Chapter 2 foreword

This volume provides a historical and analytical study of the concept of revolution over four centuries.Such a complex subject seems to require a lot of research from different angles because of the wide range of events, people and ideas involved.The first thing to do is to analyze the stages in the development of a scientific revolution from the initiation of a revolutionary idea to the acceptance and use of a new science by a considerable number of scientists.Judgments on questions such as whether a particular set of events in science constitute a revolution are certainly individual.I, on the other hand, propose a set of criteria for judging whether a scientific revolution has occurred—a set of criteria based on historical evidence.The stages and criteria I have described (outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively) of this book form the analytical framework of this book.

Using this framework, I critically examine some of the major scientific revolutions that have occurred during the four centuries of modern science.The introductory part deals with the political or social revolutions of the various periods of these four centuries, and the general impressions that revolutions left on people at that time, because I find that within the context of science, the word "revolution" always appears. It not only reflects some popular theories about political revolution and social revolution, but also reflects people's certain understanding of the revolution that has taken place in reality.So, my thinking about each of the scientific revolutions discussed here is in the context of social and political revolutions.

We must distinguish how people in history have viewed revolutions from how historians view revolutions.The former part contains people's views during the revolutionary period and the subsequent periods. This part is some objective historical facts and data; while the latter part contains some subjective views of people at present. .Of course, I have also made a subjective, historian-like evaluation of each of the revolutions discussed in this book.However, I also emphasize the importance of historical evidence in each example.In nearly every instance, the two aspects converge; those revolutions that pass the test of historical evidence will still be considered revolutions in the eyes of historians (and scientists) today.However, a comparison of the historical evidence with the judgments of historians also reveals some puzzling anomalies.

In particular, the study of historical evidence shows that the concept of a scientific revolution, like the concept of revolution itself, is not, and has not been, fixed.The literature presented in this book, for example, demonstrates that the views of scientists and historians are constantly changing as to whether scientific progress is dominated by incremental growth or the result of a series of revolutions.In addition to changes in views on scientific revolutions in general, people's views on judging whether particular events were revolutionary or not are constantly changing.The Copernican Revolution is a case in point.The notion that there was a revolution in astronomy with the publication of the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres in 1543 was but a product of the fantasies of eighteenth-century astronomers; it was so popular that the Copernican Revolution became the paradigm of the scientific revolution.However, historians' critical examination of the historical evidence proves that it was not a Copernican revolution at all, it could at best be described as a Galileo-Kepler revolution.

With the passage of time, people's understanding of the meaning and importance of some great political revolutions will undergo fundamental changes.In (1791), Thomas Paine explained how the American Revolutionary War and the French Revolution introduced a new and revolutionary thinking into political science.Paine is famous primarily for the pamphlets he wrote during the American Revolutionary War, his most famous works are: And, etc., as a response to Edmund Burke's Thoughts on the French Revolution "Records" (1790) in reply.From some events in the United States and France, people have a new understanding of the revolution.Paine's explanation of this new perspective is a typical example, which shows that the emergence of political concepts is not only related to theory, but also related to events in reality:

The so-called revolutions in the past were nothing more than replacing a few people or changing the local situation slightly.The ups and downs of these revolutions are taken for granted, and their success or failure has little effect on areas other than the place where the revolution took place.But, thanks to the revolutions in America and France, we now see a new natural order of things in the world, a set of principles as universal as truth and human existence, and uniting morality with political perfection and national prosperity.By 1853, however, less than half a century after the above, Giuseppe Mazzini ceased to see the French Revolution as a model of progressive political activity.He wrote (1907, 251): "The progress of France was by its own strength freeing itself from the revolutions of the eighteenth century and the old." He argued that the French Revolution "should not be regarded as a rather than a program of activity: it should be seen not as the beginning of a new era, but as the inevitable dying phase of an era that is about to perish." By the nineteenth century and even For the century, the purpose of the revolution was to complete the unfinished business of the French Revolution, which can be seen very clearly in the writings of Marx, Engels, and many other revolutionary theorists of the 20th century.

