Chapter 4 2. Research on life price

In the ninth year of Xianfeng (1859), on the morning of September 18th of the lunar calendar, Emperor Xianfeng summoned Zhang Jixin, the chief envoy of Fujian (similar to the governor of Fujian Province) in Qingyinzhai, Yuquan Mountain, Beijing, and asked about the scene of the fighting in Fujian. The excerpts of the conversation are as follows: The emperor asked: "What is the situation of fighting with weapons?" Zhang replied: "...the big surnames bully the small surnames, and the small surnames are unwilling to be bullied. They correct dozens of small surnames and fight against the big ones."

The emperor asked: "Don't the local officials suppress it?" Zhang replied: "When I passed through Hui'an, I saw the fighting with weapons, and the army was very neat. The big surname was red flag, the small surname was white flag, guns, knives and spears, and equipment were available. When they heard the gold, they advanced, and when they saw the fire, they retreated. When the battle was in full swing , the official will prohibit the order, and will not obey it..." The emperor asked: "How will it end after the killing?" Zhang replied: "If the big surname kills twenty lives of the small surname, and the small surname only kills ten lives of the big surname, in addition to offsetting, according to the number, the life price must be demanded, and each other will be sued to the government..."

The emperor asked: "How much is the price per person?" Zhang replied: "I heard that the employer gave the dead relative thirty foreign dollars, and offered a tablet of loyalty and bravery in the ancestral hall." Here I see the term "life price" for the first time.The author also gave the exact price: thirty foreign dollars (Spanish silver dollars).In the 1850s, the average price of rice was 2.4 foreign dollars per stone, and the value of a human life was less than 1,800 catties of rice, which was only 2,000 yuan. The emperor's question shattered a beautiful myth.The so-called life is priceless, and the Confucian claim that human life is at stake does not conform to historical facts.There is a market for human life, and the emperor still inquires about the market.

From the perspective of self-assessment of the subject, it seems reasonable that life is priceless: nothing is as valuable as one's own life, and when people are dead, what are the things people use?Still, even from this narrow perspective, human life has a price.Today's AIDS is probably the most telling example.As long as they can afford expensive drugs, AIDS patients can live their lives to the fullest. In this sense, people who die of AIDS are because they cannot afford their own lives.The price of his life depends on his willingness to pay, but also on his ability to pay. Once you step out of the perspective of self-evaluation and enter the field of history and social practice, the price of life will show a huge difference.The price of life reflects the exchange relationship between human life and survival resources.

After realizing the existence of the price of life, I found that the ancients understood it very well, and even gave the official price in the form of law long ago. In the twelfth year of Yongzheng in the Qing Dynasty (1734), the Ministry of Household Affairs (Ministry of Finance) and the Ministry of Punishment (similar to the Ministry of Justice) asked the emperor for approval, and promulgated the price of redemption for capital crimes for people with different identities: three grades and above officials, 12,000 taels of silver; Fourth-rank officials, five thousand taels of silver; fifth- and sixth-rank officials, four thousand taels of silver; below seventh-rank officials, Jinshi and Juren, two thousand five hundred taels of silver.There are two thousand taels for tribute students and supervisors, and one thousand two hundred taels for ordinary people.

The Ming Dynasty can also redeem the death penalty, but it must meet the conditions of redemption, including considerations such as age, gender, official status, and support for the elderly. "Da Ming Law · Ming Li" stipulates that the ransom price for the death penalty is 42 copper coins.When the "Law of Ming Dynasty" was formulated, this amount of money was equivalent to 42 taels of silver.It is roughly equivalent to a year's salary of a seventh-rank county magistrate. Judging from the numbers, the life price of the Ming Dynasty was much cheaper than that of the Qing Dynasty. In fact, the purchasing power of silver in the Qing Dynasty was often less than one-third of that of the Ming Dynasty, so it should be discounted by 30% when calculating the life price.In addition, the economy of the Qing Dynasty was more prosperous than that of the Ming Dynasty, people's ability to pay was stronger, and life should be more expensive.Finally, if you recall the market price that Emperor Xianfeng inquired, you will find that the official price is much higher than the market price. The 30 foreign dollars offered by Fujian folks can only be exchanged for 21 taels of silver.

The Ming Dynasty was not the first to redeem life with money.The customary law of the Jurchens who established the Kingdom of Jin stipulated that "thirty horses and cows are paid for killing people."Going forward, during the period of Emperor Hui of the Han Dynasty, the people were guilty, and they had to buy 30 ranks to avoid capital punishment.Life is redeemable, as is other bodily harm.If Sima Qian's family was rich, he would be exempted from imperial punishment, but "the family is poor, and bribes are not enough to redeem himself." The use of money to redeem sins and even lives can be traced back to the Yao and Shun era. In "Shangshu Shundian", there is a saying that "gold is used as a ransom".The penalty for redemption can range from ink punishment to imperial punishment to death penalty, but it must meet the condition of "suspicious crime"-the conviction is suspicious.

