Chapter 3 Title II-1

Part II 73-29 (60) 67-59 Part One: The Sadness of Man Without God. Part Two: Man's happiness when he has God. or: Part One: On the Corruption of Nature.By nature itself. Part Two: On the Existence of a Saviour.According to the Holy Book. 70-47 (61) 127-48 Sequence—I could very well deal with the sequence section as follows: to prove the falsity of all circumstances, of the everyday life, and then of the philosophical life of the skeptics and of the Stoics; kind of sequence.I know a little of what it is, but how few people know it.None of the human sciences can grasp it.St. Thomas didn't get a hold of it either.

Mathematics grasps it, but mathematics is also futile in depth. 76-48 (62) 308-47 Preface to Part One—to talk about those who have explored self-knowledge; about Sharon's vexing and tiresome subsection; Jumping from topic to topic in an attempt to avoid it; he strives for elegance. His stupid design for self-portrait!And this was by no means incidental or contrary to his maxim, as everyone errs; but it was his own maxim, and a major, fundamental plan.It is only a common affliction to say stupid things out of accident and weakness; but it is intolerable to say stupid things plannedly, let alone things like . . .

77-936 (63) 330-19 Montaigne—Montaigne had too many shortcomings.A frivolous phrase; it's worthless, whatever Miss Gourney may say. A man without eyes—this is credulity.Finding a square from a circle, a bigger world—this is ignorance.And his feelings about murder, about 72's death.He encourages indifference to salvation, neither fear nor repentance.His book was not written in defense of piety, so he need not deal with it: but we are always bound not to depart from it.We can forgive him a somewhat free and dissolute feeling for certain occasions of life (730, 331); but we cannot forgive him a purely pagan feeling for death; for if a man is not at all To think of dying like a Christian, he must forsake all piety.Thus Montaigne, throughout his books, thinks of death with tenderness and timidity.

79-758 (64) 354-43 It was not in Montaigne but in myself that I discovered what I saw in him. 78-935 (65) 436-22 Montaigne possessed advantages that can only be acquired with great pains.His vices--I mean besides morals--are immediately correctable; if he can be told that he quotes too much and talks too much about himself. 81-120 (66) 156-23 Man must know himself: if this does not help to discover the truth, at least it will help to regulate his life; nothing can be more true. 196-60 (67) 320-40 The Falsehood of Science—The science of external things will not comfort my moral ignorance in times of distress; but the science of virtue will always comfort my ignorance of external science.

82-716 (68) 149-20 We don't teach people to be upright, but we can teach them everything else; and they can never boast of knowing anything else as much as they can boast of their own integrity.They only boast that they know the only thing they have never learned. 84-78 (69) 317-21 Two infinities, the middle way - when we read too fast or too slow, we understand nothing. 84-251 (70) 374-61 Nature does not ... - [Nature places us so well in the middle that if we change one side of the balance we change the other: I act.This leads me to believe that the elastic forces in our brains are also arranged in this way, and whoever touches one point of it also touches its opposite. 〕

84-75 (71) 376-373 Too much wine and too little wine: give him none, and he will not be able to discover the truth; give him too much, and the same will happen. 84-390 (72) 117-283 Human disproportion—[This is what our natural knowledge leads us to: if they are not true, man has no truth at all; Bow your head that way and see that there is great reason to be humble.Moreover, since man cannot live without believing in them, I hope that he can seriously and comfortably consider nature before he engages in a large-scale discussion of nature, and that he can also look back at himself and know what proportion he has. . . .] Let man contemplate, then, all the sublime and grandeur of nature, and let his eyes escape the humble things that surround him!Let him behold the radiant sun that lights up the universe like an everlasting fire; let the earth appear to him as a speck in comparison with the gigantic orbit the sun traces; and What shocked him was that the huge orbit itself was nothing more than a tiny dot compared to the orbits orbited by the revolving stars in the sky.But if our sight stops here, let our imaginations go beyond; it is not so much nature that furnishes the material as our powers of conception that are impotent.The whole visible world is but an imperceptible trace in the vast embrace of nature.No idea can approximate it.We may inflate our conceptions beyond all conceivable dimensions, but they are mere atoms compared to the truth of the matter.It is a sphere with a center everywhere and no surface anywhere.In the end, our imagination will be lost in this kind of thinking, which is the most striking feature of God's omnipotence.

