Chapter 81 Chapter Fourteen Twenty Years of Crisis 5

5 As the web of transnational economic domination of the world tightens, it also severely undermines an institution of human society that has been universal since 1945: the nation-state based on territorial sovereignty.Because these countries now have less and less control over their affairs, all kinds of organizations whose actions and operations are based on territorial boundaries, such as trade unions, congresses, national public broadcasting systems, etc., have since failed.On the contrary, another type of organization whose operations are not limited by territorial boundaries, such as multinational corporations, international currency markets, and global media communication in the satellite age, has begun to sing triumphant songs.The superpowers that used to be able to manipulate the every move of the vassal regime are now gone, further intensifying this trend of blurring national boundaries.Even the most irreplaceable major function created by nation-states in the 20th century: that is, the "re-income re-payment" achieved through social welfare, education, medical care, and other "transfer payment" means of fund distribution. The "distribution" function is now theoretically not self-sufficient within national borders - although in practice most will continue to be so - although supranational organizations such as the European Community are now beginning to subsidize in some respects.In the days of the free-market theologians, the idea of ​​the state was undermined even further, when there was a strong wind that decomposed and "returned" to the "market "Hand.

Paradoxically, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the phenomenon of the decline of the nation-state has gone hand in hand with a rush to carve up old territories into many new smaller states.Most of these territorial division claims are based on certain groups' demands for the monopoly of national languages ​​and cultures.In the beginning, the rise of this self-governing and separatist movement—mainly since 1970—was mostly a phenomenon in Western countries, which can be seen in Britain, Spain, Canada, Belgium, and even Switzerland and Denmark; in the early 1970s Since then, it has even appeared in Yugoslavia, a socialist country with the least centralized power.The advent of the crisis of communism has blown the wind to the east, where more new and nominally national states have been established since 1991 than at any other time in the 20th century.However, until the 1990s, the western hemisphere south of the Canadian border was not shaken by this wind in the slightest.As for other regions where some countries disintegrated in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Afghanistan and parts of Africa, the new forms that replaced the old countries were mostly anarchic chaos rather than separation into numerous new countries.

This kind of development is indeed full of contradictions. To put it simply, the troubles faced by these new small countries come from the same flaws as in the old ones, but now that the countries are small and weak, the troubles are even bigger.But it is not surprising at the same time, because by the end of the 20th century, the only existing state model in the world was a type that established boundaries and had autonomous mechanisms—in short, the nation-state model since the revolutionary era. .What's more, since 1918, all political powers in the world have been under the banner of the principle of "national self-determination", and its definition is increasingly limited to the racial category of language and culture.From this point of view, Lenin and President Wilson have the same views. Europe under the Treaty of Versailles, and the vast territory that later became the Soviet Union, were built on associations formed by nation-states.Take the Soviet Union as an example (Yugoslavia will follow the example of the Soviet Union in the future), which was formed by the union of this type of nation-states, and the latter has the right to separate from the union in theory—though not in practice.Once such a union is disintegrated, it will naturally split along the pre-delineated boundary line.

