Chapter 10 Chapter 10 Return of Hong Kong and Macau

The return of Hong Kong and Macao is an important part of the great cause of the reunification of the motherland, and generations of Chinese people have fought bravely for it.The comeback has been a long journey. As a member of this generation, I feel very lucky to be able to witness the comeback with my own eyes, and I feel extremely honored to have the opportunity to personally participate in the comeback process.During my tenure as foreign minister, at the end of the transition period between the two places, I participated in diplomatic negotiations and presided over the preparations for the establishment of special administrative regions between the two places.This is a very rare and quite unique experience in my diplomatic career.

The issue of Hong Kong's return is first and foremost a diplomatic issue.The peaceful recovery of the territory inherent in the motherland from foreign occupiers must be negotiated diplomatically. From the agreement on the principle of return to the handover of power, there has been a rather long transition period.During this period, the British side must ensure that Hong Kong’s daily administrative work is done well and maintain local stability and prosperity; the Chinese side must promise to formulate a series of specific policies for the recovered special administrative region based on the agreement reached between the two sides. To implement "one country, two systems" and maintain long-term stability and prosperity.

During this long transitional period, the two sides will conduct diplomatic negotiations in many fields in order to implement the agreement and fulfill their mutual commitments.At that time, the Chinese side determined the overall negotiating policy according to the agreement: with regard to the daily administrative management of the other party during the transition period, the Chinese side will cooperate but not interfere; the Chinese side has the right to speak or even participate in matters that cross the return and involve the rights and interests of the future special administrative region.

When Deng Xiaoping was thinking about solving the Hong Kong issue according to the "one country, two systems" concept, he had a keen insight that the key to this solution lies in whether stability can be maintained during the transition period. At that time, we were full of confidence in the prospect of Hong Kong—the final return of the territory, but we were still worried about whether such a long transition period could be maintained smoothly.We hope that there will be no major fluctuations and twists and turns that will jeopardize Hong Kong's long-term stability and prosperity.

During the diplomatic consultations on the return of Hong Kong, there was a "honeymoon period" between China and the UK, and the cooperation between the two sides went smoothly.When I directly participated in the negotiations on the Hong Kong issue in 1988, the "honeymoon period" had not yet ended. At that time, the two countries signed a joint statement on the Hong Kong issue, and Hong Kong entered the first few years of the transition period.The consultations and negotiations between the two sides on some specific issues have been relatively smooth and some progress has been made.The atmosphere of the talks was good, and when there were differences of opinion, the two sides could still consider each other's position, exchange views, and reach some consensus.

My first negotiating opponent on the British side was British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe.At that time, he served as foreign minister for many years and participated in the whole process of Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue.He is very familiar with China and Hong Kong issues, and has always had good cooperation with China. Between 1988 and 1989, I met with Jeffrey Howe three times.The first two times were in June 1988 in New York during the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament and in September 1988, and the third time was when attending the funeral of Emperor Hirohito of Japan in Tokyo.I remember that the main issues at that time were the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region being drafted by China and the confidence of Hong Kong people.

After the political turmoil in Beijing at the turn of the spring and summer of 1989, Sino-British relations took a sudden turn and reversed. Bilateral relations have suffered a severe setback as Britain joins other Western countries in imposing sanctions on China.Britain seems to have regretted the formally signed joint statement on Hong Kong in December 1984. On June 19, Geoffrey Howe wrote to me, unilaterally proposing to postpone the thirteenth meeting of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group originally scheduled for July.It was an unusual move as there had never been a unilateral postponement of a meeting since the Contact Group was formed in 1985.

Not long after, Jeffrey Howe wrote to Vice Premier Wu Xueqian, mentioning the Hong Kong issue while making comments on China's domestic situation, saying that Hong Kong's confidence had been seriously frustrated.He blatantly raised the issue of whether the Chinese military would still be present in Hong Kong after the return of Hong Kong, and said that the British side was prepared to reconsider the arrangements for direct elections in Hong Kong in 1991, and at the same time asked China to postpone the promulgation of the Basic Law. The fact that China will station its troops in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has long been included in the Sino-British Joint Declaration; and the arrangements for the 1991 election in Hong Kong have reached a consensus in the consultations between the two sides.At this time, the British side suddenly raised the question in such a way that it obviously wanted to "reverse the verdict."

Two weeks later, I replied to Jeffrey Howe with a letter, emphatically criticizing the British side's statement on Hong Kong's confidence, pointing out that it was precisely a series of unfriendly measures by the British side that hit the confidence of Hong Kong people.With regard to Hong Kong's political system, China cannot agree to unilateral changes by the British side. Soon, the British foreign secretary was replaced.My second British negotiator was Major.Major was born as a commoner, and with his own efforts, he became a rising star in the Conservative Party, which is rare in the British officialdom that attaches great importance to tradition.Major's tenure as Foreign Secretary was brief, and he succeeded Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I had only two dealings with Major.Once, at the end of July 1989, we met at the International Conference on Cambodia in Paris.Major had a more modest demeanor.I said he was a "rising star" with a bright future; he hastened to say that he was still a "recruit."During the meeting, he tried to influence the drafting of our Basic Law, such as asking to amend the provisions on the garrison in the draft.I said that the Basic Law is China's own business. If the British side has good suggestions, the Chinese side can consider them, but it is futile to put pressure on the Chinese side to change the terms agreed upon by both parties.I emphasized that the issue of the garrison has been written into the joint statement, it is a resolved issue and should not be brought up again.During this meeting, Major agreed that both parties would resume the work of the contact group.

