Chapter 17 Chapter 15 Kant's So-Called Copernican Revolution
When writing in the late eighteenth century, Kant would have been familiar with the idea, articulated by Montacre, Bailly, and others, that Copernicus had sparked a revolution in astronomy.And, by that time, the term "revolution" was quite commonly used to refer to radical changes in science, aesthetics, and thought in general.At that time, the "revolution" was still very remote.Thus, given Kant's prominence in the history of philosophy, his views on revolution, revolution in science, are particularly important for our study of these concepts in the eighteenth century.but.These observations are even more interesting since it is widely believed that Kant attributed his own innovation in philosophy to a Copernican revolution.
The Myth of Kant's Copernican Revolution
In his authoritative book, The Mechanization of the World Picture (1961, 299), Diexter Hughes asserts, "Since Kant, the notion of a Copernican revolution has been an affirmation of a radical change in opinion or perception. expression, and in the history of science the year 1543 is seen as the actual date of the division between the Middle Ages and the modern era".Numerous works on Kant's thought and history of philosophy agree that Kant compared his own achievements in philosophy with a Copernican revolution.A few years ago the Open University (British television's bold attempt at educating the masses. It gave the equivalent of a bachelor's degree to those who couldn't go to a college or university through the normal route) showed "Second Level" The course "The Age of Revolution" was launched.Two of the main units are called "Kant's Copernican Revolution"; one is subtitled "Speculative Philosophy" and the other is "Moral Philosophy".In the first unit, the author (Vesey, 1972, 10) refers to "Kant's Copernican revolution in speculative philosophy", but he never explicitly identifies this concept as Kant's own creation.In the second unit (Humphlin 1972, 23-25), the author states unequivocally that "Kant himself did not explicitly compare his efforts in moral philosophy with the Copernican Revolution, just as he did not Compare your own achievements in speculative philosophy with this. But I think we can still justly say (and it is often said) that the comparison applies as much to the former as it does to the latter."
A reader who is neither familiar with the literature on Kant nor with the history of philosophy is unlikely to realize how near-universal a belief in Kant's "Copernican revolution" was (especially among British and American writers).Here are a few examples we picked at random:
Kant ... in the preface to "" ... speaks of the "Copernican revolution" planned in our ways of thinking. (Bird 1973, 190-191)
Kant compared his own philosophical revolution to the revolution Copernicus started. (Peyton 1936, 1:75)
We can now understand what Kant meant when he claimed to have sparked a revolution in philosophy like Copernicus had in astronomy. (Broad 1978, 12)
Kant compared this new way of conceiving the possibility of a priori knowledge with the revolution Copernicus caused in astronomy. (Lindsay 1934, 50)
He insists that his Copernican revolution does not impair the empirical reality of the empirical world, any more than heliocentric theory alters or denies the phenomena of the empirical world. (Coppleston 1960, 6:242)
In the preface to [his] second edition he compared himself to Copernicus and said he had caused a Copernican revolution in philosophy. (Russell 1945, 707)
Kant said he himself had caused a "Copernican revolution". (Russell 1948, 9)
The whole point of Kant's comparison is that we find in both hypotheses a revolution or radical revision of a basic assumption that no one disputed long ago.In one case, immobility of the observer is assumed, in the other, passivity of the observer. (Welton 1945, 77)
It is especially surprising that Kant himself marked what he himself believed to be a Copernican revolution.But there is nothing Copernican in it except that he thinks it is a revolution...for his revolution, in so far as it is a revolution, is strictly an anti-Copernican revolution. (Alexander 1909, 49)
… Kant himself proudly called one of his ideas the "Copernican Revolution". (Popper 1962, 180)
Kant believed that his critique of reason caused a de facto "Copernican revolution" in philosophy. (Aiken 1957, 31)
Kant is known to state the problem succinctly by specifically mentioning the "Copernican revolution" in the preface to
What Kant would call his Copernican revolution in the preface to the second edition of (1787)... (Chevalier 1961, 3:589)
