In May 1982, I became Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and began to take charge of the affairs of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. At that time, China and the Soviet Union were in a serious situation of confrontation: the Soviet Union deployed millions of soldiers in the Mongolian People's Republic and the long Sino-Soviet border; it supported Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in the late 1970s; and it sent troops to invade Afghanistan.This poses a direct threat to my country's national security. As the saying goes, "Frozen three feet, not a day's cold."If historical accounts are not counted, during the 30 years from the end of the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, China and the Soviet Union experienced three "decades": 1959-1969 can be said to be a decade of debate; 1969-1979 is a decade of war. Confrontation; 1979-1989 was ten years of negotiations.During this period, there were both cold wars and hot wars.

But at the beginning of 1982, there were some subtle signs that some kind of change was brewing in Sino-Soviet relations. Things started on March 24 of that year. On that day, Soviet leader Brezhnev came to the Central Asia region of the Soviet Union and delivered a long speech in Tashkent, the capital of the Uzbek Republic. Although it was still full of attacks on China, he clearly recognized China as a socialist country and emphasized China has sovereignty over Taiwan and expressed its willingness to improve relations with China. It is suggested that the two sides negotiate and take some measures acceptable to both countries to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping immediately noticed the message conveyed by Brezhnev's speech in Tashkent.At that time, the talks between China and the United States on the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan had made progress, and the "8.17" communiqué—the third of the three communiqués between China and the United States—was about to be signed.It can be said that the new framework of Sino-US relations has basically been established, and the time to start improving Sino-Soviet relations is ripe. Our analysis at that time was that due to the heavy burden on the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and the increasingly tense competition with the United States on a global scale, the Soviet Union felt powerless and had to implement strategic adjustments, and easing relations with China was one of the major issues. step.This objectively provides an opportunity for us to adjust our policy towards the Soviet Union.

Comrade Xiaoping called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and instructed to respond immediately to Brezhnev's speech.At that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not have a formal press conference system.I am still serving as the director of the Information Department, and I am considering the establishment of a spokesperson. This incident has become an opportunity to immediately establish a spokesperson system. The first press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a press conference with no seats.It was March 26, at the foyer of the main building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time.At that time, there was no special venue for news releases. Seventy or eighty Chinese and foreign journalists were invited to attend, and everyone stood around me.The translator at that time was Li Zhaoxing, the current foreign minister.

As the first spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I issued a short statement of only three sentences: "We have noticed the speech on Sino-Soviet relations delivered by Chairman Brezhnev of the Soviet Union in Tashkent on March 24. We firmly reject the attack on China in the speech. In Sino-Soviet relations and international affairs, we attach importance to It is the actual action of the Soviet Union." After the statement was read, no questions were asked and no answers were given.The first press conference is over. This unprecedented press conference and short three-sentence statement immediately aroused great concern from Chinese and foreign journalists in Beijing.

The Soviet reporter who attended the press conference gave me a thumbs up on the spot and said to me: "Oqingharaso!" (very good!) He obviously heard the unusual meaning in the statement. Among the three sentences, the most important are two words, one is "attention" and the other is "attachment".In fact, it means "listen to his words and watch his actions".His words are audible, which naturally means that there are reasonable elements in what you say.In the past, everything that China said to the Soviet Union could only be comprehensively criticized, and it was impossible to listen to it, let alone "observe its actions".Now we have to "watch what they do" because we want the other party to take practical actions.

This short statement, published in the middle of the front page of the People's Daily the next day, showed that the message was short but important.The statement also immediately attracted widespread attention internationally.The five major Western news agencies and other foreign media reported and commented on the incident one after another.Some foreign sources pointed out that this cautious and reserved statement indicates that the Sino-Soviet relationship, which has been confronted for more than 30 years, may change, and it will change the world situation. This is the first and last press conference I host as the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Press conferences from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have since become a regular practice, held every week.However, instead of being held standing up, it has been moved to the International Club, where journalists can sit down.Later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs built a new building with a special press conference hall.

One day in the midsummer of this year, Comrade Xiaoping invited several leading comrades of the Central Committee and major leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to his home for a meeting to study the issue of Sino-Soviet relations.Old comrades such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian were present, and I, as the vice minister in charge of Soviet and Eastern European affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also attended. Comrade Xiaoping proposed that a major action should be taken to send information to the Soviet Union and strive for a major improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, but the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations must be principled, and the condition is that the Soviet Union must do something.This proposed that the Soviet Union should take the initiative to solve the "three major obstacles", namely, withdrawing troops from the Sino-Soviet border area and the Mongolian People's Republic; withdrawing troops from Afghanistan; and persuading Vietnam to withdraw troops from Cambodia.

Everyone agreed with Comrade Xiaoping's opinion. China and the Soviet Union have been in a long-term debate. They have been arguing about who is right and who is wrong. We say that the Soviet Union is revisionist, and the Soviet Union says that we are "dogmatic." The tone of the two sides is getting higher and higher.This time, Comrade Xiaoping put forward the conditions for the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, but put the solution of practical problems first, and the focus shifted from ideological debates to considerations of national interests, showing the trend of China's foreign policy adjustment in the future.

Comrade Chen Yun raised the question of how to convey information.The transmission of information must not only attract the attention of the other party, but also avoid suspicion from the outside world.It would be too formal to summon embassy personnel or send people to visit, and there were no other channels of contact between China and the Soviet Union at that time. Comrade Deng Xiaoping suggested that in order not to arouse unreasonable speculation from the outside world, the director of the Department of Soviet Union and European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could go to Moscow in the name of inspecting the work of the embassy, ​​and at the same time go to Warsaw, Poland.Of course, the first stop, Moscow, is the main destination of this trip. On August 10, Yu Hongliang, director of the SOEO Department, left for Moscow.Before he left, we drafted a commentary post according to Comrade Xiaoping's instructions.

