Chapter 74 Chapter Thirteen "Socialism in Reality" 1

1 When the dust of the Great War and Civil War in the early 1920s settled, the blood on the corpses and wounds finally condensed, and most of the Orthodox Russian Empire, which was originally ruled by the Tsar before 1914, was completely reappeared as a large empire at this time.But this time, the new empire was under the rule of the Bolshevik regime and was single-minded in its efforts to build world socialism.Russia, among the ancient dynasties and ancient religious empires, only survived the flames of the First World War.The Ottoman Empire was wiped out, and its sultan was originally a devout Muslim caliph.The Habsburg dynasty has fallen into ruins, and its emperor has always had a special political-religious relationship with the Roman Catholic Church.Both empires disintegrated under the pressure of defeat.Only Russia, which still maintains its multi-ethnic appearance, extends from the border of Poland in the west to the east, until it is adjacent to Japan in the east.The reason why it can survive alone is that the October Revolution is obviously an absolute factor.For in the late 1990s, after the disintegration of the Communist system that had held the alliance together since 1917, the tensions that had previously forced the collapse of other great empires also began to emerge or revive within the Soviet Union.At that time, the future was uncertain, but Russia, which stood up in the early 1920s, was still a unified single country. One-sixth of the world's land, and is determined to work for a society that is very different from capitalism and firmly opposed to capitalism.

In 1945, the number of regions withdrawing from capitalist society increased significantly.In Europe, east of the line from the Elbe in Germany to the Adriatic Sea, and the entire Balkan Peninsula, except for a small piece of land in Greece and Turkey, are included in its territory.Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the German regions occupied by the Red Army after the war and later established the "German Democratic Republic" all fell under the socialist umbrella.The territory lost by Russia after the First World War and the 1917 Revolution, as well as parts of the former Habsburg dynasty, were also recovered or occupied by the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1945.At the same time, the socialist camp has made great achievements in the Far East. China (1949), half of North Korea (1945), and the former French Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) in the long 30 years (1945-1945) 1975), the regime changed its banner and fell under the rule of the Communist Party.In addition, the power of the Communist Party expanded along several other places, including Cuba in the Western Hemisphere (1959), and Africa in the 1970s, but basically by 1950, the territory of socialism in the world had been roughly demarcated.Moreover, thanks to China's large population, the second world has one-third of the world's population at once.But if China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are not counted (Vietnam also has a population of 58 million), generally speaking, socialist countries are not counted as countries with large populations, ranging from 1.8 million in Mongolia to 36 million in Poland.

The socialism implemented in the above countries in the 1960s, to use the terminology of Soviet-style ideology, belongs to "socialism in reality"-this term is actually a bit vague, as if it means that there should be other better socialism , just because it is based on facts, there is only such a kind that is actually being practiced at present.And this region is also the country whose socio-economic systems and regimes have collapsed and separated as Europe bid farewell to the 1980s and entered the 1990s.As for the socialist countries in the East, their regimes are still undergoing reforms, among which China is the most important.

The first thing worthy of our observation in the socialist areas is that throughout the whole world, they basically form their own patterns and exist independently.Politically and economically, it has become a self-sufficient self-sufficient world with little contact with outside capitalism or the world economy controlled by developed capitalist countries.Even in the great prosperity of the golden age, when international trade was at its peak, only 4% of the exported goods in developed markets were exported to the so-called "central planning economy" regions.Even in the 1980s, the proportion of exports from the third world to the region was no more than that.As for the export volume of the socialist economy itself is limited, the proportion of their exports to the outside world is higher than that of the latter.However, in terms of the amount of international trade in the 1960s (1965), the mutual transactions within the socialist group accounted for about two-thirds (UN International Trade, 1983, voll. p. 1046).

Since the 1960s, although Eastern European countries have policies to encourage tourism, the flow of population from the first world to the second world is still very low, and the reasons are obvious.As for immigration and short-term travel to "non-socialism", it was also severely restricted and sometimes impossible.When it comes to the political system of the socialist world, the Soviet model is basically taken as a teacher, and its uniqueness can be said to be unmatched in the world.They are based on absolute one-party rule, with strict classes and clear layers-economic affairs are planned by the central government, unified command and command; political consciousness is dominated by Marxism-Leninism, and the whole people are united.The segregation or self-isolation of the so-called "socialist camp" (to borrow a term from the Soviet Union from 1940) began to disintegrate in the 1970s and 1980s, but the extent of the separation between the two worlds is still amazing-not to mention this It was also an era of revolutionary progress in communication and travel.For a long time, news about these countries was almost completely blocked from the outside world, and the outside world was also strictly blocked from the inside.Such isolation makes even educated residents of the first world feel alienated and confused about things in these countries.Because the past and present of these countries, their language and actions are too far away from us, and it is too difficult to understand.

The fundamental reason for the isolation of the two "camps" is of course political.Since the October Revolution, Russia has regarded world capitalism as its enemy. Once the world revolution is feasible, it must be eradicated.But the dreamed revolution did not materialize, and Soviet Russia was instead isolated and surrounded by the capitalist world.The most powerful governments of the latter are also more committed to preventing the Soviet Union, the global center of rebellion, and they will go away as soon as they want to go in the future.The Soviet regime was not officially recognized by the United States until 1933, which proves that it has always had an illegal status in the heart of the latter.What's more, when Lenin, who has always been practical in style, was in fact so urgent that he was ready to make big concessions in order to ask foreign funds to help Russia rebuild the economy, all these efforts were in vain. Therefore, the young Soviet Union had to go It cannot be isolated from the rest of the world economic system in order to embark on a self-sufficient development path.Paradoxically, the fact of economic isolation provides its strongest arguments in terms of political ideology.Its isolation saved it from the catastrophe of a worldwide recession brought on by the Wall Street crash of 1929.

In the 1930s, politics once again influenced economics, reinforcing the isolation of the Soviet economy.What's more, after 1945 even the world under the wing of the Soviet Union was involved in the same isolation situation.The Cold War began, and the political and economic relations between the two camps of the East and the West were declared frozen.In fact, all but the most insignificant (or ulterior) economic relations between the two sides are subject to the strict control of each other's governments, so that the trade between the two sides is completely determined by the political relationship.It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the "socialist camp" integrated itself with the wider economic world.Looking back at the formerly isolated economic world, we can see that this change is the beginning of the end of "socialism in reality".However, from a purely theoretical point of view, it is not without reason that the Soviet economy, which was reborn after the baptism of revolution and civil war, had a closer relationship with another world economic system than the actual development.Throughout the world, there is an example in Finland that proves that a centrally planned economy can also coexist closely with Western-style economic operations. The proportion of Finland’s imports from the Soviet Union was once as high as a quarter of its total imports, and the same proportion Exported to the Soviet Union.However, the "socialist camp" that historians care about here is not a theoretical hypothesis of "possibility" or "perhaps", but a historical fact that actually happened.

