Chapter 28 Chapter 5 Defend against powerful enemies together 2

2 The call for a general mobilization against fascism, that is, the German bloc, required a threefold response.First, all political forces that have a common interest in confronting the Axis forces must unite.Second, formulate a set of practical and feasible anti-enemy policies.Third, the governments of all countries should be prepared to fully implement this policy of resisting the enemy.In fact, this mobilization plan took a total of 8 years to complete - if we count the starting point of the full speed towards the world war from 1931, there are even 10 years before and after - however, everyone at that time Responses to these three calls have often been hesitant and confused.

Unite against fascism.Basically, this first call is more likely to get the most immediate response.Because fascism "treats dissidents equally", whether it is liberals of all sects, socialists, the Communist Party, or any form of democratic or Soviet-style regime, they are all regarded as enemies by them and must be destroyed.To paraphrase an old British saying, if you don't want to be "hanged" individually, it's best to "hang together" with each other to fight the enemy.At that time, in the "Enlightenment Left" (Enlightenment Left) camp, the Communist Party was originally the most divisive political force.Their artillery (aggressive struggle, which unfortunately is characteristic of political radicals) often does not strike the most obvious enemy, but concentrates all its efforts on the arch rival at hand - the Social Democrats.But after Hitler took power, within 18 months, the Communist Party made a 180-degree change in policy, becoming in one fell swoop the most organized and (always) most effective fighter in the coalition against fascism.The transformation of the Communist Party has eradicated the greatest resistance to cooperation within the left camp.Yet the deep-seated skepticism among each other within the left still lingers.

The strategy proposed by the Comintern is essentially a concentric circle of containment (co-proposed with Stalin).At that time, the Comintern had already elected Bulgarian Georgi Dimitrov as General Secretary.During the arson trial of the German Reichstag in 1933, Dimitrov openly challenged the Nazi authorities bravely and aroused anti-fascist torrents everywhere.Therefore, based on the "United Front" (United Front) formed by the combined forces of the working class, the Communist Party began to work hand in hand with the "Popular Front" (Popular Front) formed by democrats and liberals to form a broad electoral and political alliance.In addition, with the advancement of German power, the Communist Party further formulated a strategy to expand the aforementioned two fronts into the "National Front" (National Front). Axis forces) are the number one enemy of all.This left-to-center anti-fascist cooperation proposition that transcends political lines—the French Communist Party “extends a hand of friendship to Catholics” and the British Communist Party embraces Churchill, who has always been “notorious” and specializes in dealing with the Communist Party—but it is relatively small. Unacceptable to the traditional left.It was only when the war was imminent and it was really necessary to make such a bad move, the latter only reluctantly followed suit.However, the combination of the center and the left does make political sense.As a result, the "People's Front" stabilized its positions in France and Spain (France was the first country to try this strategy), suppressed the rightist forces in the country in one fell swoop, and won a dramatic victory in the election (Spain in February 1936 , France in May of the same year).

The center-left united to win a major election victory, proving the unwiseness of previous divisions and discords.The hearts of the people within the left camp began to shift significantly to the Communist Party—especially in France. However, although the political base of the Communist Party expanded, the anti-fascist forces never really benefited.In fact, although the French Popular Front received a majority of support in the elections and elected a government led by a socialist for the first time in French history, the intellectual Leon Blum (1872-1950), radicals, The actual number of votes obtained by the tripartite combination of socialists and communists was only 1% more than the combined votes of the three parties in 1932.While the Spanish Popular Front has a slightly wider lead over its rivals, the new government faces almost half of the voters who still oppose it (the Spanish left is stronger than before).But despite the unsatisfactory reality, the fruits of victory are sweet after all, not only arousing hope for the local labor and socialist movement, but also bringing intoxicated joy.But in fact, the situation of the British Labor Party at that time was extremely miserable. First, there was an economic depression, and then there was a political crisis in 1931-the seats were collapsed and only 50 seats were held. Four years later, although the number of votes rose, But it has never recovered the grand occasion before the depression, and its seats are slightly more than half of those in 1929. Although the number of Conservative Party votes decreased between 1931 and 1935, it only dropped slightly from about 61% to 54%. The so-called British "National" government led by Chamberlain from 1937 (whose name would later become synonymous with appeasing Hitler) actually had a solid majority base.If the war in 1939 had not broken out, the UK would have held a general election in 1940, and I believe the Conservative Party would be able to pass the test easily again.In fact, with the exception of Scandinavia's social democratic parties, the electoral results of the Western European countries in the 1930s showed no sign of a large-scale shift to the left.In contrast, in Eastern and Southeastern European regions where elections survived, considerable votes went to the right.But the political climate between the old and new continents is very different. In the 1932 U.S. general election, the votes of the Democratic Party rose sharply from 15 to 16 million votes, reaching almost 28 million votes. Four years later, in 1936, Roosevelt won again, this time with slightly fewer votes than before (which surprised everyone except voters).However, in terms of election significance, the peak of Roosevelt's political career was spent in 1932.

