Chapter 24 Chapter 22: The Viewpoint of Three Frenchmen

Saint-Simon, Comte and Courtno The concept of revolution in science emerges in a notable way in the writings of three nineteenth-century French philosophers and social thinkers—Saint-Simon, Comte, and Cournau.All three developed a philosophy of historical change in which the sciences took on special importance; and, all three of them envisioned that, in the near future, the social sciences would reach the point where astronomy and mathematics had already reached , and "physiology" (biology) is at an advanced and definite state in this process. Henri Saint-Simon: Revolution and the Religion of Science Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825) is an interesting figure in the history of ideas because, although he did not actually understand science, he argued eloquently about its importance; The social aspect of organization will play an extremely important role.Although in later life he disenchanted with science and—more particularly—lost confidence in the acceptance of his ideas by his contemporaries, his blueprints for a better society always emphasized scientific thought and The Importance of Scientific Ideals.He even longed for a scientific religion with a scientist-priest, and dreamed of a physicist like the pope.More importantly, he hoped that in the not-too-distant future, science, as well as educational systems and methods, would be transformed so as to ensure that science "perfected the craft" for the benefit of all working people (see Manuel 1956; 1962 , 113). Today, when Saint-Simon is remembered, he is usually thought of as a pre-socialist "socialist" thinker, an early advocate of the cult of science and a pioneer of the positive philosophy of Auguste Comte. a precursor.Friedrich Engels praised Saint-Simon's political and social thought in his pamphlet The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science.He said: "In Saint-Simon we see the great vision of genius, from which almost all the not strictly economic ideas of the later socialists were contained in the embryonic state in his thought" ( 1935, 38. See the Chinese version of "Selected Works of Marx and Engels", Volume 3, page 411).Emil Xürgan called Saint-Simon "the founder of positive philosophy and sociology".We can see the beginning of modern positive philosophy from the following statement quoted from Saint-Simon's "Discourse on Human Science" (1865-1878, 40:25-26; quoted from Manuel 1956, 113): All science begins speculatively.The great order of things predestined them all to be positive sciences.Astronomy began as astrology; chemistry began as nothing but alchemy; physiology, which had long struggled with charlatanism, today rests on observed and proven facts; psychology now begins to establish itself on Physiological foundations, and cleansed from itself of the prejudices of religion upon which it had rested. In his "Letter to a Genevan Inhabitant" (written in 1813), he also predicted that the social sciences would become sciences on the same level as astronomy, physics, chemistry and physiology. (In this work he does not use the term "positive" to describe the exact sciences; he first uses the term in 1807; see Manuel, 1956, 132).According to the order in which science has been "liberated from superstition and metaphysics" (ibid.), he divided and explained the hierarchical levels of science before Auguste Comte later elaborated.Like Comte, he believed that physiology had only just entered or was about to enter an "empirical" state.He wrote in "Letters to a Genevan Inhabitant" (1865-1878, 15:39-40; for the English translation see Manuel 1956, 133), "physiology is still in an unfortunate position or state, while astrology The scientific [sic!] and chemical sciences have moved beyond this position or state".He added, "Physiologists are now compelled to drive out of their midst philosophers, ethicists, and metaphysicians, just as astronomers drive out astrologers, and chemists drive out alchemists." The same image in surgery. Three major works written by Saint-Simon are directly related to the subject of science: A Survey of Scientific Writings of the Nineteenth Century (1808), On Gravitation (December 1813), and On Human Science (written on January 1813). month, but not published until 1858).It was in "On the Sciences of Man" that he most fully developed his theory of revolutions in science.In an appendix to the first of the two parts of the book, Saint-Simon discusses revolution.This discussion took the form of a "Letter to a Physiologist" (1858, 382-386).If they would "boldly back my word," then "a great and salutary revolution would take place in a few years' time."Then, says Saint-Simon, history shows that scientific and political revolutions alternate.In turn, each revolution is the cause of the next revolution and the effect of the previous revolution.According to Saint-Simon (1858, 382-386), this brief recapitulation "will prove that the next revolution must be a scientific one, as my writings will prove to you with increasing evidence , it is you (physiologists) who should be mainly relied on to bring about this revolution, and this revolution must be especially useful to you". The historical sequence of Saint-Simon begins with the scientific revolution with which the name of Copernicus is associated, followed by Luther's political revolution.The scientific revolution that followed included Bacon's writings, and Galileo's demonstration of the "diurnal rotation