In fact, Russia's new masters, the Bolsheviks, never thought they could survive in isolation, let alone conceive of themselves as the nucleus of any kind of self-sufficient collective economy.Among the various conditions that Marx and his followers considered indispensable to the construction of a socialist economy, none of them are contained in this huge "socialism in reality" bunker. synonym.The founders of Marx's theory often thought that the Russian Revolution would inevitably trigger the fire of revolution in advanced industrial countries, because the latter already possessed the prerequisites for building socialism.As stated earlier in this book, in 1917-18 this situation did seem to be gaining momentum.And Lenin's then-controversial actions—at least among Marxists, at least among Marxists—seem to have some merit.Lenin believed that on the road of socialist revolutionary struggle, Moscow was only a temporary command center. Once the time was right, its permanent headquarters should be moved to Berlin.In the same way, it is no wonder that the working language of the World Revolutionary Staff Headquarters established in 1919 - the Communist International - is not Russian but German.

But the situation took a turn for the worse. For a while, it seemed that the only place where the proletarian revolution could win was the Soviet Union (but the Communist regime in the Soviet Union was obviously not short-lived).The great cause of the global revolution is not expected, and the Bolsheviks naturally have only one goal left, which is to transform their backward and poor motherland into a progressive economic society as soon as possible.To accomplish this mission, the first task is to break superstition, eradicate illiteracy, and accelerate the modernization revolution of science and technology and industry.Thus, a communism that started from the Soviet system basically became a great cause to transform backward countries.Such a concentrated and fast-growing means of economic construction is quite attractive even in the eyes of the developed capitalist world.At that time, the latter was in a great disaster and was anxiously looking for a way to regain its glory. The Soviet Union was of more direct significance to the problems of Western Europe and North America, because the backward agricultural society of Soviet Russia was the shadow of these countries.The economic development plan put forward by the Soviet Union—under national overall planning and central planning, ultra-high-speed development of various basic industries and infrastructure that are indispensable to a modern industrial society—seems to be a good prescription for its difficult disease.The Moscow model is not only inherently better than the Detroit or Manchester model (because it represents an anti-imperialist spirit), it is actually more appropriate, especially for those countries that lack private capital and a large number of private enterprises.Therefore, "socialism" was developed from this perspective, which greatly encouraged many new countries that came out of colonial status after World War II. While rejecting communism, their governments embraced socialism (see Chapter 12).Countries joining the socialist camp, except for Czechoslovakia, the future East Germany, and Hungary (Hungary’s development level is slightly lower than the former two), generally have backward agricultural economies, so the economic prescription of the Soviet Union seems to be very useful.As a result, leaders of various countries took actions one after another, devoted themselves sincerely and enthusiastically to the important task of this era of economic construction.At the same time, the Soviet Union's prescription seems to be quite effective - in the years between the two wars, especially in the 1930s, the Soviet Union's economic growth was faster than that of all countries except Japan.In the first 15 years after World War II, the growth rate of the "socialist camp" was also much faster than that of the West.Its prosperity made Khrushchev of the Soviet Union complacent, thinking that as long as his own growth curve continued to rise at the same rate, the time when socialist production would lead capitalism was just around the corner—even British Prime Minister Macmillan had to do so believe.Back in the 1950s, there was actually more than one person who held the same view. Many people believed that this trend was not impossible.

Interestingly, I have searched the works of Marx and Engels, but I have never seen the two mentors mentioning the "central planning" that will become the central guiding principle of socialism in the future, and the ultra-high-speed industrial development with heavy industry as the first priority. .Of course, "planning" is a natural inherent attribute in a socialist economic system, and this matter is self-evident.But back before 1917, when socialists, Marxists, and other heroes of all walks of life were busy fighting capitalism, everyone was so busy, what should be done about the economic system that replaced it? What kind of route, there is no time to worry about it.Even after the October Revolution, although Lenin himself had stepped into the abyss of socialism, he was not eager to venture into the depths of the unknown.It was only because of the sudden reversal of the situation immediately after the outbreak of the civil war that the general trend led to the nationalization of industry in 1918 and the subsequent "War Communism" (War Communism), and the Bolshevik government was able to raise resources and command Form an army and fight a life-and-death duel with counter-revolutionaries and foreign forces.All wartime economies - even capitalist countries - are inextricably linked to state planning and control.In fact, Lenin's plan was inspired by Germany's wartime economic model in 1914-1918 (although we have also seen that the German model may not be the best example of this type of economic model at that time).The wartime economic policy of the Communist Party naturally tends in principle to the means of public property and public management, and abolishes the economic mechanism of the market and prices.What's more, when a nationwide war comes suddenly, without preparation, the characteristics of capitalism are of little use at all, and it is completely incapable of hastily responding to the battle.In addition, there were indeed a few idealists in the Communist Party at that time.Nikolai Bukharin, for example, believed that the civil war was an excellent opportunity to establish the basic structure of a communist utopia.A severe economic downturn in times of crisis, widespread shortages, rationing of the basic necessities of life—bread, clothes, bus tickets.All kinds of Spartan aspects have also become harbingers of socialist ideals.In fact, when the Soviet regime was victorious and revived in the civil war (1918-1920), no matter how effective the current wartime economy was for a while, this path would obviously not work if it continued to go forward.This was partly due to peasants rebelling against the army's confiscation of food (guns were the backbone of the wartime economy), and workers rebelling against the hardships of life.Another part of the reason is that the means of the wartime economy could not revive the already destroyed economy: after several years of war, the Soviet Union's steel production fell from 4.2 million tons in 1913 to 200,000 tons.

