Chapter 11 Chapter 9 Bacon and Descartes

The scientific revolution was a time of great concern for method.Part of the literature on the subject reflects the state of self-awareness in this new era, in which correct rules and procedures were considered more important than insight and wit for the development of knowledge. Treatise after treatise published in the seventeenth century either began with a discussion of method or ended with a methodological proposition.For example, one of the most famous works on the subject of method, Descartes' Discourse on Method (1637), was written and published to introduce three scientific works: Geometry, Meteorology and Refractive Optics. ".One of the most widely read and often cited works of Newton's writings is the "General Notes" on Method, a summary written for the second edition of the Principia (1713), in In it, he discusses the nature of explanation and the role of hypotheses in natural philosophy.

The problem of method has been at the center of scientific revolutions because the main innovation of a new science or a new philosophy is the combination of mathematics and experiment.The old knowledge was established by various schools, legislatures, scholars and established by legislation with the authority of sages, divine revelation, and the Bible. Science in the 17th century was considered to be based on experience and correct perception.Anyone skilled in the art of experimentation can test scientific truth—and this is one factor that distinguishes new science from traditional knowledge, whether old science, philosophy, or theology.Moreover, the methods are easy to master, allowing anyone to make discoveries or discover new truths.Because of this, the new science became one of the greatest democratizing forces in the history of civilization.The discovery of truth is no longer the preserve of an elite few—men or women of great decency or extraordinary talent.When introducing his method, Descartes said: "I have never been conceited that my mind is any more perfect than that of ordinary people" (Descartes 1965, 4). No aspect of seventeenth-century science was as revolutionary as its methods and their results.

The scientific revolution produced two outstanding masters of method: Francis Bacon and René Descartes.Opinions are somewhat divided about Bacon's place in the history of science, because he was not a scientist and he even ignored the great discoveries of his time such as Copernicus, Giber and Galileo.In contrast, Descartes was a respected figure in both physics and mathematics, and is generally regarded as one of the leading philosophers of the modern era.In this chapter we will explore the question of whether there was a Baconian revolution or a Cartesian revolution in science in the seventeenth century, or whether Bacon and Descartes were like Copernicus, Giber and Kepler , has made a considerable contribution to clarifying, emphasizing, or (only to some extent) making certain basic features of scientific revolutions.

Francis Bacon: Herald of a New Science Bacon's contribution to the scientific revolution is generally considered to have been fourfold: as a philosopher of science, he promoted a method of studying nature; he centrally classified science (and, broadly, human knowledge) ; he had an insight that the practical application of new sciences would improve the quality of life and man's control over nature, and he conceived and organized the scientific community (emphasizing the importance of scientific academies and scientific societies).Bacon was the mouthpiece of induction, and induction—combined with a great deal of experiment and observation—formed the basis of many sciences, and Bacon thus became the mouthpiece of the new science.

Bacon attacked that pure inductive logic is not creative, because it can never increase knowledge.He also attacks the old-fashioned simple enumeration-induction method, which is applicable only if the classes of the things involved are both finite and reachable (see Quinton 1980, 56-57), such as this Proposition: The founders of the Royal Society were all men over the age of 30.Bacon asserts that his new induction surpasses this Aristotelian complete or complete induction ("the method of induction by simple enumeration"—NOV.Org., bk.l, aph. 105), because it would lead to generalizations about everything, not just about a certain property that all members of some finite enumeration have.Bacon noted that one cannot prove that induction is true in a general sense. The word "all" must always imply the possibility that exceptions to inductive generalizations may be found, since an inductive generalization is - indeed it must be - based on a limited number of examples.Bacon earned his credit for the correct assessment that a single counterexample is enough to disprove an induction, and that every positive proof can do nothing more than increase our belief.Therefore, in his (bk.l, aph.46 = 1905, 266), he pointed out that counterexamples are more powerful ("major est vis instaniae negativae").Bacon recognized those principles so early that the century's G. H．Von Wright and Karl Popper formulated laws—nature or theories—that are not verifiable, but falsifiable; Bacon does a great job of this.

