Chapter 2 Chapter two

Armies speaking twelve European languages ​​invaded Russia.Russian troops and civilians retreated to Smolensk to avoid its onslaught, and from Smolensk to Borodino.The French army rushed towards Moscow with increasing momentum, towards the goal of its movement.The closer the French army got to the destination, the more violent it was, like the acceleration of an object when it hits the ground.Behind it lay thousands of versts of starving and hateful land; in front of it was only a few tens of versts to the destination.In this regard, every soldier in Napoleon's army felt that the invasion was advancing involuntarily, and it was going forward bravely, thanks to this momentum.

On the part of the Russians, the further they retreated, the more the morale to fight the enemy increased; the morale was refreshed and raised by the retreat, and at Perodino the fire finally took place.The armies of either side were not defeated, and the Russian army immediately withdrew from the battle as soon as the fire was exchanged. The incoming attacking ball must also roll out of a space (although it loses all its strength when it collides). The Russians retreated one hundred and twenty versts - out of Moscow.The French stopped in Moscow.After that, there was no fighting for five consecutive weeks.The French did not advance.Like mortally wounded beasts, bleeding and licking their wounds, they remained motionless in Moscow for five weeks, then suddenly and without reason fled backwards; rushed towards the Kaluzhskaya highway, and at the same time, (After winning the battle, because the battlefield near Maloyaroslaviets was in their favor), they retreated faster without fighting a battle, retreated to Smolensk, retreated from Smolensk, fled to Vil Na, fled to the Berezina River, fled further afield.

As early as the night of August 26, Kutuzov and the entire army believed that the Battle of Borodino had been won.Kutuzov also reported this to His Majesty.He gave the order to prepare a new campaign to destroy the enemy, not because he wanted to deceive anyone, but because he knew that the enemy had lost, and everyone who participated in the campaign knew this too. However, news of unheard-of deaths and the loss of half the army continued that night and the next day, so that a new campaign was impossible due to insufficient troops. It is impossible to conduct a campaign at this time, because the information has not been collected, the wounded have not been received, the ammunition has not been replenished, the dead have not been counted, new officers have not been appointed to replace the dead, and the men are starving. lack of sleep.At the same time, on the morning of the second day of the battle, the French army rushed straight at the Russian army with a speed that seemed to be inversely proportional to the distance from the army.Kutuzov wanted to attack the next day, and so did the whole army.But, in order to attack, desire alone is not enough; the possibility of attack is necessary, but at this moment, there is no such possibility.Now it was necessary to withdraw a day's march, and then it was equally necessary to retreat another day, and then a third day's march, and finally, on September 1, when the troops were approaching Moscow, despite the extreme excitement of the soldiers, the order of things Power, however, demanded that the troops move east of Moscow.They also retreated another day, the last day of their journey, leaving Moscow to the enemy.

Some people are accustomed to thinking that the plans for the entire war and even the various battles are drawn up by the commander, that is, like each of us, sitting in the office and looking at the map, imagine how he will direct this or that battle; for these people , all kinds of questions arose: why did Kutuzov not act so well during his retreat; why did he not hold his ground before withdrawing to Fili; highway and so on.People who are used to thinking like this forget, or don't know at all, the conditions necessary for the manager to take action.A commander-in-chief's actions are not at all different from those we conceive while sitting in an office, because in the office, we analyze the battle on the map under the condition of known forces on all sides and known terrain. The link was conceived at the beginning.The commander-in-chief always does not have the conditions for the starting point of an event, but we always have such conditions to study an event.The Commander-in-Chief is always in the middle of the course of events and, therefore, can never, not even for a minute, consider the full significance of the course of events.The event silently reveals its significance minute by minute, and at every moment of the continuous unfolding of the event, the commander-in-chief is in an extremely complicated contest, strategy, anxiety, mutual restraint, authority, planning, advice, threats and deceit At the center of etc., he must at all times have to answer the endless and sometimes contradictory questions that are put to him.

Military scientists tell us with too much seriousness that Kutuzov should have moved his troops to the Kaluzhskaya road long before he retreated to Fili, and this proposal was even suggested.But in front of the commander-in-chief, especially in difficult times, there are always not one, but dozens of proposals proposed at the same time.And every plan based on strategic and tactical considerations contradicts each other.What the commander-in-chief has to do seems to be to choose a plan.But he couldn't even do that.Events and times wait for no one.For example, someone suggested to him to move to the Kaluzhskaya road on the 28th, and at the same time an adjutant drove up from Miloradovich and asked whether he should engage the French now or retreat. .He had to give the order right now, in this minute.And the order to retreat would disrupt our transfer to the Kaluzhskaya road. Immediately after the adjutant, the quartermaster came to ask where the supplies should be delivered, the military medical officer asked where to send the wounded; The edict does not allow the possibility of abandoning Moscow, while the political enemy of the commander-in-chief, the man who plotted against him (not one, but several) proposes a diametrically opposed move to the Kaluzhskaya road. New plan; but the commander-in-chief himself needs sleep and nourishment; yet another senior general who has not been rewarded comes to complain; the inhabitants come to plead for protection; the exact opposite; scouts, prisoners, and generals on reconnaissance missions gave different accounts of the enemy's position.Those who are in the habit of misinterpreting or forgetting these conditions necessary for the actions of any commander-in-chief may show us the location and condition of the troops in the Fili area, and conclude that the commander-in-chief could have had no trouble at all on September 1st. The decision to give up or to defend Moscow could not be easily made. In fact, at a point where the Russian army was five versts from Moscow, this question could no longer be established.When will this problem be resolved?It was in Drissa, in Smolensk.It is especially evident at Shevardino on the 24th, at Borodino on the 26th, that every day, every hour and every minute of the retreat from Borodino to Fili was already in the solve this problem.