Chapter 5 Chapter 3 The Theory of Evolution during the Enlightenment-1

Geological discoveries in the 18th century injected new elements into natural history.Up to this point, creation myths seemed to be an accurate account of the origin of the earth and life on it.However, at this time, if someone shows that the earth has a long history and is destined to undergo changes, will this definitely cast doubt on the story of the origin of life in the "Bible Genesis"?This conclusion seems inevitable once extinct fossil species are considered.If fossils are indeed the remains of once-living organisms, the naturalist must realize that either some parts of the original creation have disappeared, or that the species may have changed over time.Either way, it would pose a threat to the traditional view that God Himself created a world and that God can maintain the structure of this world for man to live in.The growing distrust of Christianity that characterized the Enlightenment led to the eighteenth century being the period when biological change was first seriously considered. (See Glass et al., 1959; Greene, 1959a; and Bowler, 1974a. For France, see Mornet, 1911; Rostand, 1932; Guyenot, 1941; Ostoya, 1951; Roger, 1963; and Callot, 1965. For general discussions of Enlightenment thought, see Willey, 1940; Cassirer, 1951; Hazard, 1963; Gay, 1966-69; and Hampson, 1968.)

At first glance, the story of 18th-century evolution should appear simple.At the beginning of this century, the steady-state view of creation was still firmly in place.As materialist philosophers have become more daring in attacking traditional religion, they have been more daring in their search for an explanation of how life on Earth originated without invoking supernatural interference.The only reasonable concepts they came up with were aeogenesis (the spontaneous emergence of life from the union of nonliving matter) and the transformation of existing life forms in response to changes in their environment.Consequently, theories that contain what we call an evolutionary component inevitably come forward.The logic of this interpretation almost calls our attention to those naturalists who deal in detail with the possibility of biological change which is a true feature of the modern theory of evolution.In fact, the only remaining problem is to explain why natural theology revived at the end of the eighteenth century and seemed to block the promising beginning of the theory of evolution.

In reality, the situation is much more complicated.There is no doubt that eighteenth-century naturalists and philosophers did try to grasp the problem of change, and some of them developed theories that superficially resembled modern evolution.The reason they ultimately failed was that their inquiry was largely limited by their cultural environment. The theory of evolution in the 18th century was largely a product of Enlightenment thinking, which is a much more nuanced explanation than the above mentioned, which we might believe.The materialism of the Enlightenment had its own peculiarities, and it was not as cut off from the past as we might imagine.And some of the most creative developments in natural history have been extensions of older worldviews, not quite the search for materialistic explanations for the origin of life.With these considerations in mind, we should not wonder why the study of evolution at the end of the eighteenth century was abandoned along with many other Enlightenment ideas.A new beginning was needed to establish the scientific achievements of the eighteenth century within a usable framework based on a different conception of natural change.

It was from this extreme perspective that Michel Foucault (1970) viewed evolutionary theory in the eighteenth century, and his radical analysis rejected many issues that historians normally debate (Guedon, 1977).Foucault's insistence that the common misplaced focus on materialism does little to help us understand the "classical" natural histories of the period.At that time, people tried to classify natural objects according to their external characteristics; in determining the arrangement of things, they did so by determining the framework of possible relationships according to the method adopted by the classification process.Such a system is not open: by the nature of the system by which naturalists classify things, all possible configurations are foreseeable.Even recognizing that some elements of the picture on Earth are post-emergence, this simply means that the very process that has laid down the rules determines that the gaps are filled.In other words, evolution is just the display of a predetermined picture.Only in the early nineteenth century, when naturalists abandoned this belief in rational structural rules for all things, did Darwinism, an open view of evolutionary development, become possible.

The basic rationality of Foucault's view is reflected in the account that those naturalists who practiced according to traditional natural theology believed that their so-called regular process directly coincided with God's special creative plan.But we must address the more controversial question of whether those naturalists who ostensibly adopt a materialist approach still hold to the view that nature is basically a system of rules.At this point, we need a framework of our own to help us understand the forces that caused the contradictions in the minds of people in the eighteenth century.First, we need to distinguish those developments that are more or less explicitly within the creationist system from those that appear to be the product of challenges to the creationist system.We must try to identify the key features of steady-state creationism as articulated in the late seventeenth century before looking at the expansion of the problem due to the specialized problems of natural history and the generally increased awareness of the possibility of change.It is not surprising to find that some discussions of the origin of new species in this tradition tend to assume that new elements of God's plan emerged in a completely predetermined manner.We'll then look at the materialist challenge and try to identify the areas of materialist concern in natural history.As we shall see, areas of great concern to the eighteenth century were neglected by the naturalists of Darwin's day.We have also tried to look for some indications in support of Foucault's proposition that even the most radical materialists somehow believe that the laws of nature must operate in a reasonable picture.

Design and Change Issues Naturalists in the late seventeenth century still expected scientific research to be reconciled with Christianity.They held fast to the notion of the immutability of species, and insisted that each species produce offspring of the same type as itself, and they hoped that a detailed knowledge of natural type variation would help to strengthen the belief that species were products of divine wisdom.Three components of this system need to be described in detail because they have had an important impact on the subsequent history of evolution: a) Arguments of design are used to explain the structure of each species, usually from the adaptation of organisms to particular ways of life angle. b) Believe that the whole picture of interrelationships between species fits into some easily identifiable structure, such as the great chains of existence. c) extended the Aristotelian view of species being fixed and naturally subdivided into related forms of taxa to solve practical taxonomic problems arising from the discovery of a large number of new species as Europeans engaged in world-wide exploration . 

