It is difficult for the human intellect to understand the root causes of various phenomena.But people feel the need to find these causes in their hearts. Instead of deeply analyzing the countless and complicated conditions that produce various phenomena, and each of these conditions can be said to be the cause individually, the human intelligence only grasps the first. An approximate condition that is the easiest to understand I encountered, so I said: This is the reason.In many historical events (in which human action is the object of observation) the will of God is the most primitive approximation, followed by the will of man in the most prominent historical place, the will of the historical hero .However, as long as we deeply analyze the essence of each historical event, that is, deeply analyze the activities of the entire mass of the people who participated in these events, we will fully understand that the will of the heroes in history not only did not control the actions of the masses of the people, but their will Always dominated by the will of the masses.The meaning of historical events seems to be exactly the same whether one way or another is taken.However, some say that the Westerners pushed eastward because Napoleon wanted to, others say that it happened because it had to, and the two say the same thing as the other two. The difference is exactly the same, some people say that the earth does not rotate, and the planets revolve around the earth, others say that they don't know what supports the earth, but they know that the motion of the earth and other planets is caused by governed by certain laws.There is not and cannot be more than one cause for a historical event except for one of all causes.But events are governed by certain laws, some of which are not clear, and some of which we have discovered.Just as these laws can only be discovered when we completely abandon the search for causes in a person's will, so the laws of planetary motion can only be revealed when one throws away all preconceived notions about the earth.

According to historians, after the battle of Borodino and the capture and burning of Moscow by the enemy, the most important episode in the war of 1812 was the entry of Russian troops from the Ryazan road into the Kaluzhskaya road, and then The movement towards Tarutino's camp - the so-called march across the flank of the Red Pahela.Historians have attributed the honor of this feat of genius to various people, and have debated who should get the credit.Even foreign historians, even French historians, when they speak of this flanking advance, recognize the genius of the Russian commander.But why military writers and their followers should regard this flanking advance which saved Russia and defeated Napoleon as the deliberate act of one individual - it is too incomprehensible.First of all, it is difficult to understand where the deliberation and wisdom of this military operation is, because knowing that the best position for an army (when it is not attacked) is where there is plenty of food and grass-this No brains needed.Everyone, even a foolish child of thirteen, knows without effort that the most advantageous position for the army in 1812, after the withdrawal from Moscow, was on the Kaluzhskaya road.Therefore, first, it is impossible to understand what methods of reasoning historians have used in order to understand the mystery of this army movement.Secondly, it is especially difficult to understand how historians see that this military operation saved Russia and failed France; Something else happened after that, which might have been catastrophic for the Russian army, but fortunately for the French army.If the military position of the Russian army has improved since the completion of this campaign, it cannot in any case be inferred from this that it was the cause.

This flanking advance, if not for the coincidence of other conditions, would not only do no good to the Russian army, but might destroy it.What would have happened if Moscow had not been burned?What would happen if Murat did not know the whereabouts of the Russian troops?What would have happened if Napoleon had not stood still?What if a battle had been fought near Red Pahela, as suggested by Bennigsen and Barclay?What would happen if the French attacked while the Russians were crossing the Pakhla?What would have happened if, on reaching Tarutino, Napoleon had immediately attacked the Russian army with a tenth of the force he had used to attack Smolensk?What would happen if the French attacked Petersburg? . . . Of all these hypotheses, should any one be true, the flanking march will end not in salvation but in destruction.

Thirdly, and most incomprehensibly, the student of history deliberately refuses to see that this flanking advance cannot be attributed to anyone, and that no one at any time foresaw a Machian variant of it.Thinking that physical things and psychological things are just human experience, the retreat from Fili is exactly the same as it is. At any time, no one can see its whole picture clearly. It is made step by step by countless various conditions. Land, event after event, gradually reveals itself over time, and only when it is complete and in the past does it become fully present. At the military conference in Fili, most of the Russian generals took it for granted that they should retreat along the main road of the lower city.This is proved by the fact that the majority of the participants were in favor of such a retreat, especially the famous conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and Lanskoy, who was in charge of supplies, after the meeting.Lanskoy reported to the commander-in-chief that the army's supplies were mainly concentrated in the provinces of Tula and Kaluga along the Oka River. is impossible.This was the first sign that the most natural thought of going straight down town had to be set aside.The army marched south along the Ryazan Highway, getting closer to supplies.Later, the French army, which did not even know where the Russian troops were going, stood still and protected the arsenal at Tula. The main thing was to get close to the storage of supplies and move the army southward into the Tula road.While venturing across the Pakhra River towards the Tula road, the commanders of the Russian army planned to stop at Podolsk and did not consider the Tarutino position, but numerous circumstances and the fact that the Russian army was previously unknown The reappearance of the French army, the battle plan, and mainly the abundance of food and fodder in Kaluga forced the Russian army to move south, to the crossroads where the supplies were located, from the Tula road to the Kaluzhskaya road, and went straight to the tower. Rudino.Just as it is impossible to answer when Moscow retreated, it is impossible to answer who decided to move to Tarutino.It was only after the army arrived at Tarutino as a result of the interplay of innumerable and varied forces that it was confidently said that they had thought so, had foreseen it.