The most complete data on life value grades that I have seen come from the "Sixteen Laws" during the Karma regime in Tibet (Kama Tengyong Wangbu, reigned from 1632 to 1642), and the period of the fifth Dalai Lama (early Qing Dynasty). ) of the Thirteen Laws.The law divides the price of life into three grades and nine grades. The highest grade is "priceless", or gold equivalent to one's body; the lowest grade is only worth a straw rope: The king of Tibet and other supreme rulers (priceless. The "Sixteen Laws" stipulates that the price of a superior life is the same amount of gold as the body)

Good teachers, trainers, monastery stewards, high officials Middle-level officials, monks [the lamas of Dratsang, monks, government officials with more than 300 servants, etc. (the life price is 200 taels)] Ordinary officials, bed servants, officials' servants [knights belonging to Zhongke, deacons of temples, masters, etc. (life price 140 to 150 taels)] Mid-level civil servant [Zaba of a small monastery (life price fifty to seventy taels)] Commoner [secular aristocrats (life price thirty to forty taels)] [Unemployed celibate, servant of the government (life price thirty taels)] [Blacksmiths, butchers, and beggars who live and pay taxes (twenty taels of life)]

Women, vagabonds, beggars, butchers, blacksmiths (the life price is one straw rope, the "Sixteen Laws" stipulates that the life price of the lower class is ten taels.) This set of laws not only stipulates the price of life, but also stipulates the "blood price" - five sense organs or limbs are injured and disabled, and the injured person must compensate the victim one-third or one-fourth of the life price of the level to which the victim belongs according to the specific circumstances. One or one fifth. From the above figures, it can be seen that the price of life in Tibetan areas in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties was higher than that of the Ming Dynasty and lower than that of the Qing Dynasty.It is worth noting that the words "priceless" appear here.We know that this is the subject's sense of self-assessment.The law expresses this feeling, precisely who makes the law.However, self-evaluation is self-evaluation. World historical experience proves that the life of the supreme ruler is not priceless. In 1533, the Spanish colonist Pizarro imprisoned the Inca king Atahualpa. The two parties agreed that the ransom for the king's life would be a large sum of gold and silver, and the gold and silver should be piled up to a height within reach in the cell.The cell is about 7 meters long and 5 meters wide. It is said that more than 13,000 pounds of gold and 26,000 pounds of silver have been accumulated.This is the life price of the Inca king.By the way, after Pizarro got the gold and silver, he executed King Atahualpa in the same way, but changed the burning to hang.This is a one-shot deal, and it is difficult to retaliate without keeping promises.

How to treat the huge price difference of the official price?In the eyes of contemporary people, aren't laws and regulations that imply the concept of unequal human life abhorrent?It depends on how you say it.First- and second-rank corrupt officials commit capital crimes, and the statutory ransom is 12,000 taels of silver. If you insist on "same crime as the people", you can redeem your life with 1,200 taels of silver. Isn't it connivance for big corrupt officials to commit crimes?Senior officials at the first level of governors in the Qing Dynasty legally received 10,000 taels of silver every year, which was enough to redeem eight lives.Conversely, ordinary people earn 22 taels of silver a year and need 12,000 taels of ransom, so this regulation is useless.People's ability to pay for their own lives is indeed different, and their willingness to pay is also different. In fact, the price of life cannot be the same.The Qing Dynasty set different prices according to these differences, and whether to buy or not was voluntary. Compared with the one-size-fits-all policy of the Ming Dynasty, it should be a progress that faces reality squarely. In fact, contemporary life prices are not the same.The same death in a traffic accident, in practice, the compensation for farmers is often less than half of that for urban residents.The price difference in the United States is not small. After the 9.11 incident, it is said that the compensation method for the victims determined by the federal compensation fund is quite different: if the victim is a housewife, her husband and two children can receive 500,000 US dollars in compensation.Had the victim been a Wall Street broker, his widow and two children would have received $4.3 million.The disparity has prompted outcry from the families of many victims, and the U.S. government has been forced to promise to change the way compensation is paid out.But then again, it really needs to be revised, should it lower the life price of Wall Street brokers, or increase the life price of housewives?Brokers may earn three to five million yuan a year, and the tax payment is also very high, which reduces the obvious mistreatment of family members.Increase the compensation for housewives to 4.3 million, and taxpayers will have another opinion: You might as well just take my life away. The most typical buying of life, that is, exchanging money for life, occurs in the transaction of kidnapping and redemption.Regarding this set of rules and its terminology, Mr. Cai Shaoqing wrote in "Bandits in the Republic of China": There is no unified regulation on the price of ransom tickets for bandits. It mainly depends on the financial situation of the victim's family, and it also varies with time and place.According to Army Major General Qian Xilin’s report in 1918, “Bandits in Shandong cost tens of thousands of yuan to ransom for ransom.” (Ministry of the Army Document 1011, 2, 269) This report basically reflected the real situation at that time . The Times also reported that in 1917, "Jiang Zhenqing, a salt merchant in Pu County, went to chat because of business, and was kidnapped by bandits halfway, claiming to redeem 60,000 yuan." (Times, September 14, 1917) In the same year, Mao Sizhong, a bandit from Shandong, captured Cao County and kidnapped three families and six people including Yang Xiru, a gentry. The families invited citizen Li Xiangchen as a representative of the six people to intercede with Mao Sizhong.Mao Sizhong said: "Rulai's loyalty is admirable. To see your face, I will deduct 10,000 yuan. After returning home, I will send 20,000 yuan in military expenses, and I will let six people go." (Times, September 11, 1917 ). Bandits in Shandong's fights for ransom later developed into looting everywhere. When they met someone, the ticket price was reduced to "three hundred yuan, more than one hundred yuan, ten yuan is enough, and even a hundred chickens for those who have no money to pay." Tickets can also be redeemed." (Times, September 1, 1923). The situation of bandits in Henan extorting tickets for ransom is similar to that in Shandong.Bandits in Luoyang actually threatened: "Both rich and poor are worth a pack of cigarettes instead of a pair of shoes." (Times, July 31, 1927) Kidnapping terms, in addition to the above, also include hanging sheep, receiving the God of Wealth, inviting pig heads, raising geese to lay eggs, ticket, meat ticket, frame ticket, kidnap ticket, new ticket, lottery ticket (for the rich), pawn ticket (for the poor), local ticket (Farmers), Flower Tickets (Women), Water Heads (Tickets), Pressing Water (Talkers), Calling Tickets (Narranging Tickets), Receiving Tickets (Redempting Meat Tickets), Watching Tickets (Take care of hostages), Box Office (Detention Where the meat tickets are located), box office head (the leader in charge of the box office), Ye Zi (the meat ticket), Ye Ziguan (the leader who guards the meat tickets), filter leaf (interrogation and torture of the meat tickets), tearing tickets (killing the hostages). Let's analyze this transaction in detail. First of all, the so-called buying life, such as buying the life of a child hostage, means that the child's life is in the hands of the bandits, and the child cannot control his own destiny.The bandits control the lives of the hostages, but they don't care about the life and death of the hostages, they only care about money.The relatives of the hostages care about the life and death of their children, not so much about money.Even if family affection is not counted and only money is counted, the cost of raising children and the children's future contribution to the family are still a considerable amount. For bandits, this figure is nothing more than the cost of kidnapping, guarding and feeding hostages. It's irrelevant.Valuing the same life so differently is the basis of the deal. Secondly, the ticket prices vary greatly, because the value of the meat ticket is indeed different-the willingness to pay and the ability to pay of the redeemed are different.This needs no explanation.However, this principle implies a logical deduction: when ordinary people are generally poor, kidnapping will gradually become unprofitable. We have seen that ticket prices have fallen to less than one-tenth of what they were ten years ago.At this time, the risk of being a bandit is still there, but the income may not be enough to make ends meet, so banditry can no longer be a bandit, and chaos may turn into chaos.The so-called extremes must be reversed.Another inference is: the so-called "eating the big family" and "robbing the rich and helping the poor" are also a kind of morality, but in fact it is a profitable business economically.Later, the competition was fierce, and the business was not easy to do, so it was necessary to eat from small accounts.Given the situation, it is unavoidable that if economic choices are considered moral choices, it would be both a whore and an archway. Thirdly, filtering leaves (interrogating and torturing meat tickets), calling tickets (negotiating ticket prices), these all belong to the pricing procedure, which is the process by which the kidnapper determines the payment ability of the redeemer.If there is an error in this aspect, if the transaction cannot be made, people will die. Finally, it should be noted that it is not the hostage himself who pays for the ticket, but his relatives, agents or other stakeholders.These stakeholders' valuation of the hostage's life and their prediction of the relationship between the hostage's life and death and their own interests directly determine whether to pay and how much to pay.This detour can lead to countless bizarre stories. The most surreal story of murder I have ever seen was told by an Englishman. In September 1932, two Britons, the doctor's daughter Tink Polly and an employee of a British foreign firm, were kidnapped by Chinese bandits in Niuzhuang by the Liaohe River.The bandits set a sky-high price for the two foreign tickets. Below is the letter written by the bandit to the father of the hostage: The letter also mentioned that if the Japanese withdraw from Manchuria within a week, they will unconditionally return the foreign tickets. The price was so huge that even the life of the Inca king was less than that, but the bandits insisted on offering it.In this regard, the kidnapper Bei Batian had a conversation with Polly. Polly said: "We are both little people. Why do you always think that we are worth a lot of money? The only person who is willing to pay to save us is my father, but his money is not much at all." "Your government will pay for it," he affirmed. "No, it won't. Why do they have to pay? If one of you is kidnapped, will your central government pay a lot of money for him? Of course not. You must be very clear in your heart. For the government Say, you and I are nothing." "Then let the Japanese pay for it, they are responsible, and they should bear the money." "I turned my face away and shrugged impatiently. The ransom argument gets stuck every time I get to it. Explain what you want, Bei Batian thinks the Japanese should, can and will pay for us both of." The strange thing is that the Japanese did pay for it later. They came forward to negotiate and reached an agreement. On October 20, 1932, the Japanese pulled two large red boxes with a carriage, filled with brand new notes, and received them from the Chinese bandits. Li ransomed the British hostages.This means that the Chinese bandits saw more accurately, recognized the situation more clearly than the British hostages, and calculated their interests. It is said that because of the hostage crisis, the British Navy entered the river in China and threatened Japan that if they did not solve the matter, the British would solve it themselves.In this way, the life and death of the British hostages became an excuse for Britain to intervene in Manchuria and interfere with Japanese rule.The Japanese couldn't let this excuse stand. The British intervention was too bad for them to consolidate their rule. Therefore, they chose the lesser of two evils and had to pay the bandits a box full of money.Here, the life price of the British hostages depends on how much the Japanese are willing to spend to avoid the trouble caused by the intervention of the British army. The government's calculations and strategies on the redemption issue may be more complicated.The calculation of the redemption ticket for the relatives of the hostages is relatively simple, as long as the ability to pay and their own interests are considered.Not so with the government.First of all, why does the government pay for it?Is the hostage the official's son?Secondly, if faced with some kind of pressure, such as pressure from a foreign government, and the government has to redeem the ticket, then the negative effects of allowing the bandits to succeed must also be considered.Redemption and concessions can solve the immediate crisis, but the resulting incentives have created greater hidden dangers in the future.This is the conversion of immediate interests and long-term interests.In short, there are generally conflicts between the government and relatives.Relatives do not have to consider external effects, but the government does not.The government puts order first, and relatives put the safety of their loved ones first. From October to December 1923, Mr. F. Strauss, a German assistant priest, was kidnapped by bandits in the Hongjiang area of ​​Xiangxi. The bandits offered 120,000 yuan.The missionary wrote in "80 Days Kidnapped by Hunan Bandits": In the end, the hostage crisis was resolved by turning a corner.General Zhang, the head of the local garrison, agrees to recruit a group of bandits, but on one condition: release the missionaries.The bandits, who were looking forward to recruiting peace, came forward to negotiate with the bandits who kidnapped the