There is a design argument, based on the idea that every living structure has an adaptive purpose, at the heart of a school of natural theology that flourished around 1700 and continued well into the nineteenth century.John Ray's oft-reprinted The Wisdom of God in Creation (Ray, 1691) is the best-known representative of this view (Raven, 1942; Gillespie, 1987).William Derham's Physical Theology (Derham, 1717) was another popular work, while on the Continent Rabe Prouck's Conjectures Concerning Nature developed this in a multi-volume treatise. theme.Despite the challenges of the Enlightenment, a similar view persisted in William Paley's Natural Theology (Paley, 1802), and through Paley influenced the young Charles Darwin.

The design argument holds that the rules and complexity of the world, especially those embodied in biological structures, cannot be established by nature itself, but must be created by an intelligent designer.People often draw an analogy with the relationship between a clock and a watchmaker.No one believed that the metal parts that make up a working timepiece could 〖HTH〗naturally〖HTS S〗complex shapes, so we know that there must be a watchmaker who designed and built the timepiece.Since there is no force in nature capable of constructing new species of plants and animals, the same argument can be used for the existence of a Creator.But the structure of living things speaks not only of the wisdom and power of the Creator, but also of his benevolence.The form which is given to each organ to suit the function which is manifested in the mode of animal life shows that the Creator is concerned for the well-being of His creatures.We might call this the "utility" argument for design, because it assumes that every trait serves a useful purpose.Man is of course the preferred example of design, and the perfect structure of the hands and eyes seems to be the most definitive illustration of how our bodies are created for our needs.First, there is an incentive to build arguments around man to suggest that other species were designed for man's sake.It is no coincidence, for example, that horses are built for riding.Back then, such anthropocentric views could easily be carried to the point of absurdity, such as Prouck's claim that the ocean's tides were designed to help boats get in and out of docks.

Some serious naturalists, who have also advanced the design argument, realize that it is impossible to regard all creation as made for man's utility.In the course of their research the naturalist has found that many species are of little value to man, and yet these species show in certain ways that they are the product of the wisdom of their Creator.Each species is perfectly adapted to its own way of life, thereby confirming the idea that God's benevolence bestows upon all creatures.For example, notice that a predator has sharp teeth, which are great for catching prey.Isn't it contradictory to suggest that a benevolent God created animals only to kill other animals?Natural theology can reasonably explain this, arguing that in the long run the presence of carnivores reduces the degree of suffering in the world, because they remove old and diseased members of their prey species and bring them back to life as quickly as possible. die.In addition, the idea of ​​"natural balance" emerged as a precursor to modern ecology (Egarton, 1973).All agree that the interaction between species is a harmonious design to ensure the stability of the entire natural system.If some accidental cause causes the number of a species to increase unnaturally, the animals that prey on it will themselves increase in number, and the balance will soon be restored.In this way, natural theology includes an understanding of the relationship between predator and prey, but does not recognize the meaning of the struggle for existence.

Natural theology is mature enough to confront many phenomena that at first glance seem to contradict the view of a benevolent God, but some new discoveries pose problems.Why are there parasites such as intestinal worms?How do they fit into the design argument (Farley, 1977)?This is one of the few realms where some scholars have argued that there are parts of nature that exist to punish sinful humans.More directly related to our topic is the problem of fossils, especially those remains of species that no longer exist today.As the chief spokesman for natural theology, Ray found it difficult to accept the concept of extinction.How can we continue to believe in the perfection of God's work if some of God's creations perish?In order not to destroy the idea that creation is a perfect process, Ray takes another position, denying that fossils are derived from living things.However, as more fossils were discovered, this position clearly became untenable, and the steady-state view of creation had to be abandoned.

