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Chapter 47 I.Conscience is the freedom of the self within itself

Phenomenology of Spirit 黑格尔 8825Words 2018-03-20
This conscientious self, that is, the spirit with immediate conviction of its own absolute truth and existence, is the third self. ①This ego, which, as we have seen, develops from the third spiritual world, will now be briefly compared with the two previous egos.The whole or reality, which has appeared as the truth of the ethical world, is the individual self; the specific being of the individual is a recognized being.The individual is the ego without substance, so this specific existence of it is also an abstract reality; the individual is valid, and immediately valid; the ego is the point at rest in its own element of existence; Its universality is separated, so [its fixed point and its universality] do not move and relate to each other; the universal exists in this fixed point without distinction, it is not the content of the self, but the self He didn't enrich himself either. ——The second kind of self is the self that has achieved its own truth and educated the world, or in other words, it is the spirit rebuilt after being divided into two, and it is absolute freedom.In this ego the original immediate unity of the individual and the universal tends to split; Content is the universal reality of the self.But the universal does not have the form of a specific being detached from the ego; it is therefore not concretely fulfilled in this ego, does not acquire a positive content, does not become the world.Moral self-consciousness also frees its universality to become a separate nature, but at the same time insists on retaining its universality within itself as a sublated moment.But in fact, it is nothing more than playing an inversion that replaces the two provisions with each other.It is only as conscience, with its own certainty, that moral self-consciousness acquires content in order to fill out the former empty duties and empty rights and the empty general will; Therefore, it has its own certainty and also has a specific objective existence itself.

① The third spiritual world refers to the moral world, in which the subject is the moral self.And the first kind of spiritual world is the ethical society, and its self is the atomic individual in the state of legal power; the second kind of spiritual world is the enlightened world, and the second kind of self is the self that is anti-religious, utilitarian, and fighting for freedom after enlightenment; The subject of these two stages is different from the "third self" who emphasizes morality and duty, that is, the moral self. - translator 1.The reality of conscience as duty Having attained this truth of its own, moral self-consciousness then abandons, or rather sublates, the split in itself which leads to the inversion; A split between natural and sensual reality as opposed to pure purpose.Moral self-consciousness, having thus returned to itself, is a concrete moral spirit which does not regard the consciousness of pure duty as its own empty measure opposed to actual consciousness; The opposite nature is also a sublated link; the specific moral spirit, in a direct unity, is a self-realizing moral essence, and behavior is directly a specific moral form.

Let us assume that there is now an act which is an objective or objective reality to the knowing consciousness.The knowing consciousness, as conscience [or conscience], directly and concretely knows this action, and the action exists only when the knowing consciousness knows it.In this case knowledge is contingent if it is something else than the object of knowledge; But the spirit, which is certain of itself, is no longer such an accidental knowledge, produced by thought itself, as if quite different from reality; on the contrary, since the separation of in-itself and self Now, then the act is as it is in itself as it is immediately in the sensuous certainty of knowledge, and as it is in this knowledge as it is in itself. —Then the act, as actualization (movement), is the purely formal will; that is to say, the act is the mere transformation (movement), from an existing reality into an actualized reality , a simple transformational movement from mere knowledge of objects to knowledge of reality as a product of consciousness.Just as sensuous certainties are directly received, or rather transformed into spiritual freedom, so the transformation mentioned here is simply without any mediation, which is a kind of transformation through pure concepts. The transition that does not change the content, as for the content, is determined by the conscious interest that recognizes the content. —Besides, conscience does not distinguish the various situations of conduct into distinct duties.Conscience does not pretend to be a positive universal medium; if it did, the various duties would each acquire an inalterable substance in it, and this would not happen. Either, or, no action can be done at all, since every concrete action involves a general opposition, and every moral action an opposition of duties, then, according to the rules of action, There is always an aspect, an obligation, that is impaired; or, can something be done, and one of the opposing obligations actually suffers.Conscience is, in truth, that single or absolute self of negation purged of these different moral substances; But they are recognizing and implementing specific righteous things.Therefore, generally speaking, conscience is only at this time an action, a moral action, a moral action transformed from an inactive moral consciousness in the previous stage. — An action whose concrete form can be analyzed by a consciousness capable of distinguishing, distinguishing different properties, that is to say in our case, different moral relations, and these moral relations can each be declared as Strictly valid, (if they are each an obligation, they must be)

Also subject to comparison and audit.But in the simple moral act initiated by conscience, duties are stirred together so that all these individual essences are disturbed, so that, in the unshakable certainty of conscience, no duty takes place at all. Audit question. In the same way there is no such vacillating indetermination of the consciousness mentioned above, which now locates so-called pure morality in another divine essence other than itself, regards itself as unholy, and at other times regards pure morality as something unholy. Morality is placed in itself, thinking that the other essence is the combination of sensibility and morality.