The Soviet side paid special attention to the sudden appearance of our director of the Soviet Union Department in Moscow and the request to meet the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister at the embassy.Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Ilichev was invited to the Chinese embassy in the Soviet Union. Jia Picai, director of the First Far East Department, interrupted his vacation and rushed back from his villa in the suburbs of Moscow to accompany him. During the meeting, Comrade Yu Hongliang dictated the full text of more than 1,000 words to the other party, reciting it out paragraph by paragraph, almost word for word. In the post, the Chinese side pointed out that the abnormal situation in the relationship between China and the Soviet Union has existed for many years, and the people of the two countries are unwilling to see this situation continue to exist.Now is the time to do something to improve Sino-Soviet relations.Of course, the problem cannot be resolved overnight, but China believes that as long as China and the Soviet Union have the sincerity to improve relations, a fair and reasonable solution can be gradually achieved through consultation.The Chinese side suggested that the Soviet Union should start by persuading Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia. It could also start by solving other issues affecting the relationship between the two countries, such as reducing the armed forces in the Sino-Soviet border area.At the same time, both sides should also consider finding a solution acceptable to all parties concerned to resolve the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Mongolian People's Republic.China also hopes to find a reasonable solution to the Afghan issue.In short, as long as the two sides stand high, look far, have the sincerity to restore the good-neighborly relations between the two neighboring countries, and start with solving one or two important issues, a new situation can be opened for the relations between the two countries.As for the form of the exchange of views, the two sides can negotiate. Ilichev listened carefully with narrowed eyes.He is very old. During the Khrushchev period, he served as the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, as the head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee and as the editor-in-chief of Izvestia and Pravda. He was in charge of ideological work for a long time.After Khrushchev's resignation, he resigned from the central leadership position and became Deputy Foreign Minister.He is stable, cautious in dealing with things, and considers his words carefully when speaking, giving the impression that he is too rigorous and a little inflexible.After listening to our post, his response was still the usual diplomatic rhetoric.He said that it is impossible for your ideas not to attract attention, whether in terms of content or in the way of initiative.At the same time, he made an old-fashioned statement, as if he did not fully realize the true meaning of the Chinese information.On the contrary, Jia Pi, a Chinese expert who was present at the time, was more sensitive. He caught the new things in the post and said that this incident might play a positive role in promoting it. He also said that such a major problem cannot be solved by us. Report to the Politburo and top leaders. After this meeting, Yu Hongliang immediately transferred to Warsaw, in order to show the outside world that this trip was not a special trip to Moscow, and at the same time give the Soviet side time to consider and prepare for an answer. On August 18, when Yu Hongliang returned to Moscow to meet with Ilichev again, Ilichev's attitude changed and his tone became more relaxed. reply. On August 20, Maltsev, the first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, met with Ma Xusheng, the charge d'affaires of our embassy in the Soviet Union, and handed over a memorandum as a formal reply, expressing that the Soviet side was willing to discuss the Soviet Union with the Chinese side at any time, any place, and at any level. Bilateral relations between China and China in order to "remove obstacles to the normalization of relations". The Soviet side also proposed "removing obstacles", which is consistent with the Chinese side's formulation.We believe that the Soviet side responded positively to our information.Comrade Xiaoping then asked me and Yu Hongliang to go to his home, and personally listened to the detailed report on the transmission of information, and immediately decided to agree to resume Sino-Soviet negotiations. Before the opening of the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 1, 1982, China and the Soviet Union had internally agreed that the special envoys of the governments at the vice-ministerial level of the two countries would hold political consultations on the normalization of bilateral relations. In October 1982, the Central Committee appointed me as the special envoy of the Chinese government to participate in the Sino-Soviet political consultation.For me, this is an important and challenging mission.The special envoy of the Soviet government and my negotiating opponent was that Ilichev.As the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union in charge of African affairs, Ilichev had never been in charge of Chinese affairs, but he worked with four Chinese vice foreign ministers, Qiao Guanhua, Han Nianlong, Yu Zhan, and Wang Youping, on Sino-Soviet border and Sino-Chinese relations for ten years. Negotiations on relations between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union were regarded as master negotiators by the Soviet diplomatic circles. The first round of consultations was held in Beijing on October 5, 1982.We have made mental preparations for a long-term contest in the negotiation from the very beginning.In accordance with Comrade Deng Xiaoping's advice not to turn too hastily in dealing with the Soviet Union, and not to rush for success, too hasty will