I regard Kant's teachings as a great, personal philosophical achievement of the Copernican revolution.On this point, Kant himself mentioned several times. (Oyzelmann 1972, 121)
On the underlying ideas of what Kant called the "Copernican Revolution". (Deleuze 1971, 22-23)
Kant rejoiced that he had accomplished a real revolution in philosophy . . . a revolution comparable to that of Copernicus in cosmology and the mathematical order. (DeVoe, 1955, 434)
Kant's revolutionary action in the history of thought, his "Copernican revolution". (Willeming 1955, 358)
The series of citations we have made confirms a fairly common belief among philosophers: (a) there was a Copernican revolution, and (b) Kant considered himself fundamental in philosophy. Innovation is another Copernican revolution after that one, or like a Copernican revolution.Take half an hour to casually rummage through the library shelves and you will find at least a few dozen such claims; spoken by eminent scholars and published in volumes published by our premier academic and university presses among.Furthermore, the authoritative statement of the Encyclopedia (which is part of the newer, so-called 15th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, described as "Explanation"; 1973, 10:392) is:
Kant proudly proclaimed that he had accomplished a Copernican revolution in philosophy.Just as Copernicus, the founder of modern astronomy, explained the apparent motion of the stars by attributing them in part to the motion of the observer, so Kant explained the apparent motion of the stars by revealing that the object corresponds to the mind—in cognition, It is not the mind that conforms to the thing, but the thing conforms to the mind—and demonstrates how the innate principles of the mind apply to objects.
Many works on Kant or philosophy contain references to the "Copernican revolution" (Frachos 1962, 98ff; Dewey, 1929, 287), "Kant's Copernican revolution" (Popper 1962, 180) chapters.During his Gifford Lectures in 1929, Dewey boldly asserted when speaking of "the search for certainty": "Kant's claim to see the world and our knowledge of it from the point of view of a knowledgeable subject gave rise to A Copernican-style evolution [sic, should be a revolution]".Dewey ends up appraising, rather immodestly, his own contribution to philosophy as another Copernican revolution as important as the one caused by Kant.A 1954 paper by Karl Popper (which was later republished in his Conjectures and Refutations (1962, 175ff.)) devoted a section to Kant's "Copernican revolution." ".Popper quoted Kant's words here: "Our intellect does not acquire its laws from nature, but imposes its laws on nature."In this regard, Popper commented: "This formula summarizes an idea that Kant himself proudly called his Copernican revolution" (p. 180).A book devoted to Kant's Legacy and the Copernican Revolution (Willeming, 1954) has also been published.In the published proceedings of the Third International Kantian Congress held in 1970, there are at least three papers on "Kant's Copernican revolution" (Beck, 1972, 121, 147, 239), and one The title of the treatise is "The Copernican Revolution of Hume and Kant" (234ff.).
After all we have said, it must seem surprising to the reader, as to myself, if Kant did not compare his own contribution to a Copernican revolution. of.And I'm sure the reader will fully appreciate why, in the final preparation of this chapter, I found it necessary more than once to return to Kant's (in its original German text and in the three English translations now in circulation L.J.M. D. Micklejohn, 1855; Max Düller, 1881; Noel Kemp Smith, 1929, and many reprints) to keep me convinced that so many well-known authorities in at least three languages may allow such an obvious error to continue.Is it possible that none of the audience of Gifford's lectures in 1929 knew Kant's original text and so might have called Dewey's attention to his error?Didn't a single Kantian scholar at the Third International Kantian Congress ever read Kant in German or English and remember what he actually said?A paper presented at the 1974 Copernican Symposium entitled "Science and Society: Past, Present, and Future" (Sterneck, 1975) contributed to the Copernican revolution of Dewey and Kant. compared (C. Cohen, 1975).This paper was discussed in a scholarly review (Cropsay, 1975).The review raises the question that "Professor [Carl] Cohen ... presents Dewey's philosophy as the product of a genuine Copernican revolution" (105), but the reviewer fails to correct the criticism of Kant's Copernican revolution; and, apparently, none of the readers did.