The second time I saw Major was at the United Nations General Assembly in New York that fall.He once again proposed that the British side intends to speed up the pace of Hong Kong's political reform and increase the number of direct elections for members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.I said that the reform of the political system must be linked with the Basic Law promulgated later.China advocates the promotion of democracy in Hong Kong, but it must be done step by step. At this time, China and the UK quietly set up a confrontation around the issue of Hong Kong's political reform.A protracted diplomatic dispute is about to begin. The differences between China and the UK over Hong Kong's political reform quickly turned into a dispute on the diplomatic negotiating table. At the end of 1989, as the situation in our country stabilized and the economy continued to develop, Western countries began to loosen their stance on sanctioning China.The United States first sent a special envoy to visit China secretly, seeking to improve relations with China.Not to be left behind, Britain also took the initiative.Prime Minister Thatcher decided to send her diplomatic adviser Kollida as the prime minister's special envoy to visit China secretly on December 4 of that year, handing over her official letter to General Secretary Jiang Zemin, and discussing with the Chinese side the possibility of improving bilateral relations. This was an important contact between China and the UK, which opened the prelude to the confrontation between the two sides on the issue of Hong Kong's political system in the next few years. Colliday was the ambassador to China, a "China hand", and directly participated in the Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue.He is very familiar with Chinese affairs, and he also knows how to defend the fundamental interests of the UK.On the Hong Kong issue, he holds different views from the mainstream Conservative Party. After resigning from public office, he has been critical of the British government's Hong Kong policy, insisting on maintaining cooperation with China and not confronting China. However, his visit this time as a secret envoy is to faithfully implement Prime Minister Thatcher's policy. Prime Minister Thatcher's letter to General Secretary Jiang is quite long.In the letter, she expressed the hope that the two sides would reverse the deterioration of bilateral relations and restore the good communication in the past. No attempt to "internationalize" the Hong Kong issue. Then, Thatcher changed his pen and pointed out that the British side was facing enormous pressure to "significantly increase" the number of directly elected members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council in 1991, which could not be turned a blind eye.She asked the Chinese side to maintain coordination with the British side's arrangements when drafting the Basic Law. After arriving in Beijing, Colliday held talks with Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Nan for a whole day and discussed Sino-British relations and the Hong Kong issue in an all-round way.Colliday put forward specific plans to improve bilateral relations, such as increasing trade between the two countries and resuming official high-level contacts. He also proposed that the British side prepare to substantially increase the number of directly elected seats in the Hong Kong Legislative Council in 1991, from 10 to 20 seats. The next day, General Secretary Jiang met with Kollida, and the meeting lasted nearly two hours.At this time, Colliday showed the true meaning of the British side and said something like this: Sino-British relations should be viewed as a whole. If difficulties occur in one aspect, it will be difficult to make progress as a whole.If the two sides can reach an understanding on the Basic Law and direct elections in Hong Kong, the door to the restoration of good relations between the two countries will be open. This is clearly taking the Hong Kong election issue as a prerequisite for the restoration of bilateral relations. General Secretary Jiang immediately rejected the British side's means of exerting pressure.Afterwards, the British ambassador to China also deliberately explained to our staff that what Collida said was based on instructions from his superiors in London. About half a month later, General Secretary Jiang formally replied to Prime Minister Thatcher, fully affirming the positive aspects of the letter to China, and expressing the issue of the percentage of direct elections for the Hong Kong Legislative Council. ".If the number of seats directly elected by the British side in the 1991 election is too high, it may be difficult to align with the Basic Law in the future. This means that China will not accept the British proposal, but there is still the possibility of revisions to the draft. The two sides can discuss it further, and the door has not been completely closed. On the last day of Cullida's visit, I had a meeting with him.This is the last official meeting of his trip.He was deeply disappointed that no progress had been made during the previous two days' meeting, and he was eager to seize the last chance to achieve some results. Kollida told me that there is a big distance between the positions of the two sides, and he is worried that this may affect the relationship between the two countries.He asked me, before General Secretary Jiang replied to Prime Minister Thatcher, could I ask him to send her a message.In principle, I asked him to convey to the Prime Minister: the Chinese and British governments should strictly follow the principles of the joint statement, and do not easily change the things that have been agreed. Only in this way will it be conducive to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. At the beginning of the meeting, Cullida forwarded to me a letter from Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary who just took