lead to the principles, positions and policies towards the Soviet Union as stated in the instructions of the Soviet Union and the report of the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. We have drawn up the plan for this consultation The policy was to base itself on the overall strategy, adhere to principled positions, and emphatically demand that the Soviet Union do something serious, stop supporting Vietnam in aggression against Cambodia, and urge Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.At the same time, in terms of strategy, hold up the banner of improving the relationship between the two countries and maintaining the friendship between the people of China and the Soviet Union, so as to maintain the channel of consultation. The first round of consultations lasted for half a month, from the 5th to the 21st, and a total of six meetings were held.During the negotiations, I stuck to the issue of eliminating the "three major obstacles" and pointed out that the fundamental way to realize the normalization of bilateral relations lies in the joint efforts of both sides to do some solid things to remove the serious obstacles that hinder the development of bilateral relations.Barriers are removed, and the path to normalization is clear.By following this path, it is expected that the good-neighborliness and friendship between the two countries will be gradually restored. Ilichev repeatedly reiterated his desire to improve the relationship between the two countries, but tried his best to avoid and refute the "three major obstacles" we raised.The Soviet side also has three main arguments: one is to accuse China of setting "preconditions" for the consultation; the second is to propose that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations should "not harm the interests of third countries"; the third is to claim that the Soviet side "never threatens China." .He repeatedly suggested to jointly formulate the basic documents of Sudan-China relations, and first reach an agreement on promoting the improvement and development of relations in various fields such as economy, trade, science and technology, and culture. In response to Ilichev's claim that China's proposal to remove obstacles is a "precondition", I pointed out that there are no preconditions.Some of the issues that we bring up to discuss are not prerequisites.If it is determined in advance which issues can be discussed and other issues cannot be discussed, this is objectively tantamount to setting preconditions.In the course of consultations, unrestricted discussions on all issues are the manifestation of no preconditions. In response to the "normalization without harming the interests of third countries" advocated by the Soviet side, I told Ilichev that some of the issues raised by the Chinese side are not detrimental but beneficial to the interests of third countries that the Soviet side said. Improve our relations with these countries.In his first speech, the Soviet special envoy mentioned that China and the Soviet Union are two big countries, and the relationship between China and the Soviet Union will affect the situation in Asia and the world.Then, a third country will be involved in the consultation.The question is, is it harmful to the interests of these countries and not conducive to the improvement of relations with these countries, or is it beneficial to the interests of these countries and conducive to the improvement of relations with these countries?I further pointed out that it is obviously incomplete to only say that the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations should not harm third countries. As a principle, we advocate not harming the interests of all third countries. As for the Soviet side’s claim that it will never threaten China, I pointed out that the Soviet Union has stationed a large number of troops on the Sino-Soviet border and in our common neighbors, the Mongolian People’s Republic and Afghanistan. We certainly feel that there are so many troops equipped with modern weapons in front of us. There are real threats and serious insecurities. In particular, I focused on how to start eliminating the "three major obstacles".I said that our leaders listed some obstacles to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in the report to the Twelfth National Congress of our Party.Removing these barriers cannot be achieved overnight.We believe that it is necessary and possible to start with solving the issue of Vietnam's troop withdrawal from Cambodia.This is because: First, it is crucial to start here.Frankly speaking, Vietnam sent troops to occupy Cambodia with the support of the Soviet Union, which not only brought serious disasters to the Cambodian people, but also brought undue pain and sacrifice to the Vietnamese people, and caused the peace and tranquility of Southeast Asia to be destroyed by the flames of war. Moreover, it aggravated China's sense of insecurity, made the already deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations more tense, acute and complicated, and set up new serious obstacles for the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.To resolve the issue of Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia as soon as possible is an urgent need to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and a key step in the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.Second, it is more realistic and feasible to start from here.As we all know, what the Soviet Union did in the Indochina region was not just supporting Vietnam in sending troops to Cambodia.The Soviet side should have noticed that we did not make too much demands on the Soviet side. What we are asking now is only to ask the Soviet Union to use its influence to urge Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.Here, there is no question of the Soviet Union withdrawing a single soldier by itself, and nothing else is involved, although we can definitely ask the Soviet Union to do other