Authors who deal with Kant's Copernican revolution and actually provide grounds for Kant's alleged analogy refer the reader to the preface to the second edition (1787; first edition 1781).As we shall see in a moment, this new preface is very interesting because it discusses revolutions in the sciences (mathematics and experimental physics) as well as revolutions in the development of knowledge.About Copernicus Kant actually said this (quoted from Kant's 1926 edition, p. 20, i.e. Bxvi):
So we proceed exactly as Copernicus proceeded according to his basic assumptions.The assumption that "all celestial bodies revolve around the observer" cannot explain the motion of celestial bodies. Copernicus even assumed that the observer rotates and the planets are stationary, in order to test whether it is easier to succeed (translated by Lan Gongwu, Sanlian Bookstore, 1957 Annual Edition, pp. 12-13).
Here one does not have to be a German scholar, or even be intimately acquainted with the German language, to see that, in the passage we have quoted, Kant is speaking in terms of Copernicus's "basic intention" or " basic idea" rather than "in terms of a revolution".In the translation that is recognized as reliable and authoritative today, Norman Kemp Smith changed what Kant called "Copernicus's original assumptions" to "Copernicus' basic assumptions".This may provide a reasonable explanation of Kant's intentions, but it is in fact a complete departure from Kant's own simple and clear formulation.Therefore, Kemp Smith also added a footnote to the original German phrase.His translation is:
Therefore, we should proceed precisely in line with Copernicus' basic assumption [mit den ersten Gedanken des Kopernikus].Since the motion of celestial bodies could not be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that "all celestial bodies revolve around the observer", he made an attempt to see whether it would be more successful if the observer were to rotate and the planets were stationary.
However, in Kemp Smith's commentary (1923), the reader is not given any hint that Kant writes "mit den ersten Gedanken des Kopernikus" instead of "mit der ersten HyPothese des Kopernilkus".
This passage from Kant clearly states his intentions.In pre-Copernican astronomy, it was assumed that all the complexities of planetary surface motion were real.In post-Copernican astronomy, however, it was seen that part of the complexity referred to here arises from the position of the observer on a moving earth.Earlier metaphysics also made a similar assumption: all external representations (phenomena) of things have a reality beyond the cognitive mind, just as the complexity of planetary motions also appeared to astronomers before Copernicus. Same with reality.However, Kant's new view assumes that the objects of our knowledge are not "things in themselves" (thingr in them-selves), but the result of the interaction between our mind and the objects of our perception.Therefore, Kant made an important distinction between "things as they are in themselves" and "things as they appear to us" (Kemp Smith, 1968, 38).
Kant's approach may be similar to the traditional view of the Copernican revolution, since in astronomy and mathematics we can see "a revolution long undisputed, or a radical revision of a fundamental assumption" (Welton 1945, 77).That is, "in the one case one assumes the immobility of the observer, in the other the passivity of the observer".Many philosophers have pointed out that Kant's so-called revolution was not really a Copernican revolution.As Bertrand Russell (1948, 9) puts it, "Kant said he had accomplished a Copernican revolution, but it would have been more accurate if he had said that he had accomplished a Ptolemaic counter-revolution, because He puts man back at the center of the authority that Copernicus has since overthrown man".
