hand, this way of fighting also has its own irresistible charm.Mobile combat is exhilarating and addictive.Luo Ru, who has fought side by side with Zhang Xianzhong for a long time, has a famous saying: "We are happy to run rampant in the world, why (necessary) to specialize (occupy a piece of territory)?" Mao Zedong made an accurate analysis of "rogue thought".He said: "This kind of thinking is manifested in: first, unwilling to do hard work to establish a base area, establish the political power of the people, and thereby expand political influence, but only want to use mobile guerrilla methods to expand political influence. Second, to expand the Red Army, Instead of taking the route of expanding the local Red Guards and the local Red Army to expand the main force of the Red Army, we must follow the route of "recruiting soldiers and buying horses" and "recruiting surrender and accepting rebels". Third, I am impatient to fight hard with the masses, and only hope to go to big cities to fight Eat and drink."

Zhang Xianzhong's department is exactly like this.In the first ten years of the uprising, Zhang Xianzhong never seemed to have any intention of establishing a base.They are infatuated with this adventure and wandering. Every time Zhang Xianzhong's troops captured a city, the first thing they did was search and plunder.The key targets of raids are of course the rich and powerful, but ordinary people are not spared either.As described in the "Records of Zhang Xianzhong's Trapped in Luzhou" cited above, their main targets of raids were mules and horses, because this was the need to maintain a speed advantage in guerrilla warfare.The second plunder was gold and silver.However, the Ministry of Zhang implemented a strict policy of exchanging gold and silver with the public, so the soldiers were not very interested in gold and silver.The third looting was cloth, food and other logistical materials.

In Zhang Xianzhong's long uprising career, we only found a record of helping the victims once, that is, after the capture of Wuchang, he distributed gold and silver from the Chu Palace to the hungry people.In addition, there are more records of his burning, killing and looting in history. The difference between him and Li Zicheng is compared in history books like this: "The common people often open their doors to welcome Li Zicheng, but they only fear Zhang Xianzhong." Reading historical records, we can only get this feeling: these green forest heroes under Zhang Xianzhong's department seem to have been captured The city is the property in his pocket, and the people in the city are the prey he has hunted.How to deal with it depends entirely on your own needs.

Generally speaking, after collecting supplies, they would set fire to turn a prosperous city into rubble—they didn't want to leave the city that they took desperately to the Ming army intact. Yu Ruizi recorded that after Zhang Jun captured Shucheng, the capital of Luzhou, he "went into Shucheng to plunder people and accompanied him. When he saw the houses burned and bones everywhere, he was sad and wept. I think the same is true in my hometown."After burning the city, they also looted a large number of people to enrich their army. He recorded that Zhang Xianzhong's method of enriching the army was, "Go back to the camp, and the next day call out some of the men and women captured before and after each camp. Eight 'thieves' kiss outside the gate. First order the men, and divide them into upper, middle and lower classes. Stand everywhere, each with a flag. The same is true for women. Then match the top-class men with top-class women, and the middle and bottom are the same. Ask anyone who is willing to go home, and stand on the other side. Take a moment, and kill them together."

Looting, killing and destroying, this is the consistent practice of Zhang Xianzhong's department, and it is also the reason for their notoriety.When he retreated from Huguang before entering Sichuan this time, he was unwilling to occupy such a vast territory for the first time and gained nothing.The teams entering Shu were not only loaded with materials and treasures harvested from Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, but also walked with tens of thousands of Huguang civilians who had been forcibly conscripted into the army. "Badong County Chronicle" contains: "In February of the seventeenth year (AD 1644), Zhang Xianzhong drove the people of Jingzhou into Shu. Men and women supported each other and marched in file. It lasted for several months."

Zhang Xianzhong's army marched up the river. There were high mountains on both sides of the river. The mountain roads were rugged and treacherous, and the team was very long.In addition, the areas that they pass through are sparsely populated, it is difficult to "grain" and the supply of troops is difficult, and people continue to starve to death along the way. Of course, most of the starved to death are "Chu people" who were newly expelled into the army. "Wushan County Chronicles" recorded the tragic situation at that time: In Jiashenchun of Chongzhen, the "thief" Zhang Xianzhong drove all the Chu people into Sichuan, and the men and women in Chuzhong who were captured ate all the wheat seedlings and grass roots.Corpses littered the fields, the rivers were stinky, and there was not much left by the residents.