office.Hurd's letter formally and comprehensively put forward the specific opinions of the British side on the draft Basic Law of Hong Kong, which is a detailed list.My contacts with my third British negotiator began in this way through an exchange of letters. During my tenure as foreign minister, I have dealt with five British foreign ministers.In addition to the three mentioned here, there are Rifkind and Cook.The first four belonged to the Conservative Party government, and only the last foreign minister, Robin Cook, belonged to the Labor Party government. The first time I met him was at the handover ceremony of Hong Kong’s return to China.Among the five foreign ministers, the one with the longest dealing time is this Foreign Minister Hurd.From the end of 1989 to the middle of 1995, we had been in contact for nearly six years, and during this period, the two sides had the most intense disputes over Hong Kong's political system.Through exchanging letters, formal mutual visits, and meetings at international conferences, we have frequent contact and repeated consultations. This is because the Hong Kong issue is not only complicated and complicated, but also the two sides are at loggerheads on some issues, and there is an urgent timetable.This kind of situation has rarely happened in my dealings with foreign ministers of other countries. Hurd's first letter also reflected that under the new situation after the 1989 turmoil, the British side changed its mind on the Hong Kong issue.Before the draft Basic Law was formed, China and the UK had conducted detailed communication through various channels. In the end, the UK side had no comments on the published draft.But in Hurd's letter, he put forward many different opinions on the draft, especially on the development of Hong Kong's political system, and greatly raised the asking price, including the request for a substantial increase in the proportion of direct elections to the Legislative Council. I did not reply directly to this letter, but only stated that the Chinese side agreed to further exchange views between legal experts from both sides. In early 1990, the situation was even more urgent.The Basic Law of Hong Kong is about to be finalized in February, and the British side's plan for Hong Kong's 1991 election is also coming to a final decision.However, Ke Lida's visit to China, as well as consultations through other channels between the two sides, failed to reach an agreement on the proportion of direct elections, and the two sides are at an impasse. The British side is a little anxious and hopes to reach a compromise with the Chinese side on this matter before the Basic Law bill.At that time, Hurd did not have time to wait for a meeting with me to discuss the matter, so he began to exchange views with me through letters.During that period, the British ambassador to China had many contacts with Chinese personnel and passed on the "information" from their respective foreign ministers.Although this is not a signed letter, it is a written document, not a "oral message", so we call it "written information".This method is very convenient and has been often used in the consultation and negotiation process between China and Britain for many years. From January 18, 1990, when Hurd sent me a letter, to February 12, when Hurd sent me a letter confirming that a consensus had been reached, in less than a month, the two sides exchanged seven written messages.At that time, this was an internal consultation and kept strictly confidential.Later, as disputes over the political system intensified, the two sides released the seven documents separately. The focus of this round of negotiations is the election arrangements for the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Now, when people read this batch of diplomatic documents, they may wonder why China and the UK are mobilizing so many people for more or less directly elected seats? In fact, what China and Britain are fighting for is not just the number of directly elected seats, but the dominant political system of Hong Kong after the handover. To understand this point, it is necessary to understand the background of Hong Kong’s political system development and the basic considerations of the British when formulating “political reform” policies during Hong Kong’s transitional period. During Hong Kong's more than 100 years of colonial rule, Britain has always adopted a political system in which a governor appointed by London monopolizes power.The Governor has two bureaus, the Executive and the Legislative, which serve as advisory bodies.Members are appointed by the Governor of Hong Kong.This is an executive-led system. In the 1980s, after China and the UK signed a joint declaration on the Hong Kong issue, China began to formulate the basic law of the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and design a new political system that can embody "one country, two systems". At this time, the British side attempted to take advantage of the transitional period in Hong Kong to step up the implementation of the so-called "representative political reform" in order to create a fait accompli before the promulgation of the Basic Law, so as to influence the future political arrangements of the Basic Law. The goal of "representative government reform" is to put it bluntly, to change executive-led to legislative-led, to restrict the executive by increasing the power and status of the legislature, and ultimately to transform Hong Kong into an "independent entity" after returning to China. Separated from the motherland, in order to maintain the political and economic interests of Britain in Hong Kong for a long time. Before the signing of the joint statement, the British side had already started planning in this regard.After the signing of the joint statement, the British side immediately launched the deployment of political reform. In 1985, some members of the Hong Kong Legislature were indirectly elected through