Chapter 78 Chapter 29. William James

William James (1842–1910) was basically a psychologist, but he was important in philosophy for two reasons: He created what he called "radical empiricism"; he was one of three advocates of this theory called "pragmatism" or "instrumentalism."In his later years he was the acknowledged leader of American philosophy, and he deservedly so.He studied psychology by studying medicine; his tome on psychology, published in 1890, is excellent.Still, the book is a scientific rather than a philosophical contribution, so I'm not going to discuss it. William James' philosophical interests had two sides, one scientific and the other religious.On the scientific side, his medical studies imparted a materialistic tendency to his thinking, but this tendency was checked by his religious sentiments.His religious feeling was very Protestant, very democratic, very human.He refused to follow his younger brother Henry's fault-finding snobbery at all.He once said: "It is said that the devil is a gentleman, which is hard to say, but no matter what the god of heaven and earth is, it can never be a gentleman."

This is a very typical opinion. James was almost universally loved for his good-naturedness and sympathetic quality.The only person I know who has no admiration for him is Santayana, whose doctoral dissertation William James once described as "a model of corruption."There was an insurmountable antagonism of temperament between the two men.Santayana also liked religion, but in a very different way.He liked religion aesthetically and historically, not as an aid to the moral life; naturally he was far more fond of Catholicism than Protestantism.Intellectually he does not recognize any Christian doctrines, but he is content to allow others to believe in Christian doctrines, while he himself appreciates what he considers Christian myths.In James' view, such an attitude can only make him feel immoral.He had retained from his Puritan lineage a deep-seated conviction that what counted above all was good deeds, and his democratic sensibilities prevented him from acquiescing to the idea of ​​speaking one truth to philosophers and another to laity.The Protestant-Conventional antagonism of temperament still exists among the unorthodox believers; Santayana was a Protestant freethinker, William James was always a Protestant freethinker, however heretical he may be.

James' radical empiricism was first published in 1904 in a paper called "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?"The main purpose of this article is to deny that the subject-object relationship is a fundamental relationship.Until then, philosophers have taken for granted that there is an event called "knowledge," in which an entity, the knower or subject, perceives another entity, the thing known, or subject. object.The knower is regarded as a mind or soul; the object known may be a material object, an eternal essence, another mind, or— In self-consciousness - identical with the knower.In generally accepted philosophy, almost everything has an inseparable relationship with the binary opposition of subject and object.The distinction between mind and matter, the ideal of contemplation, and the traditional notion of "truth" all need to be fundamentally reconsidered if the distinction between subject and object is not recognized as fundamental.

As for me, I am convinced that James is partly right on this point, and for this reason alone he deserves an exalted place among philosophers.I did not think so at first, but James and those who agreed with him convinced me of the truth of his theory.But let's come to his argument. Consciousness, he said, "is the name of an insubstantial, unworthy of a place in first principles. Those who cling to it to this day are but clinging to an echo, the fading 'soul'." ' is but a faint reverberation in the air of philosophy".He goes on to say that there is no "primordial matter or quality of being opposed to that which constitutes material objects, the material of our thinking about them."He states that he is not denying that our minds perform a cognitive function which may be called "awareness."What he rejects, roughly speaking, is the notion that consciousness is a "thing."He believes that "there is only one original material or material", and everything in the world is made of it.This material he called "pure experience."Cognition, he says, is a special relation between two parts of pure experience.The subject-object relationship is derived: "I believe experience does not have this inherent duality".A given, undivided part of experience can be the knower in this relation, and the known in that relation.

He defines "pure experience" as "the immediate flow of life that furnishes material for our subsequent reflection." Thus, the above doctrine abolishes the distinction between mind and matter if it is regarded as a distinction between two different kinds of what James calls "stuff."Accordingly, those who agree with James on this subject advocate what they call "neutral monism," according to which the stuff of which the world is composed is neither mind nor matter, but something first.James himself does not develop this implicit meaning in his theory; on the contrary, he uses the term "pure experience", which reveals a perhaps unconscious Berkeley idealism. Philosophers use the word "experience" often, but rarely define it.Let us discuss for a moment what this word can mean.

Common sense holds that there are many things that occur that are not "experienced", such as events on the unseen side of the moon.Berkeley and Hegel, for different reasons, both deny this, arguing that there is nothing that has not been experienced.Their arguments are now considered by most philosophers to be incorrect, and so it seems to me.If we were to insist on the idea that the "stuff" of the world is "experience," we would have to painstakingly devise unreliable explanations of what something like the invisible side of the moon means.Unless we can infer from what we have experienced to what we have not experienced, it will be difficult to find reason to believe that there is anything but ourselves.Of course, James denies this, but his reasons are not very strong.