Let a man turn to himself and consider what he is in comparison with all that exists; let him see himself as lost in this remotest corner of nature; In this narrow cage—I mean this universe—learn to estimate the correct value of the earth, kingdoms, cities, and himself! And what is a man in the infinite? But in order to show him another spectacle that is equally astonishing, let him explore the smallest things he knows.Let us give him a parasite whose body is tiny and whose parts are even tinier, the muscles in its joints, the veins in its muscles, the blood in its veins, the veins in its blood slime, its mole in its slime, its steam in its mole; and to divide these last things again, let him exhaust the power of such concepts, and let him reach as far as he can The last thing is the object of our present discussion; he may think, this is the extreme smallness in nature.But I want him to see that there is still no bottom here.I would describe to him not only the visible universe, but also the infinity of nature which he could conceive within the arms of this atomic sketch.Let him see therein an infinite number of universes, each of which has its own firmament, its own planets, its own earth, in the same proportions as this visible world; There are animals, and finally parasites, and these he will find the same as he had before; and since in these others the same can be found endlessly and endlessly, let He revels in these wonders, dreadfully small, as in others equally dreadfully large; for who can but marvel at our body, imperceptible in the universe, imperceptible in itself in the embrace of all. Consciousness, and compared with that nothingness beyond which we cannot reach, suddenly becomes a genie, a world, or rather a whole!

Whoever thinks of himself in this way is terrified of himself, and when he thinks that he is held within a mass which nature has given him between the two pits of infinity and nothingness, he will He shuddered at these marvelous sights; and I believe that as his curiosity turned into admiration he would be more and more inclined to meditate on them rather than to study them speculatively. For what is man in nature?To infinity is nothingness, to nothingness it is all, a middle term between nothingness and wholeness. He is infinitely far from understanding both extremes, and the end of things and their origin are insurmountably hidden for him in an impenetrable mystery; Both are equally unfathomable to the infinity in which he is swallowed up.

What can he do, then, but observe the outer appearance of [some] of things in the eternal despair of knowing neither their principle nor their end?Everything comes out of nothingness and ends in infinity.Who can follow these astonishing processes?The Creator of all these miracles understood them.No one else can do this. Without thinking about these infinities, men venture to study nature as if they had a certain proportion to it.It is simply a strange thing that they try to understand the principles of things, from a conjecture as infinite as their objects, and thereby arrive at the knowledge of everything.For there can be no doubt that we could not have formed this plan without conjecture, or with a power as infinite as nature.

When we do, we shall understand that Nature impresses her own shadow, and that of her Maker, upon all things, and that almost all things bear her double infinity.It is from this that we can see that all sciences are infinite in their field of inquiry, for who can doubt that the propositions to be proved in geometry, for example, are infinite?And they are also infinite in their multiplicity and subtlety; for who does not know that those principles which we take to be final propositions are not valid in themselves, but depend on other principles, which It has to be based on another principle, so the final principle is never allowed?We have, however, determined certain final principles for the same reasons which seem to be the same as we do with regard to material things; and of material things, which are beyond the perception of our senses, we call is an indivisible point of matter, though by its nature it is infinitely divisible.