missionaries, redeemed the missionaries from the kidnappers with 800 copper coins, and then completed the recruiting. This price seems to be only a little higher than the local notes at that time, less than one percent of the asking price of 120,000.The reason why the transaction can be concluded is because there is another calculation of interests.This group of bandits can't blackmail another group of bandits. If you don't give face, it means that you will become enemies in the future, and you will be in a threatened position in the long-term relationship, and you will put your life at greater risk.Through this series of calculations, the government rescued the hostages without making any concessions, the redeemer was recruited for free, and the kidnappers got favors without wasting their time. Everyone was happy, and the crisis was settled in this way. In May 1929, Zhang Xueliang, Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Frontier Army, promulgated the "Reward Measures for Clearing Bandits": Every military police who hunts down the first bandit will be rewarded with 3,000 yuan in cash.Find a gangster and reward Dayang 1,500 yuan.Officials who died in battle against bandits were given a pension of 5,000 yuan each, and soldiers were given 1,000 yuan. Zhang Xueliang spent a lot of money, and the price of his life was too high. In December 1929, the provinces in the Northeast formulated detailed implementation rules, offering 30% off the life price of bandits, and 25% off and 20% off the life prices of officers and soldiers.Fengtian Province stipulates that a reward of 1,000 yuan will be rewarded for capturing a bandit leader, and 500 yuan will be rewarded for capturing a bandit.Officials who died in battle against bandits received 1,200 yuan in pensions, and soldiers received 800 yuan in pensions.These revised prices are relatively close to the asking price of the kidnapping by the bandits at that time, and are closer to the market conditions. There are two life prices here: the life price of bandits and the life price of officers and soldiers.The lives of the bandits are won by the officers and soldiers desperately. Buying the lives of the bandits is tantamount to buying the officers and soldiers to fight for their lives.For the sake of brevity, we only discuss the lives of officers and soldiers. Warlords buying the lives of officers and soldiers are different from relatives buying the lives of hostages.Redeeming a ticket to buy a life is like buying grain for the common people to eat for themselves.Warlords buy the lives of officers and soldiers, just like the owner of a pastry factory buys grain for processing and selling.In the calculation of warlords, the lives of officers and soldiers are a kind of capital goods. As long as they are used properly, they can create higher value, which is higher than the value of life itself.However, this kind of investment is very risky, and if it is used improperly, it is likely to lose everything.The father and son of the Zhang family are people who conquer the world. There are many factors to consider, and the accounts are relatively complicated, so it is not easy to calculate clearly.The Fujian Weaponry mentioned at the beginning of this article is relatively easy to calculate. The report heard by the emperor said that the small surnames fought because they could not bear the bullying of the big surnames.This kind of bullying is likely to be reflected in the distribution and occupation of some disputed land.Historically, fighting with weapons in Fujian and Guangdong was often for Shatian whose property rights were unknown, and the value of the land could be calculated clearly.Xiao surnames fight desperately to avoid being bullied, which means that the losses caused by bullying are relatively large, and it is worth hiring people to work hard, or exchanging their own lives.The big surnames also believe that in order to maintain the system of bullying the small surnames, even paying the price of human life is cost-effective.For example, if 20 people died, the cost of their lives was 600 yuan, and the value of the captured land was likely to exceed 1,000 yuan--a few yuan may not be able to mobilize everyone to collectively fight for their lives. Fighting for one's life for profit is a common thing in history, and it is not new in the international arena.On October 9th in the 30th year of Guangxu (1904), during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese offered the following price to the horse thieves in the Kanto region: In addition to the above bounties, Japan was also responsible for supplying weapons and ammunition to the Kanto horse bandits, distributing military salaries, and promising to arrange work after the war.As a result, thousands of Kanto horse thieves fought against the Russian army many times, cut off the Russian army's telephone lines, acted as guides and scouts for the Japanese army, and even charged directly into battle.In the Russo-Japanese War, the Kwantung horse bandits made a major contribution to the victory of the Japanese army, and the investment of the Japanese was richly rewarded.Russia, on the contrary, lost its teachers and land, and lost everything. The largest calculation of human lives I have ever read took place in 1230. "Yuan Shi" Biography Thirty-three, there are two records of Yelu Chucai persuading the emperor not to kill people. We can see how Yuan Taizong Wo Kuotai decided his life and death when the lives of tens of millions of civilians were in the hands of the emperor. how to estimate its value. "Yuan History" said that during the reign of Taizu (Genghis Khan), he fought in the Western Regions every year and had no time to manage the Central Plains. Most officials in the Central Plains accumulated wealth privately, with assets as large as tens of thousands, but the government did not save them.Therefore, in the second year (1230) of Ogodei Khan's accession to the throne, his close ministers Bedie and others suggested: "The Han people are useless to the country, but Xikong regards them as pasture land." This is a big proposal that is famous in history.Bie Die and others blamed the emptiness of the national treasury on agriculture, and mistakenly believed that Han farmers were of little help to the country's finances, so it was better to empty this area for grazing.This policy has indeed been implemented in some places.Some people think that the "Xikong Qiren" proposed by Biedie is a massacre, killing all the Han people in the Central Plains.Genghis Khan's cavalry were very good at this kind of thing, but it didn't necessarily require hard work with a knife and an arrow. As long as the ground was vacant, the Han people would flee and flee, and mass death would inevitably occur. Yelu Chucai (styled Jinqing, 1190-1244) was a highly Sinicized Khitan nobleman, as can be seen from the allusion of "Chucai Jinyong" on which his name is based.Yelu Chucai knew that agriculture contributed more to the country's finances than animal husbandry, so he said to the emperor: "Your Majesty is about to crusade against the south. Where will the military supplies come from? If the land tax and commercial tax in the Central Plains are determined equally, and the profits from salt, wine, iron smelting, and mountains and lakes are collected, you can get 500,000 taels of silver, 80,000 pieces of silk, and four There are more than 100,000 stone