Chapter 23 Chapter 1 Development Chapter 5 Peace

The present unity (of the Great Powers) is its only guarantee against the revolutionary embers which exist to a greater or lesser extent in every European country; social order norms. — Castlereagh In addition, the Russian Tsar is the only monarch today who can immediately fight a major war.He controls the only army that Europe can call upon today. —Gentz, March 24, 1818 After more than two decades of virtually uninterrupted war and revolution, the victorious old regime faced particularly difficult and critical problems of peacemaking and peacekeeping.They must clear 20 years of ruins and redistribute territorial spoils.Furthermore, it is obvious to all sensible statesmen that any future European war of any magnitude cannot be tolerated, since such a war would almost mean a new

revolution, that is, the destruction of the old regime.Belgian King Leopold (Queen Victoria's clever but somewhat obnoxious uncle) recounted a later crisis: "Amid Europe's social ills, ... a general war, the consequences of which will be It would be unprecedented. Such a war . Smart, no more peace-loving than ever, but no doubt more fearful than ever. Their achievement in avoiding all-out war is quite remarkable.Between Napoleon's defeat and the Crimean War (1854-1856), there was virtually no total war in Europe, nor was there any conflict between one great power and another on the battlefield.Indeed, with the exception of the Crimean War, no war between 1815 and 1914 involved more than two great powers at the same time. The people of the 20th century should be able to appreciate the magnitude of this achievement.At that time, the unrest on the international stage and the endless conflict incentives made such an achievement even more unforgettable.Revolutionary movements (which we analyze in Chapter 6) repeatedly destroyed hard-won international stability: in Southern Europe, the Balkans, and Latin America in the 1820s, in Western Europe (especially in Belgium) in 1830,

time), and all of Europe on the eve of the Revolution of 1848.And the crisis of disintegration at home, the threat of coveted powers outside—mainly Britain, Russia, and to a lesser extent France—and the decline of the Turkish Empire made the so-called "Eastern Question" (Eastern Question) a permanent crisis Roots: Erupted in Greece in the 1820s and ignited in Egypt in the 1830s.Although it was temporarily subdued after a particularly sharp conflict in 1839-1841, it was still as potentially explosive as ever.Britain and Russia had a bitter relationship over the unconquered lands between the two great empires of the Near East and Asia.France was very dissatisfied with its much weaker position than it had before 1815.But despite all these traps and eddies, the ship of diplomacy navigated the difficult waterway without collision.

Our generation has failed so markedly at the basic task of international diplomacy, namely, to avoid all-out war, that we are inclined to look back on those statesmen and those of 1815- The Diplomatic Approach of 1848. Talleyrand, who was in charge of French foreign policy from 1814 to 1835, is still the model of French diplomats.And the British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh (Castlereagh), Canning (George Canning) and Palmerston Viscount (Viscount Palmerston)-they were in charge from 1812 to 1822 respectively. The foreign policy of all non-Tory regimes from 1822 to 1827 and from 1830 to 1852 - has become a diplomatic giant to be admired and remembered.Prince Metternich, who was Chancellor of Austria from Napoleon's defeat until his downfall in 1848, is often seen today not just as a tough opponent of reform but as a wise man of stability. Gentlemen, this is different from previous views.However, even an eye of trust cannot account for the fact that under Alexander I (1801-1825) and Nicholas I (1825-1855)

Down Russia.The Prussian foreign minister, who was relatively insignificant in this period, deserves idealization. In a sense, the above praise is justified.The European arrangement after the Napoleonic wars was by no means more just or moral than any other decision; but it was both realistic and reasonable in view of the thoroughly anti-liberal and anti-nationalist (that is, counter-revolutionary) aims of its framers.They did not attempt to impose total victory on France in order to provoke the French into a new Jacobinism.The frontiers of the defeated countries were better protected than in 1789, monetary reparations were not too high, the occupation by foreign troops was extremely brief, and by 1818 France was once again recognized as a full member of the Concert of Europe . (These terms would have been even softer had it not been for Napoleon's failed restoration act in 1815.) The Bourbons were restored, but understandably they had to make concessions to the dangerous spirit of their subjects.The great changes of the Revolution were accepted, and that provocative constitutional mechanism was bequeathed to his subjects under the guise of a charter "generously bestowed" by the restored absolutist Louis XVIII - though naturally very limited.

