Chapter 23 Chapter 20 Aristotle's Ethics

In the totality of Aristotle's works, there are three treatises on ethics, but two of them are now recognized as the writing of his disciples.The third book, the Nicomachean Ethics, remains largely unquestionable in its reliability, but within this book there are parts (i.e. Books V to VII) which are considered by many to be from his It was collected from a certain work of a disciple.However, I will ignore these controversial issues and treat the book as a whole, and as if it were Aristotle's work. Aristotle's ethical views generally represent the popular views of educated and experienced people of his time.It is neither full of mystical religion, like Plato's ethics; nor does it approve of such unorthodox theories of property and the family, as can be seen in the "Nation".Citizens who are neither below nor above the orderly level of decency will find in this ethics a codified formulation of the principles by which they think they should govern their conduct.But whoever asks for anything more is bound to be disappointed.This book appeals to respectable middle-aged men, and has been used by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to suppress the enthusiasm and enthusiasm of youth.But to a man of any sentimentality it can only be abominable.

Goodness, he tells us, is happiness, an activity of the soul.Aristotle said that Plato was right in dividing the soul into rational and irrational parts.He further divides the irrational part into growth (which even plants have) and appetite (which is all animals have).The appetitive part can also be rational to a certain extent when what it pursues are those goods that reason can applaud.This point has extremely important significance for the discussion of virtue; because in Aristotle, reason itself is purely contemplative, and it can never lead to any practical activity without the help of appetite.

Corresponding to the two parts of the soul, there are two virtues, intellectual and moral.Intellectual virtue comes from teaching, moral virtue from habit.It is the business of the legislator to make citizens good by forming good habits.We are just by doing just actions, and so are the other virtues.Aristotle thought that we acquire good habits by compulsion, but that in time we will also find pleasure in doing good deeds.This is reminiscent of what Hamlet said to his mother: Even if you are out of chastity, you have to try to be a chaste woman. Although habit is a devil that can make people lose their shame, it can also be an angel. For those who are trying to do good, it will use subtle means to make them change from evil to good.

Now let's look at his famous doctrine of the golden mean.Every virtue is a mean between two extremes, and each extreme is a vice.This can be demonstrated by examining the various virtues.Bravery is the middle way between cowardice and recklessness; candor is the middle way between profligacy and vulgarity; neither haughty nor humble is the middle way between vanity and baseness; The middle ground between shyness and shamelessness.Some virtues, such as truthfulness, do not seem to fit into this format.Aristotle says truth is the middle way between boasting and hypocrisy (1108a), but this applies only to truth about oneself personally.I don't see any generalized truth that could fit into this format.There was once a mayor who adopted Aristotle's doctrine; he said at the end of his term that he had tried to walk the narrow line between partiality on the one hand and disinterestedness on the other. go ahead.To regard truth as a mean view seems almost equally absurd.

Aristotle's opinions on moral questions are often always those opinions that were conventional at the time.In some points they differ from the views of our time, chiefly in relation to some form of aristocracy.We believe that all people, at least in ethical theory, have equal rights, and justice includes equality; Aristotle believes that what justice includes is not equality but a proper ratio, it is only in a certain. Some.when.is equal (1131b).The justice of a master or father is not the same as the justice of a citizen; for a slave or a son is property, and no injustice can be done to one's own property (1134b).But when it comes to slaves, Aristotle's doctrine is slightly modified on the question of whether it is possible for a man to be friends with his slaves: "There is nothing in common between the two parties; the slave is the living instrument of the human body.... Therefore as a slave one cannot be friends with him. But as a man one can; As a party to the same agreement, - seems to have some kind of justice; so far as he is a human being, it is still possible to have friendship with him" (1161b).

If the son is bad, a father can do without his son; but a son cannot do without his father, because he has owed his father far more than he can repay, especially his life (1163b).This is true in unequal relationships; since everyone should be loved in proportion to his own worth, the inferior should love the superior more than the superior loves the inferior: wife Children, children, and subjects should love husbands, parents, and princes more than the latter love the former.In a good marriage, "the man governs the house according to his worth, and as a man ought to govern, leaving to the woman those things which are worthy of her" (1160a).Men should not manage women's affairs; and women especially should not manage men's affairs, as sometimes happens when a woman is an heir.