Whatever Kant's actual intentions, he clearly and certainly did not say that he had accomplished (or would accomplish) a Copernican revolution in metaphysics.The whole passage we quoted above (Bxvi) contains no such reference, and it mentions neither a Copernican revolution nor any revolution in metaphysics (whether actually current or imminent).But while there is no mention of a Copernican revolution anywhere in any of the editions, there are signs of a revolution in metaphysics.It is especially noteworthy that Kant does not mention a Copernican revolution, because in the preface to the second edition he fully develops the concept of revolution in science as well as the concept of revolution in knowledge.Before stating Kant's conception of revolution, however, it is worth mentioning two other references to Copernicus by Kant—both of which appear in a note to the preface of the second edition.In this note, Kant (1929, 25=Bxxii) explains how the "fundamental laws of the motion of celestial bodies"—presumably Kepler's laws—"give a new dimension to what Copernicus initially assumed to be only a hypothesis." The certainty of the proof, and at the same time produces the proof of the invisible force (Newton's gravitation) that connects the universe." Kant also said, if "Copernicus did not dare to search for the observed motion in the observer and not in the celestial bodies ", then Newton's universal gravitation "will never be discovered".I do not find in these sentences that Kant expressed his belief that a Copernican revolution had occurred; they might even suggest that it did not occur until the time of Kepler and Newton. revolution.These sentences do show the role of what Kant himself considered "a shift in perspective similar to [Copernicus's" hypothesis. Kant "is in this preface only as a hypothesized in order to call attention to the peculiarities of these first attempts to effect such a transformation (which were always hypothetical).But—and Kant asserts again—this assumption will be "in the Critique itself, from the nature of our representations of space and time, and from our basic conceptions of the understanding, to be proved to be necessary, not hypothetical."
In Kant's discourse, the name of Copernicus appears only when Kant refers to "first thought" and in the passage we have just discussed.Copernicus is also mentioned in Kant's other writings, but these have nothing to do with the idea of revolution.In short, a self-proclaimed Kant's "Copernican revolution" does not seem to have much reality, as does the so-called Copernican revolution in astronomy at the end of the century.Although at least three scholarly articles in reputable journals have attempted to tell the broad spectrum of philosophers that Kant did not compare his contribution to a Copernican revolution (Cross, 1937; Hansen, 1959; Engel, 1963 ), but eminent philosophers still give "Kant's Copernican revolution" a prominent place in their books and articles.
Kant's Views on Revolutions in Science
The discussion of revolutions in science in the preface to the second edition is noteworthy. Many scholars in the 18th century believed that revolutions, the sudden, dramatic leaps that produced something entirely new in science or something that hadn't existed until then, moved science forward.Kant is such a scholar.The first revolution he speaks of is an exciting change in our knowledge.The new meaning of the word "revolution" contained in this revolution gradually came into common use.Insofar as he uses the term "revolution," Kant is, strictly speaking, a new thinker (modern) rather than a champion of tradition; Returning to some more ideal state of the past is a fundamental, forward step in a complete and definitive break with the past.
According to Kant, the first revolution took place in mathematics and consisted in the transformation of an empirical knowledge of land surveying into a deductive system. The "true method" was discovered as "a new light" "appeared" in the mind of the first man to demonstrate the properties of equilateral triangles (whether it be Thales or anyone else).On this matter Kant says (1929, p. 19 = Bxi-xii):
The real method he created was not in examining what he saw in the figure or in the naked concept of the figure, and thereby understanding the nature of the figure, but in discovering what was necessarily contained in "his own a priori constitution". The things in the "concept" are presented by him in his own way of constituting this a priori thing, so as to express it in graphics.If he knows anything with a priori certainty, he adds nothing but what he himself necessarily puts into the figure from his conceptions.
Kant here contrasts the "swinging avenue of science" with the "blind rope".This contrast or difference is not always easy to understand and grasp.But fundamentally Kant seems to be saying that in logic reason is concerned only with itself, but in scientific geometry it is applied to something other than itself—such as geometric figures—especially is an equilateral triangle.Revolution in thought (Revolution der Denkart) consists in realizing that "neither empirical observation nor analysis of concepts helps us to prove any mathematical truth" (Peyton, 1937, 366).It is not enough to see by eye, or rely on inspection, to determine the properties of an equilateral triangle, nor is it enough to examine the conception of such a triangle.Instead, "We must employ... what Kant called the construction of concepts; that is, we must exhibit a priori the intuitions that correspond to our concepts." Thus, "Kant thought that the earliest discoveries of mathematicians seemed to be"( same as above):
The figure must be constructed from what he himself contemplates and exhibits a priori in accordance with the concept; anything.