The redrawing of the map of Europe neither considered the wishes of the peoples of various countries nor the rights of princes who had been deposed by the French at different times, but paid considerable attention to the balance of the five great powers that emerged from the war: they were Russia, Britain , France, Austria and Prussia.And only the first three really count.Britain has no territorial ambitions for the European continent. What it cares about is controlling or protecting some important points in navigation and commerce.It thus retained Malta, the Ionian Islands, and Heligoland, kept an eye on Sicily, and apparently handed over Norway from Denmark to Sweden, as well as Holland, Belgium (formerly Austrian Derain) benefited from the combination.The former prevented the control of the entrance to the Baltic in the hands of a single state, the latter placed the mouths of the Rhine and Scheldt in the hands of a harmless but sufficiently powerful state, especially under the fortress barrier of the South , able to resist France's well-known appetite for Belgium.Both arrangements were very unpopular with the Norwegians and the Belgians, especially the latter, which lasted only until the Revolution of 1830.After some friction between France and Britain, Belgium became a permanent small neutral country, and its prince was chosen by Britain.Of course, outside of Europe, Britain's territorial ambitions are much greater.Despite the total command of the British navy over the seas, it basically didn't matter what was actually under the British flag, except for a few chaotic weak states in northwest India that acted as the dividing line between the British Empire and the Russian Empire.But this Anglo-Russian antagonism had little effect on the areas that had to be rearranged in 1814-15.For Europe, Britain simply asks that none of the great powers become too powerful.

Continental Europe's decisive military power, Russia, satisfied its limited territorial ambitions by acquiring Finland (at Sweden's expense), Bessarabia (at Turkey's expense), and most of Poland.Poland was granted a degree of self-government (after the uprising of 1830–1831, which was abolished) under the leadership of local factions that consistently supported alliances with the Russians.The rest of Poland was divided between Prussia and Austria, with the exception of the city republic of Cracow, which also failed to survive the 1846 uprising.For the rest, Russia was content to exercise a long but not far-reaching dominion over all the despotic duchies east of France, the chief subject of which was the necessity of avoiding revolution.Tsar Alexander initiated the Holy Alliance for this purpose, in which Austria and Prussia joined, but Great Britain stayed out.Russia's de facto hegemony over most of Europe may have been far from an ideal arrangement in British eyes, but it reflected military realities and could not be stopped.Unless France is allowed to retain a greater degree of power than her former adversary was prepared to give, unbearable war will be the price.France's status as a great power was clearly recognized, but that was the limit anyone was prepared to accept.

Austria and Prussia were actually great powers only by courtesy, or were judged so by Austria's notorious weakness during international crises (rightly) and by the collapse of Prussia in 1806 (wrongly).Their main role is to act as a stabilizer for Europe.Austria regained its Italian provinces, plus the Italian territories of the former Republic of Venice and Dalmatia, and had protectorates over the small northern and central Italian duchies.Most of these duchies were ruled by relatives of the Habsburgs. (Except for Piedmont-Sardinia, which annexed the former Republic of Genoa to make it a more effective buffer between Austria and France.) If "order" was to be maintained anywhere in Italy ", then Austria is the police on duty.Since its only concern is stability, eliminating anything that would lead to its disintegration, it must act as a permanent security police against any attempt to create unrest on the Continent.Prussia benefited from Britain's desire to establish a suitably strong state in western Germany, an area where duchies had long tended to support France, or be controlled by France.Prussia also reclaimed the Rhineland, whose economic potential was beyond the reach of noble diplomats.Prussia also benefited from the conflict between Britain and Russia. The British believed that Russia's expansion in Poland was too much. Industrially developed half of Saxony.Territorially and economically, Prussia benefited more than any other power from the 1815 settlement, and for the first time it became a European power in terms of real resources, although it was not until the 1860s that politicians Clearly recognize this.The main role of Austria, Prussia, and a group of small Germanic states was to provide well-educated blood to the European royal families.They were wary of each other within the German Confedderation, although Austria's superiority was not challenged.The main role of the Confederation was to keep the small states out of the French orbit, as they were traditionally easily attracted to them.As much as the nationalists loathe to admit it, they were not at all unhappy as Napoleon's satellite states.

