Chapter 21 (c) Observational Physiognomy and Phrenology of Self-Consciousness in Relationship to Its Immediate Reality

Since psychological observations have found that there is no law in the relationship between self-consciousness and reality, that is, the world that is opposed to self-consciousness, the two sides are irrelevant, so we have to return to the real individual to observe the stipulation of the real individual itself .The real individual is both in-itself and for-itself, that is to say, the opposition between being-in-itself and being-for-itself contained in it is an opposition that has been eliminated in the absolute mediation of the two.It now begins to be an object of observation, in other words, observation now begins to be an object of it.

The individual is both in itself and for itself: it is for itself, that is to say, it is a free act; but it is also in itself, that is to say, it has an original definite being in itself,— This determinateness of the individual is, conceptually speaking, what psychology originally thought could be found outside the individual.In this way, an opposition arises within the individual himself, which is both a movement of consciousness and a fixed actual existence that appears as a phenomenon; this actual existence belongs to it directly in the individual; this existence, since it is The body of a specific individual is therefore the originality of the individual, or in other words, the unmanufactured thing of the individual.However, since the individual is at the same time only a thing produced by itself, its body is also an expression or a sign of itself produced by itself, and since it is a sign, it is no longer is an immediate fact, and is merely something by which the individual manifests his primordial nature.

If we use the previous point of view to examine our link here, it can be said that we were talking about general or general ethical customs and cultural education, but now we are dealing with the general image of human beings, or at least referring to a The general image of a man in a climate, a continent, a people.In addition, there are special environments and situations within the universal reality mentioned above, and in the link we are investigating now, this special reality refers to the special structure of the individual image. —And, on the other hand, what was considered before was the free action of the individual and his own reality posited as opposed to an objectively existing reality, whereas now it is the expression of the individual's self-actualization. An image, that is, the characteristics and forms expressed by the essence of individual activities.However, no matter whether the universal reality or the particular reality is considered to exist outside the individual, it is now the individual's own reality, its natural body; as for the expression belonging to the individual's actions, it is now It also falls on the body of the individual.In the investigation of psychology, it is believed that the reality existing in itself and for itself and the specific individuality are related to each other; but here the specific individual is the object of observation, and the two opposites of the object are in this whole. itself.Therefore, the entire exterior of the individual not only contains the original existence, that is, the natural body, but also contains the parts formed by internal activities; Existence permeates individual reality.This entire exterior of the individual, which contains both certain original fixed parts and the characteristics that can only be formed through action, exists objectively, and this existence is an expression of the interior of the individual, in other words, it is A representation of so-called consciousness and movement. ——Similarly, this interior is no longer the spontaneous activity without content or regulation of form, and the content and regulation of the activity no longer reside in the external environment as before; That individuality which is defined, primitive, and whose form is only in activity.Let us now examine how determined the relation between these two aspects is, and what we mean by the expression of the inner within the outer.

Ⅰ.The meaning of physiognomy of organs This exterior first signifies the interior only as an organ, making the interior visible, or at all a being for him; for the interior is the activity itself in so far as it exists in the organ.The mouth that speaks, the hand that works, and the legs that walk, if we will add to them, are organs that realize and complete the inner, so that they themselves contain the action itself or the inner itself; Externality becomes external behavior, and behavior is a reality separated from the individual.Both language and labor are external things in which the individual no longer keeps its innerness within itself, but rather lets the innerness go completely outside itself and surrenders it to the outer.One can therefore say that these externals express too much of what is internal, as well as that they express too little.Too much, because in them the inner itself is completely shattered, there is no longer any opposition between them and the inner; they not only surrender an expression of the inner, but directly surrender the inner itself.As for saying too little, it is because what is immanent in speech and action has itself become something else ①: it has abandoned itself to the changing factor, which has allowed the spoken word and the done Inverting and transforming the actions of the individual into something else, making these words and actions in their own right no longer the words and actions of this particular individual.The results of actions, not only because of the externality produced by the influence of other individuals, therefore cease to be a kind of self-subsistence in contrast to other individualities, but also, since the results of actions have included themselves in The contained interior is regarded as a separate, independent and indifferent exterior. As interior, they may be another thing completely different from their external manifestations because of the individual itself.We say for the individual's own sake, we mean either because the individual willfully presents them as something other than their nature, or because the individual is too clumsy to replace itself as it wishes. Creating an external aspect will not consolidate the manufactured external aspect so that the results of its own actions can not be reversed and changed by other individuals.Behavior, therefore, as the realized result of action, can be said to have two opposite meanings: it may be an inner individuality rather than the appearance of an inner individuality, or it may be an outer detached from the inner and quite different from the inner. Reality. —Because of this ambiguity in the meaning of the result of action, we are compelled to examine what is still in the individual, what is still visible in the individual.As for the immanence in the organ, as the immediate action itself, it has actually become the externality of the action itself, the behavior, which can either express the interior or not.Given this contrasting situation, then the organ is not the kind of representation sought here.

① See Schiller: "As soon as the soul speaks, alas, the soul is no longer it" and "Our actions are still mine when they are in our breast; A safe corner, a foreign land in which to plunge into life, belongs to that obstinate force completely alien to human art". ——Hegel's original note If it is now said that the external image can express inner individuality only when it is not an organ or an action but a persistent whole, then it will pretend to be a persistent thing, and the internal as Accepted as a foreign thing into its own passive objective existence, it becomes itself a sign of this interior;—a sign which is an external, contingent expression, since its actual aspect itself is Meaningless,—as if it were a language whose tones and tonal connections had nothing to do with the matter itself, but were only arbitrarily and arbitrarily combined with it, and so were accidental to it thing.

This arbitrary connection between such things that are external to each other certainly does not constitute a law.However, physiognomy is said to be different from these hopeless studies because physiognomy examines a given individual in terms of the necessary opposition between its inner and outer, that is, its conscious essence and its concretely existing image. It is examined, and the reason why it connects the internal and external links and makes them related is also because according to their concepts, they are originally related to each other, because they must constitute the content of a law.On the contrary, in astrology, palmistry, etc., the two parties in a relationship seem to be just a foreign object and another foreign object, a thing and a completely strange thing to it.A certain astrological seat at the time of an individual's birth, or in order to make this foreign object closer to the human body itself, for example, certain characteristics of hand lines, etc., have a great impact on a person's life span and destiny. external link.As things external to each other, they have nothing to do with each other, and have no necessary relationship, like the necessary relationship between an interior and an exterior.