Therefore, the opponents of the traditional right, although organized under the call of anti-fascism, did not increase their support.In general, anti-fascism is far more able to mobilize the political minority than it is to influence the mainstream majority.Among the non-mainstream minority, intellectuals and people who care about art are the most open minded to accept their views.Literary and artistic people are the first to bear the brunt of this and feel the most keenly because of the lofty stance of national socialism and its aggression and hostility towards the values ​​of existing civilizations (as for another group of international literary schools that have arisen inspired by nationalism and anti-democratic trends, are not included in this category, see Chapter 6).Immediate action by Nazi racism resulted in the mass exodus of Jewish and left-wing scholars scattered throughout these tolerant gardens.The Nazis' hostility to intellectual freedom immediately led to the expulsion of almost one-third of the faculty in German universities.At the same time that Hitler came to power, it was the beginning of the Nazi version of "burning books and burying scholars": "modernist" culture was violently attacked, and all Jewish and other books that did not meet the Nazis' wishes were burned.Sadly, except for certain perverse acts of anti-Semitism - such as the Nazi concentration camps and the disenfranchisement, isolation, and inferiority of Jewish Germans (according to According to the standard at the time, as long as one of the grandfathers had Jewish blood, he would be judged as a Jew) - at that time, the general public did not take this seriously, at best it was regarded as a temporary and limited deviation from the norm.Because speaking of it, concentration camps are nothing new, they have always been a magic weapon to intimidate the Communist Party, and a prison specially used to detain subversive elements.Old-fashioned conservatives liked it quite a bit.When the Great War broke out, there were only more than 8,000 prisoners in the concentration camps (this type of prison was later transformed into a death camp where hundreds of thousands, or even millions of people, were subjected to horrific torture, which only happened during the war. evolution), until the beginning of the war, no matter how brutal and cruel the Nazi authorities were to the Jews, their "final solution" to the Jews seemed to be limited to collective expulsion, not mass murder.What's more, if you look at it from a non-political point of view, although Germany at that time had some unpleasant features, it was a stable country with a prosperous economy and a popular civilian government.But under the seemingly normal appearance, interested people can find a fact from the books published at that time-including the book written by the "Leader" himself (Mein Kampf): that is, in various racially provoking, addicted Behind the murderous rhetoric, and the brutal murders that took place in concentration camps like Dachau and Buchenwald, lurks a world calculated to turn civilization on its head.Therefore, in the 1930s, the first batch of social figures who rose up against fascism on a large scale belonged to the intellectual class in the West (although they were only a few students at that time, most of them came from middle-class families that were "respected by everyone", and they themselves will also be among the class in the future. into the middle class).Although the actual number of this group of people is small, their influence is extremely considerable. Of course, this is also because they include journalists.The latter has frequently sent warning messages to conservative readers and decision-makers in Western non-fascist countries, reminding them to pay attention to the true nature behind national socialism.In this regard, the press has played a very important role.

As for how to resist the rise of the fascist camp, the actual policy seems simple and reasonable on paper.Countries should unite to resist the actions of aggressors (the existence of the League of Nations provides an operational structure that can do a lot for this goal).There must be no compromise or concession against the wolfish ambitions of the aggressors.And there are means of intimidation—coordinated action, if necessary—to deter or defeat the intentions and actions of the aggressor.Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov (Maxim Litvinov, 1876-1952) proclaimed himself the spokesman for this "Collective Security" defense system.But it is easier said than done, and the biggest difficulty hindering everyone's cooperation is that they have different hearts.At that time (and still today), even if all countries had the same suspicion and fear of the aggressor, they also had other realistic conflicts of interest among themselves, resulting in differences of opinion and actions.