The statesmen of 1815 were well aware that no solution, however carefully crafted, could long withstand the strains of national antagonism and changing circumstances.So they provide a mechanism for maintaining peace by means of regular meetings, that is, as soon as major problems arise, they meet to resolve them.The major decisions at these conferences were taken, of course, by the "great power" (great power, the term itself a product of the period). "Eurocoordination" (another term that started to be used at the time) was not equivalent to the United Nations, but rather like the permanent members of the UN Security Council.However, regular meetings were held only in the previous years, from 1818-1822 when France officially re-accepted membership in the Coordination Organization.

The parliamentary system disintegrated because it could not survive the years immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, when, because of the famine and commercial depression of 1816-17, there was a strong fear of social revolution everywhere, including in England, although this fear In the end it was not confirmed.After economic stability was restored around 1820, every violation of the 1815 settlement simply reflected differences in the interests of the great powers.In the face of the first wave of unrest and riots in 1820-1822, only Austria insisted that such movements must be suppressed immediately and actively in order to maintain social order and Austrian territorial unity.On the issue of Germany, Italy, and Spain, the three monarchies of the "Holy Alliance" agreed with France, although France, which liked to exercise international police duties in Spain (1823), was less interested in European stability than the former three countries, and was more interested in Interested in broadening its diplomatic and military spheres of activity, especially in Spain, Belgium and Italy, where it has invested heavily.Great Britain stayed out.This is partly because—especially after the flexible Canning replaced the staid and reactionary Castlereagh (1822)—Britain believed that political reform was inevitable sooner or later in absolutist Europe, and because British statesmen were different Emotional despotism, coupled with the application of police principles, only introduced hostile powers (especially France) into Latin America.Latin America, as we have seen, was a British economic colony, and a very dynamic one at that.The British therefore supported Latin American independence, as the United States had advocated in the Monroe Declaration of 1823.The proclamation had no real value, but there was a hint of significant interest, and if anything ensured Latin American independence, it was the British Navy.With regard to Greece, the divisions among the great powers were even greater.Russia, which has an infinite hatred of revolution, can undoubtedly benefit from this Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church) people's uprising, because it can weaken the power of Turkey on the one hand, and must rely on Russian help (in addition, Russia has a protects the treaty rights of Orthodox Christians to interfere with Turkey).Fears of Russian military intervention, pro-Greek pressure, economic interests, and a general belief that if Turkey's disintegration could not be prevented, it would be best done in an orderly manner, eventually led to a switch from hostility to neutrality to pro-Greek informality. intervene.Greece thus won its independence (1929) with the help of Russia and Great Britain.By turning the country into a kingdom under the rule of a German petite prince who can be found anywhere, Greece will not become just a Russian satellite, and international losses can thus be minimized.But the permanence of the settlement of 1815, the system of conferences, and the principle of suppressing all revolutions, collapsed.