Indeed, for fate, it seems that the hand cannot be said to be completely external, but rather it is the inner part of fate.Because in the final analysis, fate is only an external phenomenon, which expresses the internal original stipulation of a specific individual in itself. ——In order to know the individual at ease, palmistry and face readers have taken a shortcut. For example, Bi Sauron’s method is more direct, because Sauron believes that destiny must be inferred based on the entire life experience; Palmists and face readers are free to inspect.The reason why the hand necessarily represents or presents the freedom of the individual, so far as destiny is concerned, is easily seen from the following fact:

In addition to the language organ, the hand is the organ most used by human beings to manifest and realize themselves.It is an inspired creator of man's own happiness; it is, we may say, the result of man's actions; for the hand, as the active organ of man's self-realization, embodies in itself man as the giver of inspiration, And since man is his own destiny, the hand will express this destiny, this freedom. We have said above that the movable organ is at the same time a being and the action it contains in itself, or that it is both an inner being-in-itself existing in itself and a being-for-other, then, according to this definition, we can Create a different view of organs than before.For if the organ cannot be regarded as an expression of the interior, it is because what is present in the organ is:

Action as action, and action as action [completed action] is only an external thing to the organ, so that the inner and the outer are separated from each other, and are or can be foreign to each other, then, Even according to this definition, the organ must still be regarded as the middle term between the two; precisely because of this: the action is present in the organ and at the same time constitutes the externality of the organ, and this externality constituted by the action Sexuality is different from behavior as externality, because action as externality still remains in the individual and the organ. —This middle and unity which is internal to the external is itself external at first; but then this externality is at the same time subsumed within, and becomes a single externality as opposed to a scattered externality, And the scattered externality can be only a single externality, that is, an achievement or state of behavior that is purely accidental for the whole individual, but it can also be an externality as a whole, that is, that is scattered among many behavioral achievements and states. state of fate.Thus, the simple character of the hand, the individual peculiarities of language, such as tone and volume, and the peculiarities of individual type or handwriting in writing (words being a more fixed existence that language acquires by the hand than by the sound),— All of this is an expression of the interior, and this expression, as a single exteriority, is opposed to the multiple exteriorities of deeds and fate, which treat the multiple exteriorities as exteriority. , and himself as the inner self. —Therefore, if we first regard the specific nature of the individual, as well as the innate and acquired characteristics, as its inner being, as the essence of behavior and destiny, then this inner essence is first of all regarded as the individual itself. mouth, hand, voice, writing, and various other organs, and their fixed determinateness, as its own appearance and externality, after which it further expresses itself outwardly, as its own presence in the world. realization as its own externality.

Now, since this middle term first defines itself as exteriority, and at the same time withdraws this exteriority to the inner side, the concrete existence of this middle term is not just the immediate organ of action, but rather the face. Those useless movements and forms on the body and the whole image.These features, with their movements and forms, are, as far as the concept is concerned, the implicit and unexpressed action retained in the individual, and the relationship between the individual and the actual action is the examination and observation of the individual's own action. In other words, this appearance is a reflection of the appearance of reality. —The individual is not silent about its external action, because, as it acts, it is simultaneously reflected in itself, and it expresses this self-reflection, externally; this theoretical action, that is, the individual What it does and what it says about itself can be heard by others, because it is itself an outward expression.