The most obvious gap between the two sides lies in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western world.On the one hand, it is deliberate and dedicated to overthrowing the bourgeois regime and eventually establishing an empire all over the world as the established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.On one side are Western countries that have insight into the Soviet Union's intentions and regard it as the instigator and abettor of the rebellion and overthrow.It is really difficult to estimate how much this situation that caused the two parties to look different and separate from each other had an impact on everyone's inability to cooperate smoothly.Although after 1933, most major countries in the world have recognized the Soviet regime, and as long as it is in their own interests, the governments of all countries are willing to make peace with it at any time.However, in various countries and abroad, there are still various forces opposing the Bolsheviks, who regard them as the number one enemy of mankind.This situation is no different from the anti-communist mentality during the Cold War period after 1945.British intelligence agencies have concentrated all their efforts on dealing with the threat of red elements.It took a lot of effort, and it was not until the mid-1930s that they gave up the practice of considering the Communist Party as the main target (Andrew, 1985, p. 530).In any case, many conservatives at the time believed—especially the United Kingdom—that the best solution to all these problems was to go to war between Germany and Russia, to fight between the snipe and the clam, and to weaken or even destroy the power of the two scourges in one fell swoop. Lose.Even if the Bolsheviks were defeated by Germany, it would be a good thing if the latter's national strength could be greatly reduced at the same time.As a result, Western governments have been reluctant to effectively negotiate with the red regime; even in 1938-1939, when the necessity of an alliance of all to resist Hitler was imminent, and no one could deny it, countries still remained skeptical.The strength of resistance and cooperation forced Stalin, who had stood on the same front with the West since 1934 and took the lead against Hitler, to go against his original plan, fearing that he would fall into the quagmire of dealing with Hitler alone, so in August 1939 Signed a non-aggression pact with Germany.Relying on this treaty, Stalin hoped that the Soviet Union could stay out of the matter and watch Germany and the West fight each other and defeat each other.The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was able to reap the benefits, according to the secret terms of the treaty, to regain a large piece of western territory that Russia had lost since the revolution.It turned out that Stalin's wishful thinking was completely wrong.However, his actions, just like the failure of the previous wish to common imperial virtues, once again proved the serious differences of interests among countries.This is most likely the reason for the astonishingly smooth rise of Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1938, with almost no resistance.

What's more, due to geographical location, historical plot, and various reasons of economic power, the worldviews of various governments are also very different.For example, take the United States and Japan as examples. Their centers of gravity are in the Pacific region and the Americas respectively. The situation in Europe has nothing to do with it.For Britain, the situation on the European continent is also insignificant, because it still focuses on its own status as a world empire and focuses on maintaining global maritime hegemony-although in fact, Britain's national power has declined greatly, and its two It is also difficult to maintain a heavy purpose.As for the Eastern European countries being located between the two powers of Germany and Russia, the situation dictates that their national policy is naturally influenced by their geographical location—especially when it becomes apparent that Western countries cannot protect them in the later development of facts.Some of these countries have already obtained part of the land from Russia after 1917; therefore, although they are anti-German, they do not want to see any anti-German coalition actions to bring Russian power back to their own land.But in the end, the facts have proved that the joint action that can really play a role and effectively attack fascism cannot do without the power of the Soviet Union.From an economic point of view, Britain and other countries are well aware that they have launched a war that far exceeded their financial and material resources last time, and now they are facing the situation of rearmament again, and they can't help but hesitate.In short, although all countries recognize that the existence of the Axis forces is indeed a major threat, there is a huge gap between cognition and action.

The liberal democratic thought has widened the gap of "easier to know but harder to do" (according to the definition of liberal democratic concept, it is inherently incompatible with fascist and totalitarian thought).A democratic and free political system not only slows down or even prevents the political decision-making process - the United States is an obvious example - but also makes it more difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to implement those ideas and policies that are not popular with the public.So some government authorities use this as an excuse to cover up their insensitivity.The example of the United States further shows that even a president with a broad public opinion base like President Roosevelt cannot go against the will of the voters and implement his own anti-fascist foreign policy.Therefore, if it were not for the Pearl Harbor incident and Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, the United States would have been out of World War II from beginning to end.Therefore, apart from these two things, we really can't find any other reason to throw the United States into this war.

