Chapter 19 Chapter 1 Development Chapter 4 War 1

In an age of innovation, everything that is not new is harmful.The military art of the monarchy no longer suits us, because our members and our enemies are different.The power and conquest of nations, their political and warlike splendor, have always rested on a single principle, a single mighty institution...  We already have our own national character.Our military system should be different from that of the enemy.Well then, if the French nation is to be feared by our zeal and skill, and if our enemies are clumsy, indifferent, and slow, then our military system must march forward. ——Saint-Just, report to the National Convention in the name of the National Salvation Committee on January 19, 2001 (October 10, 1793)

It is wrong to say that war is fated; it is also wrong to say that the earth longs for blood.God himself curses war, and so do those who wage it and make it appear secretly horrible. —Alfred de Vigny, Military Slavery and Dignity 1 From 1792 to 1815, there was almost continuous warfare in Europe, combined or simultaneous with wars outside the continent.First in the West Indies, the eastern Mediterranean, and India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, then occasional naval battles abroad, and then the Anglo-American War of 1812-1814.In these wars, the consequences of victory and defeat are significant, as they change the world map.So we should first study these wars, their actual course, and the resulting military mobilizations and campaigns; but we must also pay attention to the less concrete question, namely, what did the political-economic measures of wartime look like?

Two very different belligerents, each with very different strengths and institutions, have confronted each other for more than 20 years.As a country, France confronts (or allies with) other countries for its own interests, but on the other hand, as the incarnation of revolution, France calls on people all over the world to overthrow tyranny and fight for freedom, so conservative and reactionary forces are consistent against it.Undoubtedly, after the first apocalyptic years of the revolution, the differences between the opposing sides gradually diminished.By the end of Napoleon's reign, the elements of imperialist conquest and exploitation had overwhelmed the elements of liberation.Whenever French forces defeated, occupied, or annexed countries, there was less confusion between international wars and international civil wars (and within each country, domestic civil wars).The counter-revolutionary powers, on the other hand, accommodated the irreversibility of many of France's revolutionary achievements and were therefore willing to negotiate (with some reservations) the terms of peace, but such negotiations were between normally functioning powers, not like light and dark negotiations between.Even within the first weeks of Napoleon's defeat, the counter-revolutionary powers were ready to re-absorb France as an equal partner in the traditional games of alliances, counter-alliances, intimidation, threats, and war in which diplomacy mediated the balance between the major powers. relation.Even so, the dual nature of war as a conflict between states and between social institutions persists.

Generally speaking, the camps of the two warring parties are very unequal.Apart from France itself, there is only one country of importance which, because of its revolutionary origins and appreciation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, is ideologically inclined to France's side, and that is the United States.In fact, the United States did fall on the French side, and on at least one occasion (1812-1814) went to war, if not allied with the French, at least against a mutual enemy, Britain.But the US remained neutral for the most part, and her friction with Britain required no ideological explanation.As for other allies, France's ideological allies are political parties and schools of opinion in other countries, not state power itself.

In a very broad sense, virtually every educated, talented, open-minded person was sympathetic to the French Revolution, at least until the Jacobin dictatorship, and usually longer (until Napoleon became Emperor) , Beethoven took back the "Eroica Symphony" dedicated to him).The list of European genius outliers who initially supported the Revolution was rivaled only by a similar, almost universal sympathy for the Spanish Republic in the 1930s.In England there were poets Wordsworth, Blake, Coleridge, Robert Burns, Southey, chemist Priestley, and several Birmingham neophytes. There were eminent scientists of the Lunar Society (Watt's son went to France in person, much to his father's astonishment), technologists and industrialists like the ironsmith Wilkinson and engineer Telford, and general luminaries. Whig and non-conformist intellectuals.In Germany, the philosophers Kant, Herder, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the poets Schiller, Holderlin, Wieland and the aged Klopstock, and the musician Beethoven.In Switzerland there were the educator Pestalozzi, the psychologist Lavater and the painter Fussli.In Italy virtually all anti-ecclesiastical opinion circles supported the French Revolution.But while the Revolution was intoxicated by the support of these intellectuals, and honored by honoring eminent foreign sympathizers and those believed to have supported its principles, the titles of Honorary Citizens of France, neither Beethoven nor Burns , they were not of much political or military importance. (The recipients of this honorary title are: Priestley, Bentham, Wilberforce, Clarkson (Clarkson: anti-slavery agitator), James Mackintosh and Williams[ David Williams]; Klopstock, Schiller, Campe and Cloots in Germany; Pestalozzi in Switzerland; Kosziusko in Poland; Corani; Cornelius de Pauw in the Netherlands; Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Paine, and Joel Barlow in the United States. But these were not all A sympathizer of the French Revolution.)