Lenin has always acted in a practical style, so from 1921 he announced the "New Economic Policy" (New Economic Policy, NEP), which is tantamount to reintroducing the market principle.In fact - to paraphrase his own words - a retreat from a "war economy" into a phase of "State Capitalism".However, at this time, Russia's already inferior economy suffered another serious setback, and its scale dropped to one-tenth of its size before the war (see Chapter 2).Large-scale industrialization, and the dual need for "government planning" to achieve this goal, naturally became the top priority of the Soviet government. Although the "New Economic Policy" disbanded "War Communism", the means by which the government forcibly controls everything has become the only model of a socialist economy.The first institution to host the program, the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia, opened in 1920, with the task of modernizing technology, of course.But the goals of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), established the following year (1921), were far more extensive, and the agency survived under that name until the collapse of the Soviet Union.It is not only the overlord and guide of all state-level planning units, but also the general macro hub of the national economy in the 20th century. The "New Economic Policy" sparked heated debates in Russia in the 1920s, and sparked heated debates again in the early 1980s when Gorbachev came to power—but this time the reason for the dispute was completely opposite. The "New Economic Policy" of the 1920s was obviously regarded by everyone as a sign of the defeat of communism, at least it meant that the teams advancing on the highway were forced to get out of the right way for a while.As for how to return to the right path, the path direction is not very clear.Radicals, like those of Trotsky's, advocated a quick break with NEP and a large-scale industrialization campaign, an idea that was eventually adopted during Stalin's reign.The moderates in the center, led by Bukharin, put the years of war communism behind them.Regarding the status quo of the Soviet Union, they were deeply aware of the fact that after the revolution, the country was dominated by small peasant culture more than before. The Bolshevik government was operating in such an environment, and the political and economic constraints could be imagined. The faction is in favor of "gradients".As for Lenin's own views, he was unable to express clearly after his sudden illness in 1922, and he died in early 1924.However, when he can rarely express some meaning, it seems that he is on the side of "gradual change".On the other hand, the debates in the 1980s were a kind of retrospective exploration. From a historical perspective, we wanted to find another possible option for socialism for the Stalinist line that actually followed the "New Economic Policy" back then. That is, a new road, a road of socialism that is different from the two factions around the 1920s.Looking back on the past, Bukharin at that time seems to be the prototype of Gorbachev in the future. But these arguments are moot.Looking back now, we find that once the "proletarian revolution" fails to conquer the important land of Germany, the argument for building a socialist force in Russia will also lose its validity.To make matters worse, the Russia that survived the civil war was even more backward than it had been under the tsars before the revolution.It is true that the tsar, nobles, gentry, bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie were all swept out, and 2 million people fled abroad, resulting in a brain drain, and the intellectual core of the Soviet Union was severely damaged.Under the strong winds of the revolution, the industrial construction accumulated during the tsarist era was swept away.Along with it, there is the mass of workers from all walks of life, who provided the social and political strength on which the Bolsheviks were built.Revolutions and civil wars followed one after another. Workers suffered heavy casualties, and the unfortunate survivors were scattered or moved from factories to sit on the desks of the state and the party.What remains is Russia, a country more mired in the past.On the land of Russia, there are countless farmers who stick to their hometowns and lack mobility at all, living in rural areas that have gone back to the old way one after another.For the peasant masses, the revolution gave them the land (this matter was totally contrary to the judgment of the early Marxists).To put it more bluntly, the fact that the land was distributed and occupied by the peasants in 1917-1918 was regarded by the revolution as the price that must be paid for victory and survival.In many respects, however, the NEP period was a brief golden age for agricultural Russia.Overhanging the masses of the peasantry was the