The utilitarian argument for design sees each species as a specific instance of adaptation, in addition to referring to ecological relationships.Yet no one believed that a rational God designed his creation piece by piece.There must be some complete picture that connects the different species-forms into a harmonious creative scheme.The belief that such a scheme is the basis for the apparent diversity of life is ancient, going back at least to ancient Greece.In its simplest form, it has been argued that this picture is a great chain of being, beginning with man and extending down, in the form of a hierarchy, to the simplest life-forms (Lovejoy, 1936).This is Foucault's example of a closed system of interrelationships.The links in this chain are predetermined because there needs to be a continuous relational link between the two ends.From a logical point of view, one could argue that once the broad outlines of the picture are understood, then intermediate types can be envisioned, even if these intermediate types are not yet known to science. In the face of the problem of extinction, the huge chain of existence is particularly vulnerable, because according to the original point of view, all chains must exist, or the picture of creation is not perfect.Extinction on any one chain destroys the symmetry of the entire chain.The only way to accept the elements of change is to admit that this chain is not a complete picture of nature, that the present existence of the chain only represents a sequence, and it will take a long time to fill this sequence.What existed in the early days of the earth was probably only the lower rungs of the creation ladder, after which life gradually climbed to higher levels.The idea that the chain of existence is "temporary" became the first to explain the history of life from a progressive perspective.A theory is certainly not Darwinian if it is based on the belief that there is progress toward a predetermined goal.Even emphasizing the idea that chains are transitory, the idea that there are huge chains is an obstacle to the development of the more overt view that we accept today that progress through diversity leads.In the serious discussion of biology in the 18th century, the idea of ​​​​the existence of the chain was gradually eliminated, and it was continued to be used only as a poetic metaphor.It is important to note that the more mature view of linear development continued to be popular as an alternative to Darwinism throughout the later history of evolution. According to Foucault, it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that there was a revolution in the understanding of nature that would give rise to Darwin's concept of open development.Foucault also insisted that the new taxonomic studies pioneered by Georges Cuvier bid farewell to the idea that the laws of nature were fixed and immutable, allowing naturalists to recognize that the variety of life has no limits.Although the forms of life are based on certain basic patterns, these patterns adapt to the requirements of each way of life without following any predetermined path.Note that in Foucault's view, it was Cuvier, the evolutionary Satan, who created the framework of the Darwinian worldview.What is decisive is the change in the relationship between natural forms, from a regular system to an open system, rather than the question of whether the various forms are designed by God or produced by natural evolution.Foucault believes that all the classic views of natural history in the 18th century insist on a formal view of natural interrelationships, even if they no longer insist on the view of a chain of existence.The chain of existence is the simplest imagining of the rules of creation, while a more mature taxonomy merely recognizes more complex relationships within an equally closed system of interrelationships. This poses a serious problem for our understanding of the developments that took place in taxonomy (the theory of classification) in the 18th century.Before 1700, some naturalists, like Ray, neglected to understand how actual species were related to each other in terms of the chains that existed.They believe it is necessary to start by exploring how similar different species are, without dealing with the hierarchy of complexity.A usable classification system expresses these interrelationships in a convenient way, and places newly discovered forms in their proper place by reference to their degree of similarity to known forms.By the middle of the 18th century there was an increasing need to invent a satisfactory system, which was resolved by the introduction of a series of new technologies.Historians have traditionally interpreted these developments as a revolution that laid the foundations for modern taxonomy.The nomenclature system developed by Linnaeus is the direct ancestor of the nomenclature