According to Kant (1929, 19=Bxi), this fundamental change in geometry "must be due to a revolution caused by the brilliant thought of a certain individual".Thus this man pointed out "the way in which this science must enter, by which sure progress in all ages and its infinite extension is possible."
Kant insists that "this revolution of thought "Revolution der Denkart" is far more important than the discovery of the route around the famous Cape of Good Hope". Then he mentions "the memorial of this revolution". So, on a page There are three different references to revolution in the official text (twice as "Revolution" and once as "Veranderung") (p. 19 = Bxi).
In the shorter passage immediately following (192, 19-20=Bxii), Kant turns from mathematics to "natural science—here said natural science, which is founded on empirical principles."Natural science took much longer than mathematics to enter the "road of science".Bacon, says Kant, "partially began" this transition "only a century and a half ago" and "to some extent in those who had already embarked" on creating an empirically based science—which, so to speak, "is a The unexpected result of an intellectual revolution—a new vigor and vigor aroused among those who followed the path.
In the next paragraph, Kant unabashedly "retraces the correct path in the history of the experimental method".Here, he only mentions the experiments of Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl as examples.He asserts that physics has undergone a "revolution of benevolence in its point of view" a favorable revolution in its thought. For Kant, "the revolution of benevolence in physics is based on the fortunate idea that when reason must In seeking, rather than inventing, facts in nature, that which reason cannot know from its own origins but can only learn from nature, reason must in this inquiry place as its guide that which places itself in nature." It is in this respect that "the study of nature entered the solid path of science after centuries of blind questing" (pp. 20-21=Bxiv).
The origin of this myth
After discussing mathematics and experimental or empirically based physics, Kant turned to metaphysics, "a speculative rational science in complete isolation" (p. 21 = Bxiv).He compared the discipline to mathematics and the natural sciences.Mathematics and the natural sciences, he points out, "came to prosper as they do today by a sudden revolution" (pp. 21-23=Bxv-xvi). On the third page of this discussion comes "mit den ersten Gedankendes Kopernikus".We have seen that this expression can be translated literally as "with the first thoughts of Copernicus".Here, Kant's point of view is obviously that Copernicus has completed the transformation from the viewpoint of a stationary observer to that of a rotating observer.He showed that when one decouples the observer's motion from the observed or apparent motion of the sun, planets, stars, then variation occurs.Thus Kant's understanding of Copernicus' "first thought" seems to be in the sense of logical precedence rather than historical continuity.And if Kant wanted to say that Copernicus started or initiated a revolution—in astronomy, science, or thought—why didn't he say so?For, just a few pages before, he was discussing revolutions in science, and at the beginning of this page he is speaking of revolutions in sciences, and it is clear that the concept of such a revolution occupies a prominent place in his thinking.Whether or not Kant thought there was a Copernican revolution, he certainly did not say so in the preface to the second edition.This fact seems to be all the more important when discussing the scientific and intellectual revolutions in which Kant's comments on Copernicus are placed.Of course, the mention of revolution at the beginning of the passage mentioning Copernicus is unlikely to lead commentators to think that Kant was referring to a Copernican revolution.
Kant said he thought his book gave metaphysics the certainty of the scientific method.He insisted that philosophers should try to simulate the procedure of mathematics and natural science, at least "to the extent that analogy with the same rational knowledge as metaphysical simulation might allow" (1929, 22=Bxvi).Afterwards, Kant said that "the legacy he left to future generations is a systematic metaphysics"."It is a gift whose value cannot be underestimated," he says, because "reason will thus be able to follow the solid path of science, instead of wandering blindly without scrutiny and self-criticism" (p. 30= Bxxx).