Bacon believed that the method of induction based on experiments proposed by him would provide science with a new tool (novum organum) to replace the old-fashioned tool of Aristotle's inductive logic.Bacon did not attach importance to hypotheses. He imagined that the development of science was accomplished by bringing together the actual data accumulated from experiments and observations into a large number of diagrams.Of course, Bacon was right to recognize that the accumulation of information alone is not sufficient to produce useful principles of inductive science; he advocated screening, but then the question arises: how to establish screening principles?Scientists such as Boyle, Hooke, and Newton expressed their belief in Bacon's philosophy to varying degrees.In his "Principles" (2nded. 1713; 3rded. 1726), Newton even discussed the extension of induction, that is, from the properties or properties of objects that can actually be tested to "properties inherent in all objects." "(rule3, bk.3).Bacon, he asserted, had somehow sufficiently demonstrated that "we must regard as either quite true, or very nearly true, those propositions which follow from general induction from phenomena; a hypothesis contrary to it, but it should be held as such until no other phenomenon has arisen to make it more true or to make exceptions" (3rded., rule 4). "This rule," he said, "must be followed, lest hypotheses be used to evade inductive arguments."

The influence of Bacon's positivism on scientific thinking in the 17th century can be seen from the emergence of the concept of "judgmental experiment". In the description of his experiment in 1672, Isaac Newton included the analysis of sunlight and This concept is used very effectively in the theory of composition and in the theory of the nature of color.This expression comes from Hooke's "Micrography" (1665, 56), which Hooke evolved from Bacon's concept of "judgmental cases" (1905, 343; Bacon, Nov. Organ. bk. 2, aph, 36).Newton's opposition to hypotheses, exemplified by the slogan "Strengthen abstinence from hypotheses" outlined in the final general note of Principia (2nded.), and Bacon's thought may also be the main source of this attitude.

If Bacon's general induction is indeed adopted by many scientists, Bacon's classification of procedures and his detailed rules are not followed.Defenders of the tradition say that Bacon played the role of innovator and synthesizer of scientific method (Fowler 1881, Ch, 4), which is more appropriate in philosophy than in science.Bacon's does not read like a treatise on modern science, and his discussion of heat (the main application of this method in the second volume) is more like the Aristotelian and scholastic-style Discussion, rather than a paradigm for new science.In particular, as Charles Sanders Peirce has pointed out, no "mechanistic" system of Baconian error-pronunciation can produce meaningful new scientific knowledge. "Lord Bacon's ideas [of method] surpassed previous insights," writes Peirce (1934, 224), "and the modern reader, unafraid of his exaggerations, gets the first impression that his ideas of the process of scientific development Views are insufficient."

In addition, an obvious deficiency in Bacon's view of science is that he did not recognize the important role of mathematics in scientific theories.It is good to emphasize the accumulation of facts rather than the establishment of hypotheses, but Bacon's so-called development process underestimates the renewal of concepts, and it has been proved that in the development of science, the renewal of concepts is even more important than facts and limited induction.The Royal Society did indeed set forth as one of its objects the mass collection of factual data concerning ores, crafts, etc.However, the actual scientific development model is often (and still refers to) conceptual and theoretical, not just factual. Why do we have any reason to say that those who refuse to admit that Galileo discovered Jupiter’s satellites are the so-called spokespersons of scientific methods? ?!

In the history of science there is one discipline that has traditionally developed in true Baconian fashion, and that is meteorology.At numerous weather stations around the world, scientists have long been collecting data on temperature, humidity, rainfall, and wind conditions and direction in a way that would have delighted Francis Bacon.It is well documented, however, that this branch of science has not developed (inductively or otherwise) into a practical body of theory in the way that physics, chemistry, biology, and geology have.We can talk about the weather, but we cannot predict it with perfect accuracy, nor can we make it change.