system still in use today.According to 〖HTH〗our 〖HTSS〗understanding of the Linnaeus system, it is of course open and can include a very wide range of unexpected natural forms.Foucault would argue that this is not the system Linnaeus himself envisioned.We adapt Linnaean techniques to our modern point of view, forgetting that the original formation of the Linnaean system meant that the system determined a closed relational picture in order to coincide with the divinely created plan. Significantly, when Linnaeus finally acknowledged the necessity of temporary factors of change in nature, he chose not to emphasize the adaptation of organisms to new environments, but to use hybridization as the source of new species.Interbreeding among extant species poses a problem for the traditional view that every natural form is a fixed unit within the divine plan.But Linnaeus was able to explore this question as a way out of the dilemma posed by the concept of cosmic development.Hybrids are simply new combinations of existing traits, and this easily fits the belief that natural change is nothing more than filling new gaps in the existing rules of creation.Although the structure is very different, Linnaeus' theory is the same as the giant chain view of the temporary change of the chain, showing how the view of change in the 18th century cannot get rid of the barriers of closed relational systems.But will those who give up the belief that nature has divine laws support a materialist philosophy?Are they indeed at least able to actively research changes?This is of course difficult to reconcile with Foucault's interpretation.In the materialist view, no supernatural factor is needed to ensure the stability of any particular combination of matter particles, which means that the environment can determine the form of living things without limit.But we cannot simply conclude that the materialists of the Enlightenment had anticipated the modern theory of evolution.The philosophy of materialism is applied to the study of natural history through a series of problems that have previously been pivotal.This situation determines that their thinking is obviously different from that of modern materialists, and prevents them from breaking completely with the old concept that nature is the rule. Consider what 18th-century naturalists could use to trace the veracity of natural law in lieu of divine creation as an explanation for the origin of life.In most cases, such laws were conceived in terms of the mechanistic philosophy that arose with the triumph of physical science in the seventeenth century.Descartes' philosophy arbitrarily divides the world into two parts: one is the spiritual level, which belongs to the category of human spiritual life, and the other is the material level, and things on this level are conveyed to people's hearts through feelings.The material world is actually mechanical; all changes are produced by the rearrangement of the particles of matter.The body of an animal is nothing more than a physical structure governed entirely by the laws of mechanics (what we would today call a robot).Descartes insisted on his dualism, denying that a special life force controls the living body.His "animal machine" view became the starting point for many people in the 18th century to think about the laws of life in nature.Borelli's "Motions of Animals," published in 1680, succeeded in showing how the relationship between bone and muscle could be understood mechanically.Yet when it comes to more fundamental biological questions, the idea that animals are machines creates far more problems than it solves. The most critical issue is that of development, or "occurrence," the process traditionally believed to ensure the stability of species by ensuring that each individual forms in the same pattern.Here the early belief that living matter is governed by a special vital force appears especially appropriate.Aristotle once proposed that during fertilization, the male provides the force that determines tissue, shaping the passive matter provided by the female, thereby creating the complex structure of the embryo.Could purely mechanical force work with such precision to ensure the basic form of a species?It is inconceivable to the experienced naturalist that an animal machine, like the parts of a clock, should be capable of making another machine exactly like itself.The mechanist was therefore compelled to regard the embryo as preformed in the zygote, which grew only by assimilating matter into its own structure.William Harvey once believed that all animals came from eggs, and eggs are sometimes seen as containing a whole microscopic organism's "provenance," or seed.But looking at it this way still doesn't solve the problem, because the mother cannot be considered to have formed the seed within her. 