The history of British politics provides two clear examples of events that were once regarded as revolutions and which have been changed over time.In other words, a revolution in science is not always a constant change manifested as a revolution.For historians and political theorists of the 18th century, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was the poster child for a political revolution, yet today it seems less revolutionary.The same was true of the American Revolutionary War, now commonly known as the Revolutionary War or the War of Independence.In contrast, the English Revolution of the mid-seventeenth century was generally not regarded as a revolution at all, and it continued to do so for 200 years.However, in the eyes of some commentators in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the revolution in Britain was not a political revolution like the Glorious Revolution, but an aborted social revolution.From the literature on revolution in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from the half century or so from the French Revolution to the time of Marx, from the time of Marx to the time of Lenin, from the decades after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and in the present Century SO s. From the relevant literature in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, people may see that the understanding of what constitutes a revolution is also very different from time to time.It is not surprising that these changes are also reflected in discussions of the scientific revolution.

A historical discussion of the (whether scientific or political) origin of the word "revolution" and its subsequent meanings may seem abstract and non-partisan, yet a simple Examples will show that this is not always the case.In his essay "The Muslim Concept of Revolution" (1972, 37-38), Bernard Lewis discusses the origin of "many words denoting rebellion or uprising" in Old Arabic, including the word "thawra" word.He writes: "In Old Arabic, the root th-wr means, to stand up (as a camel does), or to be agitated or spurred to . . . revolt." Lewis then explained that the word " is often used in the context of establishing a small, independent, sovereign state," and the noun form of the word," such as in the phrase ... until the excitement wears off, The first signifies a state of excitement"—Lewis says it is "a very apt introduction." Edward Seid, in reply to Lewis (197, 315), asks, "Unless it is evident to discredit Modern Speech? , why give the modern Arabic word revolution an etymological root denoting the scene of a camel standing up?" Seid asserts that the purpose of "Lewis' inference" is clearly to "depreciate the contemporary view of revolution." evaluation, reducing revolution to nothing more than a camel rising from the ground by itself, there is nothing great (or wonderful) to be said." If we imagine the reverse, Orientalists might think that the concept of revolution in Western Europe or the United States itself is Developed from a recurring notion (such as reversion or ebb and flow, etc.), and therefore criticize this concept with contempt, we may then understand the persuasive force of Seid's critique. Indeed, According to Seid's understanding, Lewis' etymological views are colored by what he called "Orientalism", which is "a Western fashion for controlling, reorganizing and exercising hegemony over the East." Seid argues that Lewis' discussion of etymology reflected his political and social stance, which led him to associate the word "thawra with the standing of a camel and, more generally, with excitement" rather than associated with the "struggle for the ideals of life." This is apparently also the case in the editor's foreword of the book containing Lewis's essay. The editor says, "In the Middle East, the struggle and radicalization for independence , that is, compdetat, uprising and rebellion", does not correspond to the term revolution as understood by Westerners (Vari Kivodis, 1972, 11). The reason put forward by the editor is that "Westerners believe that they have the right to resist corrupt regimes, And that notion is in conflict with Islamic thought."

I originally set out to write this book to explore the origins and subsequent uses of the concept of scientific revolutions (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and of scientific revolutions as models of scientific progress.I have found that many historians, even some historians of science, assume that these two concepts arose in our time, and those historians of science who use these concepts get the chronology wrong and try to force past events into 20th century models.Readers may not be hard-pressed to imagine my astonishment at the time when, in my research, I unearthed examples from each of the past four centuries discussing scientific revolutions, at least as far back as the early nineteenth century. .Since historians are not fully aware of this material, nor are scientists, philosophers, and sociologists, a chronological account of the usage of these concepts takes up a large portion of this book.