Politically important pro-Jacobinism or pro-French sentiments, mainly in areas bordering France, with similar social conditions, or frequent cultural contacts (Low Countries, Rhineland, Switzerland and Savoy), Italy, And Ireland and Poland for somewhat different reasons.In Britain, Jacobinism would undoubtedly have had greater political influence, even after the Terror, had it not clashed with the general anti-French tendencies of British nationalism.This nationalism is a mixture of contempt and hatred.Beef-raised John Bull's disdain for starving Continentals (all French were as thin as matchsticks in popular cartoons of the period) and hatred for England's world-enemy disregarded France as Scotland's allies for generations ( This may have something to do with Scottish Jacobinism being a much stronger popular force).British Jacobinism was originally an artisan and working-class phenomenon, at least after the first general upsurge, which is unique.The Corresponding Societies could claim to be the first political organizations of the working class.But it was the mouthpiece that found special power in Paine's Rights of Man, and had some political support from Whig interests.The Whig interest group itself was spared persecution because of its wealth and social status, and was prepared to defend the liberal traditions of British citizens and the benefits of a peace with France.The actual weakness of English Jacobinism, however, is shown by the fact that, at a critical stage of the war (1797), the fleet mutinied at Spithead itself clamored that, as long as their economic demands Satisfied, they will sail to meet the French.

In the Iberian peninsula, under the Habsburgs, in eastern and central Germany, Scandinavia, the Balkans, and Russia, pro-Jacobinism was insignificant.It attracted some enthusiastic young people, some self-proclaimed prophetic intellectuals and minorities, such as the Hungarian Ignatius Martinovics and the Greek Rhigas, who fought for national and social emancipation in their countries. In history, it has played a glorious pioneer role.But the lack of widespread support for their views among the middle and upper classes, let alone isolation from the ignorant and recalcitrant peasantry, made Jacobinism vulnerable to repression, even at the stage of their adventurous plotting. , such as Austria.It took a whole generation for the strong and militant Spanish liberal tradition to emerge from the tiny circle of student conspirators, or Jacobin agents of 1792-1795.

Much of Jacobinism outside of France appealed directly ideologically to the educated and middle classes, and thus its political power depended on the potency or will they wielded.In Poland, then, the French Revolution made a deep impression.For a long time the Poles looked to France for support against the greed of the Prussians, Russians and Austrians.Prussia, Russia, and Austria have already divided large areas of the country, and will soon carry out a complete partition.France, too, provided a model of the kind of deep internal reforms to which all thoughtful Poles agreed, which alone could have made their country capable of defending itself against its massacres.No wonder the Reform Constitution of 1791 was so consciously and profoundly influenced by the French

Effects of the Revolution.It was also the first modern constitution to show the influence of the French Revolution. (Since Poland was in fact a republic of nobles and gentry, its constitution was "Jacobin" only in the most superficial sense: the rule of the nobility was not abolished, but strengthened.) In Poland, however, the The reformed nobles and squires were free to act.In Hungary, where the characteristic conflict between Vienna and Zemstvo provided a similar stimulus for the country gentry to take an interest in the theory of rebellion (Gomor demanded the abolition of censorship contrary to the Rousseau social contract ), but they have no freedom of movement.So the Jacobinism here is much weaker and less effective.Second, in Ireland, ethnic issues and peasant discontent gave Jacobinism far more political power than actual support for the United Irishmen, whose leaders had a free-thinking Masonic ideology form.In that almost entirely Catholic country, church services were held to pray for the victory of the godless French.What's more, the Irish were ready to welcome the invasion of French troops, not because they sympathized with Robespierre, but because they hated the British and wanted to seek anti-British allies.On the other hand, in Spain, where Catholicism and poverty were equally prominent, Jacobinism failed for the opposite reason: the only oppressor in Spain was none other than France.