Ⅱ.Ambiguity Thus, from this interior, that is to say, from this which in its external manifestations is still interior, we have observed the actual reflection of the individual to itself; we should also see that this What is the nature of this kind of unity—the inevitability contained in reflection. —In the first place, this reflection is not the same thing as the actual act itself, so it can be and be considered to be something else than the actual act; Or whether what he did was done in good faith. — But reflection, on the other hand, is an expression of the immanent, and at the same time an expression of being, which itself is thus reduced to a being, a mere accident to the conscious individual.Therefore, this reflection is indeed a representation, but at the same time it is only like a sign, so that the sign by which the inner is expressed is completely independent of the expressed content in nature.It is true that in this phenomenon the inner becomes an invisible thing that can be seen, but it is not united with this phenomenon: although this inner can be expressed in another phenomenon, another inner can also be expressed in another phenomenon. In this phenomenon. ——It can be seen that Lichtenberg ① is right; he said: "It is not difficult to admit that physiognomists can really understand people's inner world through physiognomy, as long as they are brave and determined to make themselves incomprehensible to thousands of generations. characters."—In the case of the preceding discussion of psychological laws, the environment before us is an existing thing from which the individual takes what he is able and willing to take, for which he is both It can be submitted to or it can be defied, and for this reason, this existence does not contain necessity and individual essence.Likewise, in the case under discussion, the immediate being manifested by individuality is a being that either shows the reflection of the individual in itself from reality, is the individual's own being, or is merely A sign for the individual that is so indifferent to what it refers to that it really means nothing; it can be either the individual's true face or a mask that he can throw off at will. ——Individuality permeates or embodies in the image, moves in the image, and speaks in the image; however, this entire concrete existence—the image, can also be transformed into an existence that has nothing to do with will and action; individuality Cancel the meaning that this existence had before, so that it no longer contains the self-reflection or true essence of individuality, but put this essence in will and action. ① Lichtenberg (Lichtenberg): "On Physiognomy", second edition, Göttingen, 1778, p. 35. ——Hegel's original note Individuality then abandons the self-reflection which it expresses in the character of the figure, and puts its own essence in the result of its action, in its enterprise. In doing so, individuality actually violates the relationship that the rational instinct responsible for observing self-conscious individuality has set for the individual's interior and exterior.From this point of view, however, we can proceed to understand the real intellectual basis of the science of physiognomy, if we wish to call it science.The opposition here presented to observation is, in its form, that of practice and theory (both of which are within the sphere of practice), that is to say, in action (which is The opposition between that individuality which realizes itself (referring to action in the broadest sense) and the individuality which takes the action as its object both in it and in itself.The opposition seen in this kind of observation is exactly the reverse of the opposition in the phenomenon.This kind of observation holds that the behavior itself and the achievements it achieves, whether it belongs to language or to a more fixed reality, are non-essential external, while the self-existence of individuality is essential internal.Between the inner and outer aspects of practical consciousness itself, between intention and action, that is, between the signification or speculation of the action and the action itself, observation chooses the former as the real inner; The internal, relatively non-essential external manifestation is in the behavior, and its real external manifestation is in the image of the individual. The real external manifestation is the perceptual present existence of the individual spirit; the real internality is the intention The singularity of aspect and the individuality of being-for-itself: both together are the spirit that is subjectively meant or conjectured.Therefore, observation takes a signified actual existence as its object, and looks for laws from it. The natural or daily practice of physiognomy is the direct meaning of the spiritual reality in meaning, because ordinary physiognomy is to make judgments on the inner nature of the individual and the character of the external image at a glance, and to make a judgment. This