of the earth around its axis," which "completed the Copernican system."The ensuing political revolution took place in England, in which Charles I was "judged by his subjects" and "a new order of social organization unknown to the ancients" was established; Meanwhile, Louis XIV "set out to bring all Europe under his dominion."In the ensuing scientific revolution, Newton and Locke appeared, and these two men "produced important new ideas which caused a huge leap in science"; their ideas were developed in the French Encyclopedia and use.The political revolution that followed was the French Revolution, which "began a few years after the publication of the Encyclopedia". Saint-Simon, then, had to make a prediction about the next scientific revolution.This revolution will be a revolution in "anthropology" (the science of man), based on "knowledge of physiology".Saint-Simon envisioned that this new science would become part of school education, and that the men trained in this new science would be able to use the methods employed in the other sciences (astronomy, physics, chemistry) to Deal with political issues. The writings of the 18th century always tended to disintegrate or destroy society, whereas the writings of the coming 19th century would "strive to reform society".I have reproduced two pages from the first edition of Saint-Simon's Discourse on the Sciences of Man, so that the reader may recognize the typographical correspondence between the two forms of revolution. Saint-Simon removed the Chemical Revolution from his catalog.The sequence of revolutions that have occurred in the past has been from Copernicus to the achievements of Bacon and Galileo, and then to Newton (and Locke and the Encyclopedia thinkers).These three groups of completed revolutions, the only actual ones mentioned by Saint-Simon, constitute what we know today as the Scientific Revolution.Auguste Comte seems to have made the earliest explicit expression of this single concept in the process of reforming Saint-Simon's thought. Auguste Comte and Positivist Philosophy Auguste Comte was one of the most creative and important thinkers of the 19th century.His profound influence on science, philosophy, and the social sciences is quite wide-ranging and pervasive.He created the thought movement called "positivism", and the goal.He invented the name "sociology" for a science that did not yet exist.His philosophical thoughts are elaborated in his book "A Course in Positive Philosophy".The book was published in French between 1830 and 1842 and translated into English by Harriet Martineau.Comte's influence in the Anglo-American world was not as profound as his influence was and still is in France and continental Europe and Latin America.In the 20th century, certain parts of Comte's philosophy were given new life in the doctrine of "logical positivism", which was strongly influenced by the thought of Ernst Mach and propagated through the Vienna School.In this new variant it is evident that Comte is no longer considered the founder of positivism. Comte introduced two important new concepts into the historical development of science.The first concept is his three-stage law.Comte thinks.The three stages of the development of the human spirit are inevitable in the process of recognizing and understanding the phenomena of the external world, and they are the ways and means to explain such phenomena.The first is the "theological" stage, in which all events are attributed to God and the activities of the divine; the second is the "metaphysical" stage, in which the will of God or divine powers superseded by abstract concepts; finally, the third or "positive" stage is reached when scientific explanations supersede metaphysics.Comte explores the succession and succession of these three stages through his extensive historical description of the development of culture or civilization, of thought, and especially of science.He was "convinced that knowledge of the history of science is of the utmost importance" and, he went even further, "if we do not know the history of a science, we shall not know it well at all" (1970 , 49).Comte was thus the first to advocate serious and systematic study of the history of science.George Sutton praised Comte as the founder of the discipline of history of science. Comte's second conception of history forms part of his new and rather inventive classification of the sciences.He proposed a classification scheme in which he classified the sciences according to a historical and analytical hierarchy of "decreasing generality and increasing interdependence and complexity."Therefore, this classification system is not only determined by a logical analysis, but also confirmed by history.Mathematics is the foundation of all sciences, the most general of all sciences, and the first to become a "positive" science in history.In Comte's classification sequence, after mathematics is astronomy.In astronomy, objects are considered to be in free motion, or that their motion is not affected by surrounding fluids, collisions, friction, and all the other complexities that arise in geophysics (physical processes) with respect to visible objects. impedance.Astronomy was followed by physics, chemistry, and physiology (which, in Comte's time, was in the process of becoming a "positive" science), and the last science was "sociology."Psychology has no place in Comte's classification, since Comte believed that it should perhaps be considered part of human biology ("physiology").Such a classification was in harmony with Comte's training as a mathematician at the École Polytechnique and his studies of the exact natural sciences.Because of his background in mathematics and physics, Comte saw physics (geophysics) as the model and example for all sciences, since in physics observation and experiment are combined with mathematics to produce a true "Positive" body of knowledge.Thus, in his early writings, Comte conceived of the future science of society as a "social physics" - a term Keitel would later use in a quite different sense. Comte's three-stage law, like all creative thought.In a way, it was a reformation of the concepts or ideas of his predecessors, especially Condorcet, Cabanese and Saint-Simon (Conte once served as his secretary).The extent of this transformation may perhaps be seen by comparing the views of Saint-Simon and Comte, and this is therefore a measure of Comte's true originality.According to Saint-Simon, in the final stage of development, philosophy becomes "scientific" in the sense of rejecting everything that is unverifiable.According to Comte, however, the establishment of the last science—sociology—as a "positive" doctrine was not the final stage; the differences between the several sciences had not yet been overcome to produce a complete ( Overall) positivist system, even such an "idea of ​​the world and of man": it will be a synthesis that deserves to be called "philosophy".In this final stage, all knowledge will be "positive" and integrated, and will be combined in the science of man and society, the new science of sociology.Therefore, people will not only recognize and understand the problems and needs of people and society, but also clearly know the steps to be taken to transform and improve the current situation of people and society.This line of thinking inevitably makes positivism develop into a religion, even to the point where there are churches, a large number of priests or priests, and a "positivist" list of saints including Moses, Homer, Aristotle, and Archimedes. , Julius Caesar, St. Paul, Charlemagne, Dante, Gutenberg, Shakespeare, Descartes, Frederick the Great, Beza). The influence of Saint-Simon and Comte on each other is difficult to grasp because there was a serious conflict or disagreement between them.Both Comte and Saint-Simon claimed to have benefited greatly from Condorcet's teachings on the successive maturation of science, but Comte cautiously refused to acknowledge what he had learned from Saint-Simon and referred to him only in contemptuous language. .It has often been speculated that Saint-Simon's influence on Comte must have been more important than any possible influence of Comte on Saint-Simon.So far as I can judge, the only basis for this view or opinion (without any real evidence to support it) is that, at the time of their close intellectual association, Comte was younger than Saint-Simon, and that at this time Comte It's Saint-Simon's secretary.However, considering that Comte was one of the most outstanding and influential thinkers of his time, and that young people generally have more creative ideas than older people, the influence of Comte on Zhiximen Could it be that Buxie was more important than Saint-Simon's influence on Comte?In any case, the considerable agreement between many of their ideas (including the law of three stages, the successive development of science, and the concept of "positivism" or "positive" science) does not detract from the appreciation of Comte's creative brilliance.What matters is not that Comte somehow reinvented some of the ideas of his older friends and colleagues, but that he used them creatively. (A good review on this topic can be found in Manuel 1962, 251-260.) Finally, Comte was convinced that others (Jean-Baptiste Say and Charles Denoyer) in the development of his thought In the process, than the "foolish old philosopher" and the "degenerate liar" he said occupy a more important position.His "spiritual ancestors" (Manuel 1962, 257) were Hume, Kant, Condorcet, de Maistre, Gall and Bichat. In discussing the development of science, Comte often used the concept of revolution in science and the idea of ​​revolution in general in science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.For example, he invoked the idea of ​​the Scientific Revolution in an 1820 paper entitled A Brief Appraisal of Modern History (Fletcher 1974, 99).Comte said in the text: Until modern times they [the natural sciences] mixed superstition and metaphysics within themselves.Only at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century did they completely free themselves from theological dogmas and metaphysical assumptions.The age in which they began to be truly positive science must have begun with Bacon, then with Galileo, and continued with Descartes.Bacon first sparked the great revolution of which his contemporary Galileo provided the earliest example, and Descartes decisively freed reason from the shackles of authority over science.Then came natural philosophy, and the capacity of science acquired its true character, namely, the contribution of the spiritual element to a new social system. And from this epoch, the sciences have successively become positive sciences in a natural sequence of succession, that is to say, according to their actual closeness to man.Thus, first astronomy, then physics, then chemistry, and finally—in our own time—physiology, were developed as positive sciences.So far as all