Bolshevik party, which no longer represented anyone.Lenin had always observed things clearly, and he deeply realized that the only thing the Bolshevik Party could rely on at that time was the fact that the state could continue to be the existing government accepted by everyone.Other than that, it's nothing.Even under such circumstances, the backbone of the real governance of Russia at that time was a group of underdeveloped bureaucrats, large and small, and on average, the educational and other levels of these bureaucrats were worse than before. With such a regime, what choice does it have?What's more, it is still under the isolation of foreign governments and capitalists.The country's assets and investments were also expropriated by the revolution.To put it bluntly, the "NEP" has done a great job in rebuilding the Soviet economy that had been destroyed in 1920.By 1926, industrial output in the Soviet Union had roughly returned to pre-war levels—though in fact it was not that great.Generally speaking, it is still a mainly rural country (82% of the population in agriculture before and after) as it was in 1913 (Bergson Levin, 1983, p. 100; 1969).With such a huge population of peasants, what do people want to sell and buy in the city?How much income are they planning to save?How many of the millions of people who stay in the countryside and don't want to go to the city to be poor plan to leave the fields?Their willingness to move determines Russia's economic future.Because apart from income tax, this country has no other investment and labor resources.Apart from political considerations, if the "New Economic Policy" continues to be implemented, no matter whether it is revised or not, it can only achieve moderate industrial construction at best.What's more, before the industrial development reached a higher level, the peasants could buy very limited goods from the cities, so they would rather eat and drink in their hometowns than sell the rest.This situation is called the "scissors crisis", and the "New Economic Policy" was finally strangled to death. Sixty years later, a similar pair of scissors, but this time a "proletarian" brand of scissors - also stifled Gorbachev's "perestroika" policy.Soviet workers asked: Why do they work hard to increase production and earn more wages?No matter how high the wages are, the domestic economy cannot produce enough decent things to attract them to buy.But on the contrary, if the Soviet workers did not increase their productivity, how could they produce these things? Therefore, the "New Economic Policy" is doomed to a dead end.This strategy of putting the state at the helm and relying on farmers' market economic development is doomed not to last long.As a socialist regime, its internal policies that are inconsistent with the "New Economic Policy" are too strong: the new society was established, and if it is now going back to promote small-scale commodity production and small enterprises, it is called a small group of fighters dedicated to the new society How to resist?Is it possible not to go back to the old road and call back the capitalism that everyone just overthrew?However, the Bolsheviks were hesitant and unwilling to take another path—if the "New Economic Policy" was not used, industrialization could only be achieved by high-pressure means, which meant a second round of revolutionary storms.This new revolution will not be launched from the bottom up.Rather, state power is enforced from top to bottom. In the subsequent Iron Age of the Soviet Union, Stalin was an extremely rare ruler who wielded power—one might think that he was different, and his strict rule was rarely seen in history.I believe that if Russia at that time was led by other members of the Bolshevik Party, the common people would have suffered less and the number of victims would have been lower.However, at that time, for the country and its people, if the Soviet Union adopted any rapid modernization policy, cruelty and ruthlessness would inevitably be inevitable.The central command-dominated economy promotes construction with numerous "plans", and the result will inevitably tend to be military-style operations rather than corporate-style operations.But on the other hand, just as military actions are often supported by the popular spirit, the desperate industrialization actions of the Soviet Union's first five-year plan (1928-1933) were found in the "blood, sweat and tears" it brought to the people. support.Churchill knew a truth: sacrifice itself can be turned into the greatest inspiration.It may be hard to believe that even the Stalinist Soviet economy does have considerable support - although it once again forced poor small farmers into serfs tied to the land, and built its important economic links at 4 million To the 13 million labor camp (Gulag) prison workers - but this support obviously does not come from the