Of these double infinities of science, the grand infinity is the easiest to feel, and that is why so few people claim to know everything. Democritus said: "I will speak of everything". Yet tiny infinity is less obvious.Philosophers often claim to have reached this point, but it is at this point that they all stumble.This has given rise to such familiar titles as The Principle of Everything, Principles of Philosophy, which, though superficially inferior, are in fact as good as that other glaring book, De omni sci-bili. Exaggerated. We naturally believe that we are strong enough to reach the center of things, not merely grasp their circumference; the visible extent of the world is obviously beyond us; but since we are beyond the tiny things, we Just believe that we can master them.But the attainment of nothing requires no less power than the attainment of everything; both require infinity, and it seems to me that whoever understands the ultimate principle of all things can finally know the infinity.The two are interdependent, and the two are interlinked.These two extremes come into contact and join each other by virtue of their distance from each other, and find each other in God and in God alone. So let us recognize our own boundaries; we are something, but not everything.The very fact that we exist deprives us of knowledge of first principles, which are born out of nothing; and the smallness of our existence blinds our vision of the infinite. Our understanding occupies only the same place in the order of intelligible things as our body occupies in the realm of nature. We are finite in every respect, and thus exhibit this middle state between two extremes in every respect of our powers.Our senses fail to perceive any extreme: too loud a sound is deafening, too bright a blinding, too far or too close a sight, too long or too short a speech to obscure a point, too much truth to overwhelm a man. (I know some people don't understand that zero minus four makes zero), first principles make us feel too sure, too much joy makes people unpleasant, too much harmony makes music bad; too much kindness is disturbing, we are willing to be a little Things can superpay debts: Beneeicia eousque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multumante-venere, pro gratia odium redditur.We feel neither extreme heat nor extreme cold.All excess qualities are our enemy, and are impossible to feel: we no longer feel them, but bear them.Too young and too old are both bad for the spirit, as is too much education and too little; in short, extreme things seem to us as if they do not exist at all, we are not in their eyes at all: They avoid us, or we avoid them. This is what is true of us; it is what makes it impossible for us either to know with certainty or to be absolutely ignorant.We are driving in a vast expanse, drifting in perpetual uncertainty, being pushed from one end to the other.We try to hold on to a point to anchor ourselves to, but it ripples away from us; if we pursue it, it eludes our grasp, slipping away from us in an eternal flight.Nothing can stay for us.This state is both natural to us and most contrary to our will; we burn with the desire to seek a firm base and a lasting final stronghold, on which to build a tower that can rise to infinity. tower; but our whole foundation is broken, and the earth is split into an abyss. So let us not seek certainty and certainty.Our reason is always deceived by the inconsistency of appearances, and nothing can fix the finite between the two infinities that both contain and evade the finite. After this point is well understood, I believe that each of us will settle down in the state that nature has arranged for us.Since this intermediate state to which we are destined is always at a distance from extremes, what is the point of human beings knowing a little more?If he has a little more, he has a higher understanding.But isn't he always infinitely far away from the ultimate?And if we live another ten years in our life, isn't it also infinitely far away from eternity? Under this view of the infinite, all finites are equal; and I see no reason why I should prefer to set my imagination on one finite than on another.The mere comparison of ourselves with the finite is enough to make us miserable. If man will first study himself, he will see how