The best individual conceived by Aristotle is one who is quite different from the Christian saint.He should have proper pride, and should not underestimate his own merits.He should despise anyone who deserves despise (1124h).Aristotle's description of the proud or magnanimous man is very interesting; it shows the difference between pagan and Christian ethics, and why Nietzsche sees Christianity as a slave morality. What is the meaning of reason. Since the magnanimous man is worth the most, he must therefore be the highest good, because the better man is always worth more, and the best man is worth the most.Therefore, a truly magnanimous person must be kind.Greatness in virtues of every kind seems to characterize the magnanimous man.To run from danger, to stand by, or to injure another, is the most disproportionate thing to a man of great magnanimity, for he—there is nothing greater than any other—why do dishonorable deeds Woolen cloth? ... So magnanimity seems to be a crown of all virtues; for it is it that makes all virtues greater, and without which all virtues would not have it.So true grandeur is very difficult; for grandness is impossible without nobility and goodness of character.Hence honor and dishonor are chiefly the concern of the magnanimous man; and he is duly pleased with the honors bestowed on him by great men, and thinks he is getting his own. what he is worth, or even less than he is worth; for no honor is worthy of perfect virtue, but since nothing greater can be added to him, he will at last accept Such honors; but honors from any man and on shabby grounds he utterly despises, for it is unworthy of him, and the same for dishonour, for it is unworthy of him. He is unjust. . . . For honor's sake power and riches may be desired; and even honor is a trifle to him, and all others still less.Hence the magnanimous man is thought to be contemptuous of all things. ...the magnanimous man does not take unnecessary dangers, ...but he dares to face great dangers, and when he is in danger, he can spare his life, knowing that there are some situations where life is worth it for the price.He is a man who gives favors, but he is ashamed to receive favors; for the former is the mark of a superior man, and the latter of an inferior one.He often repays others with greater favors; so that the original benefactor, besides being rewarded, owes him something. . . . the mark of a magnanimous man is to ask for nothing or hardly anything, and to be ready to help others, and should be no less dignified to those of high rank, nor haughty to those of the middle class; for To be superior to the former is a rare thing, but to the latter it is easy, and it is not a sign of bad breeding to be superior to the former, but to the humble The same is true of the people in the world, which is as vulgar as showing off strength to the weak. . . . and he must be explicit, because it is part of cowardice to hide one's feelings—that is, to care less about the truth than about what other people think. . . . he talks freely, because he despises everything, and he always speaks the truth, except when he is speaking ironically to vulgar people. . . . and he cannot praise lightly, for nothing is more important than others. . . . nor was he a gossiper, for since he wanted neither praise nor blame, he spoke neither of himself nor of others. ...he is a man who would rather have something beautiful and unprofitable than something profitable and useful. ... Besides, slow walking should be considered befitting a man of grandeur, deep intonation and smooth speech. . . . such is the grandiose man; what is less is bound to be servile, and what is more is bound to be pompous (1123b-1125a).It makes one shudder to think what such a hypocrite would look like.

Whatever you may think of magnificent people, one thing is clear: there cannot be many of them in a society.I do not mean merely in the general sense that, because virtue is difficult, there are not many virtuous men; enjoy a special social status.Aristotle regards ethics as a branch of politics, so after he has praised pride we find him thinking that monarchy is the best form of government and aristocracy the next; Can be strange.Princes and nobles can be "magnificent," but it would be ridiculous for ordinary citizens to try to live like this. This raises a question that is part ethical, part political.Can a society be considered morally satisfactory which, by virtue of its fundamental structure, confines the best to a few, and requires the majority to be satisfied with inferior things?Plato and Aristotle said yes, and Nietzsche agreed with them.Stoics, Christians, and democrats all answer in the negative.But the way they answered no was very different.The Stoics and the early Christians believed that the greatest good is virtue, and that external circumstances cannot prevent a man from being virtuous; so there is no need to seek a just system, because social injustice can only affect to unimportant things.The democrat, on the other hand, generally maintains that, at least as far as politics is concerned, the most important things are power and property; and therefore he cannot accept a social system which is unjust in these respects. .