I presented some of my first findings in an article published in the Journal of the History of Ideas (1976, 37:257-288), which I intended to expand into a small monograph.However, as Thomas Mann (in the preface to his Joseph series) and many other scholars have said, "Fata sua habent libelli" ("A book has a life of a book").A mountain of evidence and materials have prompted me to complete this huge book.Even so, I didn't use all of my discoveries; I could have made the book longer, three or four times as long.The question of revolutions since World War I and the Russian Revolution alone is enough to be the subject of a monograph.As a last resort, I have given only a few carefully selected examples, some of which, in my opinion, are typical of the current view, and some of which are of special significance.

This book is part of a larger research program with a dual purpose.In part, I am concerned with exploring and elucidating the creative process by which a person engaged in one discipline applies concepts (concepts, methods, theories, tools, etc.) to work in another discipline.In my other book, Newton's Revolution (1980), I paid great attention to this kind of research.In that book I emphasized that the doctrine of "ideas shift" was a key component of the revolutionary process.In this book, however, I have limited my use of the concept of transformation so as not to overwhelm the reader with lengthy analyzes of and chronicles of the Scientific Revolution in the first place.As for the further analysis of the conceptual transformation in the scientific revolution, I leave it to the later research.A second purpose of my research is to explain and analyze the interaction between the natural and exact sciences and the social and behavioral sciences.This book combines historical research with analytical research.My purpose is not merely to identify and study, by means of particular cases, the general process of transformation which takes place when an idea from one discipline is adopted by another; The "scientific" basis of the social sciences, and examines how the social science community uses science to demonstrate the applicability of scientific findings to public policy issues.Although it is generally believed that the flow of ideas tends to be from the natural and exact sciences to the social and behavioral sciences, there are many interesting instances where the flow in the opposite direction also exists.This book on revolution deals with this topic because the concept and term "revolution" originated in the sciences (astronomy and geometry) and in turn entered the realm of political and social change, thus undergone a significant initial change. As the literature in this book demonstrates, the changing concept of revolution, in turn, returned from the social sciences and the various literatures on political theory and As such, this book explores an area of ​​the relationship between these two research communities. It is the interplay between the notion of a political (or social) revolution and that of a scientific revolution that is dealt with throughout this book, although I am fully aware that this subject should be dealt with more fully.As early as the seventeenth century, even before the modern notion of revolution in the acyclic sense gained popularity, many authors sought to explain the progress of science in terms of political analogies.Of course there is also the opposite thesis, that science and scientific revolutions may have an impact on political revolutions, which I have mentioned but not explored.It is well known that Marx, and especially Engels, regarded their revolutionary movement as "scientific". The terms "scientific socialism" and "scientific communism" appear frequently in Marxist (especially Soviet) literature, although, as far as I know, the extent to which this use of the word "scientific" is Basically rely on the use of the concept of "science" as generally understood by the domestic scientific community, and there is no rigorous evaluation. Although the topic of changing concepts of scientific revolutions runs throughout the book, and is indeed the main thread of the book, many readers will find the case histories of individual revolutions interesting.The bulk of this book is composed of these case histories of some of the great revolutions that marked the development of modern science, with specific examples illustrating the different phases of the revolutions that I have found, and of a series of Whether a unique event is a revolution provides evidence.Moreover, these case histories illustrate how the imagination of political revolutions and the prevailing theories of revolutions have conditioned (and continue to condition) perceptions of scientific revolutions.The people's views on the revolution before and after the French Revolution are an obvious example.As another example, those scientists who identified and documented a revolution in Earth science arising from new ideas such as plate tectonics and continental drift were influenced by Kuhn's work. In most of the case histories, I like to repeat the account of the revolution by the scientists who caused or participated in it and by the bystanders who did