What do we mean by "experience"?The best way to find an answer is to ask: What is the difference between an unexperienced event and an experienced event?Seeing or bodily feeling rain falling is experienced, but rain falling in a desert where there are absolutely no living things is not experienced.We thus arrive at the first thesis: that there is no experience except where there is life. But the scope of experience and life is different.There are many things that have happened to me that I have not noticed; it is difficult to say that I have experienced such things.Obviously, what I remember is always what I experienced, but there are things I don't know to remember that may have created habits that still exist today.A child who has been burned by fire is afraid of fire, even if he has no memory of the time he was burned.I think that an event can be said to be "experienced" if it creates a habit. (Memory is a habit.) Habits, roughly speaking, are formed only in living things.A poker that is burned is not afraid of fire no matter how often it turns red.So, on common-sense grounds, we say that "experience" and the "stuff" of the world differ in scope.I personally don't see any valid reason to depart from common sense at this point.

Apart from this "experience" issue, I think I agree with James' thorough empiricism. As for his pragmatism and "will to believe," that's different.The latter in particular, I think it is a deliberate attempt to give some religious dogmas an apparent truth but a sophistical defense which no sincere believer would accept. "The Will to Believe" (The Will to Believe) was published in 1896; Pragmatism, a New Nameor Some Old Ways of Thinking (Pragmatism, a New Nameor SomeOld Ways of Thinking) was published in 1907.The doctrine in the latter book is an extension of the doctrine in the former.

The Will to Believe argues that, in practice, we often have to make a decision where there is no proper theoretical basis for it, because even doing nothing is still a decision.Questions of religion fall into this category, says James; he argues that although "our very logical reason may not be compelled," we are also justified in adopting an attitude of faith.This is basically the attitude of Rousseau's Savoy priest, but James' play is novel. According to him, the moral obligation to be truthful includes two equivalent precepts, namely, "believe the truth" and "avoid error."It is wrong for the skeptic to pay attention only to the second dogma, and thereby to disbelieve many truths that a less prudent man would.If it is equally important to believe the truth and to avoid error, then when faced with a choice, it is better for me to believe one of the possibilities at will, because then I have a 50/50 chance of believing the truth, but if it is in doubt, there is no chance nor.

If this is taken seriously, the resulting code of conduct is a most eccentric one.Suppose I meet a stranger on a train, and I ask myself, "Is his name Ebenezer Wilkes Smith?" If I admit that I don't know, then I really have no real belief about the man's name.On the other hand, if I decide to believe that it is his name, I may be genuinely convinced.The skeptic fears being deceived, says James, and because of this fear loses important truths; he adds: "What evidence is there that it is much worse to be deceived by hope than by fear? "It seems clear from this that if I have been hoping for years to meet a man named Ebenezer Wilkes Smith, then until I have a conclusive proof against it, the positive truth-seeking as opposed to the passive truth-seeking should prompt I'm sure every stranger I've ever met is called that.