functional groups (representing different industries or professions); and then a new system of directly electing some members by region was introduced when the election was decided in 1991; and plans were made In 1995, the appointment system was completely abolished, so that all members of the Legislative Council were elected by functional groups, indirect elections by the Election Committee, and direct elections by districts. When the Chinese side listened to the British side's opinions on the drafting of the Basic Law, the British side strongly recommended Hong Kong's executive-led system to the Chinese side.China also believes that this system is suitable for Hong Kong's actual situation and is conducive to the implementation of efficient administrative management and the maintenance of stability and prosperity. At the same time, China also supports the gradual implementation of a democratic system in Hong Kong, and all members of the legislature will eventually be elected by universal suffrage.But China believes that, based on Hong Kong's reality, the development of democracy should be gradual.At that time, the British side also agreed to this point. The relevant content of the Basic Law was drafted according to the two principles of administrative leadership and gradual progress. After 1989, the British side changed its mind and wanted to greatly speed up the pace of political reform.The most important of these, and also the most controversial, is to rapidly increase the proportion of directly elected members of the Legislative Council. The growth rate and proportion of the number of directly elected seats became the focus of the Sino-British negotiations at that time. Before Hurd sent me a letter on January 18, the British side had proposed to the Chinese side to increase the number of directly elected seats from 10 to 20 in 1991 and to 24 in 1995.This is very different from the 18 seats proposed in 1997 in the draft of the Chinese Basic Law.If the British arrangement is accepted, there will be problems with the transition of political systems before and after the return of Hong Kong in 1997. For the smooth transition of Hong Kong, China has made major concessions. On January 15, proposals for 15 seats in 1991 and 20 seats in 1997 were put forward. The British side expressed appreciation for China's "positive spirit" and said it would study "the possibility of fewer than 20 seats in 1991." Then came urgent written negotiations between Hurd and myself.To sum up, the general situation is as follows: the British side responded to the Chinese proposal on the 15th, and proposed a plan for 18 seats in 1991 and 24 seats in 1997.The Chinese side also put forward the plan of 18 seats in 1991 and 20 seats in 1997.The British side refused to accept it and threatened that if the Chinese side did not amend the number of seats in the draft Basic Law, members of Hong Kong's executive and legislative councils would resign. They also suggested sending senior officials to Beijing for interviews.The Chinese side responded that the major concessions made by the Chinese side have not received a positive response from the British side, so there is no need for the British side to send people to Beijing for consultations. If the British side does not accept the Chinese proposal, the Basic Law Drafting Committee can only make a decision according to the original plan.The British side also raised several questions about the arrangement of the election committee and the election method, and asked the Chinese side for clarification.When the Chinese side clarified, it adopted some opinions from the British side.Finally, at the request of the Chinese side, the British side formally confirmed in writing that it accepted the plan of 18 seats in 1991 and 20 seats in 1997, and guaranteed to maintain the "continuity" before and after "1997". There was another small episode during this period: a few days before the final confirmation by the British side, Hurd sent a letter saying that time was running out and that he might not be able to make a final reply before the General Assembly of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, and asked the Drafting Committee to confirm the 1997 When directly electing seats in 2019, do not write in the text, just leave a blank for later filling.We judge that the two sides are likely to reach an agreement before the meeting.Finally, an agreement was reached.Since this letter did not involve substantive content, it was not published together with the seven documents. Seven diplomatic documents show that when the Basic Law was drafted, the two sides formally reached an agreement and understanding on the progress of Hong Kong's political development.At this time, the British side has to abide by the principle of consensus with the Chinese side and consistency with the Basic Law. Foreign Secretary Hurd and I reached an important agreement by exchanging letters before meeting each other.This is also the only written agreement reached with the British side during my tenure as foreign minister.Unexpectedly, it was later destroyed by the British side.The Chinese and British sides and the mass media also launched a debate on whether the content and form of these seven diplomatic documents count as agreements and understandings between the two sides, and whether they are binding.In fact, it is not difficult for anyone with diplomatic common sense, let alone someone who is familiar with the history of Sino-British negotiations, to come to the correct conclusion. In April 1990, after China and the UK reached an agreement and understanding on the Hong Kong election issue, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was officially promulgated. At this point, it seems that the dispute between China and Britain on the development of Hong Kong's political system should come to an end, but this is not the case. Around the election of the Hong Kong Legislative Council in 1991, the British