In fact, however, the secessionist nationalism that has been in crisis for two decades is quite different from the initial period of the nation-state in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It basically belongs to the combination of three phenomena.One is the fierce resistance of existing nation-states to their own reduction to regional membership.This phenomenon became more and more obvious in the 1980s when the member states (or quasi-member states) of the European Community struggled to maintain their autonomy.These countries may have very different political personalities—Norway and Margaret Thatcher's Britain, for example—but in matters of national importance they are all alike, and they all want to be consistent in the pan-European general standardization. The autonomy of one place and one country.However, protectionism, which has traditionally been the main pillar of national-state self-defense, is clearly much weaker in the two decades of crisis than it was during the catastrophe of that year.Global free trade, at this time still the highest ideal, is surprisingly not even a contemporary fact - all the more so after the collapse of the economic system of national command - although some countries covertly defend themselves against Foreign competition, it is said that Japan and France are the masters.But the Italians have managed to keep their own car – namely the Fiat – taking a huge slice of the domestic pie, which is particularly impressive.However, these can only be regarded as defensive defenses. Although the battles have become more intense and sometimes quite successful, the most intense line of fire is often outside the economy and involves cultural identity.The French - and to some extent the Germans - fought desperately to preserve the high subsidies provided to their own farmers.The reason for this is not only because the peasant family holds the votes at stake, but also because the French sincerely believe that once smallholder agriculture does not exist-no matter how uneconomical and uncompetitive this method-the idyllic scenery, the The long tradition, part of the French national identity, will also be destroyed.The United States has repeatedly asked France to open free trade in film and audio-visual products, but the French strongly resisted with the support of other European countries.Because if requested by the U.S. side, the U.S. entertainment industry will carry Hollywood’s old glory, and under the momentum of rebuilding the world’s film and television hegemony, its products will inevitably flood French public and private silver (screen) screens (although these are based in the U.S. entertainment business, which is now owned and controlled by multiple countries).But the real reason is more than that. The French also feel—and rightly—that purely cost-based profit-making can lead to the end of French-language film production.Regardless of the economic reasons, there are still some things in life that must be deliberately protected.If, even if we can prove that the construction of luxury hotels, shopping malls, and conference halls on the original site will bring greater value-added to the national product than the original tourism, will the government of any country seriously consider this? Shoveling your own Chartres Cathedral or the Tai Mahal to the ground?Questions like these just need to be asked, and the answer is already there.

The second phenomenon, best described in terms of the collective egoism of the rich, also reflects the growing disparity between rich and poor within continents, between countries, and within regions.Old-fashioned nation-states, whether central or federal, and supranational entities such as the "European Union", usually took responsibility for the development of their entire territories and, to some extent, shared the Overall burdens and benefits.This kind of move means that poorer and backward regions can receive subsidies from more advanced and rich regions (via some kind of central allocation mechanism system), and sometimes even give priority to investment in order to narrow the gap.But the European Community is very practical. Its membership is only awarded to countries whose poverty and backwardness will not cause undue burdens on the remaining member states.This practical style of picking and choosing was not seen in the "North American Free Trade Area" (NAFTA) in 1993.The United States and Canada (with an average GNP of $20,000 in 1990) have no choice but to shoulder the burden of Mexico, whose GNP is only one-eighth of that.Within a country, the reluctance of rich areas to subsidize poor areas has always been familiar to scholars who study local government, and the United States is the best example.In the "inner city" (inner city) of the United States, the poor gather, and because the original residents have moved out one after another, fleeing to the suburbs, resulting in insufficient tax revenue, most of the problems are caused by the above-mentioned psychology.Who wants to give money to the poor?Wealthy suburbs of Los Angeles, such as Santa Monica and Malibu, opted out of the city because of this; Reasons to vote to secede from New York.

Part of the secessionist movement during the twenty years of crisis stemmed from this collective egocentric mentality.The separation pressure of Yugoslavia came from the "European" Slovenia and Croatia; the secession force of Czechoslovakia came from the loud clamor for the "western" Czech Republic.Catalonia and the Basque Country are the wealthiest and most developed regions in Spain; the single most important secession movement in Latin America also came from Rio Grande do Sul, the wealthiest state in Brazil.Among them, the most representative of this self-sacrificing mentality is the Lombard League that emerged in the late 1980s-later renamed the Northern League-its goal is to center on Milan, the "economic capital" of Italy. , separated from the rule of the political capital Rome.The alliance's vocabulary, with constant references to the glories of the Middle Ages past and the local Lombard dialect, is a common inflammatory rhetoric used by nationalists.But the real key lies in the fact that the rich districts do not want their own wealth to flow out.

Third, perhaps it is mainly a reaction, an echo of the cultural revolution in the 20th century, that is, the disintegration of traditional social norms and texture as value.Many people in the developed world have become abandoned and lonely wandering souls in this earth-shattering social and cultural change. The word "community" has been used so abstractly and impractically over the past few decades—such as "public relations group", "gay group" and so on—because the so-called community in the original sociological sense , which is hard to find in real life.So the so-called "identity group" (identity group) rises, that is, a person can "belong" to a certain "race" without any doubt; this phenomenon, since the late 1960s, has always been good at self Observation of people within the United States noted.Most of them naturally appeal to the common "ethnic" background, but those who aim at collective separatism like to borrow similar nationalist language, such as gay defenders love to use the queernation one word.