The Stoic-Christian point of view required a very different conception of morality than Aristotle's, since they had to maintain that virtue was equally possible for slaves and masters.Christian ethics does not approve of pride, Aristotle considers pride a virtue; Christianity praises humility, Aristotle considers humility a sin.Both Plato and Aristotle value intellectual virtue above all else, but Christianity strikes it out altogether, in order that the poor and mean can be as virtuous as anyone else.Pope Gregory first severely condemned a bishop for teaching grammar. The highest virtue can only belong to a few people. Aristotle's viewpoint is logically related to his viewpoint that ethics is subordinate to politics.A good society can be a society of subordination if the aim is the good society rather than the good individual.In an orchestra the first violin is far more important than the oboe, though both are necessary for the beauty of the whole.It is impossible to organize an orchestra on the principle of giving to each what is best for him as an isolated individual.The same applies to modern great power governments, however democratic they may be.The modern democracies, unlike the ancient democracies, entrust great powers to selected individuals, such as presidents or prime ministers, and necessarily expect from them advantages that cannot be expected from ordinary citizens.When people are not thinking in terms of religious or political controversy, it is generally believed that a good president is more respected than a good bricklayer.In democracies a president is not expected to be exactly the grandiose man of Aristotle, yet he is still expected to be different from the average citizen and to have a certain merits relevant to his position.These particular advantages may not be considered "ethical," but that is because we use the word in a much narrower sense than Aristotle did.

As a result of Christian dogma, the distinction between morality and other virtues became much sharper than it was in the days of Greece.It is a merit that a man can be a great poet or composer or painter, but not a moral merit; we do not think that he is more virtuous, or more likely to enter heaven, if he has this talent.Moral virtue involves only acts of the will, that is, making legitimate choices among possible courses of action.People don't blame me for not writing operas because I don't know how to write operas.The orthodox view is that whenever there are two possible courses of action, conscience tells me which one is right and that choosing the other is evil.Virtue consists primarily in the avoidance of vice, not in anything positive.We have no reason to expect an educated person to be morally superior to an uneducated person, or a wise person to a stupid person.Many advantages of great social significance are thus excluded from the field of ethics.In modern usage, the adjective "immoral" is much narrower in scope than the adjective "undesirable."Weakness of will is undesirable, but not immoral.

