Chapter 5 Chapter 4 On the first class of objects of the subject, and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing them 1

Section 17 General Description of the Subject Matter The first class of possible objects is intuitive, complete, empirical to our faculty of representation.Compared with pure thinking, that is, abstract concepts, they are intuitive; according to Kant’s division, they not only contain the form of phenomena, but also contain the content of phenomena, so they are complete; they are also empirical, and this aspect is Because they do not arise from mere connections of thought, but from tactile stimuli in our sensory organisms, whose origin is evidently inseparable from their reality; are all connected together, and in this combination constitute our empirical reality without beginning or end.According to Kant, however, since empirical realities do not cancel their transcendental ideas, when we consider them we deal only with the formal part of representational cognition.

Section 18 Essentials of the Prior Analysis of Empirical Reality The forms of these representations are internal and external sensory forms; namely time and space.But these representational forms can only be intuitive when filled.Intuition is matter, which I shall restate further in Section XXI.If time were the only form of these representations, these representations would not co-exist, and therefore nothing would last forever or last.For time can only be visualized when it is filled, and its progress can only be visualized through change, and change can only take place in filled time.Thus, the permanence of an object can only be ascertained in comparison with change, which takes place in other objects that coexist with it.But the appearance of coexistence cannot be in time alone; in its completeness it cannot be separated from the appearance of space; for, in pure time, everything follows one another, and in pure space, everything Juxtaposed with each other; therefore, the appearance of coexistence can only be produced by combining time and space.

On the other hand, if space were the only form of such representations, there would be no change of such representations; for change and change are the succession of states, and succession is possible only in time.We can therefore define time as the possibility of relative states of the same thing occurring. We can thus see that although infinite divisibility and infinite extension are common to both time and space, these two forms of empirical representation are quite different, since for one of them is What is essential has no meaning for another: juxtaposition in time has no meaning, succession in space has no meaning.But it is in the union of these two forms that the empirical representations belonging to the ordered complex of reality take place; Yes, just as a product arises from its elements.Since it is the understanding, by its own special function, that brings about this union and links these heterogeneous modes in such a way, empirical reality—though only for the understanding—comes out of their interpenetration. , and it is produced as the representation of a set, and a complex formed by the representation of a set is combined through the form of the principle of sufficient reason, but its limit is still a problem.Every single representation belonging to this class of objects is a part of this complex, and has its place in it, as determined by our a priori laws of cognition; therefore, there are innumerable co-existing objects in it, because the substance, That is, matter is eternal, despite the constant passage of time, and because its state is still changing, despite the immutability of space.In short, in this complex, all objective, real worlds exist for us.Any interested reader will find a further elaboration of the analysis of empirical reality outlined here in the fourth section of the first volume of The World as Will and Representation, where it is shown in more detail how the understanding realizes this. a way of unifying and thus creating for itself the world of experience.The reader will also find very important help from the chapter IV of the second volume of the same book, "The A priori Conceptions of Time, Space, and Matter," to which I advise the reader to give sufficient attention: for it especially shows that time How the contrast with space is balanced in the matter that is its product in the form of causality.