millet, these materials are enough to supply the military, how can it be said that there is no supplement?" The emperor said: "Try it for me." So Yelu Chucai established a tax collection system in Yanjing and other ten roads. In the autumn of 1231, when the emperor came to Datong, the tax registers and the collected gold and silk were all displayed in the court. The emperor saw it and asked Yelu Chucai with a smile: "You have always been by my side, and you can use the country if you don't leave. Sufficient, minister of the Southern Kingdom, is there anyone else as capable as you?" On the same day, Bai Yelu Chucai was appointed as the Minister of Zhongshu (Prime Minister), and he discussed everything with him first. The total amount of silver, grain, and cloth mentioned above can be converted into about 700,000 taels of silver according to the price level at that time. How many lives of Han people in the Central Plains were saved by this money?At that time, the population of the Kingdom of Jin occupying the north was about 60 million. The Kingdom of Jin established 19 roads including Zhongdu Road (in the area of ​​today’s Beijing), and deducted the most populous Nanjing Road (in the area of ​​Kaifeng) and East Shandong Road (in the area of ​​today’s Shandong Peninsula). In half, it is one or two less than the ten roads set up by Yelu Chucai, and there are still 20 million lives. On average, each life can contribute three cents and five per cent of silver per year, which is about 14 yuan.Why didn't the emperor issue an order to sweep away the Han people?The key lies in the 14 yuan. I don't know how much more taxes can be provided by agriculture than animal husbandry. Even if animal husbandry does not contribute to military supplies and national use, the price of Han people's lives is only 14 yuan per year.To put it another way, the Han people bought their own lives from the emperor with a ransom of 14 yuan per person per year.The implicit premise of this transaction is that the lives of civilians do not belong to them, and that life and death are decided by the violent ruling group. Two years later, the same thing happened again in Kaifeng.On the eve of conquering Bianliang (now Kaifeng), the Mongolian general Subotai sent someone to ask the emperor for instructions.Subotai suggested: "The people of the Jin Kingdom resisted for a long time, and many of our soldiers were killed or injured. The city should be massacred on the day of the city." Subotai's suggestion is well-founded.According to the regulations of the Genghis Khan era, if the enemy resists during the siege, it is a refusal to order, and the city must be slaughtered in retaliation after the city is broken. After Yelu Chucai heard the news, he "sprinted into the play" and said to the emperor: "The soldiers have worked hard for decades, don't they want land and people? What's the use of land if you have land but no people! "These words were relatively empty, and could not suppress the emperor's murderous intentions, "the emperor hesitated."So Yelu Chucai said very practically: "Skillful craftsmen and thick houses are all gathered here. If you kill them all, you will get nothing in the future." The emperor agreed with this statement, and issued an edict to kill only the surname Wanyan. Yes, don't ask about the rest.As a result, 1.47 million people in Kaifeng were rescued. I have also seen a more detailed account of this conversation, but I can't recall the source at the moment.I remember that Yelu Chucai reported the number of bows, arrows and armor that Kaifeng craftsmen could produce every year, and compared it with the annual military supplies of Mongolia and Yuan, which solidly proved their usefulness to the country.After calculating the usefulness, the emperor agreed to spare the people's lives. Of course, there has never been a savior, nor can we rely on a fairy emperor.The right to subsistence of the people is the same as that of cattle, sheep, pigs and chickens. In the final analysis, it is obtained by exchanging meat, eggs, milk and fur. The right to subsistence and development of a certain species depends on a relatively high level of productivity. Competition comes.The role of Mr. Yelu Chucai is nothing more than helping the emperor recognize the true value of the Han people and correcting Biedie's miscalculation. Mr. Yan Jingyao introduced a case of banditry in "The Relationship Between Crime Problems and Social Changes in China": Liu is a tenant farmer in Northeast China. In order to rent land from the landlord, he competed fiercely with other tenant farmers.According to the rules at that time, tenants had to pay rent in advance in the first year, and could only farm in the second year. In 1927, the harvest was very poor, and Liu could not pay the rent.He knew that if he could not pay the full rent by the end of the year or the beginning of the next year, he would not be able to plant the land anymore.But he was unable to pay the rent due to poor harvest. After the harvest, Liu left his hometown, joined a bandit organization, and went out to rob.In the coming spring, he paid all the rent and continued to rent.His employer was very happy that he paid the rent, since none of the other tenants could afford it that year. In the second year, the year was not good, so Liu did the same thing as last year.Other tenants became suspicious of where his money was coming from.In the end, they decided he was a bandit.Otherwise, where does so much money come from?Because Liu was suspected of being a bandit, he simply joined the bandit group without doing anything.He said: "As soon as I was dragged into the gang, I was introduced to other gangsters. I found that many people in my neighboring village were forced to become bandits just like me." In fact, this bandit case is not typical.Calculated by the industry of origin, the proportion of farmers who become bandits ranks fourth, but we might as well use this to analyze first. To put it bluntly, why did Liu become a bandit?In order to keep the leased land.For the tenants, the land is not an idle property, but the foundation of their livelihood, the lifeblood, and the "life property".Generally speaking, material resources are "things outside the body". However, as the scarcity of resources gradually approaches or even breaks through the bottom line of survival, things outside the body gradually evolve into "things equal to the body" and become the "life capital" that life is tied to. The means of production that can provide "life capital" are life property. In a social structure where resources have been divided, the bottom line for survival is a blood line.Below the blood line, all kinds of materials have acquired the meaning of life capital. A bowl of rice can last a day's life, and a glass of water can also equal a human life.Breaking through the bloodline will definitely lead to bloodshed, one will either lose one's own blood and die, or risk one's life to threaten others, robbing one's lifespan. In short, Liu became a bandit in order to keep his life property, so as to obtain life money, and thus to save his life. The risks of being a bandit are not small.Mr. Tian Zhihe and Gao Lecai compiled a list of bandit leaders in Northeast China in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republic of China (before 1931) based on archives, chronicles, newspapers and other materials. They listed the bandit numbers or names of 1,638 bandits. 