stepped up the pace of the so-called "representative political reform", but this issue is not as urgent as it was in the previous stage. At this time, the foreign ministers of China and the UK exchanged visits for the first time since 1989, and bilateral relations improved. Foreign Minister Hurd visited China in the spring of 1991, and I had a formal meeting with him.The Chinese leaders met with him and gave him very high courtesy. Foreign Minister Hurd worked in the British Embassy in China in his early years and is very familiar with Chinese affairs. In 1974, he visited China with former Prime Minister Heath and met with Chairman Mao Zedong. During Hurd's visit this time, the two sides agreed to strengthen ties in the future, and the foreign ministers of the two countries will meet twice a year to discuss timely issues that have been put on the agenda during the transition period of Hong Kong. From 1990 to 1991, consultations between China and the UK on the construction of a new Hong Kong airport were going on intensely, and other issues seemed less prominent for a while.When Hurd came to Beijing, he mainly talked about the new airport.The issue of Hong Kong's new airport and the development of Hong Kong's political system are two different issues, but they also have the nature of crossing the "97" period and affecting the rights and interests of the SAR government. Both parties need to negotiate and reach a consensus.The negotiation on the new airport issue lasted for several years, which is another rather complicated story, so I won’t make a special account here. About a year later, in the spring of 1992, I made my first official return visit to the UK.At that time, on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the upgrading of Sino-British diplomatic relations, the leaders of the two countries had just signed a memorandum of understanding on the issue of the new airport, so the atmosphere of the visit was good. However, at that time, the British side was planning to implement a new system of so-called "standing committees" in the Hong Kong legislature, which was intended to increase the power of the legislature and check the executive body. In response to this trend, I specifically pointed out to Hurd during the meeting that the Basic Law has designed an executive-led system for the future special administrative region, and this system has also been effective in Hong Kong for many years.If it is changed to be legislative-led now, it will inevitably conflict with the Basic Law.China does not want this to happen.At that time, Hurd still stated that the British side had no intention of changing executive-led to legislative-led. With regard to the election of the next Legislative Council in 1995, I would like to remind the British side that the method for the election of the last Legislative Council should be in line with the Basic Law, otherwise there cannot be a direct transition.Hurd said that the British side will make a decision on this in 1993 and will consult with the Chinese side before that. However, shortly after my visit to the UK, the British government in April appointed the "strong man" Chris Patten, who was once the chairman of the Conservative Party, to replace Wilson, who was considered "soft" towards China, as the last Hong Kong Governor. As soon as Patten took office, he further and substantially changed Britain's policy towards Hong Kong.The differences between the two countries over the direction of Hong Kong's political system development soon turned into a new round of open and serious contests. It stands to reason that the mission of the last governor of Hong Kong should be to cooperate well with China in the final stage of Hong Kong's transition period to ensure a smooth transition and a smooth handover of power.To be able to do this is to complete your merits and virtues, and you can leave your name in history. No, Patten, the last Governor of Hong Kong, did the opposite, fearing that the handover of power to China would be too smooth. Shortly after he took office in July 1992, he launched a Hong Kong constitutional reform plan that confronted China, and made a completely different design for the 1994 regional organization elections and the 1995 Legislative Council elections that Hong Kong faced.On the surface, this plan still says that the executive-led system must be maintained; in fact, it requires a drastic change in the political system and a rapid increase in the status and power of the legislature.Its main measures include: changing the indirect elections of the functional groups of the Legislative Council and the Election Committee to direct elections in a disguised form; immediately abolishing the appointment system for regional organizations that has been effective in Hong Kong, and changing the non-political nature and functions of regional organizations. Patten delivered his first policy address after taking office on October 7, announcing his political reform plan.Previously, on September 25, when I met with Foreign Minister Hurd while I was attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he informed me of the content of the political reform plan; at the same time, the British side also submitted the text through diplomatic channels in Beijing.I made a principled stand on the spot, emphasizing that the arrangements for the 1995 election must first be agreed upon by both parties through consultations and should be consistent with the provisions of the Basic Law.A few days later, after deliberation, the Chinese side decided that Lu Ping, director of the Hong Kong and Macau Office of the State Council, would meet with the British ambassador to China, Mak Ruobin, to make preliminary comments on Patten's plan, explaining in detail where the plan violated the Basic Law, and pointing out the consequences arising from the plan. The legislature was unable to transition the prospect of "1997", and specifically reminded the British side not to engage in