〖HTH〗When she gave birth〖HTSS〗, the seed that will grow into her child is already in her body.To maintain the logic of this argument, her seed must exist in the body of 〖HTH〗her〖HTSS〗mother, and so on, the seed must exist in the body of the first mother, Eve.This "preformationism" (more properly called "pre-existing provenance") holds that, strictly speaking, all human beings were created in the first place by God, but one within the other, like a set. Russian dolls, waiting to be unwrapped generation after generation (Cole, 1930; Needham, 1959; Adelmann, 1966; Gasking, 1967; Roger, 1963; Bowler, 1971). It seems inconceivable that such a seemingly absurd theory has been seriously discussed for a century.The fact that it is taken seriously shows the influence of two factors, the doctrine that animals are machines and the design argument.Mechanistic philosophy in biology does not necessarily lead to atheism at first, because the only way to explain how animal machines came to be is to assume that animals (or animal genus) were created by God.Only as naturalists developed new confidence could they hope to explain the origin of life in a materialistic way.The first step was to show how the formation of an embryo in a normal womb could be explained by a complex pattern of Newtonian laws of physics; only after this would it be possible to use the same arguments to explain the formation of life on Earth.The fact that some important theories of the origin and development of life have indeed emerged from this deliberate challenge to the provenance theory suggests that the mechanistic origin of life is still an important idea.The theory of animals as machines and the concept of provenance determined the characteristics of the framework for exploring the origin of life in the eighteenth century.The subsequent collapse of this framework meant that later researchers, such as Darwin, not only ignored these strange concepts, but also did not consider the emergence of the earliest life on earth. By replacing the concept of provenance with the belief that every living body is formed by physical forces, naturalists have largely removed the walls that protected the immutable view of species.Some naturalists, like Buffon, in their search for a causal explanation of how the world came to be the way it is, are able to analyze how the environment might affect species over a long period of time.Naturalists at the time were reluctant, with good reason, to abandon the notion that life was fixed and unchanging.They must grasp very serious questions in explaining embryonic development: how matter can form complex, purposeful body structures and maintain similar structures over long generations.Even if the preservation of the species is not controlled by the gods, the true fact remains that the forms of nature are not infinitely variable.Furthermore, taxonomists have the practical advantage of proposing that species are fixed.Philosophers may venture to conjecture that nature is not stable, but for naturalists who try to provide usable classification systems, such a stance is tantamount to ruining their careers.From these practical considerations, Buffon soberly decided to uphold the fixed and unchanging view of life-forms by imagining that matter could only arrange itself according to limited pictures, and thus decided that all animals belonged to the kingdom Animalia.Here we see how a materialist is forced to compromise the traditional belief that there are stable rules within the manifestly changing material world. In contrast, some philosophers, such as the Baron d'Alembert, saw no reason to limit their conjectures to biological facts.Some very bold views on evolution can be found in the writings of materialists during the Enlightenment, and they used evolutionary views to attack existing religions.By shaking the foundations of biblical stories, they hope to strike at the intellectual structures that underpin traditional moral codes.It therefore makes sense to think, as boldly as possible, that species have no fixed structure, that nature is capable of creating any imaginable configuration through random combinations of atoms, and that only the most successful configurations survive.It would be a mistake to regard these wild conjectures as the true precursors of Darwin's theory of natural selection, yet it is generally believed that Enlightenment thinkers were able to arrive at the concept of complete openness to change. great chain of existence The doctrine of provenance represents the conservative aspect of mechanistic philosophy, which attempts to maintain the traditional relationship between God and nature.So we should not be surprised that provenance is allied with another ancient concept, that of the chain of existence.The concept of chains has a long history, going all the way back to ancient Greece (Lovejoy, 1936; Bynum, 1975).The concept