impossible it is for him to go any further.How can the part know the whole?Perhaps, however, he would wish to know at least those parts which are proportional to him.But all the parts of the world are so related and related to each other that I am convinced that without one part or without the whole it is impossible to know another part. Man, for example, is related to everything he knows.He needs a place to stay, time to subsist, motion to live, elements to compose him, heat and food to nourish him, air to breathe; he sees light, he feels objects; in short, everything are all associated with him.Therefore, if one wants to know man, one must know why he needs air to survive; and to know air, one must know why it has such a relationship with human life, and so on.Flame cannot exist without air; therefore, to know the former, one must know the latter. Since all things are cause and made, supporter and aided, hand and hand, and all things are connected by a natural and imperceptible bond which connects the most remote with the most Things that are not the same are connected—connected; so I think it is impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole, and it is equally impossible to know the whole without knowing the parts specifically. [The eternity of things in themselves, or in God, should also amaze our short lives. The fixed and enduring immutability of nature should have the same effect in comparison with the constant change we experience in ourselves. ] And what makes us powerless to know things is that things are one, whereas we are composed of two natures of opposite and different kinds, soul and body.For it would be impossible for the reasoning part of us to be anything other than mind; and if we thought we were mere flesh, it would all the more exclude our knowledge of things, and nothing can Even more inconceivable is the idea of ​​knowing itself; it is impossible for us to know how matter could know itself. Therefore, if we [are] mere matter, we know nothing; and if we are composed of mind and matter, we cannot adequately know mere things, whether mental or physical. . From this it can be seen that almost all philosophers confuse their ideas of things, and they speak of physical things from the spiritual side, and spiritual things from the physical side.For they talk a great deal about the tendency of the flesh to pervert, that it seeks its own center, that it flees from its own destruction, that it fears the void, and that it also has inclinations, sympathies, and antipathies of all sorts of spiritual things.And when they start from the spirit, they regard the spirit as existing in a certain place, and attribute to the spirit also the movement from one place to another, but these are purely physical things. Instead of accepting the ideas of these mere things, we anoint them with our own character; and stamp all the mere things we think of with our own synthetic life. Who would not believe that such an amalgamation is quite intelligible to us, since we synthesize everything with our mind and body?Yet it is this which we least understand.To himself, man is the most wonderful object in nature; for he cannot conceive what a body is, much less what a spirit is, and the most inconceivable thing is that a body can be united with a spirit.This is the pinnacle of his difficulty, and yet this is his own existence: Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiriH reads: "Since we explain everything by the synthesis of spirit and body". "It" refers to nature. tus comprehendi ab hominibus non potest, et hoc tamen homo est.Finally, to conclude the proof of our vulnerability, I end with these two considerations... 