Bacon may have revolutionized the philosophy of science, but he certainly did not cause a Baconian revolution in science.The same is true of Bacon's classification of science, which is in fact a classification of knowledge (see Fowler 1881, Ch. 3; Quinton 1980, ch. 6 on this issue).Bacon's system was revised, and later honored in tables and diagrams in the Introduction and Introduction to the great Encyclopedia compiled by Diderot and D'Alembert in the mid-eighteenth century.In any case, Bacon may have made a great contribution in this field of philosophy, but it did not constitute a revolution in science. So what conclusions can we draw about Bacon's relationship to the scientific revolution?Like Quinton (1980, 83), I believe that Bacon is mainly important in two aspects, namely "as an advocate and a critic".One of his great contributions was to "free science from religion and religious metaphysics," "to free the study of nature from what was at that time considered witchcraft, contempt, and low-level labor and monotony." And the proscribed situation shifted" (Quinton 1980, 83-84).More importantly, Bacon recognized that science would enhance human ability to control the environment more effectively. "The true and legitimate aim of science," he wrote in (bk.l, aph.81=1905, 280), "is nothing more than this: to bestow upon human life new discoveries and new powers. . ""Although the two roads to human power and to human knowledge are closely adjoining and almost merge into one" (bk. 2, aph. 4 = 1905, 303); "Truth and utility  … It is one thing" (bk. 1, aph. 124 = 1905, 298). "It is by art and science that man will establish his empire over all things," he wrote (bk. 1, aph. 129 = 1905, 300), "for we cannot dominate nature unless we obey it. "Undoubtedly, people have tried to describe Bacon as a "philosopher of inductive science" (B. Farrington 1949).We must remember, however, that in these views Bacon was not primarily concerned with changing the conditions of life.On the contrary, he believes that "all kinds of achievements themselves, as evidence of truth, are more valuable than improving the comfort of life" (bk. 1, aph. 124 = 1905, 298). Bacon was also an important advocate for the organization of scientists into societies and academies, which are characterized by collective research.In an unfinished utopian work entitled The New Atlantis (1627), he described a central scientific institute complete with laboratories, botanical gardens, a zoo, kitchens, furnaces, and even Mechanical workshop.In this work, Bacon declared that in science; the production of knowledge proceeds more efficiently through the division of labor.People concerned with economic history often credit Bacon with being the first to formulate the general idea of ​​the division of labor.One might be a little skeptical as to whether Bacon ever had much influence on the principal founders of the Royal Society, the research arm of which is considered to bear Bacon's stamp to a considerable extent.In Spratt's History of the Royal Society (1667), Bacon's name not only pops up and is celebrated, but he also appears in the allegorical frontispiece, thus attesting to Bacon's influence .We will admit that the Royal Society "is perhaps justly said to be the greatest memorial to Francis Bacon" (Farrington 1949, 18). Descartes' scientific revolution Bacon was not the only thinker of his time to realize that true science would lead to advances in medicine and various technical fields.Descartes made almost the same point in his famous Discourse on Method (1637).At the end of the book he discusses the goal of "doing what we can for the general good of mankind" (1965, 50).A complete science, developed in parallel with the principles laid down by Descartes, would be that "knowledge of the highest practical use in science." Science, properly speaking of applied science, would "make ourselves masters and possessors of nature . . . "Among some specific goals, he hoped that the invention of mechanical devices "would enable us to enjoy all kinds of agricultural products and all the wealth on earth without hard work." He especially emphasized that for medicine.For the ultimate eradication of "diseases of body and mind".Science has a very important role to play in eradicating the "weakness of old age" etc. (Descartes 1956, 39-40).It would appear, therefore, that the development of science which is based on experimentation or experience, would naturally lead to the belief that advances in knowledge would lead to new practical inventions, and to effective improvements in health. Descartes does not believe that formal societies or research institutions can fund and supply experimental equipment to meet