This phenomenon of "new ethnic groups" also emerges endlessly in the countries with the most multi-ethnic structures, showing that the political nature of the so-called identity groups is very different from the traditional "national self-determination".The goal pursued by the latter is to create a country with a certain territory and identify with a specific "group of people", which is basically a nationalist idea.But the requirement to separate the land is not part of their "ethnic politics" for African-Americans or Italians.Similarly, the political attributes of Ukrainians in Canada do not belong to Ukraine but to Canada.In fact, within a city that is inherently a heterogeneous society, its ethnic politics or similar political essences are competing with each other, that is, different ethnic groups in a non-ethnic country, each exerting their allegiance to their own group to marry politics. , and compete for a share of the resource pie.For example, New York City politicians manipulate the redrawing of constituencies to elect representatives for Latino, Oriental and gay groups. Once such people are elected, they will naturally demand more from New York City.

Ethnic identity politics has one thing in common with racial nationalism at the end of the century, that is, both insist that in a person's identification with the group, there is something related to survival and the so-called innate, irreversible It is thus a permanent personal trait.And these traits are shared only with other members of the group, and no one else has them.Unique exclusivity has become the highest definition, because the differences between various human societies are actually extremely thin.As a result, young Jewish people in the United States are eager to find their "roots", because the distinctive marks that identified them as Jewish have lost their effectiveness, and the segregation and discrimination before World War II are no longer seen.Although Canada’s “Quebec” keeps claiming that it is a “very different society”, Quebec became a major force in Canada only after it shed its bright color that was always “very different” until the 1960s. occur (Ignatieff 1993, pp. 115-117).Racial composition changes and flows in urban society, and it would be arbitrarily pretentious to uphold the absolute basis for racial discrimination.Taking the United States as an example, except for blacks, Hispanics, and those of British and German descent, at least 60% of women of various ethnicities born in the United States are intermarried with foreigners (Lieberson, Waters, 1988, p. .173), so "personal identity" increasingly needs to be based on "others' differences".If not, how can I survive?German neo-Nazi skinheads, wearing uniforms, shaven heads, and dancing to the music of universal teenage culture, how can they assert their German identity without beating up the local Turks and Albanians?How can we, the Croat, or the Serbs, have been established for most of history without cutting off those who "do not belong" to us? (Serb)'s "unique" personality?

No matter what the ultimate goal of this highly exclusive identity politics is, no matter whether it requires the establishment of an independent country or not, the tragedy is that it will not work at all, and everyone can only pretend on the surface that it is a fact that it can be realized.Italian-Americans in Brooklyn, so emphatically (and probably increasingly) Italian, they love talking to each other in Italian, sorry for not being fluent in what should be their native language.But where they live and work is obviously the American economy and society, whether it is Italy or not, except for some very small special markets, it doesn't matter at all.As for the so-called blacks, Indians, Russians, or women, or any kind of identity group, which has its own psychology that cannot be explained or understood by outsiders, this kind of rhetoric has only its sole function, that is, to encourage this. Only in the mechanism of this point of view can we survive, and once we go out, we cannot stand up.The physics studied by Islamic fundamentalists is not Islamic physics; the engineering studied by Israeli engineers is not exclusive to Jewish Hasidic (Cassidic) engineering.Even France and Germany, which have the strongest concept of cultural nationalism, have to admit that in a global village where scientific and technological experts and scholars work together, an international common language similar to medieval Latin is bound to be needed; It's English.Perhaps under the genocide, collective expulsion, and "ethnic cleansing" of the past generations, in theory, the world has been divided into many homogeneous territories according to ethnicity.Yet even in such a world, due to the mass movement of people (workers, tourists, businessmen, technologists, etc.), the prevalence of fashions, and the pervasive tentacles of the global economy, it is inevitable to become heterogeneous again. Society, this scene, is vividly seen in Central Europe; but this place was subjected to "racial purification" during and after World War II.This situation is bound to happen in an increasingly urbanized world.