things.Such a reasonable proposition from the Chinese side should be able to get a positive response from the Soviet side.It was also clear to everyone that the Soviet Union possessed the capabilities and means to urge Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.If the Soviet side calmly weighed the pros and cons, had foresight, made political decisions, and took necessary measures, the problem would not be difficult to solve. As for the Soviet Union's insistence on starting with the joint formulation of a document on the principles of mutual relations between the Soviet Union and China, I told Ilichev that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations cannot be achieved simply by issuing a statement or document expressing this desire.This just shows in essence that the Chinese side really attaches importance to and takes a prudent attitude towards the drafting of the document of principles for the relationship between the two countries.We believe that when both countries use their own actions to prove that we are both loyal to the principles we advocate and abide by these principles, the document of principles for the relationship between the two countries is placed in front of us.When the melon is ripe, the fruit will fall, and it will come when conditions are ripe.That is to say, the Sino-Soviet relationship principle document can only be the product of the development of the relationship between the two countries to a certain stage. It should be summarized from the specific practice of the relationship between the two countries and used to guide the relationship between the two countries.Therefore, we believe that the most urgent task for both of us at this stage, or the main energy of both of us, should be to do some practical things to eliminate the obstacles to the development of bilateral relations in a down-to-earth manner, so as to create conditions for the future formulation of bilateral relations documents . During the entire consultation process, the two sides confronted each other, and the atmosphere was sometimes fierce. Both sides prepared manuscripts in advance to refute each other.Ilichev was in charge of ideological work for a long time, and he was a doctor of philosophy himself. He was compiling a dictionary of philosophy at the time, and when he started his speech, he was not only tough, but also very theoretical. It's annoying.Later, he specially gave me a philosophical dictionary written by him, which showed his theoretical foundation.Of course, the Chinese side was not polite to him, and often responded in a high-profile manner, calling the Soviet side's propositions "a moon in the water" and "a flower in a mirror", emphasizing that it is completely impossible to improve Sino-Soviet relations without solving the "three major obstacles". It's wishful thinking. During the consultation period, in addition to formal negotiations, there are many tours and visits, and the two sides can exchange views informally.In diplomatic struggles, some things must be said on a formal occasion, but some things can be said in private.Formal words spoken on formal occasions may not be important; informal words spoken on informal occasions may not be unimportant.In addition, I have had enough noise in formal occasions, and I can be a little more polite below. Some information, although not recorded, can be passed on to the other party more directly. In order to create a relaxed atmosphere for the tense consultations, I specially invited Ilichev and his entourage to visit the Miyun Reservoir, where they could breathe fresh air, enjoy the scenery and try new things, and increase the conversation and contact between the two sides.Ilichev said he had been there before and had only eaten fish, but not fished there.It seems that he has doubts and is a little worried that we will lead him to the bait.But he thanked me for the invitation, saying that it would give him time to consider the issues in the consultations so that he could reply to us. On the day of visiting the reservoir, the autumn was crisp and sunny, and it was refreshing to see thousands of hectares of blue waves, kites flying and fish jumping.While drinking tea and admiring the scenery, I said to Ilichev that I hope the Soviet side can correctly understand our opinion, and there are new things in the Chinese speech.For example, on the issue of reducing the armed forces in the Sino-Soviet border areas, both sides should undertake the obligation.On the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, we proposed that a solution acceptable to all parties should be found.We only asked the Soviet Union to promote the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and did not involve the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam.The Soviet Union supported Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, which not only caused tension in the Indochina region, but also imposed a heavy burden on the Soviet Union.Solving this problem will only benefit the Soviet Union and Vietnam.We do not understand what difficulties the Soviet Union has on this question. Ilichev listened carefully, and obviously understood my words, and knew our principled position on the "three major obstacles" and the possible ways to solve these problems.But he did not let go, and just reiterated the Soviet side's consistent position on the "three major obstacles".Even so, he is still worried, fearing that there may be some "trap" here. It is considered that the two sides have discussed the issue of eliminating the "three major obstacles". Conversation". The first round of political consultations between the special envoys of the Chinese and Soviet governments was a preliminary battle to find out the bottom line of each other. The two sides could be said to be arguing endlessly, going back and forth, saying their own things, and making no major progress.However, this consultation started the process of normalizing the relationship between the two countries, marking