-------- ① Volume 1 of the first edition begins on page 12, and the third edition begins on page 9. We shall now proceed to a careful examination of the intellectual functions which form the basis of empirical reality; however, we must also begin with a few incidental remarks so as not to come into direct contradiction with the basic idealistic views I have adopted. §19 Immediate existence of appearances Although this unity is accomplished through apperception of the forms of the internal and external senses in the process of representing matter and thus producing an eternal external world, all direct cognition can only be obtained by the subject through the internal senses —The outer sense is in turn the object of the inner sense, because the intuitions of the outer sense are in turn intuited by the inner sense—therefore, with regard to the immediate existence of representations in its consciousness, the subject, as the form of the inner sense, is subject only to the law of time , the result: only one representation is presented to it (the subject) at a time, however complex this representation may be.When we say that representations are immediately present, we mean that they are not only known to us in the unity of time and space achieved by apperception, an intuitive faculty that we shall soon see. , and through apperception the composite representation of empirical reality arises, and is known to us only in pure time as a representation of the inner sense, and it is at the intermediate point called the present moment that its two streams diverge. .The necessary conditions for the immediate existence of this kind of appearance mentioned in the previous part refer to the causal action that occurs on our sense organs, that is, the organism. Of course, the organism itself also belongs to this kind of object, and it must also obey the causal law that governs it. This we will examine soon.On the one hand, according to the laws of inner and outer worlds, the subject cannot suddenly stop at a representation; and, on the other hand, there is no coexistence only in time: the single representation must always disappear and be replaced by others, which is our It cannot be determined by laws determined a priori, but it depends on certain conditions which we shall soon mention.It is a well-known fact that imagination and dreams can reproduce the immediate presence of representations; however, the study of this fact belongs to the domain of empirical psychology.Although the representations immediately present in our consciousness are temporal and discrete in nature, yet, as described above, through apperception the subject holds representations of synthetic complexes of reality; by this contrast , we can see that the representations belonging to this complex are markedly different from the immediate representations that exist in our consciousness.Viewed from the former point of view, they are called real things; from the latter point of view alone, they are mere appearances.This ordinary view of matter we can understand from what is called realism.With the rise of modern philosophy, idealism is opposed to realism, and has been developing gradually.Malebranche and Berkeley are the original representatives of this opposition. Kant created transcendental idealism, which strongly promoted the development of idealism. Since then, the coexistence of the empirical reality of things and their transcendental ideas has become possible. , Kant expressed this point of view as follows: "Transcendental idealism wants to show that all phenomena are only appearances, not things in themselves." It must be contained in this representation. It is only represented in it, and nothing else." ②Finally, he said: "If we remove the thinking subject, the entire material world must disappear; because it is only our own subjective perception One of the phenomena and one of its representations." ③ In India, spiritualism even became a popular religious doctrine, not only referring to Brahmanism, but also Buddhism; only in Europe did it become specious, and this It is caused by the inescapable realism inherent in Judaism.But realism completely ignores the fact that real things exist only in the sense that they are thoroughly represented, or—if it must be stated precisely, then, we may say, only immediate existence in the consciousness of the subject can What is called actually represented—even the possibility of being represented merely as represented.Realists forget that an object is not an object if it cuts off the relationship with the subject, and if we cut off this relationship or think it does not exist, we are equal to eliminating all objective existence at the same time.Although Leibniz really felt that the subject is a necessary condition of the object, he still couldn't get rid of the idea that the object exists by itself and has no connection with the subject, that is, it is not a derivative of the subject. .Therefore, he originally assumed that the objective world and the world of appearances are the same, that the two go hand in hand, that there is no direct connection, and that the only external connection occurs through a pre-established harmony;—obviously, this is the most redundant thing, because It does not enter into intuition, and the perfectly analogous world of representation which enters our intuition has nothing to do with it.However, when he needed to further determine the nature of these objectively existing things-in-itself, he found himself compelled to assert that the object-in-itself is the subject. Moreover, he argues in this way because our consciousness is only for cognition, in the intellect— — within the confines of the instrument by which we represent the world — the inability to discover anything beyond subject and object, the representer and the represented, furnishes the strongest argument; therefore, if we abstract the objectivity of the object, or In other words, to extract its represented, if we remove it from its character as an object, but still wish to retain something, then this retention is the subject.On the contrary, if we want to extract subjectivity from the subject and hope to have something left, this will lead to the opposite result, that is, materialism.

-------- ①Kant:, 1st edition, p. 369. ② Kant: Notes on pages 374-375. ③ Ibid., page 383. Spinoza never thoroughly explored this problem, so he did not get a clear concept about it, but he saw clearly the necessary connection between subject and object. He thought that if we put aside this necessary connection , then subject and object are incomprehensible; therefore, he defines it as the unity of cognition and extension in substance. NOTE - I would like to take this opportunity to make a point on the main point related to this section.In this monograph, for the sake of greater clarity and intelligibility within the limited space, real objects should be used in every case to illustrate those intuitive representations which are joined together to form a complex of empirical realities which The self is always conceptual.