Conscience rejects all these positings and affirmations and negations or nullifications of the moral world view, because it rejects at all the consciousness that duty and reality contradict each other.From the point of view of the consciousness that duty and reality contradict each other, to say that I am acting morally is because at the moment I am aware that I am performing a pure duty and nothing else, which in fact means , I am acting morally because I am not acting then.But when I actually act, I am aware that there is something else, a reality, and that there is something I want to bring about, that I have a specific purpose, that I am fulfilling a specific purpose. duty; here there is clearly a difference from the pure duty, which is said to be the intention of the act. — Conscience, on the other hand, is the consciousness which knows that when moral consciousness says pure duty is the essence of its own actions, it speaks of this pure end as a perversion of the matter; This is itself: pure duty is constituted by the empty abstraction of pure thought, which has as its reality and content only a definite reality, and this definite reality is the reality of consciousness itself, more precisely , this consciousness is consciousness as an individual thing and not as a thinking thing. —Conscience, for itself, has its truth in its own immediate certainty.This immediate concrete certainty of itself is the essence; and if this immediate certainty is considered in terms of the opposites contained in consciousness, the inherent immediate individuality is the content of moral action; and the form of moral action, It is this ego as pure movement, that is, as knowledge or as its own belief.

If we examine this self in the sense of its unity and moment, we find that the moral consciousness understands itself only as the in-itself or essence; But when it is conscience, it realizes its being-for-itself or its ego. — The contradictions of the moral worldview dissolve themselves, that is to say, the difference on which the contradictions of the moral worldview are based has shown itself not to be a difference, the difference is reduced to pure negativity; but pure negativity is precisely the ego; this is a simple The ego, which is both pure knowledge and knowledge of its own individual consciousness.This ego then becomes the content of the formerly empty essence, since it is a reality which no longer means an independent nature alien to the essence and with its own laws.This ego, as negativity, is a purely essential distinction, a content, to be precise, a content valid in itself and for itself.

Moreover, this self, as knowledge of pure self-identity, is absolutely universal, so it is this knowledge, as knowledge of itself, as belief, that constitutes duty.Duty is no longer the universal that appears opposite the ego, but rather has been recognized as something void of validity in this division.Now, the law exists for the self, not the self for the law.But then law and duty signify not only being-for-itself, but being-in-itself; For this knowledge is precisely being-in-itself by virtue of its self-identity. This being-in-itself also separates itself in consciousness from its immediate unity with being-for-itself; in this separation and opposition it is being, for others. —It is at this moment that duty, as a duty abandoned by the ego, is recognized as a mere moment; what originally meant the Absolute Essence has descended into a being which is not the ego, which is not For-itself, that is to say, it has descended into an existence for others.But this being-for-other is still an essential moment, because the ego, as consciousness, constitutes the opposition between being-for-itself and being-for-other; No longer just abstract pure consciousness.

2.acknowledgment of belief This being-for-other is therefore an entity that exists in itself and is distinct from the ego (or subject).Conscience does not sublate pure duty or abstract free existence, but pure duty is an essential link, and it regards other links as universal.Conscience is the common element of the different self-consciousnesses, and this common element is the substance in which action can acquire persistence and reality; it is also the moment of recognition by others.Moral self-consciousness has no moment of recognition, no moment of pure consciousness of specific existence, so it is not a consciousness of action at all, not a consciousness of realization.Its self-existence, for it, is either an abstract unreal thing, or a spiritless reality, existence.But the existential reality that conscience has is a reality that is an ego, that is to say, a specific being conscious of itself, the recognized spiritual element.Action is thus only a translation of its individual content into an objective element in which the individual content becomes universal and recognized, and precisely because the content is Acknowledge, so the act becomes reality.Actions are recognized and therefore actual because the reality of being is directly associated with belief or knowledge, in other words, knowledge of one's purpose is directly the element of being, universal recognition.For the essence of action, duty, is constituted by conscience's belief in duty; this belief is nothing less than Being-in-itself; so the essence of action is self-consciousness universal in itself, in other words, recognized and thus actual.An action performed on the basis of a belief in duty is thus immediately a thing with a continuous and specific existence.