189-124 (73) 164-60 [Perhaps, however, the subject is beyond the capacity of reason.Let us, therefore, examine its original vision of what is within its power.If there is anything which, by its own inherent interest, can make the most serious application to itself, it is the inquiry into the highest good.Let us, therefore, see where these powerful, discerning souls place the highest good, and see if they agree. Some say that the highest good consists in virtue, others attribute it to pleasure; some in knowledge of nature, others in truth: Eelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, still others in ignorance, Still others in idleness, others in the rejection of illusions, others in aspirations, and true skeptics in their indifference, doubt, and eternal suspense; People still want to discover something better.We have benefited a lot from these. According to the rules, it is adjusted to the following outline. It should be seen that if, after so long and so laboriously, this fine philosophy has yielded nothing certain, at least the soul may at least know itself.Let us hear what the world's authorities have said about this subject.What do they think of its substance? 394.Were they more fortunate in arranging it? 395.What have they discovered about its origin, its continuation, and its demise? 399. But is the subject of the soul too noble for their meager knowledge?Let us then bring it down to matter, and see if it understands what the body itself is made of which it animates, and whether it understands what it thinks and can move as it pleases. those other objects.What do the great omniscient dogmatists know about this? Harum sententiarum, 393. This is undoubtedly enough, if reason is rational.It is well justified enough to admit that it has not yet discovered anything solid; yet it does not give up, it always wants to get there, it is always ardent in this inquiry, and confident in itself. has the necessary strength for such a conquest.This must be attained, and let us, having examined its powers in respect of their effects, come to know them in themselves; let us see whether they have some forms and some powers to grasp the truth. 〕 188-40, 303 (74) 158-562 A stupid letter on human science and philosophy. This epistle precedes the treatise on entertainment. Eelix qui potuit． ． ． Nihil admirari. There are 280 supreme goods in Montaigne's book. 191-761 (75) 71-527 Part I, 1, 2, Chapter 1. Section 4. 〔guess.There's nothing difficult about taking it down a notch and making it ridiculous.For in order to begin with itself,] what could be more absurd than the following statement?Saying that inanimate objects also have feelings, fears, and terrors, saying that inanimate, inanimate, or even impossibly living objects also have feelings (this at least presupposes that there is a sentient soul that can feel them), It even goes so far as to say that the object of this horror is emptiness. What is there in the void to frighten them?Could anything be shallower, more ridiculous?This is not enough, and it is said that they themselves have a principle of movement. To avoid emptiness, do they also have arms, legs, muscles, and nerves? 193-92 (76) 141-62 Articles should be written against those who study science too far.Descartes. 194-(77) 134-63 I cannot forgive Descartes; in all his philosophy he wanted to be able to leave God alone; yet he could not do without a touch of God in order to set the world in motion; otherwise he had no need of God up. 195-297 (78) 69-65 Descartes is both useless and unreliable. 192-174 (79) 207-64 [Descartes - in general it must be said: "It is composed of numbers and motions" because this is true. But to say what it is, and to construct the machine; that would be absurd.Because it's useless, unreliable, and annoying.If that were true, we would judge all philosophy as not worth the effort. 〕 101-188 (80) 136-144 A lame man does not vex us, but a lame spirit does; why is this? It is because a lame man admits that we walk uprightly, and a lame spirit says that it is we who are lame; but we should pity them instead of irritating them. Epictetus asks with exceptional force: "Why are we not offended when someone says something is wrong with our heads, but we are offended when someone says something is wrong with our reasoning or our choices? What?" The reason is that we can be quite sure that our head is not wrong and our feet are not lame; but whether we have chosen the truth, we are not so sure.Since we are sure only because we have seen it with all our sights; therefore, when others also see with all their sights the opposite, it makes us hesitate and wonder; and We are all the more so when millions are laughing at our choices; for it is hard and difficult to insist on preferring our own wisdom to that of all others.But there is never such ambivalence about the feeling of a crippled man. 103-256 (81) 82-66 It is natural for the mind to believe, and for the will to love; so that in the absence of real objects, they must cling to falsehood. 