judgment of signification requires an object whose essence reveals itself to be something other than the immediate existence of pure sensibility.And it is precisely this which exists in the sensibility and which is reflected in itself beyond the sensibility, and the visibility which is the object of observation is also the visibility of the invisible.But precisely this sensuous immediate presence is a spiritual reality, something that belongs only to signification; , font, tone, etc. to deal with. — Observation then connects such concrete beings as it signifies with what it also signifies as inwardness.It is not robbers and thieves that should be recognized through observation, but the ability to be robbers and thieves.Fixed abstract stipulations are lost in the concrete infinite stipulations of individual individuals, and the skills required to describe the concrete infinite stipulations are more ingenious than the previous fixed abstract stipulations.It is true that more things can be said through such ingenious descriptions than through the qualities of "robber", "thief" or "kindness", "purity", etc., but to achieve the purpose of description, that is, to think After all, it is far from enough to describe the existence that it means, that is, individual individuality. It is not enough, just as it is not enough to describe an image by only describing a wide forehead, a high nose bridge, etc.For the individual image, like the individual self-consciousness, is indescribable as a signified being.Therefore, the so-called science of knowing people, which studies people who belong to meaning or speculation, and the science of physiognomy, which studies the reality of meaning and wants to elevate the unthinking judgments of daily physiognomy into scientific knowledge, are both a science of physiognomy. A thing without purpose and ground, it can never say what it signifies, because it only signifies, its content is only that which belongs to signification. ① This refers to the claim of Lavater, whose book is called Fragments of Physiognomy for the Acceleration of Knowing and Love, Leipzig, 1775-8. ——English Translator's Note The laws that this science tries to seek are actually some relations between these two aspects it means, so it is nothing but an empty meaning itself.Moreover, since this science, which professes to be the study of spiritual reality, has recognized the mind as that which rises out of its sensuous concrete existence and reflects itself upon itself, the determinate concrete existence is a kind of indifference to the spirit. chance, then this science must understand that the laws it discovers say nothing but really mere words, or say an opinion about itself;—we use such a The truth of a noun is to indicate that saying its opinion is the same thing as giving an opinion about oneself without saying the thing itself.But in terms of content, these observations cannot differ in value from the following two opinions: the peddler said, "It rains every year we meet"; the housewife said, "Yes, every time I hang clothes It's all raining." In addition to describing the observation of physiognomy in this way, Lichtenberg also said this: "If someone says that you act like an honest and honest person, but I can see from your appearance that you are artificial." , you are a rascal at heart; no doubt a speech like this will, till the end of the world, be slapped on the face of any decent man." —The slap is good in that it refutes the first postulate of such a science of signification, namely, that man's reality is what he looks like, etc. —Truely speaking, man's true being is his action; in action individuality is actual, and it is man's action that supersedes what is meant in both its respects . First, on the one hand, what is signified is a static existence of the body; in the act, individuality appears as a negative thing, which sublates the existence of the body to reveal itself, or in other words, has its own existence. .Secondly, the act sublates the indescribability of the meaning of individuality with self-consciousness, because in meaning, individuality is an infinitely determined and infinitely determinable and therefore indescribable thing, and in the realized In behavior, this bad infinity has been sublated.An act is something simply defined, universal, graspable in an abstraction; it is a homicide, an act of theft, or an act of charity, an act of valor, etc.; Anyway we can tell what it is.Behavior is this behavior, and its existence is not just a sign, but the thing itself.Behavior is just this behavior, and what kind of behavior is there is what kind of individual; in this simplicity of "existence" or "existence", the individual person is an existing and universal thing for others, It is no longer just a signified thing.It is true that he