However, the crux of what really weakened the will of the important Western democracies—such as Britain and France—to resist the enemy was not the operation of democratic politics, but the tragic memory of the last World War.This period of pain, whether it is the voters or the government, is deeply in the hearts of everyone, and will never be forgotten.Because the impact of that war was not only unprecedented, but no one was spared.In terms of human life (rather than in material terms), the losses of the First World War were far greater for Britain and France than the subsequent sacrifices of the Second World War (see Chapter 1).Therefore, they must prevent the recurrence of such wars at any cost.Only when all political means have been exhausted and nothing can be done can a war be resorted to.

However, this "unwillingness to go to war" mentality of various countries should not be confused with the "refusal to go to war".However, France, as the country that suffered the most losses among the belligerent countries in the last war, the morale of the army at this time has indeed been greatly reduced.None of the countries participating in the war went there with great interest and joy, even the Germans were no exception.On the other hand, the so-called completely unconditional peace appeasement theory, although popular in Britain in the 1930s, never became a general mass movement; by 1940, it had completely disappeared.During World War II, although the society was quite tolerant of "those who opposed the war based on conscience", in fact, the number of people who really advocated the right to "refuse to fight" was very small (Calvocoressi, 1987, p. 63). As for the non-Communist leftists, since 1918, the cruelty of war and militarism has been hated even more deeply than the war-weariness before 1914 (at least in theory).But anti-war Although anti-war, the theory of peace at any cost is still a minority view, even in countries with the strongest anti-war voices such as France. In Britain in 1931, the pacifist George Lansbury found himself at the head of the British Labor Party as a result of an unexpected electoral chaos.By 1935, he was quickly and ruthlessly removed from the party leader's throne.The British Labor Party is different from the French People's Front government led by socialism from 1936 to 1938. We cannot blame it for not being firm enough and lacking determination to fight the fascist invaders.What should be blamed is its refusal to support necessary military means, such as rearmament, conscription, and other preparations for war that can fully play an anti-German role.In the same way, communists, while never seduced by peaceful rhetoric, are just as open to discussion as the British Labor government. At that time, the leftist camp was actually caught in an embarrassing situation.On the one hand, the people, who trembled at the shadow of the First World War and harbored unknowable fears about the future, were now mobilized by the strength of the anti-fascist movement.Fascism itself has a strong sense of war, enough to make people rise up and fight it to the death.On the other hand, a futile confrontation with fascism without resorting to military action clearly has no hope of success.Furthermore, it is tantamount to delusional thinking to peacefully bring about the downfall of Nazi Germany and even Mussolini’s Italy based on the firm will of everyone.Not only did he not understand the essence of Hitler too much, but he also had too many false illusions about the opposition forces in Germany.All in all, anyone who lived through this period, "then" was well aware of the fact that a war was inevitable in the end.Whatever plans we may devise to avoid this evil, we all know that it is in vain.I still remember that deep down in the hearts of everyone at that time—as a historian, the author also had to resort to his own memory—they all predicted that the war would come, and they all knew that they would go to the battlefield and even die for it.As opponents of fascism, we know that when the great war breaks out, there is no choice but to go into the fighting ranks. However, the left's political dilemma does not explain the failure of its government.Because effective armament measures do not lie in the resolutions (or non-decisions) of the Congress in party politics—even the calculations of politicians over elections for a certain period of time cannot determine everything.But governments, especially Britain and France, were hurt too badly by the First World War.After this battle, France was exhausted to the point of blood loss, and its national strength may be worse than that of the defeated Germany.Since the revival of Germany, France has been far behind. Without the support of its allies, nothing can be said.The only other European countries with equal interests in France, and with which they could join forces, were Poland and the small states that inherited the territory of the Habsburg dynasty.But these countries are too weak to help.So France, with all its financial resources, bet all on a mere front line of fortifications—the Maginot Line, named after a soon-to-be-forgotten minister—in the hope that it would be able to defend itself as it once did. At the Battle of Verdun, the German attack was stopped with heavy casualties (see Chapter 1).Beyond that, the French had no other hope than Britain; by 1933, the Soviet Union. The British government, too, was aware of its fundamental weakness.Financially, it simply cannot afford another war.Strategically, Britain no longer