However, there are also many modern philosophers who have not accepted this ethical point of view.They believe that goodness should be defined first, and then say how our actions should achieve goodness.This view is more similar to Aristotle's view, because Aristotle believed that happiness is good.It is true that the highest good is open only to philosophers, but for Aristotle this is no objection to this theory. The doctrines of ethics may be divided into two classes according to whether they regard virtue as an end or a means.Aristotle generally takes the view that virtue is a means to an end (that is, happiness). "The end is what we desire, and the means are what we consider and choose, so any behavior related to the means must be both in line with the choice and voluntary. The practice of virtue is related to the means" ( 1113b).But virtue has another sense in which it is included in the purpose of action: "The good of man is the soul acting according to virtue in a perfect life" (1098a).I thought Aristotle would say that intellectual virtues are ends and practical virtues are mere means.Christian moralists hold that although the consequences of moral actions are generally good, they are not as good as the moral actions themselves; that moral actions are valued for their own sake, not for their effects .On the other hand, whoever regards pleasure as a good sees virtue as a mere means.Any other definition, except that the good is defined as virtue, will have the same result, namely, that virtue is only a means to a good other than virtue itself.We have already said on this subject that Aristotle generally, though not completely, agrees with some that the first essence of ethics is to define the good, and that virtue is defined as tending toward produce good deeds.The relationship of ethics to political science raises another ethical question of considerable importance.Assuming that the good to be pursued by just conduct is the good of the whole collective, or ultimately of all mankind; is this social good the sum of the benefits enjoyed by individuals, or is it fundamentally some kind of good that belongs to all? And what about things that are not part?We can use the human body as an analogy to illustrate this problem.Pleasure is mostly combined with the parts of the body, but we think of them as belonging to the person as a whole; we can enjoy a pleasant smell, but we know that the nose alone cannot enjoy it .Some maintain that in a well-organized body there are similar advantages which belong to the whole rather than to any part.If they were metaphysicians, they could hold, like Hegel, that all good qualities are properties of the universe as a whole; Be less wrong.This view can be logically stated as follows.We can describe a nation by various predicates which cannot be applied to its individual members—for example, that it is populous, vast, mighty, and so on.The view we are examining here puts ethical predicates in this category as well, the view that ethical predicates belong to individuals only by extension.A man may belong to a populous country or to a good country; but according to them the man is no more good than he is not populous.This view was widely held by German philosophers, but it was not Aristotle's, except perhaps to some extent in his conception of justice. A considerable part of the Ethics is devoted to friendship, including all relations of affection.Perfect friendship can only exist between good people, and we cannot be friends with many people.We should not be friends with a man of higher rank than ourselves, unless he has a higher virtue to deserve the respect we show him.We have seen that in unequal relationships, such as between husband and wife or father and son, the one who is superior should be loved more.So it is impossible to be friends with God, because He cannot love us.Aristotle also discusses whether a man can be friends with himself, and asserts that this is only possible if he is a good man; he affirms that the evil man hates himself at all times.A good man should love himself, but love himself nobly (1169a).Friends are a consolation in times of adversity; but we should not trouble them by seeking their sympathy, as women or effeminate men do (1171b).Friends are not only needed in misfortune, for happy people also need friends to share their happiness. "No one would choose the whole world on condition that he is alone, because man is a political animal, an animal whose nature is to live with others" (1169b).Everything he said about friendship was reasonable, but not a single word was beyond common sense. Aristotle also showed his reasonableness when discussing happiness, while Plato viewed happiness more or less asceticly.Pleasure, as Aristotle uses it, is distinct from happiness, although there cannot be happiness without it.He said that there are three views on happiness: (1) happiness is never bad; (2) some happiness is good, but most happiness is bad; (3) happiness is good but not the best.He argues against the first view on the grounds that pain is of course bad, and therefore pleasure must be good.He says quite rightly that it is nonsense to say that one can be happy while being beaten: some degree of external luck is necessary for happiness.He also discarded the notion that all pleasures are bodily; all things have something divine and therefore have the potential for higher pleasures.The good man is always happy if he does not suffer misfortune; God enjoys a single and simple happiness forever (1152-1154). There is another passage on happiness in the latter part of the book, which does not quite agree with what has been said above.Here he argues that there are also bad pleasures, but that to the good man they are not pleasures (1173b), perhaps of different kinds of pleasures (ibid); It depends on whether it is associated with bad activities (1175b).Some things should be more important than happiness. No one is satisfied with living a life with a child's reason, even if it is happy.Every animal has its own pleasure, and man's own pleasure is bound up with reason. This leads to the only doctrine in the book that is not merely a sense of common sense.Happiness consists in virtuous activity, perfect happiness in the best activity, and the best activity is contemplation.Contemplation is more valuable than war, or politics, or any other practical enterprise, because it affords the leisure which is essential to happiness.Practical virtues can bring only inferior happiness; the highest happiness lies in the exercise of reason, because reason (more than anything else) is man.Man cannot be completely mindful, but as far as he is mindful, he is sharing the sacred life. "The activity of God above all other well-being must be contemplative."Of all men the philosopher is the most godlike in his activity, and therefore the happiest and the best: he who exercises his reason and cultivates it, seems to have the best state of mind, And also the closest to God.For if the gods have any interest in human affairs, as men think, then why should they love that which is best, that which is most like them (that is, reason), and