the end of the state of non-dialogue and indicating that the relationship between the two countries will change from long-term tension to long-term dialogue. The second round of Sino-Soviet political consultations was held in Moscow in March 1983.During the talks, the two sides still had their own opinions on the normalization of the relationship between the two countries, and did not find any common language on substantive issues. During this consultation period, my meeting and confrontation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was quite interesting.Gromyko served as the foreign minister of the Soviet Union for 27 years. From Stalin to Chernenko, he went through five generations of Soviet leaders.He has what Westerners call a "poker face" and is expressionless even when he's talking.No matter what the occasion, he appears very reserved, but also very aggressive, and seems to be ready to engage in a diplomatic wrestling with others at any time. He has also been described by Western reporters as a "Mr. Say 'No'". During the meeting, he actually accepted our idea of ​​anti-hegemony and elimination of threats, claiming surprisingly that this point can become an important basis for the normalization of relations between the two countries.Then, he cursed at the Americans, saying that the Americans are not trustworthy, and that the United States is going to carry out a crusade against the Soviet Union, and that President Reagan wants to eradicate socialism from the earth. In the policy of eliminating socialism pursued, the conclusion of what kind of relationship should be established with the Soviet Union or with the United States was drawn. At that time, he was very old and a little dependent on his old age. I gave a simple and clear response to his remarks.I said: "When it comes to international tensions, this is an objective existence. I think that improving Sino-Soviet relations under this situation is not only in the interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples, but also in the interests of peace in Asia and the world. As for The United States, the People’s Republic of China has fought with the United States for a long time after its founding, and we are more qualified to speak than anyone else and know how to deal with the United States.” Gromyko was momentarily at a loss for words, appearing a little embarrassed. Since then, political consultations between the special envoys of the Chinese and Soviet governments have been held twice a year in Beijing and Moscow in turn.This is a marathon negotiation, a contest of resilience and perseverance.We have always adhered to the principled position that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations can only be achieved by removing obstacles, refuted the Soviet side’s unchanging arguments by presenting facts and reasoning, dispelled the Soviet side’s illusions, and urged the Soviet Union to do something to remove obstacles.But until the eighth round of political consultations concluded in Moscow in April 1986, the two sides still failed to make any substantive progress on the "three major obstacles".However, the consultations were able to continue and maintain a communication channel, which objectively played a role in promoting Sino-Soviet bilateral relations. In retrospect, there were other reasons why the consultations did not make concrete progress.During this period, the fortunes of the Soviet Union were not prosperous, and a leader would die almost every two years. The three leaders Brezhnev (November 10, 1982), Andropov (February 9, 1984) Day), Chernenko (March 10, 1985) died of illness one after another.It is said that in his later years, Brezhnev could only work for one hour a day, make phone calls, and could not see things normally.Andropov, who took over, was smart and capable. He had served as the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, knew the situation in the outside world, and wanted to make a difference.He felt that the bureaucracy of the Soviet government was rampant. Everyone loved to drink and did not do things seriously. He believed that drinking was harmful to the country, so he ordered a ban on alcohol, changed the winery into a juice factory, and strictly investigated alcoholism everywhere.But not drinking is not in line with the "national conditions" of the Soviet Union, and it is difficult to implement.He was seriously ill and had only been in power for more than a year.Chernenko came to power, didn't want to, he got sicker, his health got worse, he was in power for a shorter time, he couldn't do anything. A sick man governing the country has three major changes, and it is difficult to do anything externally. Naturally, he is unable to solve such a major issue as the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations for a while. Interestingly, the level of contact between China and the Soviet Union was raised because of the funerals of three Soviet leaders. When the news of Brezhnev's death came, Comrade Xiaoping immediately ordered Foreign Minister Huang Hua to go to Moscow to attend the funeral as a special envoy of the government.This is an extraordinary measure taken after the suspension of high-level contacts between China and the Soviet Union for many years. It aims to seize the opportunity to do the work of the Soviet side, to test the direction of the new leadership's China policy, and to promote the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.After Huang Hua set off, Comrade Xiaoping also instructed that he should make a concise speech, neither to simply criticize Brezhnev, nor to just say good things.According to Comrade Xiaoping's intention, Comrade Hu Qiaomu drafted the speech.The talk reviewed the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, and pointed out that Sino-Soviet relations had gradually deteriorated since the late 1950s, and reached a serious level after the late 1960s. After the end of the 1960s was the period when Brezhnev was in power.This sentence means that Brezhnev is responsible for the serious deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, but considering that this event is a condolence, he did not name him.At the same time, he expressed his appreciation for his speech on improving the relationship between the two countries not long ago. This is to hope that the new leaders of the Soviet Union will make new efforts to promote the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations.This manuscript was published as Huang Hua's talk to reporters when he left the Capital Airport. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately notified the Chinese embassy in the Soviet Union of the matter.It was only when Foreign Minister Huang Hua arrived in Moscow that he learned that he had such a public talk when he left Beijing. This time, Foreign Minister Huang Hua met the new Soviet leader Andropov and Foreign Minister Gromyko.The Chinese side emphasized that in order to achieve a real improvement in the relationship between the two countries, the Soviet Union must take practical steps in removing obstacles and do one or two things first.Although the Soviet side expressed its willingness to improve the relationship between the two countries, it only emphasized that the two sides should first make efforts to promote exchanges in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, and culture.It appears that the new Soviet leadership will continue the momentum Brezhnev started to improve relations between the two countries, but has yet to make up his mind to take major steps. In the next two years, I accompanied Vice Premier Wan Li and Vice Premier Li Peng to the Soviet Union to attend the funerals of Andropov and Chernenko.The Chinese side used the opportunity of high-level contacts to make another effort. During the conversation, it evaluated and supported the cause of building socialism in the Soviet Union, and urged the Soviet side to take practical actions in realizing the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. In the formal rounds of consultations, China and the Soviet Union were talking like deaf people, completely out of tune.Although it is mutual wrangling and no consensus can be reached, but wrangling also has the meaning of wrangling.The first is that the two parties have a better understanding of their respective positions and viewpoints; the second is that the wrangling itself keeps the relationship between the two sides from becoming more tense. In short, it is better to keep talking than not to communicate with each other.There is a lot of wrangling, and the communication will gradually increase.At that time, some people described the relationship between the two countries as an embassy, ​​an airplane, and a train.It is said that the relationship between the two countries is only these connections. Although diplomatic relations are maintained, and the sky is open to navigation and the ground is open to traffic, there are very few exchanges.Sometimes, when returning home from the Soviet Union, the entire flight and train compartments are empty, and few people can be seen.As the Sino-Soviet political consultation continued, the economic and trade relations between the two countries increased, and exchanges in other fields also increased. They began to exchange students and organize mutual visits. Meanwhile, at the end of 1984, Arkhipov, an old friend of the Chinese people and First Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, paid an official visit to my country at the invitation of Vice Premier Yao Yilin. The highest-level delegation sent by the Soviet Union to China. In the 1950s, Arkhipov served as the leader of the Soviet Aid to China Expert Group and contributed to the construction of my country's first five-year plan.He is friendly to China, and he never said a bad word about China in the era of deteriorating relations between the two countries.The Chinese side gave Arkhipov a very high courtesy, Deng Xiaoping received him, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo and other old friends who worked with him all met him.The old friend reunited, and the meeting was very happy, and the scene was very touching. I remember that Comrade Chen Yun invited Yao Yilin, Chen Chu and me to report to his residence in preparation for the meeting with Arkhipov, and we had a very happy conversation.That night, he handwritten the banner "There is no way out of the mountains and rivers, there is no way out, the willows are dark and the flowers are bright and another village", and sent someone to give it to me. With Lu You's famous line, he expressed his feelings about the development of Sino-Soviet relations and his expectations for the prospects of bilateral relations. During Arkhipov's visit to China, I accompanied him to Yanshan Petrochemical Company, Wuhan Iron and Steel Company, Wuhan Yangtze River Bridge and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.From time to time, I mentioned some projects aided by the Soviet Union, and I also introduced to him the history of the amazing development of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone under the direct care of Comrade Xiaoping, who insisted on reform and opening up.Arkhipov was extremely impressed with China's achievements in reform and opening up and its rapid development, and he expressed his sincere admiration from time to time, but at the same time expressed his disappointment and dissatisfaction with the status quo of Soviet society at that time. During the visit to China, the two sides signed the "Sino-Soviet Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement" and the "Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Establishment of an Economic, Trade, and Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee", which restored the economic and technological cooperation between the two countries that had been suspended for many years. In July 1985, I accompanied Vice Premier Yao Yilin on a return visit to the Soviet