Chapter 19 Chapter Nineteen

Is there any Russian who does not feel a hundred and twenty thousand regrets, uneasiness, and incomprehension whenever he reads the account of the last phase of the War of 1812?Who doesn't ask himself the question: since all three armies surrounded the French army with superior strength, since the fleeing French were hungry and cold and surrendered in droves, and since (as history tells us) the Russians The plan was to intercept and capture all the French, so why didn't they capture and destroy all the French? Why did the Russian army, which was numerically smaller than the French, fight the Battle of Borodino?How was it possible to surround the French army on three sides, with the object of capturing them all, and fail to achieve this end?Could it be that the French are so much stronger than us, that they will not be able to destroy them after being surrounded by our superior forces?

How could this happen? History (so-called history) answers these questions by saying that this happened because Kutuzov, Tormasov, Chichagov, and so-and-so affirmed the materiality of the world, Advocating atheism, but arguing that consciousness is also material, big, they are not executing a strategy of one sort or another. But why aren't they implementing these strategies?If they were guilty of failing to achieve the intended purpose, why were they not tried and executed?However, taking a step back, let us assume that the mistakes of the Russians were the fault of Kutuzov, Chichagov and others.It remains difficult to understand, however, why the Russian army had those conditions at Krasnoe and at Berezina (where the Russian army was superior), while the French army, with its marshals, princes and emperors, was not Capture, and this is the purpose of the Russians, what is the reason for this?

There is no basis for explaining this strange phenomenon (as Russian military historians say) by saying that Kutuzov hindered the attack, because, as we know, at Vyazma and at Tarutino, Kutuzov The husband's will can no longer stop the attacking army. Why was it that the Russian army, with its meager strength, defeated a mighty enemy at Borodino, and was defeated by a French mob when Krasnoe and Berezina were superior in strength? If the purpose of the Russians had been to cut off and capture Napoleon and the Field Marshals alive, this purpose was not only not achieved, but every attempt to achieve it was not shamefully thwarted.The French, then, are quite right in saying that the last stage of the war was a series of French victories, while the Russian historians are completely wrong in saying that the Russians were victorious.

Russian military historians, if they are willing to follow logic, will naturally come to this conclusion, no matter how enthusiastically they sing about bravery, devotion, etc., they must admit that the retreat of the French from Moscow was achieved by Napoleon. A string of victories, Kutuzov's defeat. However, completely putting aside national pride, it can be seen that this conclusion is itself contradictory, because a series of French victories led to their total ruin, and a series of defeats of the Russians led to their annihilation of the enemy and the destruction of the French. Drive out of the country.

The source of this contradiction lies in the fact that historians, who study events at the time on the basis of letters, battle reports, reports, and the like, of the emperors and generals of the two countries, say that the purpose of the final phase of the War of 1812 was to Cutting off the retreat of the French army and capturing Napoleon, his marshals and his army alive never existed, and it was completely fabricated by them. There never was such a purpose, and it cannot be, since such a purpose has no meaning, and it is absolutely impossible to achieve it. This purpose does not make any sense because,

First, the fleeing Napoleon army tried its best to escape, to escape from Russia as soon as possible, which is what every Russian expects.For the French who escaped so quickly, what's the point of organizing a few more battles? Second, there is no point in cutting off the path of those who are only interested in escaping. Thirdly, it is pointless to lose one's own army in order to destroy the French army, which, for no external reason, is also destroying itself at this stage, without any hindrance on all roads, and it is impossible to take ten One percent of the army that survived in February led the escape across the border,

Fourthly, there was no point in capturing the emperors, princes, and dukes. The most experienced diplomats of the time (such as Meister and others) had realized that capturing these people would make the Russians very embarrassed.It is even more meaningless to capture the entire regiment, because Russia's own army was reduced by half when it reached Krasnoye, and a whole division was needed to escort these prisoners, and their own supplies were already very difficult, and their rations were insufficient. Most of the captives were starving to death. All the lofty plans of cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his army alive seemed to be the plans of a gardener who, while driving away an animal trampling his garden, ran up to the gate of the garden and beat the animal head on.The only reason that could defend him was that he was too angry.However, even this reason cannot stand for those who made that plan, because the trampling of the garden does not belong to them.