Section 20. Principle of Sufficient Reason for Generation In objects of subjects of the kind just described, the principle of sufficient reason appears in the form of the law of causality, which I call the principle of sufficient reason for becoming.With the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, all objects presenting themselves within the full range of our representations are, insofar as we call the appearance and disappearance of states of objects, that is, movements in the stream of time, forming complexes of empirical reality. can be linked together.We can thus formulate the law of causality as follows: When one or several real objects enter a new state, some other state must have existed before this state, and the new state necessarily follows from this previous state, provided that the previous state Appear.We call derivatives of this kind generation; states of the first kind cause, and states of the second kind effect.For example, when a substance catches fire, there must be a state before it burns, namely 1.Close to oxygen; 2.Contact with oxygen; 3.Give it a decent temperature.Since the state of combustion necessarily arose out of this state, and because it has just occurred, this state could not have existed there before, but on the contrary, this state arose precisely with the preceding state.This accompanying process is called change.It is for this reason that the laws of causality relate only to changes and only to them.In any case, the production of each result is a change, and just because it does not precede it, there is no doubt that another change preceded it.It is called a cause when it is related to the subsequent change, the effect, and it must be called an effect when it is related to a third preceding change.This is the chain of cause and effect.It must have no beginning.Every subsequent state, therefore, must have arisen from the preceding one: for example, in the case we have just referred to above, it was the contact of matter with free heat that caused the temperature to rise; Depends on a previous state, e.g., the sun shining on a convex lens; this in turn depends on the movement of clouds and fog not covering the sun; this in turn depends on the wind; the wind in turn depends on the imbalance of density; this in turn depends on other conditions, to an infinite .When a state contains all but one of the conditions for producing a new state, the ultimate realization of this condition may in a certain sense be called a fundamental cause, since it is the cause to which we pay special attention. the final—in this case decisive—change of ; but if we do not consider it this way, there is no condition in this causal state that is more decisive than all others in the causal connection as a whole. , because it was the last one entirely by accident.Therefore, from the above example of cloud movement, the cause of combustion can be said to be that it occurs after the convex lens turns the direction to the object; however, it is also possible that oxygen is involved after the cloud drifts away, and then the fire occurs: thus, Seen in this respect, we know that it is the accident of the order of things that determines who is the cause.On closer inspection, however, we find that it is this whole state which forms the cause of the subsequent state, and that the order of time is in all essential respects indifferent to each of the conditions under which it occurred. of.Thus, in relation to a particular case, the conditions under which a state finally arises may be called the fundamental cause, because it satisfies the necessary conditions, and its occurrence thus becomes a decisive change.However, when considered in general, the whole state can be regarded as a cause only if it leads to its successor.These single necessary elements which together form and constitute the cause may be called causal elements or conditions, and the cause may therefore be subdivided into these elements or conditions.On the other hand, it would be very wrong to call these objects themselves causes rather than states: for example, in the above example someone called the convex lens the cause of the burning; others called the cloud the cause; , irregularly calling the sun or oxygen, etc., the cause.But the reason to call one object another is absurd; first, because objects contain not only form and quality, but also matter without beginning and end; It is related to the emergence and disappearance of states in time, so the law of causality governs this special relationship, in which the state that appears first is called the cause, and the state that appears later is called the effect, and the necessary connection between the two is is one arising from the other.

I would here refer the thoughtful reader to the illustrations given in my representative works. ①Because we should have a clear and practical understanding of the true and exact meaning of the concept of causality and its effective range: first of all, we should realize that the law of causality is only related to the change of the state of matter and has nothing to do with others; therefore, when it has nothing to do with the law of causality, Just don't use the law of cause and effect; this is of the utmost importance.The laws of causality govern the changes in objects of our external experience that take place in time; but these objects are material.It is by law that every change is invariably produced by another change which preceded it, and that a new change must necessarily be derived from an earlier change.This inevitability is the chain of cause and effect.