small peasant class. Numerous "Five-Year Plans" replaced the "New Economic Policy" from 1928 onwards.This kind of "planned economy" is inevitably rough—far rougher than the precise calculations of the economists of the State Planning Commission who pioneered planning in the 1920s; and compared to the planning tools of the government and large companies in the late 20th century, the State Planning Commission The scholars naturally bowed down again.Basically, the function of these five-year plans is only to create new industries.As for how to operate, it is not considered.The order of development, in turn, gives priority to basic heavy industry and energy production, both of which are the cornerstones of any large industrial economy: coal, steel, electricity, oil, and so on.The Soviet Union is rich in mineral resources, so the aforementioned development direction is both reasonable and readily available.Just like a wartime economy—in fact, the planned economy of the Soviet Union can also be regarded as a kind of wartime economy—its production goals can often be set regardless of actual costs and cost-effective considerations (in fact, it must often be the case).In this life-or-death desperate situation, the most effective method is to issue an emergency order suddenly, ordering everyone to work hard and submit papers regardless of the situation. "Crisis management" and "emergency operations" are its management methods.As a result, the Soviet economy, in the midst of regular operations, suddenly experienced convulsions every once in a while, and the whole people mobilized to "crazily overwork" in order to complete the urgent order from top to bottom.The Stalin era has finally passed, and Khrushchev, who followed him, tried his best to find another way to institutionalize the Soviet economy, instead of only being effective under "roaring".In a word, Stalin was well versed in the way of "wind raid" and brought its mystery to the fullest. He repeatedly set unreasonable astronomical figures as goals, motivating the Chinese people to make superhuman efforts. What's more, after the goal is set, the person in charge must understand the meaning and details of it, and then fully implement it.Such an order and a movement go deep into various places, even the distant outposts in the inland of Asia-but these administrative personnel and technicians who are responsible for propaganda and carrying out tasks, most of them have little experience and poor education, and the tools they have always been used to, A wooden rake rather than a machine—at least the first generation, when the cartoonist (David Low) visited the Soviet Union in the 1930s, he drew a cartoon of a collective farm worker, "absently giving a a tractor to milk the cows".The low quality of grassroots personnel further reduced the quality of the overall plan, so all the heavy responsibilities fell on only a few people at the top, and the degree of centralization became increasingly serious.At that time, Napoleon's generals were not skilled enough, and the staff took the heavy burden.Likewise, all decision-making in the Soviet Union was increasingly concentrated at the very top of the Soviet system.Although the high degree of centralization of the State Planning Commission made up for the shortage of management talents, it caused serious bureaucratization of the Soviet economic system and all aspects. If we say that the Soviet economy was only satisfied with maintaining a semi-self-sufficient state, and only wanted to lay the foundation for modern industry, then this rough system, which was mainly rushed out in the 1930s, also played its role.What's more, in the same crude way, it has developed its own special leeway.Usually, under the complicated and interconnected system of the modern economy, the whole body is affected by a trigger. Setting a set of goals A often affects the implementation of another set of goals B.But the Soviet Union was not the case. In fact, as far as a backward and primitive country with no foreign aid was concerned, the command-based industrialization measures, although there were many wastes and inefficiencies in production, could exert amazing and amazing effects.Under its command, within a few years, the Soviet Union was transformed into one of the best large industrial countries, and it was able to wash away the regrets of the tsar.Of course, during the war, the Soviet Union also suffered heavy losses. For a while, it lost a vast land including one-third of its total population, and half of the factories of the Soviet Union's major industries were also destroyed under the flames of war.The sacrifice of the Soviet people is unparalleled in the world.Few countries in the world can match the disastrous experience the Soviet Union endured in this war, especially in the 1930s.The Soviet economy has always given the lowest priority to national