732 people, accounting for 44.6%.I roughly calculated, assuming that those whose whereabouts are unknown (about 55%) have all escaped punishment, among the 732 people who have a whereabouts, 626 people died due to bandit career, still accounting for 38.2% of the total 1638 people, accounting for whereabouts 85.5% of the respondents. 38.2%, this is the probability of death as a bandit. The basic tactics of bandits are similar to guerrilla warfare, and the Eighth Route Army is the top master of guerrilla warfare.In the Anti-Japanese War, the Eighth Route Army’s death toll was about 400,000. At the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the total number of the army was 1.2 million, and the total number of life and death was 1.6 million. A simple calculation of the death rate was 25%.The Kwantung horse thieves could not be compared with the Eighth Route Army in terms of tactical literacy and mass relations. Therefore, it is estimated that 38% of the bandit death rate may not be far from the truth. What about the living standards and income of bandits?It's a long story.Contrary to the usual impressions and rumors, except that there are more opportunities for overeating, the general conditions of life and income of the bandits may not be higher than that of ordinary self-cultivating farmers. They rarely accumulate wealth.This basic estimate is also consistent with the situation that most bandits yearn to recruit security and are willing to "eat food as soldiers".Of course, the income of the bandits does not represent the bandit leader, who holds a large share in the dividends.The same is true for the distribution of dividends for the heroes of Liangshanbo. The wealth obtained from the robbery was shared by 50% of the remaining village, and the remaining 50% was divided into two. The eleven chiefs shared half, and the seven or eight hundred minions shared the other half. times, it is not as equal as the bandits in the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China. With a 38% mortality rate, in exchange for living resources that are only enough to maintain food and clothing, this is the bandit's business.This way of living with life for life is actually replacing the current high death rate in ten months with the lower death rate in the next few years.This is the quest for the greatest chance of survival. Who is willing to do this kind of business with a mortality rate of nearly 40%? According to the "List of Persons Executed in the Chahar Bandit Case" collected by the Second Historical Archives of China, from January to December 1917, the origins of the 106 bandits executed by shooting were as follows: According to the occupational statistics of the bandits executed in the files of the Ministry of the Army, from the third year of the Republic of China to the fourteenth year of the Republic of China, a total of 1,105 bandits were executed in Shandong, Anhui, Henan Nanyang, Northeast China, Guizhou and other places. Among them: Farmers rank fourth in both statistics.Please imagine, if Liu was seized by the landlord and lost his life and property, and he had no other skills, what way out would he have in front of him?One is to work hard as a soldier, and the other is to work hard as a coolie.This happened to be the origin of the bandits who ranked second and third.Although these two industries have no life property, they can "use their bodies as a career" and exchange blood and sweat for life capital. Imagine one more step, if Liu is dismissed by the army, or fired by the boss, what should he do?At this time, Liu's identity became the biggest source of vagrants, that is, bandits.The vagrants at that time were generally social groups struggling under the bloodline.In the large-scale army file statistics, the proportion of bandits who are jobless is as high as 78%, and their stand is the most firm. They are the permanent backbone of bandit gangs. From this point of view, Liu's temporary banditry in order to keep the tenancy rights has the meaning of avoiding becoming a professional bandit.However, his secretive behavior aroused the suspicion of tenant competitors, and the risk suddenly increased, so he was forced to become a professional. It is also the exchange of life for money, but the level of development is divided into low-level and high-level. Low-level horse thieves, road robbery, house robbery, unstable income and huge risks, this is a direct exchange of life and money, belonging to a relatively destructive low-level stage.High-level horse thieves issue notices (call tickets), set rules, and wait for others to pay tribute and fees, which is similar to government taxation.At this time, life is exchanged for a system, which is an advanced stage with stable income and less destructiveness. "Kandong Horse Thieves" introduced that there is a special kind of "ticket-eating" bandits, who generally do not rob or kidnap tickets, and rely on strong force to set up checkpoints at traffic passes, crossings that business travelers must pass, and mountain gates and river mouths that must pass through for mountain goods to go down the mountain. , commissions for cargo owners and business travellers.They often sit in one place and wait to eat tickets, or send their cubs to temporarily set up cards to eat tickets seasonally.The fate of those who resist, evade, and report to officials is uncertain. After the 1860s, the east and southeast of the Northeast were opened up, and there were many people who collected ginseng, herded mountains, hunted, panned for gold, collected herbs, and released waste.Bandits set up secret cards at intersections, hotels, inns, car shops, casinos, brothels, warehouses, stations, wharfs, riversides and other critical places.Generally speaking, the minimum ticket price is 10%, and the maximum is 30%. It is conceivable that as long as they can sit and eat, the bandits will not take the risk of robbing.The problem is that it takes a lot of human life and energy, years of hard work, a good protection net, a scouting net, the eradication of rebels, and the drive away of competitors, in order to effectively establish the ticket system.However, once such a system is established, vested interest groups only need to pay the cost of maintaining the system, and do not have to work hard.At that time, it was possible to rob, but it was not necessary to rob, and even rob was prohibited.The bandits in the low-level stage can only make a living by robbery, and are forced to live a life of licking blood with knives.In such a comparison, it is up to each other. The same is true for pirates. (Qing) During the reign of Qianlong and Jiaqing (1790-1810), after several generations of latent development, South China pirates entered their heyday.In the fifth chapter of "Pirates of South China (1790-1810)", Mu Di'an introduced "Pirates' Earnings", and listed four ways of making money in total.Robbery and kidnapping belong to temporary income and are the main source of pirates' early income.Taxes and fees can bring stable high income, which was the main way of income during the heyday of piracy.The author describes the creation of this fee system: In the early 19th century, Guangdong had 22 saltworks, most of which were located in the southernmost state capitals of the province—Gaozhou, Leizhou, Qiongzhou, and Lianzhou. … much of the salt is shipped around in sailing ships.Four times a year a large