Napoleon went to war with Russia because he couldn't go to Dresden, he couldn't help being dazzled by his position of glory, he couldn't help putting on a Polish uniform, he couldn't help being influenced by the ambitions aroused on a June morning, he couldn't help but first In the presence of Kuragin, and then in the presence of Balashev, there was a sudden rage. Alexander refused all negotiations because he felt insulted.Barclay de Tolly tried to command the army in the best possible manner, in order to do his duty and earn the honor of Grand Commander.The reason why Rostov leaped to charge the French army was because he couldn't help galloping his horse on a flat field. That's why the countless people who participated in this battle all followed their own characteristics and habits. , environment and purpose.They are afraid and want nothing but fame; We understand what they don't understand themselves.Such is the inevitable fate of all practical activists that the higher they are, the less free they are.

Now, the activists of 1812, they have long since retired from the stage of history, their personal interests have long since disappeared, and only certain historical consequences of their time remain before us. Providence sent all these men to pursue their own ends, with a great historical consequence.No one at that time, whether it was Napoleon or Alexander, let alone a certain participant in the war, did not have the slightest expectation of this historical consequence. We now know very well the reasons for the fall of the French army in 1812.Nobody can argue anymore that Napoleon's army was destroyed for two reasons: first, because they penetrated deep into the heart of Russia and were too late to prepare for the winter; , thus forming the nature of war.However, not only was no one foreseeing it at the time (it seems obvious now), but only in this way would the 800,000 troops commanded by the best commanders in the world be able to survive against an army twice as weak as themselves. Inexperienced, and commanded by inexperienced commanders, the Russian army was destroyed; and not only was this not foreseen by anyone, but all efforts on the part of the Russians were often hindered by the only thing that could save Russia. and the French, despite the military genius and combat experience of the so-called Napoleon, made every effort to advance to Moscow at the end of the summer, that is, to do what would inevitably lead to the destruction of the French army.

In the historical works about 1812, French authors always like to talk about how Napoleon felt the danger of the extended front, how he looked for a decisive battle, how Napoleon's marshal persuaded him to stand still in Smolensk, And cite some other similar arguments to prove that the time was already aware of the danger of war; while the Russian author prefers to talk about, from the beginning of the campaign, there was a Scythian plan to lure Napoleon deep into the heart of Russia. The plan has been attributed to Pfuel by some, some Frenchman by some, Thor by some, and Alexander himself by others, and notes, schemes, and letters are cited, in which it is true There are hints of such a battle plan.But all insinuations of events foreseen, whether by Russians or French, are now made public only because de facto events have justified their insinuations.If the event had not happened, the hints would have been forgotten.Just as there are now thousands of hints and assumptions to the contrary, popular at the time, but proved to be incorrect, and thus forgotten.There are so many assumptions about the outcome of every event that no matter what the outcome of the event, someone will always say: "I told the time that this is how it will end." But they completely forget, Among the countless hypotheses there are many opinions to the contrary.

That Napoleon felt the danger of a drawn-out front, and that the Russians intended to lure the enemy deep into the depths of Russia, are obviously assumptions of this kind; only historians can force such speculations on Napoleon and his generals imposed that plan on the Russian military generals.All these facts are diametrically opposed to such assumptions.During the entire war in Russia, not only had no intention of luring the enemy into the heart of Russia, but from the moment the enemy first invaded Russia, they did everything possible to prevent the French army from advancing; He is proud of winning the battle, and he is not as eager to find new fighters as he was in previous battles.

Our armies were cut off at the very beginning of the war, and the only object we sought was to bring them together, though a combined army was no good for retreating or luring the enemy deep into the interior.The emperor's personal visit to the army was to encourage the army to hold on to every inch of Russian land, not to retreat.According to Pfuel's plan, a huge barracks was deployed at Drissa, so there was no plan to retreat.The emperor blamed the commander-in-chief for every step back.But not only Moscow was burned, but the enemy was allowed to attack Smolensk, which even the emperor found incredible.When rendezvousing with the army, the emperor was greatly indignant at the loss and burning of Smolensk and the failure to fight a great battle outside the city.