The 1830 revolution completely destroyed the settlement of 1815, because the revolution affected not only the small country, but also a large country - France itself.In effect, the Revolution of 1830 freed all of Europe west of the Rhine from the police operations of the Holy Alliance.At the same time the "Eastern Question," the question of what to do about Turkey's inevitable disintegration, turned the Balkans and the Levant into a battleground for the great powers, especially Russia and Great Britain. The "Eastern Question" disturbed the balance of power, as all plots strengthened Russia, and from then on Russia's main diplomatic objective was to win control of the straits between Europe and Asia Minor that controlled its passage to the Mediterranean.This action has not only diplomatic and military importance, but also economic urgency as Ukrainian grain exports increase.Britain, concerned as usual with the passage to India, was deeply concerned that Russia might threaten its southward advance.Britain's apparent policy was to support Turkey at all costs against Russian expansion. (This had the added benefit of British trade in the Levant, which increased very satisfactorily during this period.) Unfortunately, this policy was entirely impractical.The Turkish Empire was by no means a hopeless husk, at least militarily, but it could do no more than act slowly in response to domestic rebellions (which it could still easily quell), Russia, and an unfavorable international situation. A combined force (something it cannot easily defeat).At this time, the Turkish Empire was neither capable nor willing to modernize, although the beginning of modernization had already begun during the reign of Mahmoud II in the 1830s.Therefore, only the direct diplomatic and military support of Britain (that is, the threat of war) can prevent the continuous growth of Russian influence and the disintegration of Turkey under various troubles.This made the "Oriental Question" the most explosive issue in international affairs since the Napoleonic Wars, and the only one that could have led to a general war and the only one that did lead to an international war in 1854-56.However, in this international gamble, the situation favoring Russia and detrimental to Britain continued to intensify, but this development also made Russia tend to compromise.Russia can achieve its diplomatic goals in two ways: either by defeating and partitioning Turkey and occupying Constantinople and the two straits; or by establishing a practical protective relationship with a weak and compliant Turkey.And no matter which way it is, it is all there.In other words, a major battle for Constantinople was never worth fighting for the Tsar.Thus, while the Greek wars of the 1820s were in keeping with its policy of partition and occupation, Russia did not benefit from this event as much as it craved, because it was unwilling to assert its superiority too much.On the contrary, it also concluded a particularly favorable treaty at Unkiar Skelessi (1833) with Turkey, under strong pressure and eager to realize the need for a strong protector.The treaty infuriated Britain and generated a popular feeling of hatred for Russia in the 1830s, and Russia's image as the traditional enemy of Britain was formed. (Indeed, Anglo-Russian relations, based on economic complementarity, were traditionally very friendly, and did not seriously deteriorate until after the Napoleonic Wars.) Faced with British pressure, the Russians retreated of their own accord and, in the 1840s, instead proposed Claims to partition Turkey. Therefore, the confrontation between Russia and Britain in the East is actually less dangerous than the open war cry (especially Britain).Moreover, Britain's greater apprehension about the revival of France diminished the importance of this opposition.In fact, the term "great game" more aptly described the situation at that time, and the term was gradually used to refer to the espionage activities carried out by adventurers and spies in the undetermined East of the two powers .What made the situation really dangerous was the unpredictable course of the liberation movement inside Turkey and the interference of other powers.Among the great powers, Austria seemed uninterested, itself a crumbling multiethnic empire threatened by the same national movements that destabilized Turkey—the Balkan Slavs, especially the Serbs.However, similar threats were not immediate, although they would later become the immediate cause of the First World War.France was more troublesome, with a long track record of diplomatic and economic influence in the Levant and trying to restore and expand its influence at regular intervals.Especially since Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, France had a greater influence on Egypt. Since King Ali of Egypt was actually a dictator, his wishes could influence the disintegration or consolidation of the Turkish Empire.Indeed, the crisis of the Eastern Question in the 1830s (1831-1833, 1839-1841) was basically a crisis in the relationship between Ali and his nominal suzerain, which was later complicated by French support for Egypt.However, if Russia is unwilling to go to war for Constantinople, then of course France cannot and does not want to go to war.There are diplomatic crises.But in the end, apart from the Crimean episode, there was no war over Turkey until the end of the 19th century. Therefore, from the process of international disputes during this period, we can clearly see that flammable materials in international relations have already existed, but they have not yet reached the level of detonating a war.Of the great powers, Austria and Prussia are too weak to count on much.The British have been satisfied.They had won in 1815 the most comprehensive victory achieved by any power in the history of the world.It rose from a twenty-year war against France to become the only industrialized economic power, the only naval power (the British Navy had almost as many