consumption needs. In 1940, the production of shoes and socks in the Soviet Union was so low that there was only a little more than one pair per person in the country, but it guaranteed that everyone could get a minimum supply.This system, through the means of controlling (subsidizing) prices and rents, provides work for everyone, food, clothing, and housing for everyone, as well as pensions, health insurance, and primitive and crude equal status for all beings.It wasn't until Stalin's death that the privileged class got out of hand.More importantly, this system also bestows education on everyone.The transformation of such a country of widespread illiteracy into a modern Soviet Union is an achievement by any measure.For millions of people who were born in the countryside, even in the most difficult years, the development of the Soviet Union meant the opening of a new horizon, representing the transition from ignorance to a bright and advanced city.As for personal enlightenment and career development, it is not a problem.The evidence of the new society is solid, and Xiaomin can't help being unconvinced.What's more, besides this, where do they know a second different society? However, the success story of Soviet modernization did not include the agricultural sector, and the population that depended on agriculture was left behind.Because the development of industrialization came out on the backbone of the peasant masses who were exploited and used.The peasantry and agricultural policy of the Soviet Union were really lackluster, almost useless.If there is one consolation, it is that they have taken on the great task of "socialist primary accumulation".In fact, it is not only the peasants, the workers of the Soviet Union also took on the heavy task of developing resources and laying the foundation for the future. The small peasant masses, the majority of the Soviet population, were not only legally subordinate to the government (at least until the constitution of 1936, which had no effect at all), they were taxed more heavily than others High, but the safety guarantee of life is not as good.What's more, the basic agricultural policy (that is, the collectivized cooperative farm and state farm system) that replaced the "New Economic Policy" not only caused a catastrophe in agriculture, but also never got out of the catastrophe.The most direct blow was a sharp drop in grain production, and the number of livestock was halved, resulting in the great famine of 1932-1933.Russia's already low agricultural and animal husbandry productivity, fueled by the collectivization system, sank even further into a slump. It was not until 1940 that it gradually returned to the level of the "New Economic Policy" period.At the same time, it also contributed to the future disasters during World War II and 1950.In order to save this declining trend, the Soviet authorities vigorously promoted mechanization, but the effect was also not obvious and there was no distinctive feature.Although the Soviet Union's agriculture once recovered after the war, and there was even a surplus of grain for export, it would never recover its status as a major exporter under the tsarist rule.By the end of this revival period, its agricultural products could no longer supply the domestic population.Thus, since the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had to rely on the supply of the world grain market, sometimes as much as a quarter of its total demand.If it weren’t for the collective system, it also opened a door for small farmers, leaving a sliver of life, allowing them to cultivate a small amount of individual plots of land, and sell their field income in the market (in 1938, individual plots accounted for only 4% of the total arable land ), Soviet consumers probably had nothing to eat except black bread.In short, the Soviet Union paid a very high cost, but only converted an extremely inefficient smallholder agriculture into an equally inefficient collective agriculture. However, the various disadvantages of the Soviet Union often reflect the social and political conditions of Soviet Russia, rather than the essence of the Bolshevik design.Cooperative systems and collective work, mixed to varying degrees with private farming, could have been successful—the kibbuzim in Israel, for example, was more communist than the Soviet system.However, the purely small-scale peasant system often devotes energy to obtaining subsidies from the government, but is unwilling to spend more efforts to improve and increase land production.However, the Soviet Union's agricultural policy was undoubtedly a complete and complete failure, but in the later socialist regimes, there was no shortage of wise men, at least at the beginning. There is another major drawback on the development of the Soviet Union, that is, its huge and overexpanded bureaucratic system, that is, the deformed product of its government's centralized orders.It was so huge and complicated that even Stalin himself could not handle it.In fact, some people even believe that the "Great Terror" directed by Stalin in the late 1930s was actually a countermeasure he came up with in desperation, to overcome "the numerous obstacles of the bureaucratic camp and various evasive tactics against government control and prohibition." .At least, his intention was also to prevent the bureaucracy from degenerating into a rigid ruling class, which finally appeared in the Brezhnev era.