Can such a change in metaphysics be said to be a revolution?Kant answered in the affirmative.The purpose of his treatise, he said, was "to change the method of metaphysics which prevails at present, and to follow the practice of the geometers and natural philosophers, thereby launching a general revolution [eine ganzliche Revolution] in metaphysics (Bxxii). Kant thus joins the ranks of scientists of the eighteenth century—Simmel, Lavoisier, Marat—who all said their job was to cause and make a revolution. But Kant neither said that the revolution was the result of Copernicus Nor did he cite Copernicus or astronomy. For Kant never mentions a Copernican revolution in any known letter, published book, or manuscript. Therefore, he cannot say However, his major contribution to philosophy was (or would be) a Copernican revolution.
So how could the literature we have seen be so wrong?One possible explanation is that a paragraph begins with a discussion of revolutions in metaphysics, and the paragraph before that has a longer footnote that talks about Copernicus and Newton.The error of the commentators may have been due to combining the sentence on the revolution in metaphysics with the preceding footnote.But since Kant used "the example of the geometers and natural philosophers" rather than the example of the astronomers, any possible (though unlikely) connection seems to us to be with a Newtonian revolutions rather than Copernican revolutions.Regardless of the source of the original error, the authors are clearly passing it on to each other without carefully examining its sources.Despite the three caveats that Kant never described a Copernican revolution, and not many say that Kant sparked a Copernican revolution in metaphysics, this error is rife in the philosophical literature It still exists year after year.
Just as I was finishing the final revisions to this chapter, I came across four more books that continued this chronic error.One is by Roger Scruton and is published by Oxford University Press as part of the "Famous People of the Past" series.In the book the author emphasizes "what Kant called his Copernican revolution in philosophy" (1982, 28).The other is a great masterpiece by the late Ernst Cassirer (first published in 1918).This work has been translated into English.A new "Introduction to the English edition" (1981, vii) begins by discussing "Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy".We also read in it: "The Copernican Revolution was founded on a completely new philosophical outlook and method, which Kant described as critical and transcendental" ( p.viii).
In a superb study of Goethe, Kant, and Hegel, Walter Kaufmann wrote (1980, 87-88): "Kant claimed to have accomplished a Copernican revolution".But, Kaufman argues, in Kant "completed an anti-Copernican revolution. He reversed and overturned Copernicus' deafening attack on man's self-esteem" because he "returned man to the center of the world position". A very insightful entry on the Copernican Revolution in the Dictionary of the History of Science (1981) emphasizes that the expression can have two meanings: one is that Copernicus "introduced a heliocentric system into astronomy ", and the second is "Such a system was firmly established in the seventeenth century in a modified form with the elliptical orbit proposed by Kepler".The entry concludes with a comment: "The notion of a Copernican revolution is generally used, like Kant's, to describe any fundamental transformation of ideas that would promote the advancement of thought."But there is no reference to the so-called Copernican revolution in the later entry on Kant in the same dictionary.
Attributing to Kant a self-proclaimed Copernican revolution in philosophy or metaphysics is not a recent invention.Between 1799 and 1825 at least four writers on Kant's philosophy - in publications or lectures - publicly stated that Kant himself expected or had embarked on a Copernican revolution in philosophy.A Frenchman who lived for many years in Germany, Charles de Villars, dedicated to his countrymen a large number of publications explaining Kant's thought.In an essay on Witnesses of the North in 1799, Villars stated that Kant's meditations on human knowledge and reasoning "made him think that a revolution was needed in metaphysics as Copernicus accomplished in astronomy" (p.7).Villars then explains the nature of Kant's revolution in terms and phrases similar to those used by Kant himself in the preface to the second edition when describing "Copernicus's first thought" (B.xvi).In another book, Kant's Philosophy (1801, pp. Viii-x), Villar suggested that Descartes, Lavoisier, and Copernicus and Kant had caused a revolution in thought.