specialized knowledge is concerned, the revolution is complete, and in philosophy, ethics, and politics it has evidently reached its end. In a paper published in 1822 entitled "A Brief Discussion on the Necessary Role of Science in the Transformation of Society", Comte proposed that "scientists in our time should elevate political science to the status of observation (empirical) science" principle (Fletcher 1974, 135).His analysis is based on his three-stage law.While claiming that "the four fundamental sciences—astronomy, physics, chemistry, and physiology"—"and the sciences attached to them" have become positive sciences, he has to say that certain aspects of physiology still exists in all three states.For example, "what are especially called moral phenomena" are regarded by some as the result of a continuous supernatural operation; situation is linked".Comte developed this idea in more detail in his November 1825 "Philosophical Thoughts on Science and Scientists" (Fletcher 1974, 182ff.).When Comte evaluated the "progress of the human spirit in the past two centuries" in this article, he pointed out that "the moral phenomenon (moralphenomena) is the latest phenomenon among all the phenomena that have escaped from the field of theology and entered the field of physics. ".He actually believes that "physiologists [or biologists] study moral phenomena in our time in the same spirit as other phenomena of animal ecology". This or that theory contradicts and conflicts with each other, but, he does bluntly assert, "the very existence of this theoretical difference, which shows an indeterminacy inevitable in every young science, just clearly demonstrates that , in this branch of our knowledge, as in all other sciences, the great philosophical revolution has been accomplished". Comte, therefore, can be believed to see the development of science - their transformation into a positive state - as a revolutionary continuum.He believed that the establishment of modern science was a "great" revolution.However, I don't see where Comte has discussed the revolutionary process itself from which science has developed, but the goal.Nor can I conclude that Comte ever legitimately compared or contrasted scientific or philosophical revolutions with social or political ones.For Comte, however, there are very simple reasons why "the transition from one social system to another can never be continuous and direct" and why "there is always a Transitional Chaos" (1975, 24; for an English translation see Rendzel 1975, 201).In the first place, "the experience of evil in anarchy" can inspire or inspire new institutions to a greater degree than consideration of the shortcomings of old institutions.Second, "it is impossible to form any adequate conception of what must be done" until the ancien regime is destroyed, because Our lives are short, our reason is weak, and we cannot free ourselves from the influence of our surroundings.Even the wildest dreamers reflect in their dreams the current state of society; and it is even more impossible to conceive of a real political system radically different from the one in which we live.It is impossible for the highest spirits to discern the character of the time to come until it is near.And, before that, all the husks of the old regime will be smashed and thrown away, and the spirit of the people will be accustomed to the destruction of the old regime. Comte cites Aristotle as an example.Aristotle "could not have conceived a state of society not founded on slavery, which would necessarily abolish all that happened in the centuries that followed him." Concerning his own time, Kong "The innovation destined to take place was so extensive and so thorough," says De, that "never before has the decisive period of preparation been so protracted and so dangerous."He said, "For the first time in the course of world history, revolutionary action rests on a complete doctrine which systematically negates all orderly regimes." For researchers of the history of revolutions in science, Comte The three-stage analysis of revolutionary political change is very interesting because, as early as a century ago, J. S．Baye has introduced two of the three stages into the discourse and discussion of science.Comte's trinity consists of the destruction of the old, the resulting chaotic anarchy, and the establishment of the new.Baye envisions a two-stage process by which every revolution in science will first destroy an existing body of knowledge and then create and adopt a new one. Kurno Antoine-Augustin Courneau, a contemporary of Auguste Comte, was a mathematician and administrator.He is remembered today primarily for his contributions to probability theory, but also for his general or philosophical analysis of scientific knowledge and his work on the nature of scientific explanations.The difference between him and Comte is that his epistemology is characterized by probabilism, while Comte firmly opposes probability and statistics as the key and key of social science or science. Similar to Comte, Cournau also proposed a classification of science, which is linked to history and to the stages that the development of science has actually gone through.However, Courneau objected to Comte's formulaic description of the "so-called necessary sequence" of three stages in which "religious, philosophical and scientific doctrines appeared successively" (1973, 4:27).Moreover, what Comte saw was a one-dimensional or linear progression or development (series), while Cournau proposed a two-dimensional pattern (matrix), which he called a "double-entry bookkeeping" table (see Courneau, 1851, & 237, 289; Granger 1971, 452-453).The vertical categories proposed here are somewhat similar to those of Comte's historiography: mathematical sciences; physical and cosmological sciences (equivalent to Comte's astronomy, physics, chemistry, and geology and engineering); biological and Natural sciences (Comte's physiology); spiritual and semiotic sciences (which are absent from Comte's classification); political and historical sciences (including Comte's sociology). In his book "On the Foundations of Our Knowledge" (1851), Cournau did not explicitly say that this vertical arrangement represents a historical sequence, although this arrangement contains logical subordination and dependence, it requires a certain Some sciences precede others at time L.Cuerneau's treatise draws heavily on historical illustrations, but does not cite many examples in its discussion of the process of scientific change.Great changes, such as those that have occurred in computational mathematics, have only been classified as "great innovations", "creations" and "significant discoveries" (& 200, 201; 246-249).An event of apparently revolutionary significance, in Cuerno's view, was Galileo's negation of the futile quests of "the philosophers from Pythagoras to Kepler" throughout their lives.These philosophers tried to find "an explanation of a large number of cosmic phenomena" in "harmonious thought".They mystically linked "the idea of ​​harmony" to "certain properties of numbers which they themselves considered and had nothing to do with measuring continuous magnitudes" (p. 246): The real physics is when Galileo repudiates these long and futile speculations, and thinks not only of examining nature by experiment--an idea also advanced by Bacon--but by taking the measurement of all that can be measured in the phenomena of nature. It is established when the object is the immediate object of the experiment and thus precisely accounts for the general form given to the experiment. Thus, Cournot compares Galileo's bold innovations to Lavoisier's innovations in chemistry.He called it "a similar revolution".According to Cuerneau, "this revolution occurred in chemistry a century and a half later. At that time, Lavoisier dared to make comparisons, that is to say, dared to carry out measurement or quantitative analysis, while for Lavoisier's comparison and analysis chemists before him applied only what they called qualitative analysis".Thus, according to Cournau, both Galileo and Lavoisier were the initiators of a revolution in science.However, in regard to "continuity and discontinuity" in "On the Foundations of Our Knowledge", Kurnow is more interested in "number and magnitude" than in revolutions in science. One of Curnow's books has a particularly attractive title, On the Order of Fundamental Ideas in Science and History (1861).Although this work cites many historical examples, it is not so much a historical exploration as it is a logical or philosophical study of science and history.According to Kurno, the "order of basic ideas" mentioned here is a logical rather than chronological order.Although the work deals in places with political and social revolutions (especially those in England and France), it does not, when it talks about such famous men as Copernicus, Descartes, Galileo, Leibniz and Newton The scientific figures did not adopt the concept of revolution.However, in the opening paragraph of Chapter 5, Kurno mentions some revolutions in passing.In this passage, Kurnow contrasts physical mathematics with chemistry and physics.He said, "Chemistry and physics have made progress and undergone revolutions, whereas in geometry and mechanics there has been little progress or corresponding revolution" (1861, 120).But in what follows, Kurneau neither specifies what these revolutions were nor the extent to which they are characteristic of scientific progress. The most historically researched work of Kurneau is his "Inspection of the Development of Modern Thought and Events".The book was first published in 1872.One of its main themes is the role of revolution in the development of science and technology, social science, and human society.Three of the chapter titles indicate the importance of the concept of revolution: "The Revolution in Mathematics" in Chapter 1 of Volume III (on the seventeenth century), "The Revolution in Chemistry" in Chapter 1 of Volume 4 (discussing 18th century), Volume 5, Chapter 6, "The Economic Revolution" (about the 19th century).The last entire sixth volume of the book is devoted to the French Revolution and its consequences. After a general introduction and discussion of the Middle Ages (Volume 1), Volume 2 begins with an analytical account of the "progress of science" over the centuries.Preliminary illustrations and explanations of mathematics begin with the Copernican revolution (1872, 99): "In the history of science through the centuries, everything bears the name of Copernicus and the importance of the revolution he caused in astronomy The face dwarfs in comparison, pale and feeble."Indeed, "The revolution which Copernicus brought about in astronomy will always be the most perfect example of the great triumph of reason over the senses, over the imagination, over all prejudices, and a proof that it is possible to achieve such a victory, that all The best example to which critical discourse