of the chain of existence tries to see nature as a structurally complete system, which means that the system is completely designed by God.The concept of the chain of existence originated from the intuition of naturalists, that is, living beings can be arranged from the highest (human) to the most primitive, forming a complex hierarchical system. This concept believes that a linear creation plan combines two Extremely connected.In this chain, each species can be arranged in a unique position, and species closely related to this species are arranged above and below it respectively, through a series of regular intermediate links, and finally the highest organism and the lowest Waiting for the biological connection.As originally understood, the chain was a static arrangement of nature, indicating that the original creation was as we see it today.The doctrine of pre-existing provenance allows one to see how God maintains the structure of his program because God created the provenance series so that each species would be fertile.Finally, Charles Bonnet and J. B. Robinett, two philosopher-naturalists who combined the theory of provenance with the theory of the chain of existence, saw the chain as a project developed over time.In the course of Earth's history, the successive elements of the chain manifested one after the other, and the whole process was predetermined by the provenance system.Lovezoy calls this view the temporal view of the chain, which injects an element of time into an otherwise static scheme.While this view still holds that all development is nothing more than the manifestation of a fixed creative scheme, it is already a view that attempts to grasp cosmic change. Perhaps the best-known defender of provenance is the Swiss naturalist and philosopher Charles Bonnet (Whitman, 1894; Savioz, 1948; Glass, 1959b; Bowler, 1973; Anderson, 1982).Bonnet is best known for his discovery of parthenogenesis in aphids.The fact that females of this insect can reproduce several generations on their own without fertilization convinced Bonney that the microscopic structures that produced the entire series of generations must be stored in the aphid's mother.In his "On Organisms" in 1762 and "Meditations on Nature" in 1764, he developed a theory based on the concept of provenance: the provenance is a miniature body, which contains the entire structure of a new organism, all of which Generations are wrapped together one by one according to the principle of compression.Bonnet insisted that such a system was essential according to the mechanistic worldview: the laws of nature could not arrange matter in the complex structure of living things, but could only fill matter into existing structures already created by God. Of course, there is a problem with this, especially when confronted with genetic facts.If all organisms of a species come from the provenance structure contained in the mother, how can the offspring inherit the traits of the father?Bonnet's way of solving this problem is to think that the initiation of provenance development requires semen, so that some unique characteristics of the father can be passed on.In the end, he came to the conclusion that the provenance only determines the structure of the species, not the structure of the individual: the basic traits contained in the provenance only determine whether the creature grows into a human being, a dog, a horse or something.All the traits of the individual are due to substances absorbed by the provenance during growth, first from the semen of the male and then from the womb of the mother.Bonnet also believes that the provenance is not a microscopic body exactly like an adult organism, and it is impossible for people to identify it through a microscope.Provenance contains only the outlines of the basic structure, which can only be seen clearly when grown up. Provenance in its original state is no different from a deflated humanoid balloon. Bonnet was also an ardent proponent of chains of existence (Anderson, 1976).He believed that by arranging species in order of relatives, a perfect linear chain could be formed linking man to the lowest form of life (see diagram).Such an arrangement represents God's special creative plan, and the regularity of this plan has many important implications.It reinforces once again the belief that no species can become extinct.If the chain is complete according to plan, then God must make sure that the chain does not become unbalanced by removing parts of the overall picture.Species are "links" in the chain, so their structure must remain absolutely fixed and eternal.The doctrine of provenance offered Bonnet a way to see how God could maintain this absolute stability; God shaped the provenance of each species, thus ensuring that each closed series would grow to the same Types of. If the Creator had fashioned the