is not identified here as spirit, but since what is in question here is his existence as being, and since, on the one hand, the dual existence of his image and action are opposed to each other, both are claiming himself to be his reality, this would rather only affirm that the deed is his real being;—and the form is not his real being, for the form expresses what he thinks his deed expresses. something, or something that other people think he has to do.At the same time, on the other hand, since the results of his actions, or careers, are opposed to his inner possibilities, abilities, or intentions, it is likewise only the achievements of his actions that can be regarded as his true Reality, although he may have delusions at this point, mistakenly thinking that he is different from his behavior in his heart after returning to himself from its behavior.It is true that an individuality can be changed and reversed when it becomes the result of its actions and thus surrenders itself to objective factors.But the character of an act depends entirely on whether the act is a persistent, actual being, or merely a signified thing that cannot last.The objectivity of the act does not change the act itself, it only shows what the act is, in other words, what it is or what it is not. —— As for decomposing real existence into subtle and subtle things like intentions, and then interpreting real people, that is, human behavior, in retrospect as a signified existence (just as the individual himself may give His own reality conceives some special intentions), we must leave such decompositions to lazy people who are good at meaning speculation.If this kind of person wants to develop his wisdom of inaction, and wants to deny the rational nature of behavior, so as to despise it, saying that it is not human existence, but instead refers to the image, appearance and characteristics of human existence, then , he should accept the above-mentioned retaliation, the slap in the face, because this slap proves to him that the appearance is not at ease, but rather an object that can be acted upon. Ⅲ.Phrenology If we now check to see if there is anything left to be seen among all the observable relations between the individuality of self-consciousness and its exterior, we shall find that one more relation must Observe by observing as your own object.In psychology, the external reality of things is said to regard the mind as its own conscious counterpart or reflection, and the mind can be understood in the external reality of things.But in physiognomy, the spirit is said to be known in its own exterior, which is a being like language which has as its essence a visible and invisible.Now, then, there remains to be determined that aspect of reality in which individuality is said to express its essence in its immediate, solid, purely concrete existence. ——The last relationship between appearance and essence is different from the relationship in physiognomy. The behavioral performance of an individual also includes its self-reflection and self-examination performance, so such an external performance itself is a kind of movement, but it is also some fixed characteristics. It is an intermediary existence.But in the determination yet to be examined, the external aspect of the spirit is finally a completely fixed reality, which is not itself an expressive symbol, which has nothing to do with conscious movement, but only presents for itself. For a naked and pure thing. 1.The skull as the external reality of the mind In the first place, as regards the relation of the interior of the mind to its exterior, it is evident that this relation must be understood as a causal connection, since one that exists in itself is related to another that exists in itself. Since the relationship between things is an inevitable relationship, there must be a causal relationship. Now, since the individuality of the mind acts upon the body, it must, as cause, itself be of the body.But that corporeal thing in which the individual acts as cause is an organ, not an organ of action against external reality, but an organ of action of the essence of self-consciousness in itself, if it may be said When dealing with the outside world, it is only dealing with its own body; therefore, people cannot immediately see what organs these organs are.If only organs in general are thought of, it is of course easy to think of the organs of motion in general, and likewise, the sex organs, etc.Such organs, however, should be regarded as instruments or as parts, which are the middle term or bridge between the mind as one extreme and the other, the external object.But here this organ must be understood as that in which the self-conscious individual, as an extreme, confronts its own reality opposed to itself, as another One extreme, which maintains