可是每次欲改进行政效率及弹性的尝试，却都难逃失败命运，反使行政系统愈加肿大，其存在更不可少。到30年代的最后几年，行政人员每年以二倍半于总就业人口的速度增长，战争逐渐到来，苏联已经发展成每两名蓝领工人，就有一名行政人员的头重脚轻之势。于是在斯大林的高压统治之下，这一批领导精英的最上层，如人所说，不啻一群“拥有权势的特殊奴隶，随时随地都在大难边缘。他们的权势、他们的特权，永远笼罩在一股'记着，你总逃不了一死'的阴影之下”。斯大林死后，或者说在最后一位“大老板”赫鲁晓夫于1964年被赶下台后，苏联体系内，便再也没有能人可以阻挡沉滞僵化的发生了。 最后使得苏联制度陷于绝亡的第三项缺陷，却是它缺乏弹性的僵化。苏联式的生产，一味致力于产量的提高，而产品的种类和质量，则完全于事先决定。其体系内部，毫无一种变换“产量”及“品质”的调节机制（其产量目标只有一个方向：就是不断上扬）。创新发明，更非此制度所长。事实上，在苏联的经济制度中，“发明”根本不能为其所用，而且也不会用在与“军事-工业复合体”（military－industrial complex）完全呈对比的民间经济之上。至于消费者需要的供给，既非通过反映其喜好的市场环境，也非基于以消费为取向的政治经济制度。在这里，国家计划机器扮演了决定一切的角色。充其量我们只能这么说：虽然苏联工业结构本身，继续偏向于生产资料，它同时却也提供了更多的消费品。只是其分销系统实在太过糟糕，更有甚者，组织性的功能几乎完全不存在。因此要没有“次级”或所谓“黑市”经济，苏联境内的生活水准，根本不可能有效提高。40年代至70年代之间的改善很惊人，而黑市经济的增长之快，自60年代结束以来尤为快速。地下经济的活动规模，自然缺乏官方文件的统计，在此我们只能大略猜测。但是到70年代后期，据估计，苏联都市人口花费在私人经营的消费、医疗，及法律服务方面的支出，约有200亿卢布，另外还要花掉70亿的保安“小费”（Alexeev，1990）。这个数字，几乎可以与当时苏联的输入总值相等。 简单地说，苏联体系的设计用意，在于尽快将一个极落后，开发度极低的国家，早早送上工业化的大道。它也假定，它的人民将满足于一种最基本的生活水准，只要有足以保证其生存所需，最起码的社会物质条件，一切都好说话。至于这些基本生活程度的高低，则全看这个进一步工业化的经济体系，在其全面总增长的巨流当中，能够疏漏下多少给人民消费了。说起来，尽管这个体系极其缺乏效率，极其浪费，却毕竟达到了上述目标。1913年在沙皇治下的帝俄，虽有着全世界9．4％的人口，却仅占全球“国家所得”的6％，以及工业总产量的14．6％（不过其农业产量，却只比其人口比例稍高而已）（Bolotin，1987，pp．148－152）。俄罗斯已经摇身一变，成为一个工业大国，而它维持近半世纪之久的超级大国地位，事实上也靠工业化的成果所赐。然而后来的发展，却有违共产主义者先前的期望。当苏联经济发展大车向前走了一段距离之后，由于其引擎结构设计的特殊，驾驶人虽然一再猛踩油门意欲加速，引擎却不快反慢。它的动力设计，本身便包含着将其力量消耗殆尽的结构。这么一个制度，却是1944年后，世界上将近三分之一人口所在的国家经济沿袭的范本。 苏联革命，同时也发展出一个极为特殊的政治制度。欧洲左派的群众运动，包括布尔什维克党隶属的马克思主义劳工社会主义运动在内，都从以下两项政治传统出发：自法国大革命以来，一脉相传的雅各宾时期革命传统——即选举式，有时甚至直接式的民主——以及集中式的行动导向。19世纪末叶在欧洲各地风起云涌的劳工群众及社会主义运动，不论是以党派、工会、合作组织，甚或以上三种结合的面貌出现，其内部结构及政治志向，都具有强烈的民主气息。事实上，凡在普遍选举权宪法尚未存在的地方，以上这些运动，往往就是促其出现的主要力量。马克思主义者与无政府分子不同，前者在根本上，便一心以政治行动为主要任务。苏联的政治制度，却扬弃了社会主义运动的民主性质（与其经济制度一般，后来也纷纷为社会主义世界的国家依样画葫芦），虽然在理论上不断保持着它的科学内涵，不赞同个人独裁。简而言之，正如苏联经济是一个统制式的经济，苏联政治也是统制式的政治。 苏联政治制度的演变，部分反映出布尔什维克党本身变化的历史，部分反映了当时年轻苏维埃政权面对的重重危机及紧急形势，部分还反映出独裁者本人的怪异性情——这个格鲁吉亚地区一名酒鬼鞋匠的儿子，早先曾读过神学院，后来则在自封的“钢人”政治称号之下以铁腕统治苏联。首先，由列宁精心设计，并以一批训练精良的职业革命干部组成，专在中央领导分配下从事任务的先锋党团组织，其本身便极具发展为强权的性质。关于这一点，其他众多革命热情不下于布尔什维克的俄罗斯马克思者，早在当时便已提出警告。因为如此一来，党便可以取代它口口声声领导的人民；（被选出来的）委员会，则可以取代一般党员，甚至取代固定代表大会的意见；至于大权在握，一人号令天下。（理论上虽经由选举诞生）实际上定于一尊的元首，取代了一切。这种层层“取而代之”的危险趋向，有什么法子可以制止呢？当时列宁本人虽然不想也不能做个大独裁者，而布尔什维克党团，也从来不像个军中幕僚单位，反而倒更像一个永远争辩不休的学社社团（其实凡属左翼意识形态的组织，都爱争爱辩），可是这种“取而代之”的危险性，却不因此而有所减少。十月革命之后，这种趋势愈发接近事实，党由一个不过几千人的组织，摇身一变，成为拥有数十万，最终甚至数百万专业组织者、行政官员、管理者、监督者的庞大政党。这些人声势浩大，成为主流，压倒了原有“老布尔什维克”的声音，也盖过了1917年前加入他们合作的其他社会主义人士，如托洛茨基。他们与传统左翼原有的政治文化毫不相通，他们只知道党永远正确，只知道上级的决定务必执行。因为唯有如此，革命的果实方能得以保存。 革命之前，不论党内外对于民主、对于言论自由、对于人民自由、对于宽容异己，对以上种种事项的态度看法为何，1917-1921年间的政治社会氛围，却使得任何一个意欲挽救苏维埃政权于挣扎脆弱的政党，都不得不陷于愈发走向权威统治模式的境地。其实一开始，苏联并非马上便成为一党政府，它也不排斥反对力量的存在。可是它却以一党独裁的姿态，靠着强大情报安全工作，以及全力打击反革命的恐怖，赢得了一场内战。同样地，它也放弃了党内民主的原则，于1921年宣布，禁止党内对其他可行的政策进行集体讨论。在理论上指导它的“民主集中制”精神，如今“民主”不存，只剩下“中央集权”。它甚至不再遵照自己的党纲行事，原定每年举行的代表大会愈来愈时有时无，到斯大林时代，更变成毫无准期，偶而为之的稀奇大事。“新经济政策”年代虽然缓和了非政治层面的气氛，然而就党的形象而言，却没有多大好处。一般的感觉认为，党已成为了饱受攻击的少数分子，虽然也许有历史站在它的一边，可是眼前的行事方向，却不合俄国现状及民众的心意。从上而下发布的全面工业化革命号令，遂使整个系统愈发走向强制权威，比起内战年代，其残忍无情，也许有过之而无不及，因为这套连续实行权力的机制，如今更具规模。于是在“权限分离”之中剩下的最后一项成分，即“党”“国”之间的分野，苏联“政府”最后留下的运作空间日益缩小，这个卑微存在的狭小空间，最终也全部消失。只见一党垄断，定于一尊的领导高高在上，绝对的权力在握，其他所有的一切，都屈从在他的号令之下。 就在这个时候，苏联体系在斯大林手中变成了一个独断专制政权。这个政权，如水银泻地，无孔不入，不但要全面整体地控制其人民生活、思想的各个层面。人的存在，人的价值，但凡可以之处，也完全受制于整体制度的目标与成就。至于目标为何，成就何在，则由至高无上的绝对权威界定指令。这样一个世界自然绝非马克思恩格斯两人设想的未来，也非发展自马克思路线的“第二国际”（Second International）及其旗帜下的众多党派所期。因此与卢森堡同任德国共产党领袖，并与她同于1919年被反动军官暗杀的李卜克内西，虽然其父为德国社会民主党的创始人之一，却从不认为自己属于马克思派。而奥地利马克思派（Austro-Marxists）虽然名列马克思的门下，并且也戮力于马克思的学说，可是却毫不犹疑地别出心裁，另辟蹊径。甚至连被共产党官方正式视为异端者，也依然被人视为理所当然，合乎法统的社会民主派人士——如伯恩斯坦（Eduard Bernstein），即因其“修正理论”（revisonism）而被戴上这项异端帽子（事实上，伯恩斯坦也始终是马恩著作的正宗编辑人）。所谓社会主义国家应该强制每个人思想统一的主张，这种论调，若回到1917年前，根本不可能在任何社会主义者的脑海中出现，更别说其领导们圣袍加身，称其“集体智慧”，拥有如教皇制服绝对无误的圣质（虽然单让任何一人拥有这种天才英明，毕竟仍属不可想象之事）。 就马克思派社会主义的信徒来说，它在根本上便属于一种激情的个人承诺，它是一组希望，一组信仰，具有某种世俗宗教的特点——不过论其宗教性，并不见得多于那些非社会主义群体的意识形态。更重要的是，马克思社会主义一旦变成一股洪流，成为广大的群众运动，原本微言大义的精幽理论就难免变形。最佳，也只不过流于僵化独断的教条；最糟，则幻化成人人须敬而礼之、认同效忠的旗帜象征。这一类的群众运动，正如某些深具真知灼见的中欧社会主义人士早已指出，往往具有敬仰甚至崇拜领袖的倾向。不过大家都知道，左翼党派内部素来喜欢争辩，因此个人崇拜的程序多少受到抑制。在莫斯科红场上兴建列宁陵墓，将这位伟大领袖的遗体防腐处理，永存于此以供瞻仰。这番举动，与革命、甚至与俄国本身的革命传统都毫无关系，显然是为了苏联政权，意欲在俄罗斯落后的农民大众之中，激发出类似对基督教圣者及遗骨遗物的崇拜热情。我们也可以说，在列宁一手创建的布尔什维克党中，所谓正统性的思想，以及对异己的不容忍，多少是以实用性的理由出发，而不仅是作为基本的价值观。列宁就如同一名杰出的将领——其人基本上属于计划行动的好手——他可不要部队里人人有意见，个个议论不休，因而造成实际效率的损失。更有甚者，正如所有讲求实际的天才们一般，他也深信，唯有他自己的意见最对最好，因此哪有多余的工夫去听他人纠缠。就理论上而言，列宁属正统派，甚至可说是一名原教旨主义的马克思门徒。因为他很清楚，像这样一个以革命为基本要义的理论，若对其教义文字有任何瞎搞胡掰，都可以鼓励“妥协修正”意见的出现。但是在实际上，他却毫不迟疑，着手修改马克思的观点，并任意增添内容；同时却为自己辩称，实质上始终忠于伟大教师的教诲不变。