So the emperor thought, and the Russian generals and the whole Russian people were still more indignant at the thought of our troops retreating to the hinterlands. After Napoleon cut off the Russian army, he continued to push into the heart of Russia, and gave up several chances for a decisive battle.In Smolensk in August he was preoccupied with advancing, but we now see that such a further advance was clearly self-defeating for him. It is evident that neither Napoleon foresaw the danger of marching on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian generals then think of luring Napoleon deep into the hinterland, but thought just the opposite.Napoleon was lured deep into the heart of Russia, not by anyone's plan (no one would believe the possibility of such a thing), but by those who did not foresee what was bound to happen, what the only way to save Russia was. It is caused by the extremely complicated intrigues, intrigues, private purposes and various desires of the combatants.Everything happened by accident.The army was cut off early in the war.We try to bring the armies together, the obvious purpose is to fight a battle and prevent the enemy from attacking, but when we try to bring the army together, we should avoid fighting the strongest enemy, and unconsciously retreat at an acute angle, so that we lead the French army to the enemy. Arrived in Smolensk.But more than that, our retreat was formed at an acute angle because the French advanced between our two armies, and the sharper the angle became, the farther we retreated because of Barclay de Tolly. He was an unpopular German, and Bagration (the officer under Barclay's command) hated him very much, so Bagration, in command of the Second Army, tried to delay joining forces with Barclay as long as possible. Not under his command, Bagration delayed joining forces (although the main purpose of all commanders was to join forces), because he felt that his army would be in danger during the march, and it would be in his best interest to retreat to the left and south , harassing the enemy's flanks and rear, replenishing his troops in Ukraine.It seems that he was able to think of this because he did not want to belong to the hated and inferior German Barclay.

The emperor came to the army in person to boost morale, but his personal conquest and hesitation, as well as a large number of advisers to offer advice, destroyed the combat effectiveness of the first army, so the army retreated. They had planned to hold on to Drissa's position, but Paulsi, who had conspired with the Commander-in-Chief, used his energies to influence Alexander, unexpectedly, and the whole plan of Pfuel was abandoned, and all military affairs were entrusted to Barclay.But Barclay was unpopular, and his powers were limited. After the army was dispersed, there was no unified command, and Barclay was popular.On the one hand, because of this confusion, the army was cut off, and the Commander-in-Chief, the Germans, showed hesitation and avoided all battles (if the armies would get together, and Barclay was not the Commander-in-Chief, then There must be a war); on the other hand, indignation against the Germans grew stronger and patriotic enthusiasm grew.

At last the emperor left the army, and the single best excuse for him to leave the army was that he had to inspire the people of the capital to start a people's war.The emperor's trip to Moscow tripled the Russian army. The emperor left the army in order not to fetter the unity of the commander-in-chief, in the hope that some more decisive measures would be taken later; but the leadership in the army was more disordered and gradually weakened.Bennigsen, the Grand Duke, and a large group of high-ranking aide-de-camp remained in the army to watch and encourage the commander-in-chief's movements, while Barclay felt less free under these eyes and eyes of the king, and for decisive actions Be more careful and always avoid fights.

Barclays advocates proceeding with caution.The crown prince hinted at an act of treachery and called for a major battle.The quarrel between Lyubomirski, Branicki, and Wlotsky was so severe that Barclay, under the pretext of presenting documents to the Emperor, sent the Polish high-ranking aide-de-camp to Petersburg, and then told Benig Mori and the Grand Duke engage in an open struggle. In spite of Bagration's reluctance, at last the armies met at Smolensk. Bagration drove to Barclay's residence.Barclay came out to greet him with his ribbons on, and reported to the senior Bagration.Bagration tried his best to be magnanimous, and despite his high rank, he still obeyed Barclay's leadership; but as a subordinate, he was even more out of harmony with him.Bagration reported to the Emperor himself, as ordered by the Emperor.In his letter to Arakcheyev, he wrote: "Although this is the will of my emperor, I cannot get along with the minister (Barclay) anyway. For God's sake, please put I can be sent anywhere, even commanding a regiment, but I can't be here; since the whole headquarters is full of Germans, a Russian can't be here, and there's no point in staying. I thought, I really I was serving the Emperor and my country, but it turned out that I was serving Barclays. Seriously, I was reluctant." A group of Branitsky, Wenzengerode and his like worsened The relationship between the two commanders was overwhelmed, and the result was even more disunity.They were preparing to attack the French before Smolensk, and a general was sent to inspect the position.But he hated Barclay and went to spend a day with a friend, the Legionnaire, before returning to Barclay to find fault with every aspect of the future battlefield he hadn't seen.

While quarreling and plotting about the future of the battlefield, while we were looking for the French army by mistake, the French had broken through Neverovsky's division and were approaching the walls of Smolensk. In order to save our lines of communication, an unexpectedly bad battle had to be fought in Smolensk.The battle was fought, and thousands of people were killed on both sides. Smolensk fell.This is against the will of the emperor and the people.But Smolensk was destroyed by the inhabitants themselves, deceived by the governor. The ruined inhabitants set an example for other Russians. run away.Napoleon continued to advance, we retreated, and thus achieved the inevitable victory over Napoleon.