itself for itself; At the same time, on the one hand, the individual does not turn outward, but reflects itself in its actions, and on the other hand, here, that is, on the side of being, is not a being for him.In relation to physiognomy, organs are indeed regarded as concrete beings that reflect on themselves and comment on actions; Consciousness confronts itself precisely with this observation as something indifferent.This indifference disappears of itself as soon as this self-reflected thing has acted on itself, because when it has acted, the indifferent concrete existence has assumed a necessary relation to it.But if it really acts on concrete existence, it must be a kind of existence itself, although it does not have to be a real objective existence, and it should be able to be designated as such an organ. In daily life, for example, anger, as such an internal thing and action, is considered to belong to the liver.Plato even thought that the function of the liver was not limited to anger, and some people even regarded it as the highest thing, saying that it was the organ of prophecy, or the seat of the faculty of expressing the divine and eternal in an irrational way.However, individual liver movement, heart movement, etc., cannot be regarded as the movement of the individual that is completely reflected in itself. To be honest, the movement in the liver and heart has been transformed into the body of the individual, and has become a kind of animal nature. The concrete existence that reflects the reality of the outside world. The nervous system, on the contrary, is the immediate stillness of organic matter in its motion.Although the various nerves are already the organs of consciousness with an external tendency, the brain and spinal cord can be regarded as the self-persisting (that is, non-objective, and not detached from itself) direct organs of self-consciousness. currently exists.If the existence link of this organ is a kind of existence for others or actual existence, then it is a kind of dead existence, and it is no longer the present presentation of self-consciousness.But conceptually, this being-in-itself is a kind of fluid, in which all the areas added in are dissolved by themselves, and no difference appears as the difference of being.At the same time, since the mind itself is not an abstract unity, but a system of motions in which it distinguishes itself into distinct moments and is free from this distinction, since the mind divides its body in general as different functions, and stipulates that each individual part of the body has only one function, then one can also imagine that its fluid existence in itself (Insichsein) must also be a differentiation into different parts. and it seems obligatory to conceive it this way, since the self-reflected existence of the mind in the brain is itself only a middle term between its pure essence and its differentiated limbs, and being a middle term it must necessarily Contains the nature of both ends, and therefore must itself contain the differentiation that exists because of the latter, i.e. differentiated limbs. The organic existence of the spirit has at the same time a static and unchanging concrete existence as its necessary aspect.The former must retreat to itself as one extreme of being-for-itself, while the latter confronts itself as the other extreme, making it an object, and then itself acts on this object as a cause.If now the brain and the spinal cord are the former extremes of the spiritual, bodily, being-for-itself, then the skull and the vertebrae are the other extreme of separation, that of the fixed static thing. —But since anyone who thinks of the real seat of the concrete existence of the mind always thinks only of the head and not of the spine, when we analyze a knowledge such as we are analyzing, we may be content with this reason. On the grounds--and this is not too bad a reason for the present problem--to regard only the skull as this concrete existence of the mind.也许有人会想到脊椎是精神的所在地，因为他觉得有的时候知识和行动确实也是有的被它吸入，有的从它那里发出，但这种论据，对于证明脊髓一定也要被视为精神的居住地而脊椎一定要被视为与之对应的具体存在，可以说完全无用，因为这样，可以证明的东西就太多了，因为人们同样可以想到，还有别的外在途径也适宜于影响精神活动，无论是去激动它或抑制它。 ——因此脊椎骨就可以，如果人们愿意的话，名正言顺地撇开不谈了；至于说头盖骨并不是含有精神的器官（但包含它的具体存在），这也象很多别的自然哲学学说一样是理由充足言之成理的。因为前面已经把器官排除于这个关系的概念之外，所以头盖骨过去总认为是具体存在。或者有人会说，我们不应该专就事情的概念上着想，可是，日常经验总在教导着我们：人们以眼睛为器官观看事物；却并不能同样地以头盖骨为器官来杀人、偷窃、赋诗等等。 ——所以我们随后还要谈到头盖骨的时候，也不应该使用器官这个名称来表示它的含义。因为尽管人们经常说，对于有理性的人，要紧的不是言词而是事实，这句话却不允许我们使用一种与事实不符合的言词去指示这一事实：因为这样做就同时既是愚蠢又是欺骗，这样愚蠢地进行欺骗的人自以为是，并且佯言只是由于没找到适当的言词，其实他是掩饰他根本没把握到事情，没把握到概念；如果确实有了概念，那么概念就自然会有它正确的名称。 ——那么在这里，暂且规定了的只有这么一点： 大脑是活的头，头盖骨是死的头。 2.头盖骨的形状与个体性的关系 于是大脑的精神活动及其有规定的样式就应该在这个死的存在里有所显现，显现为外在的现实，虽说这种外在现实仍然是在个体的自身以内。精神活动与头盖骨亦即本身并不含有精神的那个死的存在之间出现的头一种关系，乃是上面所规定的那种外在的机械关系，由于它们之间有这种机械关系，真正的器官——它们都在大脑里面，——就在此一处把头盖骨鼓成圆的，在彼一处把它压得很平，或者挤得很扁，或者还有其他的说法，可以用来表示这种影响。