public debate. The British side has apparently decided to stir up trouble, completely ignored China's objections and reminders, and unilaterally and publicly announced the political reform plan without reaching an agreement through consultations.This practice violated the provisions of the joint statement, deliberately provoked public debate, and attempted to exert pressure on China through public opinion.As soon as the plan was introduced, the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister immediately publicly expressed their support. The Chinese side immediately stated its position publicly, expressing its deep concern about the British move, and pointed out that the political systems before and after the return of Hong Kong will not be compatible in the future, and its responsibility does not lie with China.Relevant institutions in the SAR will be established in accordance with the Basic Law and the decisions of the National People's Congress. Patten announced the plan first, and then visited Beijing on October 22.He wants to blackmail the Chinese side with a fait accompli, asking the Chinese side to make counter-proposals based on his plan. We adhere to the principles stipulated in the joint statement, and believe that the 1994/1995 election arrangements are directly related to a smooth transition and must be discussed and reached by both sides. The British side should not take unilateral actions without consultation.Therefore, China requires Patten to change his attitude first and publicly withdraw his political reform plan. During the meeting, the Chinese side repeatedly and in detail analyzed how the political reform plan violated the joint statement, the principle of coherence with the Basic Law, and the relevant agreements and understandings reached by the two sides in the past.This is what we call "three violations". At that time, we got the impression that Patten himself didn't seem to know much about the relevant agreements and understandings reached by the foreign ministers of China and Britain in 1990.During my meeting with Chris Patten, I solemnly pointed out that his plan "raised a challenge to Sino-British cooperation." The question for the future is whether the two sides will continue to cooperate or "part ways and start anew."These words are very heavy, and we have never used such language in previous representations and negotiations during the transition period.It's a pity that Patten turned a deaf ear to it, completely ignoring China's advice and ignoring China's warnings. Patten's trip to Beijing was fruitless, and the positions of the two sides were openly at odds. At this time, we made a calm analysis of the situation and concluded that the British side's "three violations" political reform plan was not accidental, but had a profound background.The proposal seriously threatens Hong Kong's smooth transition and is completely unacceptable. In order to cope with the possible crisis, we have made two preparations: on the one hand, we have to take a firm stand and carry out necessary struggles to maintain the basis of cooperation between the two sides; , Do a good job of "restarting the stove". In March 1993, just after Patten published his political reform plan in the Gazette, China took the first countermeasure. At the plenary session of the Eighth National People's Congress, the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was approved. Work body decisions. Seeing China's resolute rejection of Patten's political reform plan, which was strongly criticized by public opinion from all quarters, the British side suggested formal negotiations through diplomatic channels to resolve differences. On February 6, 1993, Foreign Minister Hurd sent me a letter, suggesting that the two sides negotiate "without preconditions".At that time, we still hoped that the British side could change its mind, return to the path of "three accords" and continue to cooperate with China, so we agreed to the British side's negotiation proposal from the overall situation. I replied to Hurd on February 11, proposing that negotiations should be conducted on the basis of the "three compliances" as a response to the British side's "no preconditions".I also pointed out that if the British side submits the political reform plan to the Legislative Council for discussion at this time, it will not be beneficial to the negotiations. I hope the British side will consider it carefully. In the following two months, the two sides conducted repeated internal consultations on issues such as the press release of the negotiations and the composition of the two delegations.It was finally agreed to start negotiations between representatives of the two governments in Beijing on April 22, 1993.The Chinese representative is Vice Foreign Minister Jiang Enzhu, and the British representative is the British Ambassador to China Ruobin McGregor. This confrontation between China and the UK lasted for half a year, with a total of 17 rounds of negotiations, and the process was quite tortuous and complicated.With sincerity, China has made a lot of efforts to maintain the cooperation between the two sides, put forward many reasonable suggestions, and made necessary concessions and compromises.Regrettably, the British side has been unwilling to give up its "three violations" position. In the final stage, when the two sides had almost reached an agreement on most of the issues, unexpected complications arose and the negotiations were unilaterally interrupted.Subsequently, the British side handed over its political reform plan to the Legislative Council for approval, and since then "parted ways" with the Chinese side, and finally embarked on the road of confrontation and no return. Later, the Chinese and British sides respectively published the detailed process of the relevant negotiations. Due to their different positions, the two sides said their own things. It turns out that China and Britain have reached an understanding