However, besides cutting off Napoleon's army being pointless, it's also impossible to do. This is impossible because: First, experience has shown that in a campaign where the fronts of the individual columns extend to a distance of five versts, it is impossible at any time to match the actions of the troops to the battle plan, if Chichagov, Kutuzov and The possibility of Wittgenstein meeting up at the designated place on time is very small. It can be said that there is no such possibility. Kutuzov thought so. Can not achieve the intended purpose. Second, the reason why it is impossible is that there is a huge force of inertia in the desperate flight of Napoleon's army. To stop it and paralyze it, it is necessary to have a much larger army than the existing Russian army.

Third, it is impossible also because the military term "cutting off" has no meaning.Bread can be cut, but the army can't.Cutting off the army—blocking its way—was impossible, because there were always plenty of places to go around, and there was still darkness, and military scientists could learn from Krasnoe and Berezina. Examples to demonstrate this.As long as the enemy would rather die than surrender, it is very difficult to capture them. It is like a little swallow falling on your hand, it seems that you can catch it, but you just can't catch it.Only those who surrendered according to the rules of strategy and tactics, like the Germans, could capture them.For the French army, however, they fully believed that this was not suitable for them, because whether they escaped or were captured, what awaited them was death, either from freezing or starvation.

Fourth, the reason why it is impossible is the most important point. From ancient times to the present, there has never been a war as terrible as the conditions of the war of 1812. The Russian army has exhausted all its strength in pursuing the French. , so that doing a little more will surely lead to self-destruction. During the march from Tarutino to Krasnoe, the Russian army lost 50,000 people due to sickness and stragglers, which is equivalent to the population of the capital of a large province.Without fighting troops, half of the personnel was reduced. At this stage of the campaign, the army had no boots and furs, no provisions, no vodka, and slept for months at night in the freezing cold of minus fifteen degrees.At that time, there were only seven or eight hours of daylight, and the rest of the night was the undisciplined night. At that time, in combat, people were only on the verge of undisciplined death for only a few hours. starved to death; half the army would have died in a month—historians, when they tell of this phase of the campaign, say that Miloradovich should march somewhere on the flank, that Tormasov should March to XX, Chichagov should move to XX (in knee-deep snow), XX should drive back and cut off the enemy, etc., etc.

Half the Russian army was dead, but they did everything they could and ought to do to achieve what the people expected.As for the other Russians sitting in the warm room, who suggested the impossible, it was not the Russian Army's fault. All these strange and now incomprehensible inconsistencies in the factual and historical accounts arise because the historian who wrote about the event wrote about the noble sentiments and sweet words of the generals, not about the historical event. What interested them most was the words of Miloradovich, the rewards received by this or that general and the conclusions they drew; but the question of the fifty thousand people left in the hospitals and in the graves did not even arouse their interest. Interest, because this is not within the scope of their research. In fact, as long as we do not study those reports and the plans of the generals, but delve into the actions of millions of people who directly participated in the events at that time, those problems that were originally thought to be difficult to solve can be easily and simply obtained. Answer. The purpose of cutting off Napoleon's army never existed except in the imagination of a dozen generals.This purpose is also impossible, because it has no meaning, and it is absolutely impossible to achieve this purpose. The people have only one purpose: to clear the invaders from their land.This goal was achieved. First, it was achieved naturally, because the French escaped, as long as you don't stop them from escaping.Second, this end was achieved by means of a people's war against the French, and thirdly, a strong Russian army was in hot pursuit of the French, and this force was used whenever the French stopped. The role of the Russian army is like a whip to drive away running animals.Experienced herders know that it is better to frighten a running animal with the whip than to strike it head-on.