the needs of scientists for the common research enterprise. This view of Descartes is different from Bacon's.However, he also felt that it was difficult for one person to carry out all the experiments; at the end of the Discourse on Methods, he discussed some methods that might help the researcher, such as, for his "necessary experiments The expense "provides donations and protection so that "his leisure will not be disturbed by any blackmailer" (Descartes 1956, 47).He even openly raised the issue of social and personal sponsorship of scientific endeavors.In a letter to Mason dated 10 May 1632, he hinted that he was eager to have a wealthy patron to finance the study of the series of "celestial phenomena" already listed (Descartes 1970, 24; 1971, l: 249). Bacon saw himself as the herald of the new science, and his role was to advocate the study of the new science ("Ego enim bucciinator tatltum": Bacon 1857, 1:579; Progress 4, 1). "All I have done is," he wrote to Dr. Platfer, "to ring the bell and wake up all the men of insight." Descartes was a true revolutionary, a He was the founder of this new science, and he himself was fully aware of this.In March 1619, at the age of twenty-three, Descartes had predicted (in a letter to Beckmann; cf. 1971, 10:156) that a "entirely new science" was about to emerge; This new science can solve problems in mathematics in general.In November of that year, he dreamed that "the basis of an astonishing science" had been discovered (1971, 10:179). Ten years later, Descartes was invited, along with several others, to a lecture that refuted the traditional philosophy taught in schools.The speech [according to Descartes' biographer Bellett, translated see Smith (1952, 40ff.)], "was almost full of applause." Among the audience, only Descartes "was very deliberate and showed no signs of approval." love," which attracted the attention of Cardinal de Beryl, founder of the Oratorian Order of Paris, and Father Mason, nuncio of the Pope, and others, all of whom urged him to state his case. View.In the ensuing dialogue, he confided in his own "general laws, which he sometimes called his natural method" - which he had taken from "the treasury of the mathematical sciences." Descartes gave de Belle Cardinal Descartes was so impressed that he invited Descartes to visit him to explain his methods in more detail.Descartes dissected to him the nature of his method, noting that "the practical benefits which this method may produce will enable his method of philosophical research to be applied to the fields of medicine and mechanics," thus "leading to the restoration and preservation of health, And ... lead to a certain reduction and lightening of human physical labor." The cardinal encouraged him "to engage in this [study of nature] work," doing his best to carry out scientific and philosophical reforms. This project was completed in 1637, when three works on science (Geometry, Refraction, Meteorology) and Discourses were published, subtitled Reasoning and The right way to seek the truth." This method has been fully stated in a previous work, completed around 1628 (that is, around his meeting with Cardinal de Beryl), entitled " Rules for the Guidance of the Mind; it was not published until about 80 years after Descartes' death (1701).The Cartesian method is a clear and successful way of thinking, but it is by no means a practical or amateur means of conducting experiments and drawing conclusions from them.However, like Bacon's method, Descartes' method aims at making discoveries by breaking down a complex and complex problem into its simpler elements or components.His model, he says, can be seen in his New Geometry, where complex curves are studied by this decomposition into simple elements.The approach is generalized; it applies not only to science and philosophy, but to "any rational inquiry . . . in whatever field" [(Bernard Williams) 1967, 345].In fact, what Descartes believed in was a solid unity of all knowledge, including science and philosophy. He vividly compared this unity to a big tree, the root of which is metaphysics, and the trunk of the tree is In physics, the branches of the tree are these specialized topics: medicine, mechanics, ethics, etc.All these sciences gathered together, he says, "are identical with the human intellect, however different the disciplines applied, and this is consistent" (Ruler 1; 1971, 10: 360) o Although much of Descartes' science was based on experiment and observation, his well-articulated concepts of science and method were rationalistic and non-empirical.In his view, science should ultimately be based on philosophy.For Descartes, the elements of everyday experience are "complex" and must