Neither Poland nor Ireland is a typical example of pro-Jacobinism, because the actual program of the revolution has little appeal there.It plays a larger role in countries with similar social and political problems as France.These countries fell into two categories: those whose native Jacobins had considerable hope of gaining political power, and those whose progress could only be driven by French conquest.The Low Countries, parts of Switzerland, and maybe one or two Italian neighbors fall into the first category; western Germany and most of Italy fall into the second category.Belgium (Austrian Netherlands) was already in the midst of the uprising of 1789: it is often forgotten that Camiile Desmoulins called his magazine Les Revolutions de France et de Brabant).The pro-French elements of the revolutionaries (democratic Vonckists) were no doubt weaker than the conservative statists, but still strong enough to provide genuine revolutionary support for the French conquest of the country. the country they love.In the United Provinces, the "patriots", seeking an alliance with France, were strong enough to consider a revolution, although success without outside assistance was doubtful.This group of patriots represented the lower middle class and others against the oligarchy dominated by big businessmen.In Switzerland, the left has remained strong in some Protestant cantons, and France's gravity has remained strong.Here, too, French conquest only strengthened rather than established local revolutionary forces.

In western Germany and Italy the situation is different.The French invasion was welcomed by the German Jacobins, especially in Mainz and the Southwest, but no one would say they were strong enough to cause much trouble to the government in their own right. (France even failed to establish satellite states, such as the Rhineland Republic.) In Italy, the predominance of the Enlightenment and the Masonic program made the revolution popular among the intelligentsia, but local Jacobinism could Only in the kingdom of Naples was it stronger, where it actually won the attention of the entire enlightened (i.e., anti-Church) middle class and part of the country gentlemen, and went further to form secret societies and conferences which, in the context of southern Italy, flourishing.But even here the Jacobins suffered a complete failure in establishing contact with the social-revolutionary masses.When news of the French advance came, a Neapolitan republic was easily proclaimed, but was just as easily overthrown by a right-wing social revolution under the banners of the Pope and the King, because the peasants and Neapolitan lazzaroni, It is not unreasonable to describe the Jacobins as "people with four-wheeled carriages". Broadly speaking, therefore, the military value of foreign pro-Jacobinism was mainly as an auxiliary force for the French conquest, and its combination of forces was more complex in terms of the relationship between the conquered and the old powers.The basic conflict here was that between France and Great Britain, which for most of the century dominated international relations in Europe and, from the British point of view, was almost exclusively economic.They wanted to eliminate their main rivals in order to realize their dream of total domination of European trade, total control of colonial and overseas markets (which also meant control of the high seas).In fact, that's pretty much how the war ended.In Europe, such an aim meant that Britain had no territorial ambitions other than to control certain points of nautical importance, or to ensure that these points did not fall into the hands of states powerful enough to pose a danger.In other respects, Britain welcomes any balanced continental policy.Overseas, such a goal represented the wrecking havoc of other countries' colonial empires under British rule. This policy in itself would have been sufficient to furnish France with some potential allies, for British policy was viewed with suspicion and hostility by all seafaring, commercial, and colonial nations.In fact, their normal attitude was to be neutral, since the advantages of free trade in wartime were great, but the English tended to see shipping from neutral countries (totally realistically) as helping the French rather than them, and there were often Conflict broke out, and it wasn't until after 1806 that the French blockade policy pushed them into the opposing camp.Since most of the seafaring powers were weak or deeply located in Europe, they did not cause much trouble for Britain; but the Anglo-American War of 1812-1814 was the result of such a conflict. French hostility to England, on the other hand, was a little more complicated, but in it, like the English, the elements for total victory were greatly strengthened by the revolution which brought the French bourgeoisie to power, and the bourgeoisie The appetites of class, like those of the English, are in a way limitless.A modest victory over England required the destruction of British commerce (on which, they rightly believed, Britain depended), and the only way to prevent her return to power was to destroy her commerce once and for all. (Analogs to the Anglo-French conflict and the Roman-Carthaginian conflict abound in the minds of the French, whose political imagery is largely classical.) When ambitious, the French bourgeoisie will look to rely on its own political and military resources to offset Britain's obvious economic advantages, such as building a large and controlled market for itself to the exclusion of competitors.Both of these considerations would make the Anglo-French conflict protracted and intractable, unlike other conflicts.Neither side was actually prepared to settle the issue other than total victory (a situation that, while common today, was a rarity at the time).The brief peace between the two wars (1802-1803) ended