Thus, identity politics, and end-of-the-century nationalism, are not a solution to the difficult problems of the late 20th century, but an emotional response to them.But as the century draws to a close, where are the mechanisms for resolving these conundrums?What is the method?But it is clearly becoming more and more problematic.Nation-states can no longer provoke this task.But who can? Since the United Nations was founded in 1945, countless institutions have been created to deal with such problems.The establishment of the United Nations was based on the assumption that the two powers of the United States and the Soviet Union would continue to shoulder international affairs, but this dream was soon shattered.However, compared with its predecessor, the League of Nations, the United Nations still has one achievement that is not satisfactory.It has finally existed through the second half of the 20th century; and its membership has gradually become an identity certificate for the international recognition of a country's independence and sovereignty.However, according to its own charter, the sources of power and resources of the United Nations are all delegated by member states, so it does not have the power to act independently. Given the growing need for international coordination, the two decades of crisis have seen the emergence of new international organizations faster than in any previous period.By the mid-1980s, there were 365 official international organizations in the world, and no less than 4,615 unofficial ones, more than twice the number in the early 1970s (Held, 1988, p.15).What's more, with regard to major issues such as environmental and ecological protection, people are increasingly aware of the need for immediate international joint action.It is a pity that the only procedure that can achieve the above goals is time-consuming and sluggish, because international agreements must be signed and approved by each country before they can take effect.One example of its slow effectiveness is the protection of the Antarctic continent and the permanent ban on whale hunting.In the 1980s, the Iraqi government actually used poison gas on its own people, which was tantamount to breaking one of the few sincere agreements in the world, that is, the 1925 "Geneva Convention" that banned the use of chemical weapons, and further weakened the current situation. have the effect of international means. Fortunately, in addition to this, there are two ways to guarantee international action, and these two methods have also been strengthened to a considerable extent during the two decades of the crisis.First, many medium-sized countries have surrendered state power automatically to supranational authorities because they feel that they are not strong enough to continue to stand alone in the world. In the 1980s, the European Economic Community, which was renamed the "European Community" and then changed to the "European Union" in the 1990s, doubled its membership in the 1970s; The decision-making power of member state affairs.Although the increase in the number of its members and the expansion of the power of the European Community will inevitably lead to dissatisfaction and resistance from the governments of member states and domestic public opinion, the increase in its scale and power is an undeniable fact.What makes the European Community so powerful is its unelected central body in Brussels, which can make decisions independently, completely independent of the pressure of democratic politics.The only very indirect influence is through regular meetings and consultations of representatives of member governments (whose governments are elected).The European Union's special way of doing things allows it to function effectively as a supranational authority, subject only to certain specific veto powers. Another weapon of joint international action, which also operates without the involvement of sovereign states and democratic politics, to a lesser extent, but at least as much, is the international financial organization established after World War II. Among them, the International Monetary Fund, And the World Bank-based (see Chapter 9, Section 4).The two institutions have acquired growing decision-making power during the two decades of crisis, backed by oligopolies in the major capitalist countries - named after the vaguely titled "Group of Seven" , and since the 1970s, the oligarchic forces of the "Seventh National Congress" have become more and more formally institutionalized.The changing situation of international exchange, the debt crisis in the third world, and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc economy after 1989 have made more and more countries in the world have to rely on the nose of rich countries, relying on the willingness of the latter to agree to lend loans.And all kinds of borrowings have increasingly become a prerequisite, that is, the economic policy of the debtor country must be in line with the wishes of the international banking authorities. The 1980s came at a time when neoliberal theology was gaining momentum, and its advocacy manifested itself as a policy of systematic privatization and liberalized market capitalism.These two policies were imposed on governments that had already lost their fortunes and had no strength to resist; regardless of whether they had a direct impact on the economic problems of these countries (Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union was an example).Keynes and White, if they saw that the two world financial organizations they established at the beginning had changed to this point, they would not know how to feel.What they had in mind—not to mention their goal of full employment in their respective countries—has evolved in a very different way than it does today.However, although this question is interesting, it doesn't make any sense. However, these are extremely effective international power institutions, especially the best weapon for the rich countries to impose policies on the poor countries.As this century draws to a close, the aftereffects of these policies and the consequences for the development of the world are still not fully answered. There are two major regions of the world where their effects will be tested.One is the economies of the Soviet Union and its associated Eurasia, which have declined since the fall of communism in the West.The other is the third world full of social powder magazines.As we will see in the next chapter, since the 1950s, the Third World has become the greatest source of political unrest on Earth.