在1917年前的岁月里，列宁不但一直领导着俄罗斯左翼路线内（甚至在俄国社会民主圈内）饱受攻击的少数，而且更是这一支力量的代表，因此获得了一个不容异己的名声。可是一旦情况改变，他却毫不踌躇，一如他往年坚决地排除反对者一般，立刻便伸出手来欢迎他们。即使在十月革命成功之后，他也从不倚仗自己在党内的权势压人，反而一直以立论为出发点来说服众人——我们甚至看见，虽然他位高权重，却也不是从来不曾面临挑战。要是列宁后来没有早死；相信他一定会继续激烈抨击反对者，就像在当年内战时期一样，他那以实际为用不容异己的作风，必将没有止境。不过尽管如此，却没有任何证据显示，列宁预想到——甚或能够容忍——自己身后竟会发展出那一种无孔不入、全面性、强制性的国家暨个人全民信仰的共产宗教。斯大林也许并不是自觉地创设出这个宗教，他可能只是懵懂地跟随着当时自己所见的主流现象：一个由落后农民组成的俄罗斯，一个权威独裁、讲求正统教理的巨大传统。但是若无斯大林，这个极权新宗教很可能不会出现；若无斯大林，这个新宗教模式绝对不会强加于其他社会主义政权，或为它们沿袭模仿。 一个资产阶级的政权，也许可以接受保守政府下台，由自由分子接班的念头。因为后者纵使上台，仍将不改社会上的资产阶级本质，可是资产阶级政权，却绝对不能容忍共产党接手。同样地，一个共产党政权，也同样不能忍受被一个必定动手恢复旧秩序的力量所推翻。可是这个假定，却不意味着苏联一定会出现定于一人的独裁，是斯大林其人，一手将共产党的政治制度，转换成非世袭的专制君主制。 就许多方面而言，这个矮小、谨慎、缺乏安全感、永远疑心重重的斯大林，活脱脱就是罗马传记大家苏埃托尼乌斯（Suetonius）笔下《历代罗马皇帝传》（Lives of the Caesars）中帝王的再现，而不是一名现代政治世界的现代人物。他外貌平凡，一般不易给人产生深刻印象，斯大林一直使用八面玲珑的斡旋手段，一直到他升至顶层为止。当然，即使在革命之前，他就已经凭着这项了不起的天赋，进入党的高层；在临时政府垮台之后的首任政府里，斯大林就出任民族部部长。然而在他最后过关斩将，终于登上顶峰，成为无人挑战的党内领袖（事实上也是国家领袖）之后，则一概使用令人恐惧的手段，来处理党务或其他任何他个人权力所及之事。 同样地，他将“马列主义”简化为简单绝对的教义问答、教条式口号的做法，也不失为将新观念灌输给第一代识字人的上乘方式。而他的恐怖作风，也不可仅视为暴君个人无限度权力的支持。诚然，斯大林本人一定颇享受那种大权在握，得以呼风唤雨的乐趣，那种令人恐惧，定人生死的权力感；但是他对本身地位所可带来的物质收获，却漫不经心。而且，不管心理上精神上，斯大林到底有什么乖僻怪诞之处，他的恐怖手段其实和他的谨慎作风一样，都是他在面对难以控制的局面时，一种同样理性的对付策略。不论是恐怖还是谨慎，都是基于他避免风险的原则考虑。两者分别反射出他的缺乏自信，不能肯定自己的“评估状况”能力（套用布尔什维克的术语，即对状况“进行马克思主义分析”的能力）。这一点，却正是列宁的极大优点，两个人的个性气质可谓大相径庭。斯大林恐怖“立业”的唯一意义，只能表示他终身不悔，顽固追求那想象中的乌托邦的世界。甚至在他死前数月，在他最后出版的书中仍致力于这一目标的再坚持、再主张。 统治苏联的政治权力，是布尔什维克党人在十月革命中取得的唯一收获，而权力，也是他们可以用来改变社会的工具。但是这项权力，却不时遭逢来自不止一方，并且不断再现的困难夹击。斯大林曾有一套理论，他认为在“无产阶级取得权力的数十年后”，阶级斗争反而会变得愈加激烈。他这套说法的真正意义即在于此，否则换作其他任何角度，都是讲不通的。只有前后一贯地、残忍无情地、坚持地使用权力，才能除去各种可能的障碍，走上最后成功的阳关大道。 基于这套假设而决定的政策，其中有三项因素促成其走向无比凶残的荒谬境地。 其一，斯大林相信，只有他才知道前途如何，而且一心一意、全力为之。诚然，无数的政治家及将领们，都有这种“舍我其谁，少我不得”的心态，可是只有那些真正绝对权力在握之人，才能迫使众人也一起相信只有他才最行。因此在30年代掀起的大清算高潮，与此前的恐怖捕杀不同，这一回清洗的对象，是针对党内而言，尤其是它的领导阶层。原因在于许多原来支持斯大林的强硬派党员开始后悔（包括那些20年代全力支持他对付反对人士，并且真心拥护集体大跃进及五年计划的人）。他们如今发现，当时手段的无情，造成牺牲的惨重，已经超过他们所愿接受的程度。这些人当中，相信有许多人都还记得，当年列宁便不肯为斯大林撑腰，不愿让他接班，理由就在他行事作风太过残暴。苏联共产党第十七届大会揭幕，会中形势，即显示党对斯大林有着相当的反对力量存在。这股反对势力，对他的威胁究竟几何，我们永远都无从得知。因为从1934-1939年，有四五百万党员及干部因政治理由被捕，其中约四五十万未经审判即遭处决。到1939年春天，十八届党代表大会召开，当初1934年参加第十七届会议的1827名代表中，只有37名侥幸仍得以再度出席（Kerblay1983，p．245）。 这种难以形容的恐怖，不是出于什么“为求伟大目的，可以不择手段”的信念，也非基于“这一代的牺牲再大，与未来世代因此得受的福祉相比，却又算得什么”的理想。它是一种无论时空、永远全面作战的原则的体现。列宁主义，基本上是从军事角度思考——就算布尔什维克所有的政治词汇均不能证实此点，仅看列宁本人对普鲁士兵法家克劳塞维茨（Clausewitz）的崇敬，即可证明这是不争的事实。也许正因为列宁思想中带有着强烈的“唯意志论”气息，使得其他马克思人士极不信任列宁，将其斥为布朗基派（Blanquist）或“雅各宾”之流。“谁胜谁负？”是列宁的处世箴言：这场斗争，是一场不是全输就是全赢的战争，胜者赢得全部，输家倾其所有。我们知道，在两次世界大战之际，即使连自由国家也采取这种心态作战，准备不择手段，对敌方人民毫无保留地施以任何苦难折磨（回到第一次大战时，无尽苦难的对象甚至在自己的部队内）。于是没有事实基础，毫无理由地便将整批人送去牺牲的做法，也的确成为战争行为的一部分：比方二战期间，美国政府将所有日裔美国公民，英国将境内所有德奥籍居民，一律关入拘留营内即为例。美英两国的理由，乃是基于这些人当中可能潜有敌方奸细。这场不幸的变调，是在19世纪以来文明进步之下忽然有野蛮复萌的悲剧。此情此景，却像一股黑暗势力的漫漫长线，一直贯穿着本书涵盖的悠悠岁月。 所幸在其他实施宪政民主、拥有新闻自由的法治国家里，体制中自有某些对抗牵制这类思想的力量存在。可是绝对极权的国家就没有这种福气，虽然最终也会发展出某种限制权力的成规。不为别的，单单为了求生存的本能，以及当全面权力的使用扩展到无限的时候，它自然会生出自己毁灭的苦果来。偏执妄想，就是滥用权力到极至的最终结果。斯大林死后，陆续登场的接班人等，相继都有一种默契，决定要为这段血腥年月划上句号。然而斑斑血迹，斯大林岁月究竟一共付出了多少人命代价，（一直到戈尔巴乔夫年代）只有内部的持不同政见者，以及海外学者和宣传家去细心追查。从此，苏联政界中人总算能寿终正寝，有时甚至得享天年，进入50年代，古拉格牢狱逐渐空去。虽然以西方标准而言，苏联仍是一个未能善待其国民的社会，但是至少，这个国家已经不再大规模地逮捕处决自己的人民了。事实上到80年代，苏联人民死于犯罪事件、民间冲突、以及国家之手的风险率，甚至低于亚非美三洲的许多国家。但是尽管如此，它毕竟仍是一个警察国家，一个权威统治的社会，而且依据任何实质标准，也还是一个不自由的国家。只有官方认可或批准的信息，才可传达一般人民，至少就纯技术观点而言，其他任何的信息均属触犯法律。这一切到戈尔巴乔夫实行“公开性”政策才改变。至于行动及居住自由，更要看官方的准许而定。这项规定在苏联境内虽然越来越有名无实，可是到了边境地带，甚至与另一个同属“社会主义”的友好国家相邻之地，却变得真实无比。从这些角度而言，苏联实际上不及沙皇时代。更有甚者，虽然就日常行事而言，苏联社会是以法治为准，可是行政当局的权力，即任意逮捕、下狱，及境内流放的情况，却依然存在。 苏俄铁幕时代付出的人命代价，恐怕将永远无法确切估算，因为甚至连官方对处决人数及古拉格囚犯的统计——不论是现有的或日后可能面世的数字——都无法涵盖所有的死难损失。而且依人不同，估算的差距更有极大出入。有人曾如此说过：“对于这段时期里苏联牲口的死伤数目，我们知道的反而比被苏联政权滥杀的反对人数更清楚”（Kerblay，1983，p．26）。1937年人口普查的数字始终秘而不宣，更使这项估算工作难上加难。但是不论各项估计使用的假定如何，前后直接间接的死难人数绝对高过七位数，甚至进入八位数。在这种情况下，不论我们是否采取“保守”估计，将其定位于一千万，而非两千万甚或更高，实在都无关紧要了。面对这种骇人的天文数目，只能令人感到不可饶恕，完全不能理解，更不要说为杀人凶手做任何辩解。在此作者还要添上一笔，不带任何评论：1937年，苏联总人口据称为1．64亿，比起第二个五年计划（1933－1938年）原先预估的人口总数，一共少了1670万。 不过，尽管如此，苏联体制绝不是一个“极极”政体。“极权”一词，是在第二次世界大战后，才开始在共产党的批评者中盛行起来。究其源流，此词是意大利法西斯党于20年前发明的“夫子自道”，用以形容自己追求的目标所在。可是自此之后，却被外人挪借，专为批评意大利法西斯及德国国家社会主义之用。“极权”代表着全方位无所不包的中央集权体制，不但对其人民施以外在的全面控制，甚至更进一步，以对宣传及教育机制的垄断，成功地将它所推动的价值观念，在人民心中内化。奥威尔（George Orwell）的（1948年出版），即为西方世界描绘出极权社会达于极点时的画面：一个人民大众都被洗脑的社会，在“老大哥”无所不在的严密监视下生活作息。偶尔只有一两个寂寞的孤人，才会发出不同的异议。 这个最高境界，自然是斯大林意欲达到的目标。可是若换作列宁及其他老派的党员，闻此必然大怒，更不要说祖师爷马克思了。就将领袖“神化”而言（“神化运动”，日后被人美言为“个人崇拜”），或将他塑造成集美德于一身的圣人斯大林大致有一点成就，正如奥威尔在中的讥讽描述。但是说来矛盾，斯大林在这方面的成果，却与他个人的绝对权力无关。当1953年斯大林的“噩耗”传来，某些在社会主义国家阵营之外的共产党人，的确流下了真情的伤心泪，这种人还不少。他们认为，斯大林象征、并且激发了他们投身的运动大业，而且他们也都是真心自动地投入斯大林阵营。这些外国人不知真相，可是俄国老百姓却都心知肚明，只有他们才知道自己命中已经吃了多少苦头，而且还在继续受煎熬。然而尽管如此，只因为斯大林是这片俄罗斯大地上铁腕的合法统治者，只因为他是现代化了这片大地的领导人，就某种意义而言，他也便代表着他们自己的某一部分。更何况，在最近一次战争的经验里面，斯大林又作为他们的领袖，至少对大俄罗斯而言，真正为国家赢得了一场艰苦胜利。 然而，不论从哪个角度评断，苏联式的体制实在谈不上“极权”二字，因此不得不让人怀疑“极权”一词，到底有几分确切的用处。这个体制，一未能实现有效的“思想控制”，二更不曾造成“思想改宗”。相反地，反而使人民对政治隔阂到令人惊异的程度。马列主义的官方学说，与广大民众之间没有任何明显关系，因此在他们身上自然发生不了感应。这门奥秘难懂的学问，只有那些打算在这条路上功成业就之人，才会对它发生兴趣。在经过40年马克思主义教育的匈牙利，当问及途经布达佩斯马克思广场上的路人“马克思何许人也？”时，他们的回答是，他是位苏联哲学家，恩格斯是他的朋友。我想想看，还什么可以讲的？噢，他死的时候年纪很大了。另外一个插话，当然是个搞政治的。他这个人，你知道，他这个人就是他的名字的意思嘛，——列宁的名字，列宁，