not participate in the revolution, but without explicitly explaining in each case what someone had in mind might be what.The problem here is twofold.First, we don't know exactly what a particular scientist might have in mind; and second, (in the numerous examples in this book) many scientists have no idea what a scientific revolution in particular or scientific revolutions in general might be. very clearly stated, but not necessarily a coherent and complete theory of the general pattern of revolution or even scientific change.Such an approach, for example, combines Albert Einstein's comments on revolutions in science in 1905 and 1906 with the events of the famous Russian failed revolution of 1905 and those who wanted to revolutionize Russian society It is attractive to be linked to the idealistic hopes of the 1917 Russian Revolution; equally attractive, his denial of revolution in the theory of relativity can also be used to illustrate his response to the violence of the Russian Revolution in 1917, Opposition to the aborted revolution in Germany shortly after World War II, including the violence in the streets of Berlin.It must be taken into account that Einstein objected to the newspapers painting him too much as revolutionary; this practice undoubtedly contributed to his endorsement of the view that his work was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.When evaluating Einstein's view of scientific revolution, one thing must be kept in mind: Einstein's entire discussion of revolution and evolution appears in a few isolated sentences, and they are often based on other people's statements. Answer; I do not know of any complete treatises, letters, or even full-fledged, detailed discourses of his on the development of science, let alone on scientific revolutions.Presumably the same has been true of other scientists who have expressed their views on scientific revolutions in particular or in general over the past three centuries.So, in each instance I offer the reader the present-day representation of the revolution.However, the reader will easily realize that, when it comes to a particular scientific theory, it is unreasonable to demand that every statement about revolution by a person or persons should be consistent with the meaning of the word "revolution". In conclusion, I often speak of my discoveries in a perhaps overconfident manner.I know that in many cases I should add phrases like "as far as I know" or "as far as my research suggests" to the narrative.Are there any earlier examples than what I've found?By no means do I wish to pretend that my studies have been exhaustive and that such a subject would not have led to such results.I hope readers who have further information will also let me know so that I can correct it in future editions of this book. Readers will naturally wish to know that this book is closely related to T. S．Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and some other works.Many readers will recognize the importance of Kuhn's work in shifting the minds of scientists and historians of science to believe in (or to give importance to) the idea that revolutions are a law of scientific change. influences.So, in my conceptual history of scientific revolutions, Kuhn's work can be regarded as an important historical event.A major thesis in Kuhn's analysis is that scientific change of all kinds, including revolutions, is not the result of competing ideas, as Ernst Mach and others imagined, but is the result of accepting or believing in those views caused by scientists.This thesis is based on my analysis of four stages of development which I have found to be common to all scientific revolutions.Finally, I agree with Kuhn's general view that a revolution is a shift in a set of scientific beliefs—in Kuhn's original terminology, a "paradigm" shift; Kuhn originally used this in this context terminology, but I find it unfortunate that he used the term very vaguely and in several entirely different senses, so he later dropped it. However, it is not my intention in this book to discuss some of the specific properties that Kuhn ascribes to the "structure of scientific revolutions."For example, I do not intend to explore the proposition that revolutions in science are necessarily brought about by crises, because I find that the exceptions to this proposition are too numerous to hold.The same is true of the details of his other systems.Nor do I intend to explore the question of Kuhn changing the distinction between words "paradigm", "paradigm", "professional substrate", etc.The fact that it is well documented is very interesting, and while Kuhn's system has been an important topic of discussion, criticism, or approval among historians of science, historians of science (including Kuhn himself) do not intend to Kuhn's framework is used in his current work.Kuhn thus appears to have influenced philosophers and sociologists of science (and scholars in very different fields such as political theorists) more strongly than he has influenced scientists and historians of science today.It must be pointed out, however, that the recent revolution in geology is an exception to the historian. [See Reingold (1980) for a first-class