entire provenance series in the same format, no variation of species would be possible.Yet Bonnet's system is potentially variable, and one could also argue from it that the Creator shaped different kinds of provenance that could grow in different historical periods.Ultimately, Bonnet believes that the existence of chains is not a steady-state scheme, but a step-by-step display over time that leads to the progression of life, from the simplest life at the bottom of the chain to the most complex life at the top of the chain.The whole process is pre-designed by the Creator through the different series of provenances he initially shaped. According to the plan, each sequence of provenances can only be manifested at a specific time. Figure 6. Existing chain This is Bonnet's simple statement of the existence of a great chain in his Meditations on Nature, published in 1764.This chain is established through a series of superficially similar morphologies, many of which, according to modern taxonomy based on internal structure, are nonsense.Note why it is necessary to establish a continuous linear picture up to the establishment of general relationships.Although many subsequent naturalists considered reptiles to be superior to fish, Bonnet arranged fish and reptiles in a different way because this would account for his transition from fish to birds and then to mammals. View.Even so, Bonnet has to admit that at a certain point the chain may fork, which shows that the view of a complete linear arrangement has begun to fail. Bonnet explored this idea of ​​general progress in his 1769 Philosophy of Rebirth.Interestingly, the idea of ​​general progress stems from Bonnet's interest in the Christian idea of ​​bodily resurrection, which can be achieved by the Creator endowing each soul with a second seed.He proposed that animals might also have souls, confined within their finite bodies, and could be resurrected in a higher animal body in the future.At that time humans will move to a higher level of existence, and animals will become humans, and plants will become animals.But why limit this resurrection to a future event?Perhaps in the past each soul has been through a series of physical incarnations, all developed through a seed originally provided by God.In each rebirth the soul is reproduced in a further perfected body, so that the history of life is a chain of existence that gradually climbs from the simplest body at the far end of the chain to the most perfect of the chains that we have today. body of.Bonnet concludes that geological upheavals have wiped out existing life forms time and time again, but that provenances that respond to future regeneration will survive and be able to develop into an entirely new group when the environment stabilizes . This is how Bonnet arrives at the idea of ​​biological progress through a temporal view of the chain of being.However, he does not go into detail about how the provenance reproduces, and his whole system appears too vague to be seen as a step towards the modern theory of evolution.In fact, some historians have given little weight to Bonney's system, arguing that it tries to bypass the implications of development by understanding things in terms of a single original origin (Whitman, 1894; Glass, 1959b).Of course progress means only the display of God's plan locked in a series of sources.However, some later naturalists are credited with playing some role in popularizing the view of evolution, but they also saw the development of living things as progress with a predetermined goal.Even if Bonnet condenses all of God's design into a single act, he is at least in tune with a growing trend of thought that no longer invokes miracles to interfere with the natural process of progress.他对于人们正在加深的对地球的兴趣作出了真正的回应，他利用地质剧变作为新种群产生的途径。事实上邦内已经表明他认识到每一个种群需要适应它们生活时期的环境，这比存在链条的简单线性上升更属于一种有预见的观点。 法国哲学家让—巴波蒂斯·罗宾奈在他的《论自然》（Robinet，1761-66；见Murphy ，1976）的第一卷和第四卷中，也对于由稳态的存在链条观变成进步的存在链条观作出过贡献。在罗宾奈的书中有比邦内的更著名的猜测。他并不相信存在的链条可以分成分别代表不同物种的链结。相反，他却把存在的链条想象成一个〖HTH〗连续〖HTSS〗的图景，很像一根绳子。他声称物种只是人的错觉，因为经过详细分析总是会发现一个完整的形态顺序，链条上的任何两个点都是相连的。将连续的分部划分为物种所根据的仅仅是中间类型的稀少，并且得到了那些图方便的博物学家的支持。自然界中不存在物种，只有个体对应着存在链条上每一个可能的环节。18世纪的许多博物学家被这种观点所吸引，乍一看，这种观点也许可以作为进化论的先驱。然而事实上，连续性的观点是旧传统的一部分，只有将其抛弃，才有可能产生出任何类似达尔文主义的学说（Zirkle，1959b）。达尔文并没有摧毁物种概念；他只是重新解释了它；在他的系统中，物种依然是〖HTH〗界限分明〖HTSS〗（但不是固定不变）的实体。罗宾奈的看法只能产生沿着预先规划好的形态顺序进步的变化思想，而不是现代的分支进化思想。 罗宾奈接受了生殖的种源学说，但是相信种源分散在自然界中，等待着适合发展的环境。他在书的第四卷中提出，在地球历史的进程中，存在链条上相连的种源一定是相继发展成熟。最初，最简单的种源能够发育，致使生命沿着链条进步，直至产生人类。邦内与罗宾奈的观点中存在着许多差异，但是这两个种源学说的头号支持者都将种源学说与存在链条的进步解释结合起来这一事实表明，即使通过保守的思想也能愈加认识到，在非常古老和不断发展的世界中，人类的出现比较晚。 新分类学 存在链条的基础是相信根据物种之间相似而建立的分类系统会自然地形成一个阶层体系的线性图景。这种观点在18世纪遇到了麻烦，当时的研究表明，越来越多的物种难以这样分类。这时对多数博物学家来说，自然太复杂，不可能以一种简单的线性图景来描述。人们需要一种更为灵活的表示生物之间关系的方法。 首先必须确立分类系统的基本单位。可能有人会提出自然界只存在个体生物，不能将它们归为明确限定的类群，罗宾奈就是这样做的，他提出存在链条是连续的观点。然而，不必认真观察也能发现，多数地方的生物个体属于某一特征明显的类群，传统上称之为“物种”，物种可以作为分类的基本单位。