-------- ① "The World as Will and Representation" Volume II, Chapter Four, especially after page 42 of the second edition; after page 46 of the third edition. Therefore, no matter how simple the law of causality appears, in all philosophical works, from ancient times to the present, we find that the expression of the law of causality varies greatly, that is, the more general it is, the more abstract it is, and thus the more uncertain it is.For example, in one book we read that the law of causality is the law according to which other things come into being, and in another we read that it is that which produces another thing or makes it exist, and so on.Wolff says: "A cause is the principle upon which the existence or reality of another thing depends,"1 so it is clear that in the law of causality we are only connected with change in the form of matter which is neither born nor destroyed, but It is absolutely impossible for something that did not exist to suddenly leap into existence.Undoubtedly, lack of clarity of thought produces such views of causality in most cases; but certainly there are cases where a hidden intention lurks in the background - treated frivolously for theological purposes. The "cosmological proof" even distorts the transcendental and a priori truth, the milk of human reason, for this purpose.We find one of the clearest examples of this in Thomas Browne's 460-page book On Causality, which reached its fourth edition in 1835 and which may have been published since. Several editions.The book, despite being annoying, pedantic, disjointed and long-winded, manages to get the point across.The Englishman rightly realized that the law of causality must be related to change, so that every effect is a change.Yet, although he may well have recognized it, he is unwilling to admit that every cause is also a change, and that the whole process is therefore merely a never-ending chain of change, successive in time.Instead, he clumsily insists on calling cause an object or entity that precedes change, knowingly wrong, and using this utterly wrong The expression completely distorts his own thought and destroys everything he intends to explain, all in order that his definition will not get in the way of cosmology and be blamed for it by later generations. —But what is a truth worth if it makes its way by this means?

-------- ①Wolf: Section 881 of Ontology. What have the honorable and honest professors of German philosophy—gentlemen who put truth above all else—doing for a "cosmology" with which they feel dearly dear, since Kant dealt the fatal blow to it in ?They have indeed run out of wits, because—as these great men know, though they do not say so—the first cause is self-cause, and even though the former expression is more widely used than the latter, it is still self-contradictory. of.Moreover, they express this view with seriousness, if not seriousness; and there are even many, especially "English-speaking clergymen," who, when they make a special reference to this natural When confronted with contradictory "first causes", they looked up and assumed a tireless posture of teaching.They know that the first cause is as utterly inconceivable as the end of space or the beginning of time at one point.Since every cause is a change, this necessarily prompts us to inquire into the previous change which produced it, and so on, ad infinitum!It is inconceivable that even the first state of matter, from which all subsequent states arise, is not now the first state of matter.For, if this state is itself the cause of subsequent states, they must likewise have arisen from an ever-existing being, and it is impossible that the actual state of the present being has only just arisen.If, on the other hand, the first state had begun as cause only at a certain stage, something had always changed it, taken it out of its inertia; but something must have happened, some change must have taken place. ; This in turn prompts us to pursue its cause—that is, the change before it; so that we are once again caught in the chain of cause and effect, driving us to explore step by step, more and more, until infinity! (No doubt these gentlemen would not be shameless to tell me that matter begins with nothing! If they had said so, the reasoning at their disposal would be infinite.) Causality, therefore, is not as convenient as a cab, which is at hand when it is needed, After arriving at the destination, wave away.On the contrary, it is like the magic broom awakened by the little wizard in Goethe's poem. Once it starts to move, it keeps running back and forth and fetching water. Only the great wizard has the magic power to stabilize it.However, there was no such thing as a great wizard among these gentlemen.Then, when the philosophical truth appears, what have these noble people who are always vigilant and have taken the pursuit of truth as their duty to announce the advent of this beneficial truth to the world?It is impossible for them to turn their eyes away from the writings of vain men, but slyly ignores their errors, slyly glosses over them, and preempts them to recognize their value. the difference?What did they do to help their old friend, the already miserable and dying "proof of cosmology"?Oh, what a skill they have! "Friends," they said, "you are in a difficult position because you are bound to meet that obstinate old man in Königsberg, but your brother's ontological and physico-theological proofs are also struggling. Please don't mind, We won't abandon you (you know, that's what we're paid to do); but you'll have to change your name - it's a last resort - because, if we call you by your real name, people will walk away. Instead , if you change your name, we can take your arm and enter society again with dignity; only, as I said, under an alias! This trick will work! First of all, your arguments must henceforth be censored. Called 'Absolute'. Because it has an aura of novelty and majesty, and incomparable nobility; no one knows that we have to put on airs against the Germans. Of course, everyone knows it, and will be flattered by it. Complacent. But you yourself must disguise yourself by omitting the syllogism. Also, those deductive reasonings and premises, which you used to drag us to the top of the long ladder, must be preserved, because Everyone knows how useless they are. Put on a straight face and pomp like a man of few words, and you'll be done with a single leap. Shout out (and we'll answer),' Damn, Absolute, it's either Absolute, or it's nothing!' At this point, you have to bang your fist on the table. Where does 'Absolute' come from?" What a stupid question! Didn't I tell you Are you 'absolutely'?'—it is done, absolutely right! It is sure to be done! The Germans are used to satisfying themselves with words, not with thoughts. Haven't we trained them that way from the cradle? Don't believe me? Just look at Hegelianism! Nothing but empty, hypocritical, disgusting nonsense! And yet, what a glorious life of this philosophic monger! A few mercenaries are just preemptively flattering Once you get this kind of thing, you will immediately get the applause of countless ignorant fools-this applause continues to echo and expand-it's so lively! A scholar with mediocre intelligence, an ordinary liar suddenly becomes an outstanding Thinker. So take heart! Also, our friend and protector, we have to protect you in other ways, because seriously, how do we make a living without you? Kant, the old man who is always critical, is not always criticizing 'reason' ', cut off its wings? Well, we will create a new kind of 'reason', a kind of 'reason' that has never been heard before - not capable of thinking, but directly intuitive - can see through the 'idea' ( a hyperbole, used to create a sense of mystery), penetrating entities; or, directly appreciating this stuff that you and others are trying to prove; and, arguably, foreshadowing of all of this—this last point for those It is very appetizing for those who are not willing to make large concessions, but are easily satisfied. So let us gloss over the old frequently used and popular concepts for the sake of this new 'reason' the direct revelation of God, that is, for the divinefeel.As for the old 'reason', since it has lost its reputation in criticism, we might as well demote it and call it 'intellect', which is also a proper assignment for it.So, what is the 'intellect' that really exists?Where should we put it? —You smile noncommittally; but we know our audience and these people who are there, and we see these people sitting in the student chairs in front of us.Baron Bacon of Viruland said when he was alive: 'Young people must learn to believe in college. ' In that regard, they can learn as much as they have to from us, and we have many articles on faith.If you are still troubled by any doubts, remember that we are in Germany, where it is easy to do what is impossible elsewhere: a dull, ignorant, pseudo-philosopher, whose unspeakable verbiage Having disturbed people's minds thoroughly and for a long time, a bad writer--I mean the beloved Hegel--is not only proclaimed to be a profound thinker who is always right, but does not even attract any ridicule, And it is also accepted by everyone: Yes, this false story has not been questioned in the past 30 years, and there are still many people who still believe it today! ——Therefore, once you help us obtain the 'absolute', you will be very safe, and you will be afraid of Kant and his 'criticism'. — so that we can, in sublime tones, and through the most heterogeneous deduction, tirelessly — and this is their only similarity, by the way — deduce the “Universe” from the “Absolute” and make it philosophic change.We call the world 'finite' and the 'Absolute' 'infinite' - to make our nonsense pleasing to the ear - talk only of God, explaining how, why and by conscious or unconscious means he can create or Make the world, say whether he is or is not in the world, etc., as if 'philosophy' were 'theology', as if it were for enlightenment in the pursuit of knowing God, not the universe! "

We have to deal with the cosmological proof here, which has been commented on above.The question now is whether we may properly say that the cosmological proof consists in asserting that the principle of sufficient reason, or causality, of becoming necessarily leads to a thought which destroys and condemns it to death.For the first cause (the Absolute) can only be reached by going up from the conclusion to the ground in a protracted infinite series; impossible. After briefly showing the utter futility of the "cosmological proof," readers who agree with me may wish that I also argue that the "physical-theological proof" " is invalid because it seems more reasonable.However, by its very nature it belongs to a different branch of philosophy, and therefore it is inappropriate to argue here.The reader is referred to Kant and his Critique of Judgment, where he deals exclusively with this question; likewise, as a supplement to Kant's purely negative process, the reader is referred to my own book, The Will in Nature. , this book is not large in length, but it is rich in content and informative.As for the indifferent reader, this and all my other writings may be passed on to posterity unread.It doesn't matter to me; for I write not for one generation, but for many generations.