be reduced to "simplicities" ("naturae smplices"), which he later called "principles" ("princi-pa") , meaning "first existence" such as "volume, shape, motion" etc. (Ruler 12; 1971, 10).Descartes gives the example of a lodestone or magnet (1911, 1:47): At its most extreme point of view, Cartesian philosophy reduces all activities and phenomena in nature to the principles of matter and motion. Descartes' outstanding contribution to scientific reform was the establishment of this mechanistic philosophy, which sought to explain the properties and activities of objects in terms of their constituent parts.Descartes rejected ultimate causal or teleological explanations, and attacked the dominant Aristotelian or scholastic models for explaining phenomena with terms such as "substantial form" and "mystical properties".But, unlike other opponents of this way of thinking, he proposes a realistic alternative, namely, to decompose the problem into such small classes as principal properties, general properties and quantitative properties: "The shape of particles of matter , size, arrangement and movement" (1971, 8-1:314II:26).In the whole world, he asserted, there were no phenomena which could not be explained by such "purely physical causes—that is, causes which do not depend in the slightest on hearts and minds." By the time Newton's Principia was published, Cartesian mechanistic philosophy had come to dominate European science (see Chapter 1).When Boyle spoke of "the two most important and universal principles of body, matter, and motion" (Boyle 1772, 3:16), it was precisely Descartes' mechanistic philosophy that had in mind.Boyle's "Origin of Form and Nature" (1666) was intended to illustrate the philosophy of mechanics and "according to the motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its constituent parts" ... the agents of matter "Activity.Boyle called the properties mentioned here the "mechanical influences of matter, because people like to think of them as different operations of various mechanisms" (Boyle 1772, 3:13).Huygens and Leibniz were generally believers in mechanism.It is for this reason that they both reject Newton's concept of gravitation - a force that acts on objects and motion through space and does not diminish. Newton himself was rational when he was educated in mechanistic philosophy.Unlike the very narrow Cartesian principle, Newton believed in the existence of atoms (similar to Boyle's); thus also admitted the existence of a vacuum.Descartes did not believe in the void, he even believed that matter and extension were identical.At that time, the recognized philosophy required to make all phenomena conform to the principle of material motion, so that only contact forces were allowed in science. In such an era, Newton actually came to the conclusion that there is a universal gravitation beyond space. This is indeed true. A bold move.This step by Newton [as Westfall pointed out (1971, 377-380)] meant that he made a radical revision of accepted philosophy, and it meant (Cohen 198O, 68-69) that "Newton The development of "formula" allowed such results as his concept of gravitation, although he still hoped or sought to find a way to reconcile this new, philosophically unacceptable principle of force with Cartesian concepts of matter and motion.In his Principia and Optics, there is abundant evidence that Newton embraced Cartesian philosophy of mechanics in general, and that he sought to reduce phenomena to "universal properties of all bodies" (Principia , 2nded.1713, bk.3, rule3). Descartes' Cosmology was written between 1629 and 1633, but the work was not published until after his death.This volume includes his thoughts on motion and the earliest explicit formulation of its principle of inertia.The bold statement that the state of uniform linear (or inertial) motion is completely equivalent to the state of rest in mechanics is not yet equal to Newton's principle of inertia, but the two are more or less equal in form.It's just that Descartes based his principle on an eternal doctrine-that is, the motion caused by God at the time of creation cannot be destroyed; while Newton's principle stems from the essence of mass. Descartes published his rules of inertia in his Principia, along with a set of rules for collisions.However, due to his ignorance of the vectorial nature of momentum, most of his rules were incorrect - as can be easily seen from some simple experiments he did.Descartes also amply explained his vortex system in his theory: a vortex of constant motion of dilute or subtle matter on a grand scale, producing what we call gravitational effects, which include putting planets into elliptical orbits .He also elaborated in