但是，既然头盖骨是有机物的一部分，那就必须设想，就在头盖骨里也有一种活的自我形成作用，正如在任何一种骨骼里的情形一样；因此，如果从这一观点来考虑，则头盖骨毋宁是从它这一方面在对大脑施加压力，在替大脑规定外部界限，而且它作为比较坚硬的一方面也确实有这种能力如此做。可是在这种情况下，头盖骨与大脑的相互活动方面应该说始终还保持着同一种关系，因为无论头盖骨是规定者也好或是被规定者也好，对于双方之有因果关联，是根本无所改变的，如果有所改变，那只是在此情况下，头盖骨成了自我意识的直接器官，因为作为原因的那个自为存在就在它那里面。不过由于自为存在作为有机物的生命性，同样地落于头盖骨与大脑两个方面，所以两者之间的因果关联事实上就丧失掉了，但虽然失去了因果关联，两方面的形成发展却会在内部互相关联着而成为一个有机的预定的和谐，这种和谐听任彼此关联的两个方面各自独立，听任每一方面具有其独特的形象而不强使另外的形象必须与之配称；而且不仅如此，形象与质之间也是各自独立的，正如葡萄的形状与葡萄酒的味道之各自独立一样。——但是，既然自为存在的规定落到了大脑那一方面，而具体存在的规定落到了头盖骨一方面，那么在有机的统一体以内，这两方面也还可以建立一种因果关联，一种必然关系，关系的双方就象是两个互相外在的方面那样，这就是说，这种关系自身就是一种外在的，通过这种外在的关系，两方面的形象就互受对方所规定。 但是，关于自我意识的器官是它的对方的一种主动原因这类规定，人们实在可以提出各式各样的说法；因为这里所谈的是这样一种原因的性质，这种原因，须根据它的漠不相干的具体存在亦即它的形状和大小来考察，而它的内在和自为存在则是一种与直接的具体存在无所关涉的东西。第一，头盖骨的有机的自我形成对待机械的影响是漠不相干的，而且这两种关系之间的关系，由于前者是自身与自身相关，正就是这种无规定性和无限制性自身。第二，即使我们承认大脑把精神的区别当作存在着的区别接收过去，自身变成了一大堆各占一个不同空间的、内在的器官——这当然是与自然相矛盾的，自然让概念的环节各有一个独自的具体存在，从而把有机生命的流动的单一性清清楚楚地放在一边，而把存在于它的区别中的它的分化和区分放在另一边，以便这些区别能象此处所应理解的这样各显现为一特殊的解剖学上的事物，——即使我们这样承认，也还完全不能确定，究竟一个精神环节按其原来的强弱，应该在一个什么情况下占有一个比较扩张的而在另外一个什么情况下占有一个比较收缩的脑器官，还是恰恰相反。同样不能确定的还有：究竟大脑的形成发展会使器官扩大呢，还是使之缩小，究竟它把器官弄得更沉重呢，还是更轻巧，由于究竟原因是怎么一回事始终是个未确定的问题，于是究竟头盖骨上所受的影响是怎么一回事也就同样地成为未确定的问题，因而不知道这种影响究竟是一种扩张，还是一种压缩和收拢。如果我们把这种影响规定为比一种激动更高贵些的作用，那么究竟它象一种芫青药膏那样起鼓胀作用还是象一种酸醋那样起收敛作用呢，这仍然是未确定的问题。——诸如此类的每一种想法，都可以言之成理持之有故，因为同样也在发生着影响的那个有机关系，使各种理由都一样地能够自圆其说，对一切这样的理解是无所轩轾一视同仁的。 不过，观察意识所想作的事，并不是去规定这个关系。因为立于关系之一方的本来不是作为动物身体之一部分的大脑，而是作为有自我意识的个体性的存在的大脑。——个体性，作为持存不变的个性和运动着的意识行为，是自为的而且是自在的。与这个自为而自在的存在对立着的是它的现实及其为他的存在，自为而自在的存在是本质和主体，它在大脑那里具有这样一种存在，这种存在统摄于本质之下并且只通过内在的含义才取得它的价值。至于自我意识的个体性的另一方面，即它的特定存在的那方面，则是独立着的存在和主体，换句话说，是一种事物，更确切地说，就是一块骨骼。 人的现实和特定存在就是人的头盖骨。——这就是这个关系的双方在对它们进行观察的意识里所具有的相关情况和意义。 观察意识现在要来考察这两方面的更确切的关系。一般地说，头盖骨的含义诚然就是精神的直接现实，但精神的多面性就使它的特定存在也具有一种相应的多义性。观察意识所要做的，就是去规定这个特定存在所划分出来的个别地区或个别位置的含义，并且去看看，这些个别位置怎么样在自身中包含着对于这种含义的指示。 头盖骨既不是一种行为活动的器官，也不是一种说话的或传情示意的运动。因为人们不是以头盖骨来进行偷窃、杀人，同时，在偷窃杀人的时候头盖骨丝毫不动声色，因而它也不能算是一种言语表情。——甚至这种存在着的东西连一个符号的价值都没有。一个表情，手势，声调，以及竖立在荒岛上的一根柱子，一个木桩，都立即指明它们在直接地仅仅是这些东西之外还意味着什么别的东西。它们既然在自身中含有这样一种规定性，这种规定性因本来不是它们本身的规定性就指示着什么别的东西，那么它们就立即表明自己是一种符号。当然，象汉姆莱特对于约里克的头盖骨那样①，人们也能因一个头盖骨而发生种种联想，但是头盖骨自身究竟是一种漠不相干、天真无私的东西，从它那里直接地看不到也想不出它自身以外的任何其他的东西。它诚然也令人想到大脑及其规定性，想到别种样式的头盖骨，但它不能令人想到一种有意识的运动，因为它既没在它上面印下面部表情和手势，也没留下其他什么足以表明自己是一种意识运动的遗迹的东西。因为它是那样的一种现实，那种现实，呈现在个体性里，将是如此另外的一方面：它不再是反映自己于自身的存在，而是纯粹直接的存在。 ①见莎士比亚：《汉姆莱特》，Ⅵ。——黑格尔原注 另外，由于头盖骨对自身也没有感觉，似乎它反而还可能有一种更为确切的意义，因为，有某些确定的感觉发生在头盖骨邻近，那么也许可以通过邻近关系而从这些确定的感觉里认识到头盖骨的含义。这就是说，一种有意识的精神样式既然在头盖骨的一个确定位置上产生它自己的感觉，那么转过来，也许头盖骨的这个位置就会以它的形状暗示出这个精神样式的特性。比如有很多人在努力思考或即在一般地思考的时候就觉得头里的什么地方有一种胀痛感觉，同样，也许可以设想，象偷窃、杀人、赋诗等等也各有一种独自的感觉伴随着，而且这种感觉还一定有它特殊的位置。大脑上的这个位置既然受到感动比较大，所作的活动比较多，很可能也就使邻近的头骨发育得比较充分；也或者，这邻近位置上的头骨由于同情或适应，也就不甘寂寞，跟着扩大自己，或缩小自己，或者以其他随便什么方式来形成它自己。——可是，这种假说是显然站不住的，因为一般的感觉乃是一种无规定性的东西，头脑里亦即感觉中心里的感觉，也许是任何感觉或疼痛都会引起的一种普遍的感觉，因而与小偷，强盗，诗人的头疼混杂在一起的可能还有别的感觉，而这些感觉很难互相区别，也很难与那些所谓纯粹的身体感觉区别开来，其难以区别的情况，就象笼统地根据头痛的病征，如果我们只就其身体上的意义而言，无法确定究竟是什么疾病一样。 事实上，无论我们从事情的哪一方面来看，双方之间的一切必然的相互关系以及任何通过这种关系而表现出来的相互指示，都消失了。如果说两者之间毕竟还有关系，那么这种关系就只能是而且必然是双方的相应规定性之间的一种无概念的、自由的、预定的和谐罢了，因为其中有一方面应该是一种无精神的现实、单纯的事物。——这样一来，排在一边的是一批静止的头盖骨上的位置。排在另一边的是一批精神属性；精神属性的多寡和性质，取决于心理学的情况。心理学里关于精神的表现愈贫乏，从这一方面说，事情就愈简易；因为第一，精神属性就愈少，第二，它们就愈分离，愈固定，愈硬化，因而就与头骨的性质或规定愈近似，愈可以互相比较。不过，虽然由于精神表象的贫乏而事情简易了很多，两方面终究都还是很大的一批；而且它们之间的关系，对于观察而言，仍旧是完全偶然的。如果要将细致一些的心理学和"识人学"所惯常谈论的每一种心灵能力，每一种激情（这是必须同样在这里加以考察的）以及各种各样的品性，都在头盖骨上指定它们的位置和骨骼形状，那么这就是十分莫须有和十分武断的玩艺了，这正象要给那些与海滨沙数相当的以色列①儿童每人各指定一颗沙粒为其符号并叫它们各自从海滨捡出代表其自己的那颗沙粒来一样。——强盗的头盖骨上所有的，不是器官，也不是符号，而是这种隆起的骨节； 但强盗还有很多别的精神属性，也还有很多别的突出骨节，并且既有突出的骨节也就还有深陷的凹窝。在很多隆起与很多洼窝之中，人们就很有选择余地了。而且他的强盗的精神属性固然有可能与此一隆起或彼一隆起、此一洼窝或彼一洼窝相联系，而隆起和洼窝也有可能与此一属性或彼一属性互相联系；因为强盗既不仅只具有一个强盗的精神属性，也不仅只具有一个隆起和一个洼窝而已。因此，在这方面进行的观察，其所得结果或价值就一定象赶集的小贩或晒洗衣服的家庭妇女每次都遇到的下雨的情况一样。那位小贩和家庭妇女当初同样也可能做出观察，说每当某个邻人从门口路过或者家里吃猪肉排的那天总是落雨的。正象落雨与诸如此类的情况完全无关一样，就观察来说，精神方面的这一规定性与头盖骨上的这一特定的存在，也是漠不相干的。因为这种观察的两个对象之一是一个干巴巴的自为存在，一个僵化了的属性，而其另一对象则是一个同样干巴巴的自为存在。一个僵死的事物，象这两个对象这样，对于一切别的东西都是完全漠不相干的；对隆起的骨头而言，有一个强盗在它的邻近与否，和对强盗而言，有一个扁平骨头在他的旁边与否一样是漠不相干的。 ①《创世记》第二十二章，十七节："我将使你的后代，象天上的星辰，象海滨的沙粒一样多"。 - translator 当然，人们仍然可能说，头盖骨的某个位置上的一个隆起的骨头是与某一种品质或情感等等有联系的。人们尽可以想象，强盗的隆起是在头盖骨的这一个位置上，小偷的隆起则在另一位置上等等。其实从这方面来说，头盖骨相学应该还大有扩展余地，因为一望而知，它所指出的都还只限于同一个个体的某一个隆起与某一种属性的联系，头骨和属性还都是属于同一个人的。但是，天然的头盖骨相学——因为既有天然的面相学，一定也有这样一种天然的骨相学——事实上早已超越了这个限制，比如说，它不仅断定一个狡猾的人在自己耳朵后面总生有一个拳头大小的隆起，并且认为不忠实于丈夫的妻子所生的隆起，不是在她自己的前额上，而是在她的配偶的前额上。 ——人们同样还可以想象，与强盗住在同一个房子里的人，或者也可以说他的邻人，乃至于更进一步说他的同胞等等，都总在头盖骨的某个位置上生有高出来的疙瘩，人们可以作这样的想象，正如人们之可以想象一头飞牛，先被骑在驴身上的巨蟹所温存抚摩，然后又如何如何一样。 ——但是，如果可能性不是指想象的可能性，而是指内在的可能性或概念的可能性，那么对象就是这样的一种现实，它确实是而且应该是纯粹的事物，内中不包含任何只在想象中才有的意义。 3.潜在与现实 既然观察者不考虑双方互不相干的情况，而一方面以外在是内在的表现这个普遍的理性原理为根据，另一方面应用动物头盖骨与其性格之间的关系的类比（动物所可能有的性格诚然比人所有的要简单些，但同时，要说出究竟动物有些什么性格则也比较困难些，因为并不是每一个人都能那么容易通过自己的想象体会出一个动物的性格），直接着手规定双方的关系，从而创造规律，那么观察者所以如此信心十足，也许因为他自以为找到了一种区别，足以作为辩护他所建立的规律的绝妙论据；这种区别，我们在这里也不得不加以讨论。——照这种人说，精神的存在；至少不能简单地视为是固定的和不可变动的东西。人是自由的，这就等于承认人的原始的存在只是一些潜在〔或天赋〕；只有潜在还不够，在潜在的基础上，人可以起很大的作用；或者说，人的潜在必需有利的环境才能得到发展；这也就是说，精神的一种原始的存在，同样又可以说是一种并不实际存在的存在。