Here, therefore, it can no longer be said at all that good intentions are not fulfilled, or that good people suffer bad luck, etc.; on the contrary, what is recognized as duty is fulfilled, becomes reality, because what corresponds to duty is all self-consciousness. What is universal in common, what is recognized, is therefore what exists.But this obligation is for him if taken separately and without the content of the ego, the transparent, and the transparent only means the general essence without content. If we go back to the realm in which spiritual reality first appeared, we find that the notion was that the expression of individuality was being-in-itself and for-itself.But the ideology that directly expressed this concept at that time was the honest consciousness, which then dealt with the abstract thing itself.The thing itself is there only a predicate; it is only in conscience for the first time that it is a subject, because it assumes that it has all moments of consciousness, and all these moments of consciousness seem to it to be Such as substantiality in general, external objective existence and the essence of thinking are all contained in this certainty of itself.In ethics, the thing itself is generally substantive, in education it is an external objective existence, in morality it is the essence of thinking that recognizes itself; and in conscience, the thing itself is the subject, that is, the subject, and the subject knows these things. The link is in itself.If the honest consciousness always grasps only the empty thing itself, on the contrary, what conscience wins is the thing itself which it fills.Conscience is such a force because it knows that these moments of consciousness are only moments, and that it [conscience] rules over them as their negative nature.

3.absolute freedom of belief If we consider conscience in connection with the individual determinations contained in the oppositions which appear in action—and if we examine the consciousness which conscience has of the nature of these individual determinations, we shall find that conscience is The reality of that situation, first of all, presupposes itself as a knowing knowledge.So long as the moment of universality is presented to this knowledge, then it is the part of this knowledge to act of conscience to obtain a thorough and detailed grasp of the reality before it, and thus to know and consider the situation precisely.But this knowledge, inasmuch as it recognizes the universal as a moment, is a knowledge of those circumstances which it knows it does not grasp, or which it knows it grasps. Sometimes it's not so sincere, it's all conscience.The really universal and pure relation of knowledge is its relation to something not opposed to it, its relation to itself; Because of its opposition, it is always concerned with a negation of consciousness, with a reality that exists in itself.Contrary to the simplicity of pure consciousness, this reality, as the absolute other, or as various in-itselfs, is an absolute multiplicity of situations which divide themselves infinitely. Diffusion to the rear expresses its conditions, diffusion to the side involves its coexisting things, and diffusion to the front produces its consequences. —Consciousness based on conscience is conscious of this nature of the matter and of its attitude towards it, and knows that it does not perceive the event in which it acts in the manner required here. It knows that it is universally known, and its pretense of such conscientious knowledge and consideration of all situations is empty talk.It is not, however, that such perceptions and considerations of all circumstances do not exist at all, but that they exist as moments, as something that exists only for others; Consciousness of the mind regards its incomplete knowledge as a full and complete knowledge, because this incomplete knowledge is its own knowledge.