the book the concept of relative space that was later opposed by Newton. As a result, Descartes believed that "real physics" is a branch of mathematics, and only "through mathematics can real knowledge of physics be obtained" (Descartes 1971, II: 315-316; Ray 1974, 311).In Principles of Philosophy, he claimed that his theories were based on his mathematics: "There is neither need nor desire in physics to have any principles different from those in geometry and abstract mathematics, since the latter explain All natural phenomena.” In a letter to Mason in December 1637 (Descartes 1974, I: 478; Ray 1974, 32), he explained that Refraction and Meteorology—both A 1637 pamphlet described by Descartes as "a short treatise on the application of this method" - which helped to convince most people that this method was "better than the usual method", and that Descartes himself was very proud of " This has been demonstrated in my Geometry." Descartes was one of the greatest mathematicians of all time.John Stuart Mill (1889, 617) hailed Descartes' mathematics as "the greatest single advance ever made in the development of this exact science." Descartes might have conceded as much.In a letter to Mason (Descartes 1971, I: 479; Ray 1974, 28), he said that his new geometry (analytic geometry) "better than the general (that is, Euclid's) Geometry, just as Cicero's rhetoric is higher than a child's ABC." Much of the discussion of Descartes' mathematical achievements has been confined to coordinate geometry and the algebraic solution of "geometric" problems.However, the important reform of Descartes may not be on this simple technical level, but on the mode of thinking with comprehensive analytical methods (Ray 1974, 30).For example, to square a quantity traditionally means to construct a square whose side lengths are equal to or equal to the quantity: "square" is the area of ​​the square.The case of finding the cube is similar.Descartes is an advocate of a new way of expressing powers (such as X2. Or the square of X; X3 is used to represent xxx or the cube of x). Once this exponential notation is introduced, such a major progress, that is, this Cartesian concept of a power or exponent becomes an abstract reality.This allowed mathematicians to write xn", where n could have the value of 2 or 3, and in fact could even be a fraction. Descartes revolutionized mathematics by freeing algebra from geometry and led to the emergence of "general algebra", which justified the claim (1628) that in geometry and arithmetic "something within the reach of man's knowledge and ability" was attained. Newton The original ideas about integrals were formed during a careful study of Descartes' mathematical works and some commentators' comments on Descartes' Geometry (see Newton, Math, 1967, ed. by Whiteside). The revolutionary nature of Cartesian mathematics can be seen not only from a comparison of mathematics before and after Descartes, but note that the mathematics of the 117th century (and the mathematics of subsequent centuries) were firmly Cartesian. We can also find this imprint, so it can be said that Cartesian mathematics passes the test of identifying the history of revolutions. To other revolutionary parts of Rukal science.For example, explanations of animal and human physiology based on mechanism, and explanations of human physiological psychology (cf. Descartes 1972), I will not discuss.But it must be pointed out that Descartes' goal of reducing all animal (and human) functions to mechanical activities was probably his most daring innovation in science, and was praised by physiologists in the following centuries. That said, it was a truly revolutionary move.Descartes agreed with Harvey on the circulation of the blood, but he disagreed on some essential issues, especially the activity of the heart.He also made pioneering contributions to geography, developing a theory of stratigraphy in which the Earth was formed by long-term activity based on physical-mechanical principles. Like Galileo and Kepler, Descartes saw himself as a revolutionary who created new sciences.However, Galileo believed that he had created a new science of ground motion and a new mechanics of materials, Kepler asserted that he had created a new astronomy, and Descartes claimed that he made all sciences and mathematics, and even revolutionized the methodological or philosophical foundations of science.Of course, his claim is not enough to convince people that there was a Cartesian revolution, but it is supported by comments made by a number of seventeenth-century authors.For example, in his comparison of ancient learning and modern learning, Joseph Granville not only expressed his evaluation of Descartes' great