Union.Vice Premier Yao held talks with Arkhipov, First Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and met with Tikhonov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.The two sides talked very smoothly on the development of economic and trade cooperation, and signed the "Sino-Soviet Agreement on Exchange of Goods and Payments from 1986 to 1990" and other documents. The Sino-Soviet trade volume increased from 2.65 billion Swiss francs in 1984 to 4.6 billion in 1985. .The two sides expressed satisfaction with the high-level exchanges between the two countries and the substantial increase in trade. At the same time, we urged Sudan to take action on the issue of eliminating the "three major obstacles", pointing out that there is a limit to the improvement of bilateral relations if the obstacles are not eliminated. How to get out of the stalemate in the negotiations on the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations?China insisted on eliminating the "three major obstacles", which is the basis for the fundamental improvement of bilateral relations, while the three leaders of the Soviet Union—Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko—all avoided major issues and attempted to Bypassing the "three major obstacles", the so-called normalization of relations between the two countries can be realized by developing economic and trade cooperation and increasing mutual exchanges.In the early days of Gorbachev's coming to power, he had no intention of moving forward on the issue of overcoming the "three major obstacles". On October 9, 1985, Comrade Xiaoping met with Romanian leader Ceausescu who was visiting China and pointed out that to resolve the issue of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations and eliminate the "three major obstacles", the first thing to do is to withdraw troops from Vietnam and Cambodia. rise.As long as this problem is solved, other problems are easy to solve.In order to promote a breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations, Comrade Xiaoping proposed for the first time the idea of ​​holding a high-level meeting between China and the Soviet Union.Comrade Xiaoping asked Ceausescu to bring a message to Gorbachev: If the Soviet Union reached an understanding with us to allow Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, and if it could be done, he would like to meet with Gorbachev.Comrade Xiaoping said that although his historical mission of visiting abroad has been completed, he can make an exception for this issue. On November 6, 1985, the Soviet side replied that the message had been received. On the 23rd, the Soviet side stated that the time was ripe for the Soviet Union and China to hold a top-level meeting and restore party relations. On July 28, 1986, Gorbachev delivered a lengthy speech in Vladivostok, a city in the Far East of the Soviet Union, stating that the Soviet Union was willing to seriously discuss "further measures" with China at any time and at any level to establish good-neighborly relations.He announced that six regiments of the Soviet Army would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of that year, and that the entire withdrawal of the Soviet Union would depend on whether external interference continued. China Discusses Reduction of Army in Sino-Soviet Border Area.At the same time, he also talked about the Cambodian issue, claiming that the resolution of the Vietnam-Cambodia issue depends on the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations, which is a matter for both China and Vietnam. The Soviet Union can only hope that China and Vietnam will resume dialogue and make peace. It is worth noting that he accepted China’s position in the Sino-Soviet border negotiations and agreed to divide the direction of the Amur River (Heilongjiang) boundary line according to the central line of the main waterway, hoping that the border will become a peaceful and friendly border in the near future. Compared with Gorbachev's previous speeches since he came to power, this speech showed an important change in the Soviet side's position. On the issue of the "three major obstacles", this time we did not repeat the old tunes of "no preconditions", "do not harm the interests of third countries", and "never threaten China", and no longer evade the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Mongolia and border areas , is loose.On the Vietnam-Cambodia issue, the tone is relatively peaceful, saying that now is a favorable time to solve the problem. Due to historical reasons, the border between China and the Soviet Union is in the Heilongjiang (Amur River) section. In the Qing Dynasty, the river was simply used as the boundary without strict demarcation.The Soviet Union has always stood on the tyrannical position of Tsarist Russia, claiming that China's border should be drawn along the line along our side of the Jiejiang River.In this way, the islands in the river were naturally assigned to the Soviet Union, and the Heilongjiang and Ussuri Rivers became the inland rivers of the Soviet Union.Of course we will not agree.China maintains that, according to the principles of international law and international practice, the central line of the main waterway of the Jiejiang River should be used as the national boundary between the two countries. In 1969, the bloody conflict on Zhenbao Island between China and the Soviet Union originated from this.Gorbachev's statement cannot be said to be a positive gesture. 同时，作为苏联领导人，戈尔巴乔夫也第一次公开肯定了我国进行现代化建设的方针，表示理解和尊重。他还提出了扩大和加深经济技术合作的具体设想。 中央决定抓住这一时机，采取相应对策，对戈尔巴乔夫的讲话表示了审慎欢迎的态度，但在“三大障碍”问题上不松口，继续保持压力，同时做出积极姿态，接过以主航道中心线为界的提法，同意恢复边界谈判。 为此，8月13日，吴学谦外长约见苏联驻华使馆临时代办费多托夫，做了如下表态：戈尔巴乔夫总书记7月28日海参崴讲话中对中国和就中苏关系所表述的意见，我们予以认真的评价和重视。中方注意到其中有些过去没有说过的话，对此我们表示欢迎。苏联方面清楚地知道中国方面关于消除“三大障碍”以实现两国关系正常化的原则立场和具体主张，而戈尔巴乔夫这篇讲话与消除“三大障碍”距离尚远，特别是没有提到越南从柬埔寨撤军问题，我们是不满意的。越南从柬埔寨撤军，公正合理地解决柬埔寨问题是中国方面最感关切的问题，也是去年邓小平同志通过齐奥塞斯库传话的核心。中方真诚地希望早日实现中苏关系正常化，希望苏方认真考虑中方的意见。对戈尔巴乔夫总书记宣布中苏东段边界以界江主航道中心线为界，中方表示欢迎。据此，中方认为，在适当时候恢复中苏边界谈判是适宜的。 