Sixteen years later, Victor Cousin revived the topic of Kant's Copernican revolution.Coushing was one of the most widely read popularizers of philosophy of his time, and his books have been reprinted in many editions. In 1817 he linked Kant to the Copernican Revolution during a lecture he gave at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris.These lectures of his were not published until 1841.The editor's Note to this effect says that these lectures were the first introductions to Kant's system in French universities (1841, iv-v).In the second edition (1846, 1:105-113), it is clear that Cousin also lectured on Kant's ideas in 1816, but at that time, his German level was particularly poor, so he had to rely on Kant. Latin texts of works and secondary works in French.In 1817, when he was able to read Kant in the original German (1:255, n. 2), Cushing explained, "Kant caused in metaphysics the same revolution that Copernicus caused in astronomy." revolution".In his 1820 lectures (1842, 1846, 1857 editions; 1854 English edition), Coushing said, "Kant was aware of the revolution he was making; he was fully aware of his time and understood its needs" .He then restated the preface to Kant's second edition in almost the same language as in his 1817 lecture.
In 1818 an important essay on Kant by Philippe Albert Stöpfer was included in volume 22 of the reference work Ensemble.A footnote to the article explains that Charles de Villars was originally writing the essay, but that he later assigned Stepfer to do it, and because of his imminent death he was incapable of giving the essay the intended meaning. form.Staupfer discusses Kant's second edition (but on p. 239 he also calls it the third edition), and explicitly ascribes to Kant the idea of completing a Copernican revolution in philosophy.Kant, he says, "felt it his duty to bring about in the speculative sciences a revolution which his eminent compatriot, the Prussian Copernicus, had accomplished in the natural sciences—an analogy to Kant's own thought" (p. 239).in pp. 239-240, Stöpfer develops this idea quite exhaustively, and finally he explicitly refers to Copernicus: "We will no longer revolve around things: by making ourselves their center, we will Make them revolve around us. This is the Copernican revolution".This statement, similar to Coushing's description, would give Kant the status of a Ptolemy rather than a Copernican.However, neither Cousin nor Stöpfer seemed to realize, as later generations did, that this revolution could be called a Ptolemaic counter-revolution.
In 1825, in an entry on philosophy in the Landinancis Encyclopedia (Volume 20), Thomas Vogelmann cites a passage from the Encyclopaedia linking Kant to a Copernican revolution Associated text and translated into English.Although the text was written by Stöpfer, Vogelmann attributes the entry to Villars.According to Vogelmann's translation (p. 151), Kant "believed he was destined to accomplish in the speculative sciences a revolution similar to that which his eminent compatriot, the Prussian Copernicus, had accomplished in natural philosophy; the analogy The idea was first conceived by Kant himself".Vogman continued to play along with Stumpfel.Staepfer concludes (ibid.): "We shall no longer revolve around things, but, making ourselves the center of them, make them revolve around us. This is the Copernican revolution" .