因此，假定观察的结果跟随便一个什么人所信以为真的规律发生了矛盾，比如说吧，假定年会或晒洗衣服的那天是爽朗的晴天，小贩和家庭妇女就尽可以说，本来应当下雨的，虽未下雨，而可能下雨的潜在却是现成存在着的；同样，头盖骨相学也可以说，这个个体本来应该是象头盖骨按照规律所指示的那个样子的，他有一种原始的潜在，只是没发展出来而已；这种潜在着的性质诚然并不是实际存在着，但它是应该可以实际存在的。——规律和应该，根据的是观察到了的实在的雨和观察到了的实在的某一头盖骨规定性，可是当没有这种现实存在的时候，空虚的可能性就和现实一样，可以代替现实。——这种空虚的可能性亦即这样建立起来的规律的不现实性，以及违反规律的观察结果，它们之所以必不能免，一定会发生，正是因为，个体的自由和发展变化着的环境都是与一般的存在漠不相干的，无论就其为原始的内在的存在或是外在的硬化或骨化的存在而言；而且，不仅如此，还因为个体也可以不同于它内在原始本性，更不同于一块骨头，而是什么别的东西。 因此，我们得到了这样的可能性：头盖骨上的这种隆起或洼窝，既指示某种现实存在，又只指示一种潜在，而由于潜在不确定将成为什么东西，所以等于说隆起既指示现实的东西又指示非现实的东西。在这里和在到处一样，我们看到了一种坏的遁词所产生的结果：它自身被用以反对它要去支持的东西了。我们看到，由于事实的本性，坚持意谓的人竟不加思索地自己说出它的主张的反面来了；——竟说，头盖骨指示点什么，但同样也不指示什么。 当坚持意谓的人使用这种遁词的时候，他心目中浮现着的倒是一种真实的足以破除意谓的思想，他真正意识到象这样的存在根本不是精神的真理性。既然潜在已经是一种并不参预精神活动的原始的存在，那么骨骼，当然更是这样的一种存在。没有精神活动而存在着的东西，对意识而言是一个事物，它不是意识的本质，而勿宁是意识的反面，因为意识正是要通过对这种无精神的存在的否定与破除才是现实的。——由此可见，说一种骨骼是意识的现实的存在，这简直可以说是对于理性的一种彻头彻尾的否定；而这就是把头盖骨当作精神的外在以后的必然结论，因为外在恰恰就是存在着的现实。也许有人会说，我们只是根据这种外在来推想内在罢了，内在是另外一种东西，外在不是内在自身，只是它的表现。但这种解释是毫无用处的，因为在双方的相互关系里，规定属于内在方面的正是自身思维着的和被思维着的现实，而规定属于外在方面的则是存在着的现实。——因此，如果我对你说：你（你的内在）所以是这个样子，因为你的头盖骨是这样长的，那么这无异于说，我把一种骨骼当作是你的现实。在上面讨论面相学时曾谈到用打耳光来给这样的判断以回敬，那只不过初步地给他头部的柔软部分改变一下面貌和位置，从而证明它们不是真正的自在，不是精神的现实；——在骨相学这里，这个回敬真正地说来应该更进一步，应该把作这样臆断的人的头盖骨打碎，以便也象他的智慧那样实事求是地向他表明，对人而言一种骨骼不是什么自在的东西，更不是人的真正现实。 有自我意识的理性，将以它没有受过教养的本能毫无考虑地来驳斥它自己的这另一种观察本能——头盖骨相学。理性的这种观察本能已发展到知道有认识问题，却只以外在为内在之表现这样无精神的方式理解了认识。但是，愈是坏的思想，它的坏处确切在什么地方有时愈是不显明，因而就愈不容易加以分析。因为所谓一个思想愈坏，就是说它以之为本质的那种抽象愈纯粹和愈空虚。但头盖骨相学里的对立，一面是有自我意识的个体性，另一面是外在——已完全变成了事物的抽象，这也就是，精神的内部存在被理解为固定的无精神的东西而与精神的内部存在相对立。 ——但是到达这里，似乎观察的理性的发展也已登峰造极，现在它必须抛弃它自己而彻底转变；因为只有完全坏透了的东西本身才含有向其反面转变的直接必然性。 ——这就好象犹太民族一样，它可以说是从来最遭天谴的民族，正因为它已直接站立于上帝的门前。犹太民族并不意识到，它的自在而自为的东西亦即这个自身的本质性，就是它自身，它反而使之成为它自己的彼岸；可是它通过这个外化，如果它真能将它的对象重新收回于其自身，它就有可能使自己成为一种比它如果始终停留于存在的直接性以内更为高级的实际存在。因为精神愈从比较大的对立中返回自身，就愈为伟大；然而这种对立，要靠精神扬弃它自己的直接统一和外化它的自为存在才得建立起来。但是，如果这样一种意识并不自我反映，或者说并不返回自身，那么本来含有这种意识的那个中项，由于应该回来充实它的东西变成了一个固定的极端，就成了悲惨的无救的空虚。因此，观察的理性的这个最后阶段乃是它的最坏的阶段，但唯其如此，它就需要作一百八十度的转变。conclusion 当我们回顾至今讨论过的、构成观察之内容和对象的这一系列的关系的时候，我们发现，早在第一种样式的观察里，即在对无机物的关系的观察里，感性存在已经就消失掉了。无机物的关系的环节，在观察面前，都成了些纯粹的抽象，单一的概念，它们本来应该是与事物的感性存在牢牢结合着的，但感性存在既已丧失，关系的环节就只落得是一种纯粹的运动和一种普遍或共相了。这个自由的、自身完成了的过程虽仍保有其为一种客观事物的意义，但它现在却作为一个一而出现。在无机物的过程里，一是并不实际存在的内在，但如果过程作为一而存在着，它就是有机物。——单一，作为自为存在或否定本质，是与普遍对立着，自为地保持着自身的独立自由，因此，那只实现于绝对个别化的要素里的概念，在有机存在里就找不到它的真正的表现，即是说，概念并不是作为一种普遍而存在于有机物里，它仍然是有机物的一个外在，或者，其实都是一回事，是有机物的一个内在。——有机的过程只自在地是自由的，但它的自由并不是自为的。它的自由的自为存在，出现于目的中，在那里表现为一种另外的本质，一种居于过程以外而对自由有所意识的智慧。于是，理性的观察活动就转向这个智慧，转向精神，转向作为共相而存在着的概念或作为目的而存在着的目的；而理性自己的本质，现在就变成了它的观察对象。 理性首先注意的对象是它的纯粹的本质。但由于理性把在自身的差别中运动着的对象，理解为一种存在着的东西，于是它也就觉得思维规律都是持存的东西与持存的东西之间的关系。但由于这些思维规律都只以环节为内容，它们就通统汇入于自我意识的单一。——单一，这是一个新的观察对象，就其同样为一种存在着的东西而言，它就是个别的、偶然的自我意识。因此，观察就只在理性所意谓的或猜度的精神以内，只在有意识的现实对无意识的现实的偶然关联以内进行活动。就其本身来说，精神就仅仅是这种关系的必然性；所以观察活动就鞭辟入里，步步紧逼，将精神的有愿望和有行动的现实跟它的反映于自身而从事思索考察的、亦即客观的现实对立起来，加以比较研究。这个客观现实或外在，固然是个体的一种语言，是个体自身所具有的东西，但作为一种符号，它同时却是与它要去指示的内容漠不相干的东西，正如任何一个符号所代表的东西也总与这个符号漠不相干那样。 因此，观察就终于从这种变化无定的语言回到固定不变的存在上来，并且根据它的概念而宣称：精神的外在和直接现实不是器官，也不是语言和符号，而是僵死的事物。最初在观察无机物的时候，曾经把概念可以作为事物而现成存在着的观念扬弃了，可是最后在这个观察阶段里，却把这个想法重新建立起来，把精神的现实自身说成了一种事物，或者颠倒过来说，给僵死的存在赋予了精神的意义。——于是观察终于达到我们最初关于观察所持的那种概念，宣称理性的确定性在寻找它自己，将自己作为对象性的现实。——诚然，人们并不以为一说精神是由头盖骨表象着的，就等于说精神是一种事物；在这个思想里，据说并不包含任何所谓唯物主义，而精神毋宁仍然是与头盖骨很不相同的东西。但是既说精神存在着，这就无异于说，它是一种事物。如果精神以真正的存在或事物性的存在为宾词，那么，真正的说法应该就是说，精神是象一块骨骼那样的一种东西。我们应该认为找到了真正的说法，以明确地表示精神是存在着的，这乃是一件极端重要的事情。因为如果说，当平常人们谈到精神是存在着的，它有一个存在、它是一个事物、它是一个个别的现实的时候，人们心目中所意谓的并不是某种人可以看得见、拿得到、碰得着的东西，但事实上所说出的却就是这样的一种东西；真正说出来的，于是可以表示为：精神的存在就是一块骨骼。 这个结果现在具有双重的含义。就其真正含义而言，它是自我意识至今所经历的运动的结果的一个补充。不幸的自我意识放弃了它的独立，外化了它自己，把它的自为存在转变为事物。这样它就从自我意识又退回为意识，重新以存在、事物为对象。——但是这种作为对象的事物，就是自我意识； 所以就是自我与存在的统一体、范畴。当意识具有这样规定的对象的时候，意识具有理性。意识，以及自我意识，本来自身就是理性，但只有以范畴为对象的那种意识，我们才能说它具有理性；——不过，它具有理性还是与它知道理性是什么有所不同的。——范畴是存在与"自我"（SeinundSeinen）的直接的统一体，它必须贯穿着这两种形式；而有意识的观察，则正是观察以存在的形式出现的范畴。其结果，这种观察的意识就以命题的形式把意识本来无意识地确信的东西予以表述。命题是保存于理性的概念里的；自我是一种事物这一命题，乃是无限的判断，这是一种扬弃自身的判断。——通过这个结果，范畴于是取得了新的规定性，它就是这种自己正在扬弃自己的对立了。纯粹的范畴，亦即以存在的形式或直接性的形式出现于意识面前的那种范畴，乃是尚未中介的，仅仅现成已有的对象，而意识是一种同样尚未中介的行为。上述的那种无限的判断，则是从直接性向中介性或否定性过渡的环节。这样一来，现成已有的对象，就被规定为一种否定的对象，而与它对立着的意识，则被规定为自我意识或范畴，范畴在观察里曾以存在的形式出现，而现在则在自为存在的形式之下出现了；意识不再想直接找到自己，而想通过它自己的活动来创造自己。它以它自身为它的行动目的，至于在观察里，它只以事物为目的。 结果的另一个含义，是已经考察过了的、无概念的观察的含义。无概念的观察不是别的，只是一种以骨骼为自我意识之现实的观察，骨骼是自我意识的现实，同时是在意识面前并不丧失其对象性的感性事物。然而当无概念的观察表示骨骼是自我意识的现实时，它对于它之这样表述却无明确的意识，它对它的这个命题，并不是在命题的主词和宾词的规定性以及两者之关系的规定性中理解，更不是在自身消解着的无限判断和概念的意义下理解。——毋宁说，观察利用精神的更深刻的自我意识在这里所显现的那一种天然的诚实性，就在自身中把以骨骼为自我意识之现实的那种无概念的、赤裸的思想的丑恶性隐藏起来，并且还以无思想性自身来粉饰这种无思想的、赤裸的命题，即是说，它将一些在此处毫无意义的因果关系、符号、器官等等都拉扯进来，并利用它们所含的区别来掩盖它的命题的荒唐。 大脑纤维一类的东西，作为精神的存在，已经就是一种设想的、假设的现实，而不是实际存在着的现实，不是感觉得到、看得见的现实，一句话，不是真实的现实。如果它们实际存在在那里，如果它们是看得见的，那它们就是僵死的对象，因而就不再是精神的存在。但是，真正的对象性或客观性必须是一种直接的，感性的存在，因此，在这种死的客观性里的精神（因为骨骼可说是在活的东西自身中的死的东西），就被认为是客观的现实。——这种思想里所含的概念，乃是在说，理性自身是一切事物性，甚至于是纯粹客观的事物性。但是在概念中理性才是一切事物性，或者说，只有这种概念才是理性的真理性；而概念自身愈纯粹，就愈下降而成为愚昧无知的表象，假如它的内容不是概念而是表象的话，或者，假如自我扬弃着的无限判断并不意识到它的这种无限性，而是被当作一种一成不变的命题，而命题的本来应该不分彼此的主词和宾词竟是各为自己的、自我固定为自我、事物固定为事物的话。——理性，本质上亦即概念，直接被分裂为它自身与它对方的对立，而这个对立，正因为是直接分裂出来的