104, 92-81 (82) 83-68 Imagination—it is the most deceitful part of life, the master of falsehood and falsehood; and it does not always deceive, the more so; If it is a measure, it will also be the ever-reliable measure of truth.But though it is most often false, it does not show any sign of its quality, and it ascribes the same character to both true and false. I am not speaking of fools, I am speaking of the wisest; and it is among the wisest that the imagination has its great faculty of persuasion.Reason, though appealing, cannot prescribe the value of things. This haughty power, the enemy of reason, loves to master reason and rule it; in order to show how omnipotent it is, it has laid down a second nature in man.It makes man happy, makes man unhappy, makes man healthy, makes man sick, makes man rich, makes man poor; it makes man believe in, doubt or deny reason; Its folly and its wisdom. And nothing puzzles us more than to see that it fills its masters with a full and complete satisfaction far more than reason.The wise man enjoys himself far more with his imagination than the deep thinker can with his mere intellect.They look down upon the world; they argue with courage and confidence where others shrink and hesitate.And this gaiety often gives them a head start in the opinions of their hearers, and the imaginary sage has the same advantage over judges of the same nature.Imagination does not make fools wise, but it does make them happy, which is beyond the envy of reason, which can only make its own friends unhappy; imagination honors, reason disgraces. If it were not for this power of imagination, who would be able to distribute fame?And who can ascribe respect and reverence to men, to works, to laws, to great things?How scant would all the wealth of the world be without its sanction! Can you say that this magistrate, who by his venerable age commanded the awe of all the people, was not governed by a pure and sublime reason?Can you say that he is not judging things by their nature, and is not haunted by illusory situations which only stab the imagination of the weak?You see him go into church to hear a sermon, where he is filled with pious zeal, and his intellectual firmness is strengthened by his fervent benevolence.He is here prepared to hear with an exemplary reverence.Suppose the Preacher was there, and nature had endowed him with a hoarse throat and an odd countenance, and if his barber had not shaved him, and if he happened to get extra dirty now and then; then whatever he preached What a great truth, I bet our senators would lose their dignity. If the greatest philosopher in the world stands upon a board just a little larger than necessary, with a precipice below; however much his reason may assure him of his safety, his imagination must prevail.Most people would never accept the idea without looking pale and sweating. I do not want to describe the full consequences of it. Who doesn't know that the sight of a cat or a mouse, or a lump of coal being crushed, etc., can throw the mind off its feet?The tone of voice can sway the wisest of men, and change the force of an essay or a poem. Love or hate can change the face of justice.How extraordinarily legitimate will a lawyer, well paid in advance, find in the case he defends!How superior his firm posture would have made him appear to the judge, deceived by this illusion!Frivolous reason!You fall with the wind, and you can fall in any direction. I can describe almost all the actions of those who are scarcely moved except by the assaults of the imagination. For reason is obliged to yield, and the wisest man makes for his principles those things which the human imagination has always been ready to introduce to him. [People who are only willing to follow reason are fools in the judgment of ordinary people. And we must judge by the judgment of the greatest number of people in the world.As that is endearing, we must all day toil for imaginary advantages; and, when sleep has banished our intellectual fatigue, we must rise again to pursue such