Vogelman links Kant to the Revolution and to Copernicus in his entry on philosophy in the Landinancis Encyclopaedia, among other entries.In his entries on philosophy (1825, 129), Vogelmann makes ample comparisons of Kant and Copernicus, while noting: "I cannot resist drawing hopeful analogies between these two great men. Kant created a种与哥白尼的理论同样富有想像力的理论；而且，如果它像哥白尼的理论那样经受住时代的检验，那么它将引发和完成的革命同样也将是光荣的"。
维拉尔（1799）、库辛（1817；1820）、斯特普费尔（1818）和沃格曼（1825）并不是在这个比较早的时期把康德与哲学中的一个哥白尼革命联系起来的唯一的几位作者。另外一个人是斯塔尔夫人。在1813年伦敦版的《论德国》（这也许可以看作是第一个版本，因为1810年的巴黎版在法国被禁止发行，那时，该书的印刷尚未完成），她断言（3：13-14）。
这段话是斯塔尔夫人在谈到培根时说的，但是，在《论德国》的同一部分对德国哲学的进一步论述表明，斯塔尔夫人所思考的是整个德国唯心主义哲学（一般）和特殊的康德哲学。
斯塔尔夫人并没有说康德本人期望一场哥白尼式的革命，但是维拉尔说康德认为这样一场革命在形而上学中是需要的。库辛认为，康德着手在形而上学中引发一场哥白尼式的革命，而且斯特普费尔说康德认为自己有责任在思辨科学中造成这样一场革命。值得人们注意的是，斯特普费尔的讨论概括说："C'est larevolution de Copernic"，沃格曼译为："这就是哥白尼式的革命"。人们也许注意到，除去维拉尔之外，所有这些作者都把康德对"哥白尼的最初思想"的类比发展成为一个隐喻，这个隐喻远远超出了康德在直接谈及哥白尼的文字中实际上所包含的鲜明性和含义。
卡尔·莱昂哈德·莱因霍尔德的例子是大为有趣的，因为他是18世纪80年代康德哲学的一个著名的宣传者和解释者，而且，他还谈到康德著作中对革命和哥白尼的论述。莱因霍尔德似乎并没有专门就一场哥白尼革命明确写过著作或文章，但是，其中至少有一段可能使其他人把康德与一场哥白尼革命联系了起来。莱因霍尔德对康德的探讨是比较早地介绍和描述这部著作的辅助材料之一。这个探讨见于1794年他的《纠正过去哲学家的误解》一书第2卷中。在第7部分"论的基本原理"，莱因霍尔德论述了康德第2版序言。他说，康德在该序言中以一种非常有趣的方式指明了形而上学迫切需要通过"批判"来进行的"思想转变"（p．411）。接着，他又相当详尽地摘引并评释了康德关于革命的言论（pp.411－415）。在第415页上，他把在康德的第二版序言中相隔几页的两种陈述并列在一起（见Bxvi和xxii页）：
"这种情形正与哥白尼最初的思想的情况相同。哥白尼假设一切天体都围绕观察者旋转，因此不能很好地说明天体的运动。于是，他假定观察者旋转，恒星静止不动，以尝试其是否更易于成功"。——"依据几何学家和物理学家所确立的例证，使形而上学革命化，以改变迄今为止一直流行的形而上学的程序，这种尝试即纯粹思辨理性批判的主要目的"。
在此，这些段落是未加修饰逐字逐句直译过来的，所以，人们也许会明白，它们的并列怎么可能影响到后来的读者并使他们称康德在形而上学中的革命为一场哥白尼式的革命。莱因霍尔德本人并没有明确说过一场哥白尼式的革命，尽管他认为康德"创始并引入了现在完全不可避免的革命"（pp．415-416）。
然而，早在1784年，莱因霍尔德（p．6）就认为启蒙运动是一场革命。而且，在他著名的《康德哲学信札》的第一篇信札——这篇信札写于1786年8月，因而早于第二版序言——中，莱因霍尔德就已经把康德与革命（pp．124-125）和哥白尼（p．126）联系在一起了，但是，他并没有把两者合在一起从而使康德成为一场哥白尼式的革命的发起者。
在19世纪中叶，威廉·休厄尔非常谨慎地对康德本人的论述作了忠实的概括。在他的《归纳科学的哲学》（全称为《以归纳科学史为依据的归纳科学的哲学》）（1840）中，他写道："康德的见解所引起的沉思人类知识的习惯方式中的革命是最全面的。他本人完全不公正地把它与哥白尼的太阳系理论所引起的变革相比较"。休厄尔让读者参看"康德的序言，第xv页"，他明确把康德关于形而上学中一场革命的论述与哥白尼所引入的新的观点区别开来。