Since the law of causality is known a priori for us, and is therefore an a priori law, applicable to every possible experience without exception, this can be seen from § 20; moreover, the law of causality determines After the first state of existence, the second state must follow with equal certainty according to the law, that is, always follows; All judgments are based on this, and all necessity is based on this, as will be further explained. I call this form the principle of sufficient reason for becoming, because its application always presupposes a change that produces a new state, and is therefore a becoming.One of its essential features is that the cause always precedes the effect in time (cf. Section 47), and in the closely linked causal chain composed of the two states of cause and effect, only by this can we obtain the only original standard To distinguish which is the cause and which is the effect.On the contrary, in some cases, the causal chain is only recognized by prior experience; but the different states follow each other so quickly that it is difficult for us to capture the order in which the states occurred.In this way, we have to rely on the sequential nature of causality to fully understand. For example, we can deduce that the ignition of gunpowder precedes the explosion. ① -------- ① Readers are invited to refer to page 41 of Chapter 4 of Volume Two of the second edition of The World as Will and Representation, and page 45 of the third edition. From this essential connection between causation and succession, we learn that the concept "correlation" is strictly speaking meaningless; for it assumes that the effect is also the cause of its cause, i.e. the effect is at the same time the cause.In the Critique of Kant's Philosophy, supplementing my magnum opus, I refer the reader to show at length the unacceptability of this favored conception. ②We may note that the author turns to it precisely when the understanding is in decline, and for this reason it is widely used.Especially when the concept is running out, the word "relevant" appears more than any other; in fact, it can be seen as a kind of early warning gun to warn the reader that the author has reached the end of his rope.It is also worth noting that the word "Wechselwirkung" should literally be interpreted as "correlation" - or we would rather translate it as "correlation" - and this word can only be found in German. There are no words that exactly correspond to it. -------- ②Ibid., pages 517-521 of the first volume of the second edition, and pages 544-549 of the third edition. From the law of causality, two results must be extended. If the foothold is placed on its source, these two results are regarded as a priori and confirmed, so they are regarded as beyond doubt and without one exception.They are the law of inertia and the law of indestructibility of matter.The former shows that every state of matter in which matter may exist—that is to say, both at rest and in motion—will