passing clouds, The color to serve the mistress of the world.This is one of the reasons for the error, but it is not the only one. ] Our Chief Executive knows this mystery well.Their scarlet robes, the ermine cloaks in which they wrapped themselves like furry cats, the halls in which they judged, those lily-flowered banners, all this grand appearance was necessary.Had doctors not had their coats and mules, had doctors not had square hats and gowns with baggy sides, they would never have been able to fool the world, which cannot resist such a show of authority.If they really uphold justice, if doctors really have the ability to cure diseases, they don't need to wear square hats; the dignity of these knowledge is itself enough to be respected. But since they have only imaginative learning, they are compelled to employ these vain instruments of impressing the imagination of others, and they have to play with it; in fact, it is by this that they earn their respect.Only fighters don't use this kind of camouflage, because in fact their role is the most essential, they are self-supporting by strength, others have to show. It is so that our kings do not seek these pretense.They do not display themselves in special disguise; but they are surrounded by guards and kings.Those armed red-faced men with fists and bravery who guard them specially, those trumpets and drums who walk in front of them, and those guards who surround them, all these make the strongest people tremble.They don't just have clothes, they have arms.It would take an extraordinary level of sanity to consider the Grand Duke, who lived in his exquisite harem surrounded by forty thousand Janissaries, as a mortal man. It is almost impossible to look at a lawyer in frock coats and square hats and not take a liking to his talents. Imagination arranges everything; it makes beauty, justice, and happiness, and happiness is everything in the world.I long with all my heart to read an Italian work whose title alone is worth as many works as I know: Della opinione regina del mondo Queen"〕.I didn't know the book, but I admired it, except for its faults - if any. This is largely the function of that power of deceit, which seems to have been deliberately given to us in order to lead us into inevitable errors.But we also have many other sources of error. It is not only old impressions that can deceive us; the allure of novelty is equally capable.由此便产生了人们各式各样的争论；人们在互相谴责时，不是遵循着自己幼年的错误印象，便是轻率地追求着新奇的印象。谁能把握住正中呢？就请他出来加以证明吧！ 没有什么原则——不管它可能是多么地自然，哪怕是从儿时就已有的——是不能被我们看成一种教育上的或者是感官上的错误印象的。 有人说：“因为你从小就相信在你看到箱子里没有东西的时候，箱子就是空的；所以你就相信真空是可能的。这是我们感官的一种幻觉，是被习惯所巩固下来的一种幻觉，它必须由科学来纠正”。另有人又说：“因为在学校里人们就告诉你们说，根本就没有真空，你们的常识若是竟然那么清晰地理解到了这种坏观念，你们的常识就是被人败坏了；并且必须恢复你们原来的本性，才能纠正它”。到底是谁在欺骗你们呢？是感官呢？ 还是教育呢？ 我们还有另一种错误的原由，即种种疾病。它们可以损坏我们的判断和感官；如果大病显而易见地变更了我们的判断和感官，那末我就绝不怀疑，小病也会按比例地在这方面造成同样的痕迹。 我们自身的利益也是一种奇妙的工具，足以使我们眼花缭乱。就是世界上最公正的人，也不可以担任他自己案件的审判官；我知道曾有人为了不致陷于这种自爱，竟出于相反的偏见而成为世界上最不公正的人：要使一件完全公正的案情败诉，最可靠的办法就是让他们的近亲来劝告他们。 正义和真理乃是如此之精微的两个尖端，以致于我们的工具总会过于粗糙而无法确切地接触到它们的。假如我们的工具居然能做到这一点，它们也会撞坏尖端，并且会整个倒在错误上面而不是倒在真理上面。 〔因而人是构造得如此之幸运，以致他并不具备任何有关真理的正确原则或者某些有关谬误的优秀原则。现在就让我们来看究竟有多少……。然而这些错误之最强而有力的原因，则是感官与理智之间的战争。 〕 92—82（83）163—779 必须就从此处开始写论欺骗的力量这一章。人不外是一个充满着错误的主体，假如没有神恩，这些错误就是自然而然的而又无法免除的。没有任何东西可以向他显示真理。 一切都在欺弄他；真理的这两个根源，即理智和感官，除了两者都缺乏真诚性而外，并且还彼此互相欺弄。感官以虚假的表象在欺弄理智；而正是感官所加之于理智的那种骗局，又轮到感官自己从理智那里接受过来：于是理智就对感官进行了报复。灵魂的热情搅乱了感官，给感官造成了虚假的印象。 它们都在撒谎并竞相欺骗。 然而除了这些由于偶然与由于缺乏智慧而产生的错误以及它们性质不同的能力…… 108—138（84）172—72 想象力以一种狂幻的估计而把微小的对象一直膨胀到充满了我们的灵魂；它又以一种粗鲁的狂妄而把宏伟的对象一直缩小到它自己的尺度之内，例如在谈到上帝的时候。 109—135（85）366—381 最能抓住我们的事情，例如保藏好自己的那一点财产，几乎往往都是微不足道的。 正是虚无，我们的想象却把它扩大成一座山。想象力多绕一个弯子，就不难使我们发见这一点了。 110—387（86）132—382 〔我的幻想使我恨一个哇哇喊叫的人和一个吃东西喘气的人。幻想具有很大的压力。 我们从它那里得到什么好处呢？ 因为它是自然的，所以我们就要跟随这种压力吗？No.而是我们就要抗拒它……。 〕 106—（87）305，133—383 Quasi quidquam ineelicius sit homini cui su eigmenta dominantur．〔仿佛是有比一个人被自己想像所左右更加不幸的事情似的。〕语出蒙田《文集》第2卷第1 2章引起林尼的话。 （普林．） 111—153（88）293，154—205 孩子们害怕他们自己所涂的鬼脸，那是孩子；但是作孩子时是如此脆弱的人，有什么办法年纪大了就可以真正坚强起来呢！我们只不过是在改变着幻想而已。凡是由于进步而完美化的东西，也可以由于进步而消灭。凡是曾经脆弱过的东西，永远不可能绝对坚强。我们尽可以说：“他长成人了，他已经变了”；但他还是那同一个人。 449—194（89）388—208 习惯是我们的天性。习惯于某种信仰的人就相信这种信仰，而不再惧怕地狱，也不相信别的东西。习于相信国王可怕的人……，等等。因而谁能怀疑，我们的灵魂既是习惯于看到数目、空间、运动，所以就会相信这些而且是仅仅相信105，117—133（90）162—207 Quod crebro videt non miratur，etiamsi cur eiH at nescit；quod ante non viderit，id si evenerit，osH tentum esse censet．