Chapter 9 Chapter nine

In solving the problem of free will and necessity, history has an advantage over other branches of knowledge: for history, this problem does not involve the essence of human free will, but only the performance of this will in the past and under certain conditions. In solving this problem, history is to the other sciences what experimental science is to the abstract sciences. It is not the human will itself that is the object of historical study, but our ideas about it. Thus, unlike theology, ethics, and philosophy, history has no unsolvable mysteries of free will combined with necessity.History examines people's concept of life, and the combination of these two contradictions has already been realized in people's concept of life.

Every historical event, every human activity, is understood in actual life so clearly and so clearly that there is no sense of contradiction, although each event appears partly free and partly necessary. In order to solve the problem of how freedom and necessity are combined and what the essence of these two concepts is, philosophy of history can and should take a path opposite to that of other sciences.History should not first define the two concepts of free will and inevitability, and then include life phenomena in those two definitions. History should summarize the definitions of the two concepts of freedom and inevitability from a large number of historical phenomena, and those phenomena Always related to freedom and necessity.

However much we consider the idea of ​​the action of many or of one, we always understand this action as the product of the free will of some, and the law of necessity in part. Whether we are talking of migrations of peoples and invasions of barbarians, or the orders of Napoleon III, or the action of someone an hour ago choosing a direction to walk from among several, we see no contradiction at all. .For us the limits of freedom and necessity directing the actions of these men are clear. The concept of freedom is often different according to the point of view from which we observe phenomena; but there is always a common aspect. Every action of man seems to us to be a certain combination of freedom and necessity.In every action we examine we see a certain amount of freedom and a certain amount of necessity.And it is always this way: the more freedom in any action, the less necessity; the more necessity, the less freedom.

The relation of freedom to necessity increases or decreases, according to the point of view from which action is considered; but the relation of the two is always inversely proportional. A man who falls first, catches another, and that man too drowns; or a mother, weary from nursing her baby, and starving, steals some food; A man, in the course of his service, following the orders of his superiors, kills a defenseless man—seems, to those who know the conditions in which those men are placed, to be less guilty, that is, less free, and more subject to the law of necessity ; and there is more freedom in the eyes of the man who does not know that he himself is drowning, that the mother is starving, that the soldier is serving, and so on.Likewise, a man who murdered a man twenty years ago and has since lived peacefully and harmlessly in society seems less guilty; belongs more to the laws of necessity, and to those who examine his actions the day after his crime he behaves more freely.Likewise, every action of a mad, drunk, or highly nervous person seems less free and more necessary to someone who knows the state of mind of the person who has acted in that way; It seems, it seems, that there is more freedom and less necessity.In all these cases, as the concept of freedom increases or decreases according to the point of view from which the action is considered, the concept of necessity increases or decreases accordingly.Therefore, the more the element of necessity, the less the element of the idea of ​​freedom.vice versa.

Religion, human common sense, jurisprudence, and history itself alike understand this relation between necessity and liberty. Our conceptions of liberty and necessity are invariably increased or decreased upon grounds of the following three classes: 1. The relation of the person performing the act to the external world, 2. His relationship with time, 3. His relation to the cause of the action. 1. The ground of the first kind is that we are more or less aware of the relation of man to the external world, more or less aware of the definite place which each man occupies in relation to everything which exists simultaneously with him.From such grounds it follows that a drowning man is less free, and more of necessity, than a man standing on dry ground; Action, the action of a man bound by family, office, enterprise, is undoubtedly less free and more of necessity than the action of a solitary man.

If we only observe a man, regardless of his relation to everything around him, we feel that his every action is free.But if we only see his relation to everything around him, if we see his relation to everything—to the people he speaks to, to the books he reads, to the labor he does, to all that surrounds him. By the connection of the air, with the light that falls upon the things about him, we see that each has an influence upon him, and governs at least some aspect of his actions.The more we see these influences, then, the less the idea of ​​his freedom, and the stronger the idea of ​​his being governed by necessity.