has a powerful navy that can fight in the three oceans and the Mediterranean Sea at the same time.Meanwhile, it is not Europe that really worries Britain.Its most troublesome problem is how to use this insufficient military force to restore its own empire, which is unprecedentedly large geographically, but is actually on the verge of disintegration. Both Britain and France knew that their national strength was too weak to maintain the international political status quo established in 1919 in order to meet their own needs.They also all know that the current situation is extremely unstable, and it will be even more difficult to maintain it.Another fight will not only be useless, but will only cause greater losses.Therefore, the best policy in the immediate reality is to negotiate with the re-emerging Germany in order to establish a more durable European order.But this approach obviously means making concessions to an increasingly powerful Germany.Unfortunately, the newly revived German Empire was in the hands of the militant Hitler. The so-called "appeasement" policy has been criticized by the press since 1939, and it can be said that it is notorious.Therefore, we have to remind ourselves that, in fact, this approach seemed very reasonable in the eyes of many Western politicians at the time.These people were not very anti-German in their hearts, nor did they have strong anti-Fascist zeal in principle.For the British in particular, changes in continental Europe, especially in those "distant countries with which we are most unfamiliar" (Chamberlain, 1938 on Czechoslovakia), were not things that raised blood pressure. high event. (The French are different. It is conceivable that any move that benefits Germany will make the French nervous. The Germans will confront France sooner or later, but France is so weak that it cannot stand it.) But if there is another world war , will definitely bankrupt the British economy, and most of the British Empire will also be dissolved.Later, it turned out that it was as expected.Although from the perspective of socialists, the Communist Party, the colonial liberation movement, and President Roosevelt of the United States, as long as fascism can be defeated, they are willing to pay this price at any time.But let us not forget that for the rational and practical British imperialists, such sacrifices were too much and unnecessary. However, the development of facts shows that the nationalism of Hitler’s Germany was irrational at all, and its policy goals were both irrational and endless.Expansion and aggression were innately the basic quality of Hitler's system.Unless everyone resigned to their fate as soon as possible and accepted that Germany would inevitably gain hegemony—that is, made up their minds not to resist the advance of the Nazis—otherwise, war was inevitable, just sooner or later.Therefore, in the 1930s, ideology played a central role in policy formation: if the intentions of Nazi Germany were dominated by ideology, then the practice of emphasizing real politics would be completely impossible; That is, there was absolutely no room for compromise with Hitler.However, although the former's assessment of the actual situation is quite correct, its conclusions are based on extremely unrealistic reasons.Among them, some believe that fascism is intolerable in principle and a priori and oppose fascism; some stand on the standpoint of the same a priori nature and hold another reason to oppose fascism-they think that the ideals represented by my country are just Where the Lord is", how can you say that you sacrificed and bowed your head (Churchill is the representative of the second type of people).Churchill's paradox is this: this set of romantic grand ideas applied to political judgment has been proven wrong again and again since 1914 - including his own always complacent and self-satisfied military strategy - but in the face of On the German issue, this treasure actually gave him a bet, which couldn't be more realistic. Conversely, political realists who advocate palliative means have an unrealistic view of the situation.Even in 1938-1939, when any reasonable mind could see that any agreement with Hitler was impossible, the appeasementists were still clinging to their vague illusions of peace.It was against this background that the tragicomedy of black absurdity from March to September 1939 took place.The ridiculous scene finally ended with a big war-but it was a war that no one wanted to fight at the right time and place (even the Germans were no exception).Britain and France were inexplicably involved in this war. It was not until 1940 when the Germans launched a blitzkrieg that they were swept away to the corner that they figured out what role they should play as warring countries.The trend of the times, although Britain and France had to accept the facts in front of them, they were still unable to face the reality, so they seriously considered negotiating cooperation with the Soviet Union.However, without the participation of the Soviet Union, the Allies could neither delay nor win the war.Without the help of the Soviet Union, Chamberlain's pledge to help the countries of Eastern Europe fend off German surprise attacks would be worthless.The authorities in London and Paris actually don't want to go to war, at best they are only willing to show their strength to stop the war.At this moment, both Hitler and Stalin considered it impractical not to use force.Stalin repeatedly sent envoys to negotiate with the West, suggesting that the two sides form