（西赛．583） Nae iste magno conatu magnas nugas dixerit． 118—922（91）404—206 Spongia solis——当我们看到一种效果总是照样出现时，我们就结论说其中有着一种自然的必然性，比如说将会有明天，等等。然而大自然往往反驳我们，而且她本身也并不服从她自己的规则。 119—240（92）76—82，83 我们天赋的原则如其不是我们所习惯的原则，又是什么呢？而在孩子们，岂不就是他们从他们父亲的习惯那里所接受的原则，就像野兽的猎食一样吗？ 一种不同的习惯将会赋予我们另一种天赋的原则，这是从经验可以观察到的；假如有习惯所不能消除的天赋原则的话，那也就是有违反自然的、为自然所不能消除的以及为第二种习惯所不能消除的天赋原则了。这一点取决于秉性。 120—241（93）153—9 父母生怕孩子们的天赋的爱会消逝。可是那种可以消逝的天性又是什么呢？习惯就是第二天性，它摧毁了第一天性。然而天性又是什么呢？何以习惯就不是天然的呢？我倒非常担心那种天性其本身也只不过是第一习惯而已，正如习惯就是第二天性一样。 121—162，165（94）150—368 人的天性完全是自然，omne animal．没有任何东西是我们所不能使之自然的；也没有任何自然的东西是我们不能把它消灭的。 122—914（95）333—366 记忆、欢乐都是情操；甚至于几何学的命题也会变成情操，因为理智造成了自然的情操，而自然的情操又被理智所消除。 123—202（96）401—367 当人们习惯于使用坏的推理去证明自然的效果时，人们就不愿意在发见了好的推理时，再接受好的推理了。我们可以举出一个例子，即血液循环之可以用来解说为什么血管被绑扎起来就会发胀。 127—254（97）436—369 一生中最重要的事就是选择职业；而安排择业的却是机遇。习俗造成了泥水匠、兵士、石匠。有人说：“这是位优秀的石匠”，而谈到兵士时则说：“他们是十足的蠢材”；另有人正好相反：“没有比战争更加伟大的事了；其他的人都是下贱货”。我们根据幼年时听到人称赞某些行业并鄙视其他各种行业而进行选择；因为我们天然是爱好真理并憎恶愚蠢的，这些话就打动了我们；我们只是在实践上犯了过错。习俗的力量是如此巨大，以致于我们竟从天性只是造成其为人的人们中，造成了人的各种境况；因为有的地方就都是瓦匠，另有的地方又都是兵士，等等。毫无疑问，天性绝不会是如此齐一的。 因而造成了这一点的就是习俗，因为习俗束缚了天性；可是也有时候是天性占了上风，并且不顾一切好的或坏的习俗而保存下了人的本能。 124—384（98）390—370 偏见导致错误——最可哀的事就是看到人人都只考虑手段而不顾目的。每个人都梦想着怎样利用自己的处境；但是选择处境以及选择国度，那便只好听其命运来配给我们了。 最可怜的事就是看到有那么多的土耳其人、异端和异教徒都在步着他们祖先的后尘，其唯一的理由就是他们人人都先入为主地认定那就是最好的。而正是这一点就决定了每个人的各种处境，如锁匠的处境、兵士的处境，等等。 正是由于这一点，野蛮人就根本不要神明。 472—375（99）100—371 意志的行为与其他一切行为之间有着一种普遍的和根本的不同。 意志是信仰的主要构成部分之一；并不是它可以形成信仰，而是因为事物是真是假要随我们观察事物的方面而转移。 意志喜好某一方面更有甚于其他方面，它转移了精神对意志所不喜欢见到的那些方面的性质的考虑；于是与意志并肩而行的精神也就不去观察它所喜爱的那方面；这样它就只根据它所见到的方面进行判断。 130—99（100）275—370 自爱——自爱与人类的自我，其本性就是只爱自己并且只考虑自己。然而，他又能做什么呢？他无法防止他所爱的这个对象不充满错误和可悲：他要求伟大，而又看到自己渺小；他要求幸福，而又看到自己可悲；他要求完美，而又看到自己充满着缺陷；他要求能成为别人爱慕与尊崇的对象，而又看到自己的缺点只配别人的憎恶与鄙视。他发见自己所处的这种尴尬，便在自己身上产生了一种人们所可能想像的最不正当而又最罪过的感情；因为他对于在谴责他并向他肯定了他的缺点的那个真理怀着一种死命的仇恨。 他渴望能消灭真理，但既然是摧毁不了真理本身，于是他就要尽可能地摧毁他自己认识中的以及别人认识中的真理；这就是说，他要费尽苦心既向别人也向他自己遮蔽其自己的缺点，他既不能忍受别人使他看到这些缺点，也不能忍受别人看到这些缺点。 毫无疑问，充满了缺点乃是一件坏事，但是充满了缺点而又不肯承认缺点，则是一件更大的坏事；因为它在缺点之上又增加了一项故意制造幻觉的缺点。我们不愿意别人欺骗我们；他们若想要得到我们的尊崇有甚于他们的应份，我们就会认为是不正当的： 因而我们若是欺骗他们，我们若是想要他们尊崇我们有甚于我们的应份，那也是不正当的。 因此显然可见，当他们不外是发见了我们确实具有的缺陷和罪恶的时候，他们根本就没有损害我们，因为成其为损害原因的并不是他们；并且他们还对我们做了一件好事，因为他们帮助我们使我们摆脱一件坏事，即对于这些缺陷的无知。他们认识到这些并且鄙视我们，我们不应该生气：无论是他们认识到我们的真实面貌，还是他们鄙视我们，——假如我们是可鄙的——全都是正当的。 这就是一颗充满公道与正义的心所应产生的情操。可是当我们看到自己的心中有着一种全然相反的倾向时，我们对于自己的心又该说什么呢？难道我们不是真的在仇恨真理和那些向我们说出了真理的人吗？我们不是真的喜欢为了我们的利益而让他们受欺骗，并且愿意被他们评价为我们事实上所并不是的那种样子吗？ 这里面有一个证明使我恐惧。天主教并不规定我们不加区别地向一切人都坦白自己的罪过：它容许我们向其他所有的人保持秘密；但其中只有一个唯一的例外，对于这个唯一者它却要求我们坦白出自己的内心深处并且让他看到我们的真实面貌。世上只有这个唯一的人，它命令我们不得欺骗并使他有义务担负起一种不可侵犯的秘密，那就是使这种知识仿佛对他根本就不存在似的。难道我们还能想像有什么更加慈爱、更加美好的事了吗？然而人类却是那么腐化，以致于他们还觉得这条法律太严苛；而这就是使得一大部分欧洲都要背叛教会的主要原因之一。 人心是何等不公正而又不讲理啊！——我们只须对一个人做出在某种程度上本来是该向所有的人都做出来才能算公正的事，而我们却还觉得不好。因为，难道我们要欺骗所有的人才是公正吗？ 这种对于真理的反感可以有各种不同的程度；但是我们可以说，它在某种程度上是人人都有的，因为它和自爱是分不开的。正是这种恶劣的娇气，才迫使那些有必要责备别人的人采取那么多的曲折婉转，以免激恼别人。他们一定要缩小我们的缺点，一定要做得好像是原谅我们的缺点，并且要在其中掺进称赞以及爱护与尊重的凭据。尽管有这一切，这付药对于自爱仍然不会是不苦口的。自爱会尽量可能地少服药，而且总是带着厌恶的心情，甚至于往往暗中忌恨那些为他们开药方的人。 因此，就出现了这种情形：如果有人有某种兴趣想讨我们的喜欢，他们就会避免向我们做出一种他们明知是我们所不高兴的事；他们对待我们就正像我们所愿意受到的那样：我们仇恨真理，他们就向我们隐瞒真理；我们愿意受奉承，他们就奉承我们；我们喜欢被蒙蔽，他们就蒙蔽我们。 这就是形成了每一步使我们在世界上得以高升的好运道都会使我们越发远离真理的原因，因为人们最耽心的就是怕伤害那些其好感是极为有用而其反感又是极其危险的人物。 一个君主可以成为全欧洲的话柄，但唯有他本人却对此一无所知。我对这一点并不感到惊讶：说出真话来，对于我们向他说出真话来的人是有利的，但是对于那些说出真话来的人却是不利的，因为这使我们遭人忌恨。可是与君主相处的人既然爱其自身的利益更有甚于爱他们所侍奉的那位君主的利益，因而他们就谨防给君主谋求一种利益而有损于他们自己。 这种不幸毫无疑问在最富贵的人们中间要来得更大而又更常见，然而就在下层人中间也并不能避免，因为讨别人喜欢总归是有某些好处的。因而人生就只不过是一场永恒的虚幻罢了；我们只不过是在相互蒙骗相互阿谀。没有人会当着我们的面说我们，像是他背着我们的面所说我们的那样。人与人之间的联系只不过建立在这种互相欺骗的基础之上而已；假如每个人都能知道他的朋友当他不在场的时候都说了他些什么，那就没有什么友谊是能持久的了，哪怕当时说这些话都是诚恳的而又不动感情的。 因此，人就不外是伪装，不外是谎言和虚假而已，无论是对自己也好还是对别人也好。他不愿意别人向他说真话，他也避免向别人说真话；而所有这些如此之远离正义与理智的品性，都在他的心底里有着一种天然的根源。 131—154（101）429—80 我认为这是事实：如果所有的人都知道他们彼此所说对方的是什么，那么全世界上就不会有四个朋友。根据人们对此所作的流言蜚语一再引起种种纠纷看来，这一点是显而易见的。 〔我还很可以说，所有的人都将……。 〕 140—136（102）112—536 有些罪恶是只由于别人的缘故才盘踞在我们身上；而抽掉了树干，它们就会像树枝一样地脱落下来。 182—714（103）111—81 亚历山大的贞操的范例所造就的贞洁，远不如他的酗酒的范例所造就的恣纵那么多。 比不上他那样有德并不可耻，而没有比他更为罪恶则又似乎情有可原。当我们看到自己也陷于这些伟大人物的罪恶时，我们就相信自己并非全然陷于普通人的罪恶；可是我们并没有注意到，伟大的人物在这方面也是普通人。我们与他们相联接的正好是他们与群众相联接的那一端；因为无论他们是多么高明，他们总还有某些地方是与最卑贱的人联在一起的。他们并没有悬在空中，完全脱离我们的社会。不，不是的；如果他们比我们伟大的话，那乃是他们的头抬得更高，然而他们的脚还是和我们的脚一样低。它们都是在同一个水平上，都站在同一个地面上；根据这一端，他们就和我们、和最渺小的人、和小孩子、和野兽都是同样地低下。 183—723（104）181—82 当我们的热情引我们去做一件事的时候，我们就忘掉了我们的责任；比如我们喜爱一本书，我们就会读这本书，而这时候我们本该是去做别的事情的。因而，要使自己记得自己的责任，就必须让自己从事某种自己所憎恶的事情；这时候我们就要托词自己还有别的事情要做，并且我们就以这种办法使自己记起了自己的责任。