when neither side was willing to maintain it.The intractability of this conflict is made all the more apparent by the confrontation between the two sides in the purely military sphere: from the late 1790s it was clear that the British could not effectively win wars on the Continent, nor could the French. Unable to successfully break through the strait. Other anti-French powers are busy with less brutal battles.They all hoped to overthrow the French Revolution, although they did not want to pay the price of their own political ambitions, but after 1792-1795, such wishes were clearly difficult to achieve.Austria was the most staunchly anti-French power, because France directly threatened its possessions, its sphere of influence in Italy and its dominance over Germany.Austria thus strengthened its ties with the Bourbons and joined every important alliance against France.Russia's participation in the anti-French war was sporadic, and it participated only in 1795-1800, 1805-1807 and 1812.Prussia's attitude is a bit hesitant. On the one hand, it sympathizes with the counter-revolutionary forces, and on the other hand, it does not trust Austria. Poland and Germany, which it wants to get involved in, need the active support of France.It then went to war only sporadically, and in a semi-independent fashion: as in 1792-1795, 1806-1807 (when it was crushed) and 1813.The rest of the states, which at times participated in anti-French coalitions, exhibited similar policy swings.They opposed the French Revolution, but, politics being politics, they had other important things to do, and nothing in their national interest compelled them to remain unwaveringly hostile to France, especially a determination to periodically redraw The ever-victorious French of the European territories. The long-standing diplomatic ambitions and interests of European countries have also provided France with many potential allies.For in every permanent system of states that compete with each other and are in tension, discord with Party A implies sympathy for the anti-A.The most reliable of these potential allies were the lesser German princes, some of whom had long based their interests on (alliance with France) weakening the power of the Emperor (i.e. Austria) Suffering from growing Prussian power.The southwestern states of Germany, such as Baden, Wurtemberg, which formed the core of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine (1860), Bavaria, and Prussia's old rival and victim Saxony, are such states representative.In fact Saxony was Napoleon's last and most loyal ally, partly due to economic interests, as Saxony was a highly developed manufacturing center that could benefit from Napoleon's "Continental System". Even taking into account the fragmentation of the anti-French side and the potential of allies available to the French, the anti-French coalition was statistically much stronger than the French, at least initially.The military record of the war, however, is a string of stunning French victories.After the initial alliance of foreign armies and domestic counter-revolutionaries had been repulsed (1793-1794), the defense of the French army was in critical condition only for a brief period before the end of the war, that is, in 1799, when a second anti-French coalition was mobilized. Suvorov's Russian army, a mighty and fearsome force, appeared for the first time on the battlefields of Western Europe.The list of campaigns and ground battles from 1794 to 1812 is, in all practical terms, a record of the succession of French victories.And the reason for this lies in the French Revolution itself.As stated earlier, the propaganda of the French Revolution abroad was not conclusive.The most we can say is that it prevented the inhabitants of reactionary countries from rising up against the French who brought them freedom, but in fact, the strategy and tactics of orthodox countries in the eighteenth century did not expect or welcome civilians to participate in the war.Frederick the Great had categorically told those Berliners who supported him against Russia to stay away from the war and go about their business.But the Revolution changed the way the French fought and made it far superior to the armies of the old regime.Technically speaking, the army of the old regime had better training and stricter military discipline. Where these qualities can play a decisive role, such as naval battles, the French army is obviously at a disadvantage.They were excellent privateers and hit-and-run armed clipper crews, but this could not make up for the lack of well-trained sailors, especially competent naval officers.This part of the population was killed in large numbers by the revolution, because they were mostly royalist Norman and Breton country gentlemen, and people of this quality could not be quickly assembled.In the six sea battles and eight small sea battles between Britain and France, France lost about 10 times as many people as Britain.But in terms of temporary formations, mobility, flexibility, and especially sheer offensive courage, morale and calculation, the French have no opponents.These advantages are not due to anyone's military genius, for the French military record was already quite impressive before Napoleon took over, although the general quality of French generals was not outstanding.But these strengths are in part due to the rejuvenation of the core officers and soldiers at home and abroad, which is one of the main achievements of any revolution. Of the 142 generals in the great Prussian army in 1806, 79 were over sixty years of age, and a quarter of all regimental commanders were of this age.But in the same year, Napoleon (who was a general at the age of 24), Murat (who commanded a brigade at the age of 26), Lie (who also commanded a brigade at the age of 27), and Davout (Davout), who were only 26-37 years old Wait.