fleet of salt ships converged on Dianbai to transport the salt to Guangzhou, 400 miles away. As early as 1796, pirates had been involved in the salt industry.At that time, small groups of pirates attacked one or two salt ships at regular intervals.Later, under the banner of the Xishan Army, as its organization became more perfect, its skills became more proficient.They have been able to gather 70 to 100 ships to intercept the entire salt fleet.By 1801, with a large fleet of 300 sailing ships, they blatantly attacked salt ships that had not yet left Dianbai port. ...by 1805 they were sufficient to control the salt routes.Therefore, the price of salt in Guangzhou soared at that time. Although the emperor ordered all salt ships to be escorted by Xiangyong, the effect was minimal.Salt merchants soon found it easier to negotiate directly with the pirates, paying them large sums in exchange for safe navigation on their salt ships. With the help of local councils, the pirates succeeded in perfecting the above-mentioned activities, so that every ship bound for Canton found it difficult to do so without purchasing insurance premiums.Pirates charged 50 yuan for 100 bags of salt.Sometimes the pirates even escort ships paying protection fees. In 1805, a salt fleet delivered 200 Spanish silver dollars to the pirates, and the pirates escorted them to Guangzhou.By charging salt boat protection fees, the pirates have a regular source of income throughout the year. To keep this source of income from drying up, pirates unceremoniously targeted ships that would not obey their orders.Once such a strike is implemented, its behavior is very cruel. On June 28, 1805, at the Dazhou Salt Fields, 70 resisting official salt ships were burned by pirates, and another 110 ships were reduced to ashes a few days later.On September 13 of the same year, 120 pirate ships attacked and burned 90 ships parked in Dianbai Harbor. By the end of the year, there were only 4 official salt ships not under the control of pirates.As protection fees were paid and collected, the relationship between pirates and salt merchants was also strengthened.Eventually, the salt merchants even began supplying the pirates with food supplies and weapons and ammunition. Pirates may have controlled the opium trade in the same way... Pirates were able to collect protection fees from various ships on the sea, indicating that their power had reached its peak.Merchants, ship owners, helmsmen and fishermen had to purchase insurance from pirates no matter where their ships were going.After they paid the money according to the regulations (there are various names such as "number tax", "Hong Kong regulation", "foreign tax" and "tax extortion"), they got a road license signed by the pirate leader. Generally, these protection fees are levied on an annual basis, although temporary concession licenses can be purchased for a limited period of time.The protection fee is very expensive. In some places, merchant ships pay money according to the value of their goods. The fee paid for each voyage is between 50 and 500 yuan.In other places, an ocean-going merchant ship had to pay 400 Spanish silver dollars when it left the port and 800 dollars when it returned.It is not uncommon for well-to-do ship owners to pay several thousand taels of silver for a one-way trip. The fee-based insurance system is well developed in western Guangdong.By 1803, trade west of Canton was everywhere under the protection of pirates.A year later, they expanded their influence to the Pearl River Delta. There were 70 large ships stationed in the islands near Macau for a long time. Every day, ships went out to sea to intercept ships sailing east without paying insurance premiums.By 1806, all the ships in this area were unable to protect themselves, and few ships dared to go to sea without the permission of the pirates. The Pirate Chief is very serious about enforcing the agreement between the Protector and the Protected, or rather, the entire Pirate Alliance takes this very seriously.When pirates intercept at sea, the intercepted person can be released as long as he shows the proof of payment.If this rule is violated, the pirate leader will flatly order his subordinates to compensate the victim.Once, a pirate leader mistakenly hijacked a protected fishing boat. The pirate leader not only ordered him to return the boat to the original owner, but also ordered him to pay the owner 500 Spanish silver dollars for the mistake. Paraphrasing to this point, I already feel the boundaries blur.After the common people admit defeat, what is the difference between the pirates and the government that implements the high tax rate policy?It seems that this is a difficult question to answer.For the public, no matter who they pay taxes to, they have no right to choose or withdraw anyway.Just as the people had no say in the tax rates set by the pirates, the public had no say in the policies of the government.In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the government implemented an extremely strict sea ban policy, which was equivalent to a 100% high tax rate, and they did not allow the common people to vote.At this time, who is better than whom?I have no idea.This problem also exists when hiring escorts. The security services of pirates seem to be more reliable than that of official navy. Therefore, once there is room for choice, civilians choose pirates. When discussing the issue of hard work, we did not mention the social environment.There are at least two circumstantial factors, and it would be unfair not to mention them. One is that the landlord's rent is too heavy, and the search is too ruthless.If Liu was a self-cultivator and the rent was exempted, he would not be a bandit.However, it is unreasonable to ask landlords not to take advantage of the situation of competing for tenancy rights.Probably the rationality of land reform or land revolution lies here. Second, the government failed in its duty.According to the official regulations, if a farmer encounters a famine and reports the disaster to the county government office, he can not only be exempted from taxes, but also receive relief.And what we see is an inaction government.Unwilling or unable to spend money to protect the blood line, let the scarcity break through the boundary of life and death, create a huge group of "if you don't want money, you have one life", and then spend a lot of military spending to suppress bandits and kill people, this is what we Chinese are very familiar with But it's just calling Naihe's official tricks. The lack of blood line protection is a major flaw in the social system.The system that does not keep the blood line has the characteristics of what Lu Xun called "cannibalism". In a society where the blood line is lost, it is difficult to draw a clear line between officials and bandits, as well as the line between bandits and good citizens.In the early years of the Republic of China, Mr. Yan Jingyao went to a county in Henan Province to investigate, and the county magistrate told him about this difficulty: The county magistrate said that during his two years as county magistrate, he was unable to cope with the famine.He said that when disaster victims from other places came to our county to steal food, the common people came to sue them.But there is nothing I can do.Because, first of all, I know that the defendants are not bandits but disaster