analytical introduction, irreverent but not malicious, to Kuhn's system, to the history recognized by historians of science. ] Kuhn talks again and again about small revolutions and big revolutions.By large revolutions we mean those events generally recognized as revolutions in scientific papers, for example, those associated with Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Darwin, and Einstein.And Kuhn's so-called small revolutions may also include situations such as two dozen scientists replacing an accepted paradigm with a new one.In public discussions and published writings, Kuhn emphasized the universal nature of these small revolutions.In my work, however, I would like to concentrate on those revolutions which were larger or more pronounced.One of my reasons for doing so is that the objective methods I have described for determining when revolutions occur apply precisely to those revolutions in science that closely resemble political revolutions. The reader may notice that I am neither a philosopher nor a sociologist of science.As a historian, my purpose is to conduct a critical and analytical historical study, not to argue about the merits of Kuhn's system or other systems of philosophers of science or sociologists of science.In short, my purpose, while somewhat different from Kuhn's, certainly overlaps.This book is by no means another treatise on Kuhn's "structure"; rather, it is an attempt to examine the subject of scientific revolutions from a new, strictly historical perspective. I quoted a famous Latin quote from Thomas Mann and others earlier to illustrate this well-known phenomenon: the book has a life, and the book is determined by the logic inherent in research and writing.Just as this book was going to press, I came across a more comprehensive and exact statement of this phenomenon, from Terencenus Maurus's On Horace Changed syllables and meter" (line 1286): Pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli. "It means that who can deny that the future of books depends on the readers' recognition of them? I hope that this book will give readers some satisfaction, and of course welcome your criticism and correction in order to promote further research and development. Thinking. If this powerful subject of revolution can be brought to the attention of scholars, then the underlying purpose of this book will be fully served. I．bernard cohen thank you Over the years, I have benefited from many colleagues, friends and students, such as James Adler, Peter Barker.Lorraine J. Duston, Joey Harvey, Michael Heidelberger, Joseph Dubon, Stillman Drake, Henry Gluck, Pierre Jacobs, Jay Ludwig Lander, Robert Proctor, Barbara Reeves, Joan Richards, Shirley Rowe, and Frank Sarovey all drew my attention to discussions over the past four centuries Some examples of the scientific revolution have answered some difficult questions for me. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the above-mentioned scholars for their great help.This book has been reviewed and corrected by many friends and academic colleagues, including: Jed Z.Buchwald, Peter Garrison, Irving Gingerich, Johann Heilbrun, Gerald Holden, Eddy Marvin, Arthur Miller and Noel S. Vedrow, the sections they review range from one chapter to several chapters.In addition, I benefited greatly from the critical comments of three scholars, Joseph Duben, Richard Kramer, and Roy Porter, who read the entire book before it was finalized. Both Julia Budenz and Anne Miller Whitman have been my dear friends for many years.Throughout the process of writing this book, I have continued to receive strong support from Julie Budenz, who participated in various parts of my research until the completion of this book.Without her help, it would be unimaginable to complete this comprehensive book.And Anne Miller Whitman, as before, once again beguiled me with wit and insight.Their contributions are all the more significant in light of the fact that this is the first book I have written without the loving support and creative critique of my wife, Frances Davis.In the early days of the research, Christie I.McClatchy was my research assistant.I am very grateful to Diane Q.Three students, Webb, Deborah Kuhn, and Christine Peterson, helped me check the text and complete the references.The final collection and checking of the bibliographies were carried out by Bertha Adamson and D. L．Bakan is done.Sarah Tracey indexed this book. Special mention goes to Arthur Rosenthal, the trustee of Harvard University Press, who extended a helping hand when I was down and needed to be lifted, a friendship I will never forget .Susan Wallace is an editor with rare taste and insight. During the writing period of this book, Wallace's important opinions have played a considerable role in improving the book. Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Spencer Foundation for its support in the early stages of this research, on which this book is based.The primary support for my research work on the subject of revolutions in science, and on larger projects including this one, over the past few years has come from Alfred E.The Sloan Foundation; it's hard to imagine a foundation more empathetic to those it supports.