ships as all other navies combined in 1840) and the world's only colonial power.Nothing seemed to be hindering the only important expansionism of British foreign policy, the expansion of British trade and investment.Russia, while not content, has only limited territorial ambitions, and nothing in sight stands in the way of its advance for long (or so it seems).At least there is nothing to suggest the need for a dangerous all-out war.Only France is a "dissatisfied" power with the capacity to disrupt international stability.But France could do so only if it could reinvigorate Jacobinism at home and liberalism and nationalism abroad.For it has been fatally weakened in terms of orthodox great power competition.It will never be able to fight an alliance of two or more great powers under equal conditions, relying solely on its own population and resources, as it did during Louis XIV or the Great Revolution.In 1780, the population of France was 2.5 times that of Britain. By 1830, the ratio of the population of the two countries had exceeded two to three. In 1780, France had almost as many people as Russia, but by 1830, France had almost half the population of Russia.At the same time the French economy lagged fatally behind the British, the Americans, and soon the Germans. But harnessing Jacobinism to pursue its international ambitions would be too costly for any French government.When the French overthrew their regime in 1830 and 1848, and everywhere shook or destroyed absolutism, the great powers trembled.They could have saved themselves from sleepless nights. The moderates in France in 1830-1831 were not even prepared to give any help to the insurgent Poles, although all French (and European liberal) opinion was sympathetic to the Poles.The old but enthusiastic Lafayette wrote to Palmerston in 1831: "What will you do with Poland? What can we do for it?" The answer is, nothing.France is of course willing to use those European revolutions to strengthen her own power, and all revolutionaries really want it to do so.But the consequences of such a plunge into revolutionary war frightened not only Metternich but also the moderate liberal French government.Therefore, in the period 1815-1848, no French government would endanger the general peace in the interest of its own country. Outside the sphere of the European balance of power, of course, nothing stood in the way of expansion and belligerence.In fact, despite their immense power, the white powers actually conquered only limited territories.The British were content with the occupation of small fortresses concerning the world control of the British Navy and its world-wide trading interests, such as the southern tip of Africa (taken from the Dutch during the Napoleonic Wars), Ceylon (in established during this period), Singapore and Hong Kong.And the urgency of the anti-slave trade movement—a movement that catered to both domestic humanitarian opinion and the strategic interests of the British Navy—retained a British foothold only on the African coast.In general, the British view was that a world open to British trade and protected from unsavory elements by the British Navy could be developed more cheaply without the administrative expense of occupation.There is only one important exception, India, and all the above-mentioned efforts are related to Indian rule.India must be owned at all costs, and even most anti-colonial free traders never doubted this.Because of the growing importance of the Indian market, it was generally believed that British trade would certainly suffer if it were administered by the Indians themselves.India was a key to opening markets in the Far East, the drug trade, and other lucrative pursuits that European businessmen wished to engage in.China was thus opened in the Opium War of 1839-1842.The series of British wars against the Marathas, Nepalese, Burmese, Rajputs, Afghans, Sindhis and Sikhs made the The Anglo-Indian Empire expanded to cover two-thirds of the subcontinent, and Britain's web of influence has been tightened in the Middle East, which controls the route to India.From 1840 onwards, this passage was dominated by steamship routes of the P&O Company and supplemented by overland roads across the Suez Canal. While the Russians had a far greater reputation for expansionism (at least in the eyes of the British), their actual conquests were more limited.During this period, the tsars only managed to acquire some vast unconquered territories of the Kirghiz steppe east of the Urals, and some hotly contested mountains in the Caucasus.America, on the other hand, gained the whole of the West, plus the southern part of the Oregon border, through the upheavals and wars waged against the poor Mexicans.The French had to confine their expansionary ambitions to Algeria. There they fabricated a pretense to invade there in 1830 and spent the next 17 years trying to conquer it.It was not until 1847 that they destroyed the main resistance in the area. In any event, one provision of the international peace settlement must be singled out, namely, the abolition of the international slave trade.There were humanitarian as well as economic considerations: slavery was horrific and utterly inefficient.Furthermore, the British were the main international advocates of this admirable movement.From the perspective of the British, the economy from 1815 to 1848 no longer depended on the sale of blacks and sugar as in the eighteenth century, but on the sale of cotton textiles.The actual abolition of slavery was slower than the abolitionist movement (except, of course, where the French Revolution had already swept it away).Britain abolished slavery in its colonies—mainly the West Indies—in 1834, although where large-scale plantation agriculture existed, it was soon replaced by indentured labor imported from Asia.The French did not officially abolish slavery again until the Revolution of 1848. In 1848, slavery still existed in large numbers, and so did the world's (African) slave trade.