1986年9月2日，小平同志在接受美国记者华莱士电视采访时，又一次谈到了中苏关系，强调指出让越南从柬埔寨撤军问题是改善中苏关系的关键，并说，如果戈尔巴乔夫在越柬问题上走出扎扎实实的一步，消除了这个障碍，他愿意破例地到苏联的任何地方去同戈尔巴乔夫见面。我们在9月7日正式对外发表了这一谈话，把中方的立场公布于世，实际上是对戈尔巴乔夫在海参崴的讲话做出了公开的答复。 为了推动苏联在戈尔巴乔夫海参崴讲话基础上向前迈步，我们一连做了几件事情：邀请苏联部长会议第一副主席、计委主席塔雷津访华；恢复了中苏边界谈判；在其后举行的第十二轮的中苏政治磋商中重点就越柬问题谈判。 塔雷津是在1986年9月访华的。访问期间，双方探讨了苏联向我们提供政府贷款，在广西合作建设铝厂、扩建本溪钢铁生产、修建新疆铁路；还探讨了合资办厂、补偿贸易和来料加工、扩大边境贸易、增加供应传统货物等一系列推进两国经贸合作的问题。塔雷津还探询我们对戈尔巴乔夫海参崴讲话的进一步态度。中国领导人则表示，戈尔巴乔夫的讲话有些值得欢迎的方面，但明确指出他在中国最为关切的越柬问题上没有新意，敦促苏方在这一事关中苏关系正常化的关键问题上尽早做出政治决断。 根据中方关于恢复边界谈判的建议，中苏外长1986年9月在纽约会见时达成协议，两国边界谈判于1987年2月在莫斯科举行。我出任中方代表团团长，苏方代表团团长是副外长罗高寿。此前中苏于1964年2月至7月和1969年10月至1978年6月先后举行过两次边界谈判。第一次谈判中，双方交换了地图，就东段边界走向口头上达成了一些共识，但没签署任何正式协议，会谈等于没有取得结果。当年l0月，赫鲁晓夫下台后，边界会谈未再恢复。第二次边界谈判持续了九年，双方在讨论维持边界现状协定草案时一直围绕争议地区问题激烈较量。l979年苏联入侵阿富汗，致使第二次边界谈判中断。如今，第三次边界谈判开始，戈尔巴乔夫的海参崴讲话，公开宣布以界江主航道中心线作为苏中东段边界，接受了中方的立场，使谈判有了基础，得以在比较好的气氛中进行。 我主持了1987年2月和8月的两轮会谈，此后的会谈是由田曾佩副外长主持的。在中苏举行高级会晤前，双方就东段边界走向大部分达成了原则协议。至于复杂的西段边界，双方就划界原则取得了一致意见，并同意成立专家工作组具体讨论西段边界走向问题和成立联合摄影小组进行共同航摄，等等。第三次中苏边界谈判的进展有助于缓和两国边境对峙形势，成为促进中苏关系正常化的组成部分。 戈尔巴乔夫海参崴讲话后，中苏于1986年10月举行第九轮政治磋商，直到中苏高级会晤前夕，两国一共进行了多达12轮的政治磋商。我一直主持到第十一轮。1988年4月我就任外长，中苏边界谈判代表团团长及中方政府特使改由副外长田曾佩担任。在最后四轮磋商中，苏方在阻碍两国关系正常化的关键问题上逐渐表现灵活，不再回避讨论柬埔寨问题，但称这个问题只能政治解决，后来又承认越南从柬埔寨撤军是个重要因素。苏方虽不承诺将促越南从柬埔寨撤军，却表示将做出力所能及的努力促进柬埔寨问题的解决进程。由此可以看出，苏联在有意进行战略收缩并做出从阿富汗撤军决定后，基于自身需要，也想早日解决柬埔寨问题，态度变得较前积极。 在第十二轮磋商中，苏方提出愿就柬埔寨问题同中方进行专门讨论并达成谅解。根据当时形势，为推动苏联对越南进一步施加影响，我们决定接过苏方的建议。1988年8月27日至9月l日，田曾佩副外长与苏联副外长罗高寿在北京专门就柬埔寨问题举行工作会晤。最后，双方达成了一定内部谅解，找到了一些共同点和相近之处，当然，分歧仍然存在。会晤表明，苏方在促越撤军问题上立场有所松动。出于内政外交需要，苏方确实希望早日卸掉柬埔寨问题这个包袱，并借此推动中苏关系的改善，实现高级会晤。 中苏政治磋商结束后，我就不再和苏联特使伊利切夫打交道了，以后也没机会再见到他。后来听说，他先是丧妻，惟一的儿子也先他而去。到了晚年，因身后无人，就将自己一生收藏的许多书籍和油画等，分别捐赠给了家乡的博物馆。他于1990年8月去世。我特地发去了唁电。 1988年12月1日至3日，我作为外长，应苏联外长谢瓦尔德纳泽的邀请，对苏联进行正式访问。这是自1957年之后，30多年来中国外长第一次正式访问苏联，主要任务是为中苏首脑会晤做准备。 此前，两国外长也有一些接触，但都是在纽约联合国大会期间进行的会见。这次外长访问，从相隔时间之长和任务之艰巨来看，可以说是一次破冰之旅。 陪同我一起访问苏联的，有当时外交部苏欧司司长戴秉国、新闻司司长李肇星。我们乘坐的中国民航班机，于12月1日中午抵达莫斯科，谢瓦尔德纳泽外长到机场迎接，并陪同坐车去宾馆。 我们一行十人，入住在列宁山上的柯西金街11号宾馆。正值严冬，莫斯科大雪纷飞，寒风刺骨。苏方的接待是很周到的，但鉴于两国关系的特殊和环境的复杂，我和代表团的主要成员，不便在室内商议谈判对策，清晨时，只好冒着寒风，踏着厚厚的积雪，在宾馆的庭院里不停地漫步。无法运筹于帷幄，只能策划在穹庐。 我抵达的次日，就去克里姆林宫会见了苏共中央总书记、苏联最高苏维埃主席团主席戈尔巴乔夫。当时，他刚刚提出自己的“新思维”理论，给人以年轻有为的印象。也许因为有了“新思维”，他特别爱说，话很多，会见进行了1小时40分钟。戈尔巴乔夫主动表示，对过去发生的事情苏联也有过错。在谈及中苏高级会晤时，他主动提出，考虑到各种情况，他准备到北京去。我向他转达了中国领导人欢迎他于1989年访华的邀请，并表示，对于两国关系，中方主张着眼于未来，不纠缠历史的旧账，向前看，探讨建立新的关系。 访问期间，我同谢瓦尔德纳泽外长举行了三次会谈，共约六个半小时。会谈的重点是柬埔寨问题。 关于柬埔寨问题，双方肯定了1988年8月中苏副外长工作会晤和9月两国外长纽约会晤所取得的某些一致意见，同时进一步阐述了各自主张。我着重指出，越南军队应在1989年6月底以前全部从柬埔寨撤出，中苏在越南撤军时间表问题上应有一致的主张并促其实现。同时，在越南全部撤军后，所有外国（包括越南）都应停止对柬埔寨各派的军事援助，不支持任何一方打内战。关于柬埔寨内部问题，我没有深谈，只简要重申了中方关于建立以西哈努克为首的四方联合政府，冻结、削减以至解散各方军队，派遣国际维和部队，实行严格国际监督和国际保证等主张。苏方表示希望尽早解决柬埔寨问题，越南应尽早全部撤军，但认为，越南撤军、国际监督机制和国际保证的建立，同不恢复柬埔寨过去的政策、实现柬埔寨内部各派之间以及印支与东盟各国之间的继续对话，应是平行的进程，主张柬埔寨各方达成政治解决协议后，所有国家应立即停止对柬埔寨任何一方的军援。 苏方不愿明确承诺的是促越南撤军的期限，称苏联“无法对越南发号施令”，但苏方转达了越方同我们直接讨论时间表问题的愿望，希望中越直接对话，以加快政治解决进程。看到双方的意见在接近，我们提出，可将越南自柬埔寨撤军的时间表，确定为1989年6月底到12月底之间。双方就此达成了协议。 最终的结果是，中苏两国外长指派的工作小组经过反复磋商，双方就柬埔寨问题以《共同记录》方式达成内部谅解，并经我和谢瓦尔德纳泽确认。其核心内容是：中苏双方主张尽早公正合理地政治解决柬埔寨问题，双方希望越南军队在尽可能短的时间内，例如在1989年下半年，至迟在1989年底之前，从柬埔寨全部撤出；中苏双方表示愿意做出自己的贡献，以促使上述目标的实现。 我和谢瓦尔德纳泽还讨论了关于苏联在蒙古驻军、两国边境地区驻军裁减、边界谈判等问题，也取得了一些进展。 1989年2月2日，苏联外长谢瓦尔德纳泽对中国进行回访，目的是为高级会晤做准备。我同他举行了两次会谈，重点仍然是讨论柬埔寨问题。我接过苏方的建议，同意在已经达成的两次《共同记录》的基础上继续讨论，并就柬埔寨问题公开发表一项声明，概述中苏在政治解决柬埔寨问题上的一致主张。这个声明及举行高级会晤的时间将作为一揽子协议共同发表。 在双方商定戈尔巴乔夫访华日期后，苏方突然耍起了手腕，出尔反尔，表示不愿意发表双方已经达成的协议，而只宣布戈尔巴乔夫访华日期。2月3日，谢瓦尔德纳泽抵达上海。第二天，小平同志将接见他。深夜，苏方态度变得强硬起来，不同意发表关于柬埔寨问题的共同声明。 面对苏方的要挟，我们立即反击。4日清晨我们通知苏方，鉴于双方分歧较大，同意暂不发表关于柬埔寨问题的共同声明，但同时也先不公布双方商定的5月中旬举行高级会晤的日期。 在小平同志会见谢瓦尔德纳泽前，我向他汇报了苏方在柬埔寨问题上立场后退的情况，并建议关于中苏高级会晤的日期也暂不公布，由双方继续商谈。小平同志表示，“中苏高级会晤的日期不能变，但是我今天不说访问日期，这由你们去谈”。 会见时，谢瓦尔德纳泽一上来就向小平同志表示，“戈尔巴乔夫建议5月15日至18日访华，昨天我同钱其琛外长谈了这个问题”。他的用意显然是先请小平同志确认高级会晤的日期，使之成为既定事实，从而绕开柬埔寨问题，再压中方让步。 小平同志马上做出反应，说，“你们两位外长的谈话还未结束，希望你们继续工作，日期由你们商定，我听你们指挥”。 接着，小平同志在谈话中再次强调了早日解决柬埔寨问题的重要性。 谢瓦尔德纳泽眼见自己的打算未能实现，只好表示柬埔寨问题还是可以继续讨论。 4日中午，在返京的飞机上，两国副外长再次进行了商讨，但仍相持不下。谢瓦尔德纳泽原定到达机场后立即转飞巴基斯坦，但到达北京后，就直奔苏联使馆，离京的时间一推再推。我采取在机场守候的办法，坚持要求双方达成协议后同时发表共同声明和戈尔巴乔夫访华日期。一直等到了天黑，谢瓦尔德纳泽到了机场，我们在候机室里进行了最后一次会晤。 我表示，你的访问是成功的，双方的会谈，以及同中方领导人的会见，都有成果，但说话做事不应出尔反尔，要知道，我们两国关系还没正常化呢！发表共同声明，是苏方提出来的建议，我们同意了，双方的工作小组也做了大量工作。出现目前这种情况，出乎我们的意料。这件事本来是谢瓦尔德纳泽做了手脚，现在，他见事情无法收拾，就赶紧做出埋怨罗高寿副外长不会办事的样子，同时又向我诉苦，说苏方在涉及柬埔寨问题上确有难处，事情复杂。见我不为所动，最后，他不得不同意留下两位司长，继续同中方商谈，自己先乘飞机离去了。 次日，双方工作小组连夜工作，达成协议。2月6日，双方同时发表了有关柬埔寨问题的声明和戈尔巴乔夫的访华日期。那天正好是那年农历的正月初一。 五年后，我应邀到格鲁吉亚访问，在那里又见到了谢瓦尔德纳泽。此时，他已是格鲁吉亚共和国的总统了。我受到了高规格的礼遇，他亲自举行欢迎宴会，并到机场送行，比当年在莫斯科时热情多了。 1989年5月15日至18日，苏共中央总书记、苏联最高苏维埃主席团主席戈尔巴乔夫如期对中国进行了正式访问。 40多年来，中苏两国关系，见证了几代人的努力，经受了火与血的考验，充满了坎坷曲折和戏剧性的变化。我1954年第一次到苏联时，还是一个26岁的青年，前后在苏联度过了近十年的外交生涯；又作为特使，参加了长达七年、有着许多不眠之夜的中苏政治磋商。今天，终于迎来了两国人民期待已久的重要时刻——中苏高级会晤，心情不能不格外激动。 中苏领导人的会晤，是举世瞩目的重大事件。对此次戈尔巴乔夫来访的接待礼仪，小平同志要求在安排上讲究适度，见面时“只握手，不拥抱”——这言简意赅的六个字，表达的不仅仅是简单的礼仪问题，而是准确地概括了当时中苏关系的性质， 形象地勾勒出两国未来关系的定位。 至于双方会晤的主题，小平同志提出了思想深邃、语言明晰的八个字：“结束过去，开辟未来”。 5月16日上午10时至12时30分，小平同志在人民大会堂的东大厅同戈尔巴乔夫举行了历史性的会晤。记得那天小平同志精神矍铄，情绪极好。他的记忆力惊人，谈话不用稿子，但条理清晰，用语简洁准确。他先从两个方面回顾了历史：一是近百年来中国在列强压迫下遭受的损失，二是近几十年来对中国最大的威胁来自何方。小平同志总结了几十年风风雨雨的中苏关系，强调主要是苏联把中国摆错了位置，真正的实质问题是不平等。又说，虽然如此，中方从未忘记，苏联在新中国建立的初期曾帮助中国奠定工业基础。至于意识形态争论的那些问题，小平同志说，他是那场争论的当事人，回过头来看，双方讲的都是空话。那些争论，我们也不相信自己是全对的。讲到这里，他特别强调，讲这些过去的事，目的是为了前进。不是要求再和苏方进行辩论了。这些历史账讲了，问题就一风吹了，重点是放在未来。 戈尔巴乔夫表示，关于俄国、苏联与中国关系是如何形成的，有些东西苏方有自己的看法和评价，但在不太久远的过去，苏中关系的有些方面，苏联是有一定的过错和责任的，并赞同过去的问题就讲到此为止。 当时戈尔巴乔夫的表态是比较得体的，他显然也是有备而来的。前苏联驻华大使特罗扬诺夫斯基在其名为《跨越时空》的回忆录中写道，戈尔巴乔夫曾对其陪同人员说，他打算像晚辈同长辈谈话那样去同邓小平会谈。作为历史人物，戈尔巴乔夫的功过，自有后人去评价，但他的北京之行所完成的重大历史使命，在中苏关系史上，应当被浓墨重彩地记上一笔。 所谓开辟未来，是指两国关系正常化后建立一个什么样的国家间关系，明确今后两国新型关系的具体内涵和应当遵循的准则。小平同志深刻总结了国际共运的历史教训，强调无论是结盟还是对抗，都是不成功的，中苏关系还是要以和平共处五项原则为基础。戈尔巴乔夫在记者招待会上表示，他和邓小平等中国领导人都认为，“苏中高级会晤标志着两国关系进入了一个新阶段，两国关系将建立在国与国之间交往的普遍原则以及和平共处的原则基础之上。我们的出发点是，苏中关系正常化不针对第三国，不损害第三国利益，它同当今世界的发展趋势有机地结为一体”。 高级会晤结束时发表的联合公报正式确认了两国最高领导人一致确定的两国国家关系准则。这样就形成了既不同于20世纪50年代的那种结盟，更不同于60年代和70年代的那种对抗状态，而是不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三国、睦邻友好的正常国家关系。其后的历史发展表明，这种完全新型的国家关系不仅最符合两国人民的根本利益，而且有利于维护世界的和平与稳定。 通过这次高级会晤，中苏两大邻国终于结束了几十年来的不正常状态，重新建立起正常的国家关系。 如今回顾起来，当时把握住了历史时机，实现了中苏关系的正常化，意义十分重大。此后，国际风云变幻，东欧剧变，苏联解体，世界进入了一个动荡多变的非常时期。当年确立的中苏关系正常化的框架，成为了中俄迅速建立起超越意识形态的睦邻友好关系的基础，进而发展为建设性伙伴关系，直至确立平等信任、面向21世纪的战略协作伙伴关系