of the same genre can be compared" (p. 101). It is "absolutely proper" [biendanslordre] that "this type is furnished by the oldest and most perfect in time of all sciences". Volume 3 deals with the situation in the seventeenth century.It begins by mentioning "the revolution of future public opinion, of belief, of system, of language, and of taste" (p. 172).The author argues that the advances and revolutions of science in the seventeenth century endowed that era with a uniquely great character, regardless of religion.Neither politics nor philosophy, nor literature nor art, could have endowed that age with the same striking character". The century was marked by "a series of great scientific discoveries" and a "revolution in mathematics" (ibid.). His views on the century and the revolutions that took place in science in this century are summarized as follows (pp, 173-174): The history of the development of science in the seventeenth century demarcates exactly the epoch in which theoretical sciences developed for a long time for themselves, for the magic that some people found in them, or by mysteriously vague premonitions of their future function, Suddenly unraveled the mysteries of the most fundamental, simplest, greatest, and therefore most memorable of the cosmic order.General laws of motion, the action of gravitation, and finally, a theory of the shape and motion of celestial bodies, or ... "the system of the world" - these are determined and explained by a wonderful combination of abstract speculation and critical observation (as far as to the extent that humans grasp it to explain anything).Since then, in the field of theoretical science, as in observation and experimentation, new discoveries have followed one another; in geometry, as in astronomy and physics, new discoveries have turned into revolutions. .And, at least for geometry and astronomy, these revolutions were unprecedented in their respective fields.So too is the reputation of the great scientists aroused by these revolutions unrivaled, and, of late, no glory seems to detract from the most important truths and higher laws in the order of the divine plan which they have had the honor of discovering and revealing. Occupy the same position as the position.This status will remain in the memory of mankind. Curneau did not attribute the discoveries of Leibniz and Newton to a "revolution" as Fontenelle did, although he recognized the extreme importance of calculus (bk. 3, ch1, p. 177 ), and he cites Fontenelle's ideas on some innovations in seventeenth-century mathematics (p. 180).Nor does Cuerno classify the discoveries in the physical and natural sciences of the "gate century" as revolutions (bk.3, ch.2), although he does refer to the A "revolutionary crisis" (p. 192). However, he credits Galileo with setting science on a new path: Cuerno believes that Galileo showed how to recover from, for example, a falling stone or a chandelier Shaking such "the most common phenomena" leads to important scientific conclusions (pp.186-187). He pointed out the method of "forcing the Creator to disclose her secrets and make the simple and basic laws of mathematics show their true colors" and approaches. Galileo was "the founder of experimental and mathematical physics", and especially "the founder of physical mechanics". But it is clear that he did not cause a "revolution". And so did Newton (pp. 189 -190). The only discovery in the physical and natural sciences of the whole seventeenth century that Kurneau uses the term "revolution" to describe is Harvey's circulation of the blood.After Harvey's discovery, he said, "a revolution in medicine could be expected on some grounds, as modern chemistry later brought about in industry."However, this discovery soon "had a decisive influence on the changes in medical theory and practice".The actual significance of a scientific discovery, Kurnow asserts, thus has less to do with the intrinsic importance of what is actually discovered than with the fact that it is a part of it, and that it can have its bearing on something that involves The stages of scientific maturity are associated with new ideas that are the germs of scientific reform or revolution (pp. 194-195). Describing mathematics and science in the eighteenth century, Curneau noted that Lavoisier's work was "a revolution in chemistry" (p. 271).Lavoisier's work caused "chemistry to really change its face"; the science "has undergone a revolution" (p. 278).Then he asked: "Why is it that chemistry--which has advanced so much since Lavoisier, and in which theories have changed so often--hasn't there been more revolutions?" During the nineteenth century (that is, until 1870), Cournau did not discover any scientific advance worthy of the term "revolution."One must be careful in giving too much weight to this simple statement of fact.Querneau probably did not give a serious evaluation of every discovery or innovation he ever discussed to see if it constituted a revolution.In fact, however, his writings make a great deal of the English Revolution (p. 90, 94, 242-251, 543, 549), the French Revolution (p. 461-550), the parallels between the English Revolution and the French Revolution (pp. .540-550), the political revolutions (pp.91, 93, 111), the economic revolutions of the nineteenth century (pp.418-427), and many revolutions in mathematics and science, the general characteristics of these revolutions have made considerable discuss.因此，在这种情况下，就库尔诺在描述科学事件的"革命"特点而言，任何失败或不足，必定是值得注意的。