achievements in mathematics and physics, but also put Descartes' name in large bold Printed to show its greatness (Glanville 1676, Essays 3, 13ff) We have seen how the scientific community adopted Descartes' new mathematics and his revolutionary mechanistic philosophy.His new principle of inertia and his revolutionary concept of state of motion became the basis of Newton's theoretical mechanics and celestial mechanics.His reductionist biological principles eventually came to dominate much of modern physiology.It goes without saying, then, that Zhenkar's innovations in science pass the first two tests for identifying scientific revolutions. Moreover, historians and philosophers have asserted that there has been a revolution associated with Cartesian since the mid-eighteenth century, and since then it has been a common practice to apply the concept of revolution to the development of science .This is the third test.Cartesian science also passed the fourth and final test—the perception of scientists alive at the time.Evidence for the Cartesian revolution can be traced back to the 18th century, to D'Alembert's discussion of the Cartesian revolution (1751) and A. R． J．Turgot's assertion that Descartes "started a revolution" (cf. Turgot 1973, 94).Antoine Condorcet's views on Descartes are described in terms of "first principles of the revolution of human destiny".Étienne-Bonnet-Condillac admitted that there had been a Cartesian revolution, but he explicitly denied that Bacon was a revolutionary—an instigator and even an initiator of a revolution.In the nineteenth century, William Sewell, who had written about Descartes' relationship to an anti-revolutionary movement, pointed out that Bacon did not "just correct some particular popular errors" when he "published a new method" (1865, I: 339).Bacon's method "turned rebellion into revolution, and established a new dynasty of philosophy." According to some analysts, Bacon had effected a revolution in philosophy or a revolution in scientific methodology, and Descartes had an effect in science itself.A powerful statement of this influence can be seen in the writings on the history of science by Louis Figeil and Henri de Bryanville.In his 1874 essay "On the Hypothesis: Animals as Automata," Thomas Henry Huxley wrote that Descartes "did indeed contribute to the physiology of movement and sensation (Harvey contributed to the contributed to the physiology of these processes), and opened the way to the mechanistic theory of these processes which his successors followed" (Huxley 1881, 200-201).In this century, the Nobel Prize winner in Physiology, Lord Charles Sherrington, made an even stronger assertion.Discussing Descartes' idea that the animal's body is a machine, Sherrington (1946, 187) noted, "The machines around us have increased and developed on such a scale that the word machine was coined in 17 Part of the sense of the century may no longer exist. Descartes used it more than any other, and it has a wider meaning than biology, which was revolutionary and ever-changing." However, L ．Roth asserts, "Modern criticism and comments on Gerd Frodenthal show that the innovation of Cartesianism lies neither in its physiology, epistemology, nor in its ethics or metaphysics, but in its physics. theory," concluded Roth, "that the Descartes revolution consisted in the attempt to replace a metaphysics based on physics by a physics based on metaphysics" (1937, 4). Paul Schreck, one of the century's leading analysts of 17th-century science and philosophy, wrote that although "Newton's Principia . . . led to a fundamental revolution in physics," it" Hardly a revolutionary work on the same level as Descartes' Principia" (1967, 36).Schreck cites the great historian Jules Michelet, who "asserted that with the publication of the Discourses the revolution of 1789 had already begun." John Hull, Jr.曼·兰德尔在其《现代思想的形成》中（1926，235ff．），一次又一次地谈到笛卡尔革命。他毫不怀疑，笛卡尔革命是17世纪最有意义的革命。 笛卡尔满足了所有重要的鉴别科学革命的检验要求。他也在使哲学发生革命，不过，这也许与思考他对科学的影响并非完全相关。他同时代的人对他思想所具有的革命性的证明，可以用以下事实来说明：他的《哲学文集》被编入了《禁书索引》，而且直到20世纪最后一次印刷此索引时，该书仍保留在这一索引中，而此时，伽利略的《对话》已被从中划去有一个多世纪了。 笛卡尔革命有几个与许多科学革命不同的特点。首先，它没有持续下来。牛顿的自然哲学是对笛卡尔物理学直接的、正面的打击（参见前面的第1章）；牛顿在其《原理》第二编的结论中指出，涡旋体系是与开普勒的面积定律相矛盾的。不过，笛卡尔有着如此大的影响，以致于到了18世纪中叶，法兰西主要的电学科学家阿贝·诺莱，像他同时代的人、他那个时代最伟大的数学家和数学物理学家利昂纳德·欧拉一样，仍然信奉笛卡尔的涡旋原理。笛卡尔对真空或虚空的可能性的否认，木久就过时了，不过他关于运动状态的基本概念以及惯性定律，则成了以后物理学发展的中心。在生理学和心理学领域，笛卡尔的直接影响一直持续到19世纪以后。 笛卡尔革命与其他科学革命第二个不同之处在于，没有哪个伟大的科学原理或理论是以他的名字命名的，而且，在仍被讲授的此类原理或理论中，没有哪个是与他联系在一起的。曾一度被称之为笛卡尔折射定律者，很像是这种特殊的发现，但是，由于其第一发现者是斯奈尔，所以该定律现在被称之为斯奈尔定律（也许，有人错误地称它为斯涅耳定律），而笛卡尔已被证明是从这位第一发现者那里剽窃了这一定律。然而，在数学方面，情况并非如此，在这里，笛卡尔革命最为深刻，并且持续了很长时间。我们使用笛卡尔符号律这一名称，就是表明我们对笛卡尔在代数领域诸项发现中的一个发现的承认。数学家们把直角坐标系称之为笛卡尔坐标系，以此来赞誉笛卡尔这位现代科学之初的一场伟大革命的发动者。