2. The second type of ground is that people more or less see the relationship between man and the world in time, and more or less understand the position of that person's actions in time.From such grounds it can be seen that the fall of the first man of mankind was evidently less free than the marriage of modern man.From this it can also be seen that centuries ago the life and activities of those who are temporally related to us do not seem to me so free as the life of a modern man (whose consequences I do not yet know). In this respect, the progressive perception of more or less freedom and necessity depends on the length of time that elapses between the completion of that action and our judgment of it.

If I consider an action which I performed a minute ago under almost the same circumstances as I am now, I feel that my action was undoubtedly free.But if I examine an operation which I performed a month ago, then, because it was carried out under different circumstances, I am compelled to admit that, without that operation, much of the good which would have sprung from the present operation, Satisfactory, even significant results will not be forthcoming.If I recall that action ten years or more farther back, then I feel that the consequences of my present action are more obvious; I also find it difficult to imagine what would have happened without that action. How about it.The farther I recall, or the more deeply I think about the same thing, the more I doubt my freedom of action.

In history we find the same progression of beliefs concerning the part played by free will in the public good of mankind.Every modern event seems to us undoubtedly to be the action of definite men; but to a more distant event we have seen its necessary consequences, and we cannot conceive of any other.The further back we go, the more we feel that those events were not arbitrary. We feel that the Austro-Prussian War was undoubtedly the result of Bismarck's cunning and other such things. Napoleon's wars we still regard as the result of heroic will, though we doubt it; but we already regard the Crusades as an event without which modern European History is unimaginable, although in the eyes of the chroniclers of the Crusades, this event was only the product of someone's will.As for migrations involving peoples, no one today thinks that the restoration of Europe depends on the arbitrary actions of Attila.The farther we observe the historical object, the more doubtful is the free will of those who caused the event, and the more evident is the law of necessity.

-------- ①The Austro-Prussian War in 1866, Tolstoy wrote this novel in that year. ②Attila was the leader of the Huns (406-453). In his time, the Huns tribal alliance was extremely strong. 3. The grounds of the third kind are our knowledge of the inexhaustible causal relations which reason necessarily requires, and that every phenomenon (and therefore every human action) under our comprehension, as the result of previous phenomena and subsequent The cause of a phenomenon should have its definite place. On such grounds, the more clearly we understand the biological, psychological, and historical laws governing man from observation, the more accurately we understand the biological, psychological, and historical causes of actions——this On the one hand; on the other hand, the simpler the action we observe; the less complex the character and mind of the character we are studying, and his actions, the more free and free our actions and those of others seem to us. less and less governed by necessity.

When we know nothing of the cause of an action—whether it is a crime or a good deed, or an action in which neither good nor bad, we consider the act most free.If it is a crime, we most strongly demand its punishment; if it is a good deed, we give the highest esteem.If it is an action that is indifferent to good and evil, we admit it to be the most individual, original, and free action.But knowing one of the innumerable causes, we see the necessity of a certain element, and we are less insistent on punishing sin, and not so great a feat in good deeds, nor so free in actions that seem original.A prisoner is educated among bad men, which makes his crimes less serious.The self-sacrifice that parents make for their children, the self-sacrifice that may be rewarded, is more intelligible than unprovoked self-sacrifice, and therefore seems less sympathetic and less free.The founder or inventor of a sect or party surprises us less once we know how and with what his actions are prepared.If we have much experience, if our observations continually seek causality in the actions of men, the more accurately we connect cause and effect, the more we feel their actions to be necessary and not free.If we consider simple actions, and there are many actions of that kind to observe, our idea of ​​the necessity of those actions must be stronger.The dishonesty of the son of a dishonest father, the impropriety of a woman who falls among villains, the drunkenness of a drunkard, etc., the more we understand the causes of these actions, the more we feel that these actions are not free.If we examine the behavior of mentally retarded persons, for example, of a child, of a madman, of a fool, then, because we know the causes of their behavior and the simplicity of character and intelligence, we see that there is a great deal of necessity , the free will component is so small that even once we know the cause of that action, we can predict its result. All incapacity and mitigating circumstances recognized by the Code are based solely on these three grounds.Responsibility depends on how well we know the circumstances of the person under scrutiny, on how much time elapses between the completion of the act and the scrutiny, and on how well we know the reasons for the behavior.