You will say: "But this example is not fair, because although you don't know the name of the stranger, you always know that a very small number of people are called Ebenezer Wilkes Smith. So you are not in your The state of complete ignorance that presupposes the freedom of choice." Strange to say, James makes no mention of probability throughout his essay, yet there is almost always something to be found about any problem. consider.Granted (although none of the orthodox believers would) there is no evidence or disproof for any of the world's religions.Assuming you are Chinese, it puts you in contact with Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity.Because of the laws of logic, you cannot think that each of the three is true.Now assuming that Buddhism and Christianity are equally likely to be true, then if it is known that both cannot be true, then one of them must be true, and thus Confucianism must not be true.Given that all three are equally likely, each has a greater chance of not being truth than of being truth. In this way, James' principle collapses as soon as we are allowed to give probabilistic reasons. It is inexplicable that James, despite being a great psychologist, accommodates a strangely immature idea on this point.He spoke as if the options were total belief or total disbelief, ignoring every degree of doubt in between.For example, suppose I'm looking for a book from my bookshelf.I thought to myself: "Maybe it's on this shelf", so I went to look; but before I saw this book, I didn't think: "The book is just on this shelf".We are accustomed to act on hypotheses, but not quite as we act on what we think to be true; for in acting on hypotheses we keep our eyes peeled for new evidence. It seems to me that the discipline of being realistic is not the discipline that James thought it was.I take it to mean: "Place in any hypothesis worthy of your consideration precisely the degree of confidence that the evidence warrants."And if this hypothesis is very important, there is an obligation to further explore other evidence.This is plain common sense, and is consistent with the procedure in court, but it is completely different from the procedure described by James. It would be unfair to James to examine his will to believe in isolation; it was a transitional doctrine, which, after a period of natural development, gave rise to pragmatism.The pragmatism shown in James' writings would have been a new definition of "truth".There are also two pragmatist leaders, namely E. C． S．Schiller and Dr. Dewey.Dr. Dewey is discussed in the next chapter; Schiller is somewhat inferior to the other two.There is a difference of emphasis between James and Dr. Dewey.Dr. Dewey's views were scientific, and most of his arguments were derived from an examination of the scientific method; but James was mainly concerned with religion and morality.Roughly speaking, he is happy to promote any doctrine which contributes to the morality and happiness of man; and a doctrine which does so is "truth" in the sense in which he uses it. According to James, the principle of pragmatism was originally C. S．What Peirce suggested, according to Peirce, is that clarity in our thinking about an object is achieved only by examining what desired practical effects the object might contain.To illustrate the point, James says that the function of philosophy is to see what it matters to you and me if this or that world law is true.In this way, theory becomes a tool rather than an answer to difficult things. According to James, an idea becomes true in so far as it helps us to enter into a satisfying relationship with other parts of our experience: "An idea is 'true' in so far as we believe it to be good for our lives." True Originality is a different kind of goodness, not a separate category.Reality is what happens to ideas; events make ideas real.It is true, according to the Sophists, that true ideas must correspond to reality; But the so-called "conforming" does not mean "copying". "In the broadest sense, the so-called 'conforming' to reality can only mean being guided to reality, or being guided around reality, or referring to such a practical contact with reality: dealing with reality or dealing with reality It is better to deal with something that is related than if it does not." He added: "The so-called 'truth' is nothing more than a convenient means in our way of thinking... in terms of the final outcome and the whole process of things. Look." In other words, "Our duty to seek the truth is part of our general duty to do what is worthwhile." In a chapter on pragmatism and religion, he sums up the takeaways. "Any hypothesis, if it produces useful results for life, we cannot reject it." "The hypothesis of God is true if it works satisfactorily in the broadest sense." "According to religion From the evidence afforded by experience, we may well believe that the gods exist, and are engaged in the salvation of men according to ideal lines similar to our own." In this doctrine I find several great points of intellectual difficulty.This doctrine assumes that a belief is "truth" if its effects are good. If this definition is to be useful (and if it is not, it will be rejected by the pragmatist test), we must know: (a) what is good, (b) what is the effect of this or that belief; we must Knowing these two things is necessary to know that anything is "true," because we have no right to call a belief "true" until we have decided that its effects are good.As a result, the result is unimaginably complicated.Suppose you want to know whether Columbus crossed the Atlantic in 1492.You should not look it up in a book as others do.You should first inquire what the effect of this belief is, and how it differs from the effect of believing that Columbus made the voyage in 1491 or 1493.This is difficult enough, but weighing these effects from an ethical point of view is even more difficult.You might say that 1492 has the best results because it allows you to get high marks on the exam.But if you speak 1491 or 1493, your competitors for the exam will beat you, and they may think it morally deplorable that they did not succeed and that you did.Exams aside, I can't think of any practical effect of this belief, except as far as historians are concerned. But the trouble doesn't stop there.You have to think that your moral and factual estimates of the consequences of a belief are true.Because if it is false, the argument you use to support your belief that it is true is wrong.But to say that your beliefs about consequences are true is, according to James, to say that the belief has good consequences, and that, if it is true, it must have good consequences, so Go down endlessly.This is obviously not acceptable. There is another difficulty.Suppose I say that there was such a man as Columbus, everyone will agree that what I say is true.But why is it true?It was by some flesh-and-blood man who lived four hundred and fifty years ago--in short, not by the effect of my belief, but by its cause.According to the definition given by James, it is difficult to guarantee that this kind of thing will not happen: although in fact A does not exist, it is true that "A exists".I have always felt that the hypothesis that there is a Santa Claus "works satisfactorily in the broadest sense"; so that, although Santa Claus does not exist, it is true that "Santa Claus exists".James says (and I repeat): "The hypothesis of God is true if it works satisfactorily in the broadest sense."This sentence dismisses the question of whether God is really in heaven as irrelevant; if God is a useful hypothesis, that is enough.God, the Creator of the universe, is forgotten; all that is remembered is the belief in God and the effect of that belief on the human beings who inhabit a small planet like Earth.No wonder the pope denounced the pragmatist defense of religion. We have thus come to a fundamental difference between James' view of religion and that of religious believers in the past.James cared about religion as a human phenomenon, but showed little interest in the object of religious contemplation.He wanted people to be happy, and if belief in God would make them happy, let them believe in God.So far, it is only charity, not philosophy; as soon as it is "true" that the belief makes them happy, it becomes philosophy.For someone who is looking for an object of admiration, this statement is not satisfactory.He does not want to say: "If I believe in God, I will be happy"; he is willing to say: "I believe in God, so I am happy."If he believes in God, his belief in God is the same as believing in the existence of Roosevelt, Churchill, or Hitler; for him, God is a real existence, not just a human concept with good effects.It is this sincere faith that has good effect, not James's weak substitute.Obviously, if I say "Hitler exists", I don't mean "it is good to believe that Hitler exists".In the eyes of the sincere believer, the same can be said about God. The attempt of James' doctrine to build a superstructure of belief upon a foundation of skepticism rests, like all such attempts, on error.In James' case, the fallacy arose out of an attempt to ignore all superhuman facts.The idealism of Berkeley, coupled with skepticism, prompted him to substitute belief in God for God, as if it would work just as well.Yet this is only one of the subjectivist madnesses characteristic of much of modern philosophy.