a joint formation in the Baltic Sea, but the other side ignored it.The German army marched into Poland, and the British government led by Chamberlain was still on the sidelines and planned to reopen negotiations with Hitler.In fact, Hitler also calculated that Chamberlain would have this idea (Watt, 1989, p. 215). As a result, Hitler's wishful thinking unexpectedly came to nothing.Western countries declare war on Germany.The reason for declaring war was not because politicians from various countries wanted a war, but Hitler himself.After the Munich Agreement, Hitler's eastward policy was too extreme, leaving no place for appeasementists.The broad masses who were originally indifferent to resisting fascism are now mobilizing and resisting. This situation is caused by Hitler himself.Fundamentally speaking, Germany's official occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 completely changed public opinion in Britain. Public opinion reversed the tone of compromise in the past and turned to support resistance to fascism.The people's will is determined, and the government is forced to follow it even though it is unwilling.Since the policy of the British government has changed direction, the French government has no choice but to follow up immediately and follow its only ally who has some ideas.So for the first time ever, the British people were united in the same hatred, determined to fight Hitler to the death, and no longer disagreed - but it was too late, and the situation was out of control.Quick and ruthless, the German army marches into Poland and divides the country with Stalin.Stalin retreated to neutrality, not knowing that he was in trouble.A "phony war" in which Germany sang a monologue, Britain and France could only bluff, came after the false appearance of peace in the Western world. In fact, after the Munich Conference, no matter what kind of realpolitik rhetoric, it is no longer possible to explain the actions of the appeasers.Once the overall situation is clear, the trend of war is inevitable-and in 1939, who can deny this situation? ——The only thing that can be done should be to step up preparations for war, but Western countries did not do so at that time.Paradoxically, Britain - even under Chamberlain - naturally did not want Hitler's hegemony to emerge in Europe until the tide was set.Although France had completely collapsed, the British had seriously considered negotiating peace with Germany—in other words, accepting the fact of defeat.But among French politicians and soldiers, although defeatism is pervasive and pessimism is rising, the French government does not intend to, nor will it give up the last ray of illusory hope.It was not until June 1940, when the French defenders were completely disintegrated, that this idea ceased.However, France's policy is weak and inconsistent.First, it did not dare to bow its head early in accordance with the law of power politics where the strongest is king; second, it did not dare to follow the a priori ideas of the leftists to resist Germany; communist party.For the left, there is nothing in the world more important than the downfall of fascism (whether fascism itself, or Hitler's Germany).For the right wing, "If Hitler fails, it means the complete disintegration of the main barrier against the communist revolution—the totalitarian system." (Thierry Maulnier, 1938 in Ory, 1976, p. 24) It is difficult for us to assert that, What factors influence the actions of these politicians, because their decisions are not only influenced by their own intelligence;The tragic memory of the First World War is still lingering in everyone's mind; the political and economic system of freedom and democracy seems to be facing the final extinction.In the minds of Western politicians, the mentality of losing confidence in the established system and full of self-doubt is more serious in continental Europe than in Britain.People are really worried, they are really not sure whether the policy of resistance will work in this hopeless situation.The future is uncertain, and the outcome is unpredictable. Is it worth paying a high price for this?But for the majority of politicians in Britain and France, at best they can do their best to maintain the current unsatisfactory situation and it will not last long.And behind all these phenomena, there is another fundamental question: if it is fate and the status quo cannot escape, does fascism win the other way after all-that is, the road of social revolution and Bolshevik.If Italian fascism was the only dish on the fascist menu, few conservatives or moderate politicians would have any doubts; even Churchill leaned towards Italy.But the real problem is that the fascists we are facing are not only Mussolini, but also Hitler.But in the 1930s, even though Italy was not the head of fascism, governments and diplomats from various countries still flocked to Rome, and went to make friends with Italy one after another, hoping to stabilize the situation in Europe, or at least win Mussolini. Stay away from Hitler and don't let him join hands with his protégé.We should not underestimate the significance of this expectation. Unfortunately, all kinds of win-win methods failed in the end.Though even Mussolini himself was quite practical to begin with, trying to keep some degree of room for his own action.It was not until 1940 that he came to the conclusion—a wrong one, but not entirely unreasonable—that a great German victory was a foregone conclusion.So he hurriedly followed up and declared war on the Western Allies.