why should they reward those who love this and People who respect such things, (for those people care about things dear to them, and do it rightly and noblely,)—these are taken for granted.And it is also obvious that all these attributes belong first and foremost to the philosopher.Therefore the philosopher is the one closest to God.And whoever is a philosopher is probably the happiest of men; the philosopher is thus happier than anyone else (1179a). This passage is in fact the conclusion of the Ethics; the following paragraphs deal with the transition to politics. Let us now try to decide what we should think about the merits and demerits of the Ethics.Unlike the other subjects dealt with by the Greek philosophers, ethics has hitherto not made any definite progress in the sense of actual discoveries; there is nothing in ethics which is scientifically known..We have no reason, therefore, why an ancient treatise on ethics should be inferior in any respect to a modern treatise.We can definitely say that Aristotle was wrong when it came to astronomy.But when he speaks of ethics, we cannot say that he is wrong or right in the same sense.Broadly speaking, we can ask Aristotle's ethics, or any other philosopher's ethics, with three questions: (1) Is it inherently self-consistent? (2) Is it consistent with the author's other views? (3) Does the answer it gives to ethical questions conform to our own ethical sentiments?If the answer to either the first or the second question is no, then the philosopher we are asking is committing some kind of intellectual error.But if the answer to the third question is no, we have no right to say that he is wrong; we have only the right to say that we don't like him. Let us examine these three issues in turn according to the ethical theory proposed in the book "Nicomachean Ethics". (1) Except in some minor respects, the book is largely self-consistent.The doctrine that goodness is happiness and that happiness consists in successful activity is well taught.But the doctrine that every virtue is a mean between two extremes, though cleverly played out, is not so successful, because it cannot be applied to intellectual contemplation; and Aristotle tells us that Therefore, intellectual contemplation is the most beautiful of all activities.It may be argued, however, that the doctrine of the golden mean was originally intended only for practical virtues, and not for intellectual ones.Perhaps there is another point, that is, the position of the legislator is somewhat ambiguous.The legislator is to enable children and youth to acquire the habit of performing good deeds, which will at last lead them to find joy in virtue, without the compulsion of laws to make their conduct virtuous.But it is evident that the legislator can also acquire bad habits in the youth; if this is to be avoided, he must have all the wisdom of a Platonic defender; if this cannot be avoided, then a virtuous life The argument that is happy does not hold.Yet perhaps the question is more of politics than of ethics. (2) Aristotle's ethics is in every respect consistent with his metaphysics.Indeed, his metaphysical theory itself is an expression of ethical optimism.His belief in the scientific importance of purpose implies a belief that purpose governs the development of the universe.He sees change, in general, as manifesting increasing organic organization or "form," and that virtuous behavior is ultimately behavior that contributes to this tendency.Much of his practical ethics is indeed not particularly philosophical, but the result of observations of human affairs; but this part of his doctrine, though independent of his metaphysics, is not related to his. Metaphysically inconsistent. (3) When we compare Aristotle's ethical tastes with our own, we first find - as we have already pointed out - that it is necessary to accept an inequality which is very provocative. Resentment of modern people.Not only did he not object to slavery, or to the superiority of husbands and fathers over wives and children, but he held that the best was essentially for the few—that is, for the proud of man and philosopher.It seems a natural conclusion, then, that the majority is primarily a means to the production of a few rulers and sages.Kant thinks that everyone is an end in himself, which can be considered as a manifestation of the viewpoint introduced by Christianity.There is, however, a logical difficulty in Kant's view.When the interests of two people conflict, it has no way to reach a decision.If each person is an end in himself, how can we achieve a principle that can determine which one should give way?Such a principle must involve the collective rather than the individual.It must be a principle of "justice" in the broadest sense of the word.Both Bentham and the utilitarians interpreted "justice" as "equality": when the interests of two persons conflict, the right course is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness; , or how happiness is distributed among them.If more is given to the good than to the bad, it is because rewarding the good and punishing the sin increase total happiness in the long run, not because there is some final ethical doctrine that the good should deserve more than the bad.On this view, "justice" consists in taking into account only the amount of happiness involved, not in favoring one individual or class over another.Greek philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, had a very different conception of justice, which is still widely circulated today.They believe—the original basis comes from religion—everything or person has its or his proper range, and beyond this range is "injustice".Some, by reason of their character or power, have a wider range than others, and it is no injustice for them to share in greater happiness.Aristotle took this view for granted; but its primitive religious basis, though evident in the earlier philosophers, is no longer very evident in Aristotle's writings. Obvious. There is almost nothing in Aristotle's thought that could be called benevolence or charity.Human miseries—so far as he perceived them—did not move him emotionally; he regarded them intellectually as evils, but there was no evidence that they ever made him unhappy unless the sufferers happened to be is his friend. More generally, there is a poverty of feeling in the Ethics which was absent among the early Greek philosophers.In Aristotle's speculation on human affairs, there is a certain excessive arrogance and self-satisfaction. Everything that can make people feel warm and caring for each other seems to be forgotten by Aristotle.Even his account of friendship is bland.There is no indication that he has ever had any experience of the kind that makes it difficult for him to be sane; all the deeper aspects of the moral life are apparently unknown to him.We could say that he ignores a whole area of ​​human experience that involves religion.What he says is what may be useful to a man who lives in comfort but has no feelings; Dodd said nothing to these people.For these reasons his Ethics, famous as it is, lacks, in my judgment, intrinsic importance.