and consensus on the convergence of Hong Kong's political system before and after the "1997".The seven diplomatic documents are exactly the agreement reached on the arrangements for the transition of members of Hong Kong's last Legislative Council to Hong Kong's handover.Subsequently, the decision of the National People's Congress passed in April 1990 clearly stipulated how the members of this session of the Legislative Council would directly transition to become members of the first session of the SAR Legislative Council.This is the so-called "through train" arrangement. In the 17 rounds of Beijing negotiations in 1993, the main topic was the detailed discussion of the arrangements for the 1994/1995 elections in Hong Kong. The overall goal was to try to save the "through train" arrangement under the threat of the British "three violations" of the political reform plan. , to ensure the convergence of the political system before and after the "97". During the negotiation, I had two long meetings with Foreign Minister Hurd, discussed in detail various difficulties encountered in the negotiation, and sought solutions. The "through train" issue is one of the most discussed problems between the two sides. In July 1993, Foreign Minister Hurd visited China again.At that time, the negotiations in Beijing were still in the early stages, and the focus was still on issues of principle, with little progress and uncertain prospects.I suggest that the two sides make a written summary of the principled issues involved in the previous negotiation.Hurd said that it is better to discuss the details first, as the distance between the two parties has narrowed, and then work on the text.On this issue, the two sides did not reach an agreement. Based on the progress of the negotiations at that time, I focused on the significance of the "through train" and hoped that the British side would cherish this hard-won achievement after years of negotiation between the two sides. The "through train" arrangement is when two regimes of different natures are handed over, one party agrees to let the members of the original legislative body under the administration of the other party go through certain procedures and directly transition to become members of the new body.I told Hurd that when the two parties in a country, such as the Conservative Party and the Labor Party in the UK, change after the election, there will be changes in all aspects. It is impossible for the two political parties to discuss the "through train" arrangement of the ruling team. The Sino-British handover of power in Hong Kong is different from the election of the two parties. It can engage in a "through train". This is a completely innovative work, unprecedented in history. At this time, Hurd reiterated the request of the British side in the negotiations, that is, the Chinese SAR Preparatory Committee should have clear and objective standards when confirming the "through train". After this meeting, the outside world has seen the crux of the Sino-British negotiations.A Hong Kong newspaper said that whether the Sino-British negotiations can reach an agreement depends on the concessions the two sides can make on the "through train" issue. When Hurd and I met again in New York in early October 1993, the negotiations in Beijing were still at a stalemate.Both sides expressed disappointment with the progress of the talks and were less optimistic about the prospects.The British side has begun to spread the argument outside the meeting that they are not afraid of the breakdown of the talks. At that time, bilateral relations between the two countries were also in an atmosphere of increasing tension. Hurd himself made a public speech not long ago, opposing China's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games, which hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. In late September, China publicly published three important speeches by Comrade Deng Xiaoping on the Hong Kong issue from 1982 to 1984 (September 24, 1982 with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, July 31, 1984 with British Foreign Secretary Jay Free Howe's talk and speech at the third plenary meeting of the Central Advisory Committee on October 22, 1984). Although Comrade Xiaoping's remarks were made in the 1980s when China and Britain were negotiating to resolve the Hong Kong issue, they were published in 1993 and have important practical significance.The three speeches aroused strong repercussions from the public opinion circles. It is generally believed that this is a warning to the British side to engage in confrontation and has a great shocking effect. Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that if serious fluctuations occur in Hong Kong during the transitional period, the Chinese government will have to think about the time and method of taking it back.We are very concerned about the transitional period in Hong Kong and hope that there will be no problems during the transitional period, but we must be prepared for some problems that may arise that do not depend on our will. In fact, at the first plenary meeting held in July 1993 by the preparatory work body of the Preparatory Committee, I read the conversation between Comrade Deng Xiaoping and Mrs Thatcher.Comrade Xiaoping's speech has been spread among Hong Kong people, but it has not been officially published at that time.This speech actually became the keynote statement of China's countermeasures against the British political reform plan. My New York meeting with Hurd was conducted in this situation and atmosphere.This meeting was a sharp confrontation with the longest time, which lasted for two and a half hours. After a general review and prospect of the Beijing negotiations, Hurd and I both believe that the Sino-British negotiations face two possibilities: to reach an agreement or not to reach an agreement. I emphasized that reaching an agreement is of course beneficial to all parties, but even if it fails to reach an agreement, China still has the confidence and ability to achieve a smooth transition and maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. 