不过，博物学家也认识到，真实的物种状态，并不能总是容易地确定自然类群。约翰·雷在试图解决这个问题时提出，不能根据微小的区域差别来打破上帝最初创造的真实物种的基本单位。如果发现某些形态与已经知道的形态略有差异，就算作新的物种，这样做是荒谬的。这种差异可能是由于区域的环境连续作用于原来形态的缘故。不过造物主会确保这些变化不至于使他设计的形态变得模糊不清。这样就区分了作为由上帝创造的真正实体〖HTH〗物种〖HTSS〗，与由于条件变化在种内形成的〖HTH〗变种〖HTSS〗（Ray，1724；Raven，1942；Sloan，1972）。 接受了物种是真实的和固定不变的观点后，人们就可以着手解决不同形态之间表达自然关系的难题。雷在这一方面作出了重要的贡献，但是现代分类系统是由瑞典博物学家卡洛鲁斯·林奈建立的。林奈要绕过关于机械论哲学的无意义争论，通过确立不同生命形态之间真正的关系，带来了生物学上的革命。假如物种是上帝创造的，人们可能会设想理性的上帝大概会根据有意义的规则——对此只有人本身才可能有希望理解——形成这个世界。林奈相信他受到特别的恩典，可以看到造物主计划的轮廓，而他对这个计划的努力描述将成为新生物学的基础。他在《自然系统》（Linnaeus，1735）中大致勾勒了他的技术，《自然系统》最初时是一本很薄的小册子，几十年之后变成多卷本的经典，并使它的作者成为世界名人（Hagberg，1953；Blunt，1971；Larson，1971；Stafleu，1971；Broberg，1983；Fr？ngsmy r，1984）。 林奈自然哲学的核心还是上帝设计的概念。我们可以将物种分成有规则的体系这个事实恰好证明理性造物主的存在。对于相似物种〖HTH〗之间〖HTSS〗的关系，我们今天视为共同进化祖先的依据，但是按照林奈的神的计划观，相似物种只不过表明它们是上帝设想出来的。然而这个世界不只是一种形式上相互关系的图景，它在实际中还要起作用。正如自然神学所强调，造物主设计每一个物种适应其特定的生活方式；但是林奈及其追随者对于我们今天称作生居同一地区物种之间的生态关系更感兴趣。总的来说，每一物种在其生活中都是独立的，上帝通过设计一系列的检查和平衡机制，使每一物种的群体保持在一定的水平，从而确保了系统的长期稳定。于是，“自然平衡”观得到维护，物种之间的关系，其中有些部分后来认为是生存斗争的关系，也被融合到自然神学中（Bilberg，1752；Egerton，1973）。由于这些原因，物种当然既不能变的脱离了严格的界限，又不能灭绝，因为那样不仅会搅乱特创计划，而且还会破坏自然平衡。 由于相信神的特创计划，博物学家就必须去发现和描述这个计划的结构。起点自然是将那些明显相似的物种划归为更高水平的类群，叫做“属”，然后再根据更基本的类似，将属归类，依次进行。但是我们怎样确定相似的程度？必然会提出在造物主的计划中，〖HTH 〗每一种〖HTSS〗关系都有含义；因此一个真正自然的分类系统将考虑每一物种的所有性状。林奈相信建立这样一种自然系统是他的工作目的，虽然他在学术生涯的开始，为建立自然系统得到太多的大量信息，使他无从下手。他决定作为准备阶段，要先根据单一性状的相似，建立“人工系统”。这样并不一定得出完美的排列，而是得出特创计划的大致轮廓，将来随着经验的需要，还能作进一步的修改。在林奈自己的植物学领域，他根据卡梅拉琉斯1694年发现的植物性别，以生殖器官作为他的系统所依据的关键性状。这并不是一种人为的选择，因为生殖器官代表了物种结构的保持。 林奈人工系统的成功依赖于可以方便地将任何物种排列在正确的位置上。植物界分成若干纲，每一个纲又分成若干目。要确定一种植物所属的纲和目，只需数一下它的花上的雄蕊和雌蕊。将目分成属和种则要根据更详细的观察，要考虑花型和花的大小。在动物学中也引入了同样的分类，林奈在动物界中确定了6个纲。现代生物学家发现有必要极大扩充林奈的分类阶元，于是，属首先要组成科，然后再组成目和纲。下面的图表是经过现代改造的动物界的林奈系统，其中种组成属，属组成科。从这个图表上还可以看出林奈的另一个创新，“双命名法”，即用两个拉丁文名字表示一个物种。第一个名字表示属，第二个名字表示种。根据国际惯例，所有植物的命名始于林奈的《植物的种》（1753）和他的《植物的属》第五版（1754）。动物的命名始于他的《自然系统》第十版（1758），他在这本书中第一次用双命名法命名所有已知的动物。 图7.分类与双命名法 这个图表中所列举的物种，对于那些即使没有受到过生物学教育的人来说，也是熟悉的。这里列举的例子是属于两个科中的四个属：注意一下非常相近的物种是如何归入同一个属，而具有明显相似性的属归入同一个科。犬科和猫科属于哺乳动物纲中的食肉目。 林奈的系统并没有试图根据线性或链条形式表示物种之间的关系。实际上他的系统根本没有从本意上的“阶层体系”角度暗示物种按照等级排列。现代的生物学家根据不同的方法，将林奈的系统变成阶层体系的排列（更基本的类元给人的印象是更“高等的”，因为其中包括了更低等的类元），但是这种系统摧毁了存在链条中暗含的高等—低等排列，这种排列的根据的是人们对于生物组织复杂性的认识。有些向往自然系统的博物学家仍然相信线性排列是可能的（例如Adanson，1763）。但是林奈实质上是一个现实论者者：假如造物主的计划显然不是一个线性的图景，那么就要按照任何看起来像是自然的方式，确立物种之间的关系。在上面的图表中，事实上猫排在狗之上仅仅是由于偶然，不同动物组成的科中，任何动物都不比其他动物明显“优越”。任何物种都不会只有两个较近的亲戚，一种在上，一种在下。尽管物种的关系在每一种情况中会有不同，但是每一物种都会有很多近亲。这样一种关系系统不能表述为一纬的链，至少要求有二纬。林奈事实上在一张地图上画出了物种关系与相应国家之间的联系。 最初有人提出，物种之间的近缘关系只不过是上帝计划的一个正式的部分，但是建立这种偶然联系程度的相似性非常明显，诱使博物学家猜测属的形成是否就是因为一种单一的原型逐渐地分成一些密切相关的类型。林奈最初坚决地否认这种看法，但是他最后则承认一个属中的种由于不同环境的作用会呈增殖这个概念。或许由于没有充分认识到这样作的全部后果，他因此动摇了关于种和变种的区分。在有些情况下，区域的条件能产生很大的作用，使变种最终成为一个明显的新种。于是，如何能说清楚哪个物种是上帝原创的，则成为一个非常棘手的问题。 通过外界条件的作用产生新物种当然是一种进化，但是当时认为物种的增殖也可能是由于其他机制，林奈更加强调这一点：杂交（Robert，1929；Glass，1959b）。物种一般产生出完全一样的类型，但是不同形态之间的类型进行杂交，产生的类型就不一样了，骡子就是最为人们所知的一个例子，当然骡子是不育的，并不是由于马和驴的杂交直接产生的一个新种。但是林奈和他的学生最后还是相信，在植物界，两个物种可以杂交，产生出本身可以生殖的一种杂种。因为这个杂种与双亲不同，因而会构成一个新种。发现的第一个例子是云兰属植物中的一个新种，这是林奈的一个学生发现的，命名为Peloria(Rudberg，1752；Har tmann，1756)。林奈在其1756年所著“论植物的性别”（收录在Linnaeus，1749—90，卷10）一文中提出，在上帝最初的创世中，每一个属中只有一个种作基础，属中种的增殖是自然的杂交过程。 图8.林奈的杂交体系 A，B和C是最初创造的物种，而且一直保持着正常的繁衍。在某一时间，B的雌体接受来自A 的花粉而受精，产生出杂交物种B1，然后B1又正常繁衍。林奈相信，在这种杂交中，母本将决定杂种的基本性状，而父本只对一些表面性状有影响。在这个案例中，杂种属于和B属相同属中的一个新物种。后来B的雌体又与C的雄体杂交，产生出第二个杂交物种B2，B2也是B 属中的成员。当然，如果A和C的雌体与其他物种的雄体交配，也可以产生出它们自己的杂交变种。A－B－C的顺序并不代表一个存在的链条，所以，任何原初类型都可以与其他类型杂交，产生出同一属中全新的新物种系列。 其他学者则入认为，林奈所指的杂种只有略微的变化，或者是不育的形态（K？lreute r，1761—1766；Adanson，1779）。尽管人们一般都承认通过杂交有可能产生新的种，但是直到今天才真正接受这种看法。林奈探讨杂交现象作为物种数量增多的方式这个事实表明，对于18世纪涉及生命起源问题的人来说，有很多选择。他相信自然的基本结构仍然是上帝创造的最初遗传形态决定的，但是通过杂交的自然过程，无需神的干涉，就可以填补了上帝计划中细节上的空缺。至少自然的有限发展是可能的，而分类系统要反应真正的、而不是形式上的关系。 新的发生理论 虽然林奈的系统在实际应用中颇有建树，但是他试图使博物学家远离机械哲学的努力并没有取得特别的成功。一直有人热情地试图从物理学角度解释生物是如何活动的。笛卡尔的最初方案强调需要探讨宇宙中任何结构的机械起源，也有人提出了解释地球起源的理论。一些更激进的思想家注定会有野心把生命的发生也包括在机械论的纲要中，挑战上帝创造预先存在的种源学说。抛弃笛卡尔自己的物理学，赞成牛顿的物理学，这样最终对于整个笛卡尔纲要是有利的。因为牛顿已经提出了神奇的万有引力，万有引力可以通过一定的空间距离起作用，这时，这种构成“机械”系统的概念更加成熟。身体不再只是钟表上的零件，身体可以受到更复杂的（但仍然是物理学的）力量控制。一旦用牛顿的新物理学猛攻法国文化的堡垒，就会有人首次努力通过自然力解释发生。 如果生命体是由自然力、而非预先存在的种源形成的，那么就可能提出许多观点。按照邦内的理论，上帝创造出一系列种源，保证了物种的固定不变，但是假如发生是一种物质过程，这种保证就不会存在。如果亲体发生了变化，那么通过新胚胎形成的过程，是否有可能将这种变化传递下去？而且假如这种“获得性”遗传了许多代，难道不会改变整个物种的结构？除了自然转变之外，还有更令人激动的前景：解释地球上生命的起源。如果可以用物质过程解释一般的发生，难道我们不能设想，在某种特殊的情况下，自然力可以直接作用于非生命物质，产生出生命？生命从非生命物质的“自然发生”是唯物论纲领的最后目标，因为这种观点便把上帝彻底排除在直接控制整个世界之外。 在通向唯物论解释生命起源的路上，德梅耶特迈出了一步，他在《特耶梅德》中提出的地球理论中，首次完全放弃援引创世和大洪水。这本书虽然出版于1748年，但是完成的时间却早于笛卡尔物理学只是简单地使种源理论完全不可能成立。德梅耶特坚持用唯物论的观点，他不认为地球形成之后生命有一个神奇的开端。相反，他采纳了一种种源学说的看法，认为种源独立存在，并且扩散到整个宇宙。正常的发生是由于一个适当物种的种源发现了可以进入一个能够作为其母亲的母体子宫的途径。在地球上有生命之前，广阔的古海洋的水有可能为种源的成熟提供一种环境。每一物种的最早成员并不是通过奇迹形成的，而是通过那些找到在地球上生存的种源的自然发展形成的。 德梅耶特通过提出种源随着生长适应了不同的环境，从而抛弃了奇迹，并且部分绕过设计的论点。他也曾试图通过提出种源伴随宇宙一直存在，即种源是永远存在的，而避免假设种源本身的超自然起源。极端的唯物论哲学家拉美特里也在倡导一种类似的生命起源学说。然而即使这种改变了的种源学说，按照唯物论的框架，也不是真正合适的。因为每一种生命的机构主要来源于它的种源，因此人们仍然会问种源是如何形成或“设计的”。提出种源像宇宙一样的永恒只是回避这个问题。因为仍然需要某些东西，而不仅是自然法则，来解释生命的起源，而这种“某些东西”，即种源，依然有可能是神创的。只有彻底抛弃种源观，用物质本身来解释生命的起源，才有可能完全坚持唯物论的立场。