The same is true with regard to the universality of essences, in other words, with regard to the determination of content by pure consciousness. — Conscience, which is moving in the direction of action, is in relation to many aspects of events.Just as events split into partial events, so also does the relation of pure consciousness to events split into partial relations, so that the multiplicity of events is also the multiplicity of obligations. —Conscience knows that it must choose and decide among various duties; for none of them is absolute either in its prescriptive nature or in its content, but only pure duties .But this abstraction already acquires in its reality the meaning that it is the "I" with self-consciousness.A spirit sure of itself, as conscience, rests in itself, and its real universality, or its duty, consists in its pure conviction of duty.This pure belief is itself as empty as pure duty, pure because duty is nothing in it, not any determinate content.But action must be taken, the individual must determine for action; and the spirit that is sure of itself, that is, the spirit in which being-in-itself acquires the meaning that it is the "I" with self-consciousness, Knowing this determination and content is in its own immediate certainty.Immediate certainty in itself, as determination and content, is natural consciousness, impulse and desire. —Conscience admits that nothing is absolute for it, since it is the absolute negation of everything determined.It determines entirely by itself; but the circle or sphere within itself which receives determination itself is what is called sensibility; so that in order to obtain any content from its own immediate certainty one must find nothing but sensibility. less than. —All that, in an earlier form, appeared as good or evil, as law and right, was something else, something other than its own immediate certainty; all these things is a universal, and the universal is now a being-for-him; , appearing between consciousness and its own truth, not only does not constitute the immediacy of consciousness, but it detaches consciousness from itself. —But for conscience self-certainty is pure immediate truth; The arbitrariness of the individual and the contingency of the natural existence of the individual unconscious. This content at the same time counts as the essence of morality or as duty. For pure duty, as shown in the previous consideration of the rationality of reviewing the law, is absolutely indifferent to all content, accommodates or adapts to all content.Here, at the same time, pure duty has an essential form of being-for-itself, and the personal belief in this form is nothing but the awareness of the emptiness of pure duty, the awareness that pure duty is only a moment, which is in fact In essence, it is a predicate; and the predicate has the individual as its subject (that is, the subject), and the subject can give any content to the pure duty at will, can combine any content with this form, and can make any content have Out of the nature of conscience. —Let us imagine a man who is becoming rich in some way; each man, who maintains himself and his family, likewise amasses the possibility of being useful to others, and giving aid to those in need. It is an obligation to do something useful.The man is aware that it is a duty, since this content is immediately contained in his own certainty; and the man is aware that he is in this case fulfilling the duty.Others may think that this way [of fulfilling his obligation to become rich] is a fraud; they cling to some other aspect of the particular case, but this one clings to his because he realizes that Getting rich is a pure duty. —So what others call injustice is to this man a duty to preserve his independence from being manipulated; what others call cowardice is to this man It seems to be the fulfillment of duty to preserve life and preserve possibility for the benefit of others; conversely, what others call an act of valor seems to him to be greatly detrimental to both of these duties.But cowardice, of course, cannot be so clumsy that it does not know that it is a duty to preserve life and to make it possible for itself to benefit others—so that it is not convinced of the obligatory nature of its actions that it does not know Its obligatory nature is based on the above knowledge; if a person is so cowardly that he really does not have this belief and knowledge, it is tantamount to saying that cowardice has been so bad that it is immoral.If morality consists in the consciousness that one has done one's duty, then what is called cowardice will be no less lacking in this consciousness than what is called bravery; for duty, the abstract Since things can accept all kinds of content, they can also accept the content of cowardice. —Therefore, as long as the person who acts knows that what he is doing is a duty, and as long as he knows this on the one hand, and on the other hand, since the belief in duty is also in conformity with duty, he has received the duty of others. admit; His behavior is therefore valid and accurate, and therefore has a real existence. There is no objection to the freedom of any content to arrange itself as unrestrictedly and as freely as any other content in the universal passive medium of pure duty and knowledge, even if it is asserted otherwise. That a content should be placed therein does not contribute to the denial of this freedom; Therefore, no matter what kind of content, as long as it is content, it has a definite stain in itself. This kind of stain does not exist in pure knowledge, and it can be accepted or despised by pure knowledge.The reason why all content is content is because it is a prescribed thing, so any content is on the same plane as other content in this regard, although it seems to make people feel that each content is different from each other. It seems that all the special things contained in it have been discarded.It may happen that, since duty is generally divided into two in practical cases, forming an opposition, and thus the opposition of individuality and universality, the duty itself, which has the universality itself as its content, is itself directly It should have the character of a pure obligation, and its form and content should therefore correspond perfectly to each other.Thus, for example, actions for the general good seem to be preferable to actions for the particular good.However, this general duty is essentially that which exists ready-made as a substance existing in and for itself, as right and law, independent of knowledge and belief, independent of the immediate interests of individuals. And that which alone is valid; and such a thing is precisely that which morality in general has directed against its form.As to its content, however, since the general good is opposed to the particular good, its content is also a definite content; its law is therefore such a law to which conscience Knowing that you are completely unconstrained, completely independent and free, and that you have absolute power, you can increase or decrease at will, and choose at will. —Nevertheless, the distinction made above between the duty to the particular and the duty to the universal is not at all a fixed distinction according to the general nature of the opposition.It is rather the case that what the individual does for himself is good for the general, the majority; the more he cares for himself, the more likely he is to be good for others; It consists precisely in the fact that he exists and lives together with others; his individual enjoyment essentially means that he sacrifices his own enjoyment for others, thereby helping others to obtain theirs.Therefore, in fulfilling the duty to the individual, that is, to oneself, one is also fulfilling the duty to the general. —So this weighing and comparison of duties here, if it ever occurred, would in the end devolve into a measure and calculation of how much benefit an action can confer on the universal; but this does not happen Yes, because, on the one hand, if so, morality would necessarily be lost in the accidents of insight; Make decisions on its own. Conscience thus acts and thus maintains itself in the unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, in the unity of pure thought and individuality; It contains its own truth, its truth is in itself, in its knowledge, and by in its knowledge we mean in the knowledge of duty.This spirit preserves itself in the knowledge of duty precisely because that which is positive in the action, i.e. the content and form of duty and the knowledge of duty, is subordinate to the ego and to it. deterministic; and whatever wants to appear in opposition to the self as an existence in itself, is not as real, but only as a superseded, only as a moment. Valid standard.What is valid, therefore, is not universal knowledge in general, but its knowledge, the knowledge it acquires about the situation.The ego places in duty, the universal being-in-itself, the content it takes from its natural individuality; for the content is what exists in itself; The medium becomes an obligation performed by the self, and precisely because of this, the pure obligation of the void is posited as a superseded, a moment; this content is the superseded emptiness of the pure duty, In other words, the fulfillment of pure obligation. --But conscience at the same time has no content at all; it stands above any particular duty which would serve as a law; —This self-determination is therefore immediately the absolute correspondence to duty; duty is knowledge itself; but this simple self-ness (Selbstheit) is being-in-itself; for being-in-itself is pure self-identity; and self-identity is here in a consciousness.
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