赫德摆出了达不成协议也不在乎的姿态，他用了SECOND BEST（次好）一词，说如果没有协议，只能是一个次好的选择，而这将对香港的信心和繁荣造成相当大的损害。 听他这么说，我便点明了中方“另起炉灶”的前景。我告诉他，如达不成协议，1995年产生的立法局议员的任期只能到1997年6月30日为止。特区筹委会将在1996年制定出特区第一届立法会的产生办法。 双方都明白，大家都在为谈判破裂做准备了。 关于选举方式的具体安排问题，双方都重申了各自的立场，无法取得任何进展。 在北京谈判的这个阶段，双方对于几类选举的具体安排方案和所持的立场，差不多都已表明。 英方更是明确地提出，要求把“直通车”的确认标准问题与选举安排问题“平行地”进行讨论。在这次纽约会晤的前十天，赫德曾先给我转来一个信息，强调“直通车”的确认标准，对英方来说是个“根本性”问题，而在下一轮（9月26日的第12轮）谈判中开始讨论这个问题是“至关重要”的。这将使英方能够在纽约会晤时全盘考虑谈判的前景。如果把讨论推后，就无法就各项选举事宜取得进展。 我回复时没有同意他的意见，只重申了中方的立场。 所谓“直通车”的确认标准问题，是英方在北京谈判初期提出的一个想法。英方的想法是，议员只要根据基本法第104条履行一个宣誓手续，即可过渡成为特区第一届立法会的议员。 中方认为，中方只能按全国人大的决定和基本法的有关规定行事，不能侵犯全国人大授予特区筹委会对议员进行确认的权力。中方还认为，这次谈判应该先解决1994/1995年度选举安排的问题，这个问题解决好了，香港最后一届立法局的组成，如果符合全国人大决定和基本法的有关规定，才能谈得上对议员的确认。也就是说，要先有“直通车”，才能谈得上议员过渡的确认标准。 在纽约会晤中，赫德仍是重点促中方马上具体讨论确认标准问题，把这个问题称为谈判能否取得进展的关键。我们清楚，英方最担心的，是全国人大决定中关于议员必须“拥护”基本法、“愿意效忠”特区的规定。我当时表示，选举安排圆满解决了，如能与基本法相衔接，过渡便不会成为什么问题。关于确认标准，我们不能替特区筹委会来定标准，只能谈点个人的解释性看法。如果有个别议员不愿效忠特区、不拥护基本法，甚至反对基本法、反对“一国两制”，不仅有言论，而且有行动，那他们就不符合标准，就不能过渡。 鉴于时间紧迫，为了推动北京谈判早日取得一些进展，我便向赫德再次建议，双方按“先易后难”的原则，先解决比较简单的香港1994年区域组织的选举安排问题，而1995年立法局选举安排问题比较复杂，双方也还有时间，可以延后讨论。 赫德没有同意中方的建议，仍坚持主要问题应一起解决，要有总体一揽子解决办法。 后来，在北京谈判中，英方还是同意了先讨论区域组织选举安排问题，但又提出一些先决条件。中方也做了不少让步，双方在区域组织选举安排方面基本取得一致。可惜的是，英方在最后关头又提出要把1995年立法局的选举方法也扯到一起解决。17轮谈判因11月27日英方单方面宣布而被迫中断。 11月30日，赫德外相给我来信，一方面就英方坚持一起解决1995年立法局选举方法进行辩解；一方面提出，英方决定在12月中旬即把政改方案提交立法局讨论。 实际上，这是英方在向中方摊牌。 针对英方的无理态度，我马上于次日回复赫德：中方绝不接受英方向香港立法局提交立法草案，而且不能把立法局的意见置于两国政府的会谈之上。对中方来说，这是原则问题。 我重申了中方在4月谈判之始所做的声明，即如英方将政改方案提交立法局，就意味着双方谈判的中断。 英方不听中方的警告，一意孤行，坚持把政改方案付诸实施，于1994年2月和6月，陆续交由香港立法局通过。 中方立即采取了针锋相对的措施，正式发表声明：根据中英联合声明的规定，英国对香港的行政管理到1997年6月30日为止，中国政府于1997年7月1日对香港恢复行使主权。作为英国管治香港的政制架构的组成部分，即港英最后一届区议会、两个市政局和立法局，必将随英国管治期的结束而终结。从1997年7月1日起，香港特别行政区政制架构将依据中国全国人大的决定和基本法的有关规定予以组建。 这表明，“直通车”因英方的破坏而“不通”了，中方不得不“另起炉灶”。 中英双方围绕香港政制发展的这场交锋，至此告一段落，双方“分道扬镳”，渐行渐远。 1996年3月，香港特区筹委会正式决定成立特区临时立法会。 由于没有了“直通车”，在特区1997年7月1日成立之时有许多预备工作，特别是立法工作，必须提前做好，而特区第一届立法会又不可能在此之前成立，所以有必要成立一个特区的临时立法机构，来完成必需的立法工作。这个临时立法会于回归之日起，才正式开始执行特区立法机构的职能，为期一年，即到特区第一届立法会成立时为止。 按理说，这种安排完全是中方自己的事了，英方无权干预。当然，我们还是希望英方能对各项特区筹备工作给予合作，提供一些方便。可是，在两年前成立筹委会预备工作机构的问题上，我们早已体会到了英方的不合作态度，在设立特区临时立法会的问题上，更是对英方不抱什么希望。 正如我们所预料的，英方对临时立法会就像对预备工作委员会一样，也进行了抵制。例如，临时立法会议员选出后，英方无论如何不同意临时立法会在香港当地开会，临时立法会只好在深圳开始工作，直到香港回归之后，才迁回香港。在这段时间里，在外交层面上，英方也不时把临时立法会问题提上两国外长讨论的议程，反复纠缠。 此时，我的英方谈判对手已换成了里夫金德外相。我在1995年10月再次访英时同他会晤过。后来，他回访了中国，还同我有过一些信件往来。一次，他来信对中方预备工作委员会法律小组建议废止香港人权法案条例某些条款一事提出异议，说此举将严重损害香港的信心，希望中方三思而行。我回信指出，香港其他法律应服从基本法这项根本大法，而不应与之抵触。到了1996年4月初，即中方决定成立临时立法会后不久，他便来信提出了临时立法会问题，说有的中方官员要求凡想要参加特区候任班子的香港公务员，必须声明支持临时立法会，此举对香港公务员造成相互冲突的效忠问题，会动摇人心，等等。对此信，我未予回复。 那年4月20日，我与里夫金德外相有机会在海牙中国驻荷兰大使官邸又一次会晤。会晤中，他仍就临时立法会问题纠缠，说什么在香港交接前成立临时立法会，不符合联合声明所规定的英方负责香港的行政管理，对香港信心造成了极大破坏；又说，两个立法机构并存，会引起香港社会很大混乱。这显然是颠倒了“直通车”争议中的是非和因果。 当时，我仍然耐心地说明，正是因为没有了“直通车”，而特区第一届立法会选举无法在1997年7月1日之前进行，所以，才有必要在一段时期内，成立一个临时的立法会。临时立法会所做的准备工作要到7月1日起才生效，因此，不存在两个并行的立法机构的问题。我希望，英方能够面对这个现实。 我还强调，在香港回归前余下的400多天里，双方应多做实事，不要吵架；多搞合作，少找麻烦。 里夫金德在后来的往来信件中，还不时制造出一些麻烦，我也没有一一回复。当然，双方之间的合作也有比较令人高兴的进展，那就是在1996年秋我们在纽约会晤时，共同确认了中英联络小组所达成的关于香港政权交接仪式的纪要，了结了香港回归前的一桩大事。 回顾香港回归历程，中英双方由政制问题上的分歧而导致“直通车”安排的取消，最终走向完全的不合作，无疑是整个回归过程中最大的一场风波。 为了避免这种结果，中方曾经尽了最大的努力，但终未能如愿。原因何在呢？ 对此，舆论界有过种种说法。较为普遍的一种观点，是强调彭定康的个人因素。虽然当时我们也有伦敦政府听命于港督的印象，但我想恐怕还是应从更广阔的背景来看待这段历史。 1989年后，英方提出要大大加快香港“民主化”进程，那时还不得不同中方事先磋商，以与基本法衔接。到了1992年，英方却置双方的协议和谅解于不顾，不同中方磋商，单方面提出“三违反”的政改方案，挑起公开争论，并在立法局通过，从而最终破坏了回归前后政制衔接的可能性。 英方如此大幅度改变在香港问题上与中方合作的政策，大概很难说全是个人因素所致，自有其深刻的国际背景。 上世纪90年代初东欧剧变和苏联解体后，英国的当权人士根据这种变化，错误地估计了中国的形势和发展前景。他们认为，过去与中国签署的香港问题协议，英方让步过多，吃了亏，想趁机“翻案”。我想，这才是英方在香港政制问题上引发一场大风波的根本原因。 1997年7月1日，我作为中国政府代表团成员，出席了香港回归的政权交接盛典。目睹着祖国的五星红旗冉冉升起，想到祖国领土被外国占领统治的历史从此结束，不禁心潮起伏，感慨万千，漫长过渡期中的日日夜夜、风风雨雨，都浓缩在了这个历史性时刻。令人难忘的是，交接仪式的那天，终日大雨滂沱。我想，不同心境的人会由此产生不同的感受。全世界的炎黄子孙，都会觉得这场大雨畅快淋漓，将中国的百年耻辱洗涤干净，使香港迎来一个全新的未来。 如果说香港回归祖国的历程，是“风高浪急，波涛暗涌”，那么，澳门的回归，就可以用“风平浪静，波澜不兴”来形容了。 中国和葡萄牙两国就解决澳门回归问题的谈判过程相当顺利，合作良好。究其原因，这要追溯到葡萄牙在上世纪70年代发生的一场革命。 1974年4月25日，统治了葡萄牙近半个世纪的独裁政权被年轻军官组成的“共和国救国委员会”推翻。这场政变被人们称为“4·25”革命。革命后，新政府放弃了殖民主义政策，对葡属殖民地实行“非殖民化”。先是让在非洲的殖民地走向了独立。然后，于1975年底开始从澳门撤出军队，并在后来颁布的《澳门组织章程》中，承认澳门是中国领土，由葡萄牙管理。 1979年中葡两国建立外交关系时，葡方又正式向中方承认，澳门是中国领土。 20世纪80年代，当中葡开始谈判解决澳门问题时，领土主权的归属问题已经解决。这不像香港问题那样，领土主权归属是首先面临的大难题。因此，双方谈判有了良好的基础；在起草联合声明时，很快就领土主权的表述达成一致意见。在协议文本中，由双方共同声明，澳门地区是中国领土，中方将对澳门恢复行使主权。相比之下，中英关于香港问题的联合声明中，因英方不愿说香港是中国领土，双方无法达成共同的表述方式，只能由两国政府各自做出声明：收回香港是全中国人民的共同愿望，中方决定对香港恢复行使主权；英方将交还香港。 主权归属这个原则问题解决了，中葡谈判要解决的主要问题就是中方收回澳门的具体时间了。当时，葡方希望尽量晚一点儿，最好推迟到21世纪。中方从统一大业的全局考虑，认为必须在20世纪结束之前收回，但可以和香港回归的时间错开一点儿。中葡双方在这个问题上花了较多时间和精力，最后商定，在20世纪结束前十天，即1999年12月20日，完成澳门回归的政权交接。 由于两国关系一直友好，又充分考虑到澳门的一些特点和实际情况，中方根据“一国两制”方针，在制定对澳门的具体政策时，对葡方提出的合理意见和要求都尽量予以照顾。澳门有一批葡裔居民世世代代生活在那里，即所谓“土生葡人”，他们有较特殊的社会地位，也有一些自己的特殊利益。中方在联合声明中承诺，要依法保护这批居民的利益，并尊重其习惯和文化传统。又如，葡方十分看重葡萄牙在澳门的文化遗产和影响的延续，中方觉得有些要求是合理的，便同意在协议中特别写入“依法保护在澳门的文物”，并同意葡萄牙语除作为正式语文外，仍可作为教学语言的内容，将文化、教育、语文方面的条文放在更加突出的位置。 在有关澳门回归时政权交接的安排上，中方考虑到葡萄牙早已从澳门撤军，我解放军进驻澳门时，便没有像香港那样的军事交接问题。因此，解放军没有在政权交接的午夜零时开进，而是在回归日的白天，在灿烂的阳光下，威武进驻。 澳门的过渡期几乎与香港的过渡期同样长，但面临的问题颇不相同。 为了实现平稳过渡，澳门在过渡期要解决“三大问题”：即语文、人才和法律。这三大问题成为中葡外交磋商中自始至终的重要议题。中方在各个层面都积极地推动并协助葡方解决这些难题。这中间，当然也会出现一些意见分歧，但双方基本没有公开争论过，而是协商解决，最终完成了工作。 在此期间，两国领导人曾多次互访，澳门问题自然也是双方磋商的重点。在澳门问题上的良好合作，可以说促进了两国双边友好关系的不断发展。 1991年2月，我首次访问葡萄牙，受到了友好的接待，并与葡方就中、葡语文在澳门的官方地位正式达成协议，为推动上述“三大问题”的解决迈出了重要一步。 说起来，葡萄牙成为1989年之后第一个接待中国外长正式访问的西方国家，并不是偶然的。由于在澳门问题上合作得很好，双方在过渡期中可以展望到澳门交接之后中葡友好合作的广阔前景。因此，在两国高层交往中，逐渐形成了一个共识，即澳门问题的顺利解决，可以有力地推动中葡关系以及中国与欧盟之间关系的发展。 在过渡期内，我同葡萄牙外长多次会晤，讨论澳门过渡的有关问题，也以外长身份或陪同我国领导人几次访问过葡萄牙。其间，还第一次访问了澳门，留下了很深的印象。 1999年3月，我以中国副总理的身份，应澳门总督之邀，去澳门出席澳门文化中心揭幕典礼，并在那里与葡萄牙总统桑帕约会晤。 这是我第一次踏上澳门的土地。而在香港回归前，我并未能以官方身份正式访港。 澳门是一个很有特色的地方，既有中国的传统文化，也有葡萄牙的传统文化，更有澳门本身的文化。澳门同胞有着悠久的爱国主义传统。孙中山先生早年就在澳门生活、行医。著名作曲家、《黄河大合唱》的作者冼星海也是澳门人。 在与桑帕约总统会晤中，他表示很关心澳门回归中国后，能否继续保持自身的特色，并希望澳门过渡期的结束，将给中葡两国关系带来新的积极因素。他还特别告诉我，他将亲自出席澳门的政权交接仪式。在这次会晤中，我们就澳门过渡期最后的270多天里的双方合作和所有有待解决的问题交换了意见，取得了进展，双方谈得十分融洽愉快。 1999年12月20日，中葡之间终于顺利完成了澳门回归的政权交接。 我作为中国政府代表团成员，出席了那天的交接盛典，见证了那一激动人心的历史时刻。 至此，港澳两地回归的任务都已完成，中国人民更有理由期盼，台湾能够早日回到祖国的怀抱，从而最终完成祖国的统一大业。 “何日两岸同，天意遂人愿。”这也是我晚年的心愿之一。 (full text)