victims; second, I don't have so many police and guards to catch these bandits.Even if I catch them, there aren't that many cells for them. When I said that these ordinary people (those bandits) could never be caught, they accused their relatives, uncles, cousins, etc., and asked me to catch them.In the past it was legal to implicate relatives, but the current law does not allow implicating relatives.So the common people said that I shielded bandits, or falsely accused me of taking bribes. In the second year, it was strange and a tragedy. There were serious disasters everywhere in our county, and all the people in the county became bandits.Everywhere you hear news of bandits, kidnappings, and riots.I simply have no way to exercise my functions as the county magistrate, because these bandits cannot be caught, and they are actually not bandits but disaster victims. In this story, both the county magistrate and the common people encountered difficulties in naming.Said to be bandits, those people are obviously disaster victims.Said they were victims of disasters, they took the risk again and did the deed of murdering money and killing their lives.In order to avoid moral judgment, we might as well use the neutral title of "Boming Group" and only focus on their characteristics of exchanging lives for things.This group spans a wide spectrum in terms of violent, professional, illegal, temporary or permanent. According to a report in Volume 30, No. 1 of "Oriental" magazine, after the drought in 1934 in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the victims had no rice to satisfy their hunger, so they flocked to rich merchants to grab rice.Some of the methods they used were peaceful "sitting food" and some were riots.In Zhejiang province alone, counties such as Jiaxing, Haining, Tongxiang, Changxing, Lin'an, Xiaoshan, and Jiashan had large-scale riots over rice. The peasants' famine is not only manifested in the robbing of rice and grain distribution, but also in the burning of houses and warehouses, resistance to rent and government officials. When the government regards them as "bandits" and suppresses them, many of them leave their homes. Or even become a bandit. ——It can be seen from this that there is still a transitional state between the temporary bandits and the civilians.Wilderness has obvious moral rationality.Any property rights arrangement, any right setting, any legal regulation, if it ignores human life on a large scale and belittles the most important human beings, I am afraid that it will inevitably suffer blood retribution, and it is difficult to defend this system convincingly. Finally, we summarize the above-mentioned buyer-seller relationship from the perspective of "group transactions". 1. Leaders of violent groups such as emperors, warlords or bandit leaders, they are the ones who "recruit troops and buy horses".In the trade of lives, they are the buyers and the soldiers are the sellers.In order to distinguish these two major groups in the violent industry, we compare the concepts of capitalists and workers, and call the leaders "fundamentalists".Capitalists and soldiers form a pair of trading relationships. In this relationship, the more money the wealthy family contributes, the more soldiers and horses, and the greater the hope of conquering the world.The expected future income is higher, and it is more attractive to talents.Many aspects of the military and political system reflect this aspect of transactions.For example, the aristocratic system and the military feudal lord system are the hard-working incentive mechanisms set up for high-level talents operating with capital, similar to the shareholding system or option system in the economic field. "Grabbing strong men" is to drink "soldier blood" nakedly and exploit the "surplus value" of those who work hard. Capitalists always have competitors.Even the highest emperor, sometimes more than one.What's more, there are big and small warlords in the middle class and bandits and pirates in the lower class. "If you succeed, you will be the king, if you lose, you will be the bandit." The big family often strangles you to the death.The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States, the Three Kingdoms, the Two Jins and the Southern and Northern Dynasties, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, the warlord melee until the early Republic of China, plus the end and beginning of each dynasty, are all times when they performed desperately. 2. After recruiting soldiers and buying horses, the wealthy family obtained the violent power of life and death, so they controlled the lives of the common people. If the common people wanted to live, they had to redeem themselves with servitude or tribute.This is another pair of transactions. In this relationship, the blood-born family tries to squeeze more ransom from the common people by virtue of their life-and-death strength, but they also need to control the scale so as not to seek gains instead of losses.If they kill them all and loot them all, destroying their ability to reproduce, as Yelu Chucai warned, "you won't get anything in the future."It is true that the people can be driven as cattle and horse slaves, but it cannot prevent them from being lazy and escaping.Another reason that cannot be overstated is that the higher the ransom, the more people will die.Searching below the bloodline, not letting the people live, they will die anyway, so desperately becomes a cost-effective choice.Lao Tzu's so-called "people are not afraid of death, so how can they be afraid of death," probably refers to this situation. Different types of bloodlines have different relationships with the people.Rogues are not afraid of killing and stealing everything, anyway, it is a one-shot deal.Bandits are better, and usually don't eat grass by the side of the nest.Whether the warlord eats or not depends on the length of the garrison time and whether he has any plans to take root.As for the emperor, under Pu Tian, ​​is it the king of the land, unless he is in a hurry, hungry and crazy, he generally refuses to kill the chicken for the egg.However, with the secret increase of bureaucratic agents, imperial food and labor are often over-collected, and gradually go to kill the chicken to get the egg. 3. In the above-mentioned two types of transaction relations, three social groups are active: soldiers—blood family—people.Like the workers, peasants and soldiers, the capitalists are also making history: the capitalists hang on both sides and occupy the center of the historical stage.The wealth acquired by the wealthy family is the key point of overlap between the officers and soldiers and the people.When other conditions are the same, the richer the richer the wealthy, the greater the quantity and quality of their recruits. This determines their strength, the size of their territory and the number of people they control.However, the amount of wealth searched is subject to the size of the territory and the number of people, and is subject to the common interests of the wealthy family and the people - exhausting the pond for fishing is also a harm to the owner of the fishpond.Among these contradictory factors, whoever plays well, who is good at using the wisdom of Confucianism and Legalism to govern the people, army, and officials, and strives for the greatest benefit in a comprehensive balance, will have the hope of seizing the world.