exist forever without change, if no cause accidentally happens to alter or annul it, neither Shrinks and doesn't expand.However, the latter can be used to prove the eternity of "matter", which comes from the fact that the law of causality applies only to the states of objects, like rest, motion, form and quality, because it governs the birth and death of the state of being; However, it does not apply at all to the being itself that suffers from these states.We call existence a substance in order to show precisely that it is not itself subject to change. "The entity is eternal" means that it neither comes into being nor perishes, and therefore its existence in the universe neither increases nor decreases.We are innately aware of this, as evidenced by the unquestionable consciousness that although we see an object disappear—whether by magic tricks, constant division, burning, volatilization, or any other means—we all firm belief that its substance, that is, matter, exists somewhere constant in quantity, though it may have changed in form; likewise, when we find a body suddenly in a certain position, it must have been caused by some Invisible particles combined—for example, by precipitation—came or formed, but its substance could not have then come into existence; for this is quite improbable and unimaginable.The certainty with which we presuppose (a priori) the above phenomena derives from the fact that our understanding possesses absolutely no form in which it can know the origin of matter.因为如前所述，因果律——我们能够认识变化的唯一形式——只运用于物体的状态，在任何情况下都绝不能运用于所有变化背后的存在：物质。这就是为什么我把物质不灭定律置于因果律的推论中的原因。而且，我们不能后天地获得“实体是永恒”的这样一种认识，一部分原因是在大多数情况下不能经验地确定；另一部分原因是任何经验认识都毫无例外地由归纳法而来，这种认识只具近似性，其结果是不确定的，因而不可能是绝对可靠的。因此，我们对于这一原则之信念的确定性在类别和性质上与对于从经验中获得的自然法则之精确性的信念相比是不一样的，因为前者与后者完全不同，前者的确定性深不可摇，根深蒂固。其原因是，这一原则表达了先验认识，即在一切经验之前决定和确立了我们整个经验范围内可能存在着的任何东西；而且，也正由此而把经验世界变为仅仅存在于我们大脑中的现象。在不具先验性的自然法则中，即使是那最具普遍性、最没有例外的——引力定律——法则，由于来源于经验，因而不能保证其具有绝对的普遍性；因此，对它的怀疑会时而产生，超出太阳系其有效性如何更令人生疑；天文学家认真地观察他们可能碰到的足以证明其为可疑的迹象，这就说明他们把引力定律看作为是纯粹经验的。当然，有人可能会提出这么一个问题，即引力定律在被绝对真空分开的两个物体间是否有效呢，或者它在太阳系的作用是否以某种以太为媒介呢，并且在恒星之间仍起作用呢？像这类问题只允许给予经验的问答，这就证明了这里与先验认识无关。另一方面，假如我们承认康德和拉普拉斯的假设是最为可能的，每一个太阳系都是从原始星云中不断凝聚发展而来，也绝不能设想那种原始实体可能会从无中产生：我们不得不假定，在某个地方它的粒子已先在，并以某种方式被聚集到一起，这正是由于物质不灭定律的先天本性决定的。在我的《康德哲学批判》①中，详尽地表明了实体只不过是物质的另一个代名词，实体这个概念离开物质就无从想象，因此它来源于物质。我还要特别指出，这个概念的形成是如何用于一个完全不可告人的目的。像许多其他的确定真理一样，物质的这种不朽性（被称为实体的永恒性）对于哲学教授来说是一枚禁果。因此，他们只是羞涩地斜瞟一眼就匆匆而过了。 -------- ①第二版第一卷第550页，第三版第580页。 由于无休止的因果锁链指导着所有的变化而从不超出它们的变化，因此还有两个存在着的东西未被触及，这正是由于它的作用范围是有限的：一方面是物质，我们刚说明过；另一方面是自然中原始的力。前者（物质）不受因果锁链的影响，因为它在所有变化的背后，或者变化在它身上发生；后者（原始的力）亦同，因为只有通过这种力变化或结果才成为可能；因为只有这种力才使因果转为原因，即一种操作能力，这种操作力对于原因来说完全犹如封邑里的臣民。原因和结果是发生在时间中由前后相继的必然性联系在一起的变化；任何一个原因都是借助于自然力才发生作用，而自然力是不变的；因此，在这种意义上，自然力不在时间之内，但是也正因为这样，它们无处不潜在、永不枯竭，一旦有机会就随时准备着在因果系列中表现自己。同结果一样，原因永远是一个单一的变化；而自然力却是普遍的，没有变化的，无时无处不充斥在时间中。例如，琥珀吸引线，现在看来是结果，它的原因是此前的摩擦和琥珀与线的接触；在其中起作用、掌握着这个过程的自然力就是电。在我的代表作①中对此也有说明，我阐明了在很长的因果锁链中差异最大的自然力如何相继在其中起作用。经过这种解释，瞬息万变的现象和在其中起作用的永恒形式之间的区别昭然若揭；而且有整个的一节（第二十六节）内容来说明这个问题，因此这里只须简单地概括说明即足矣。自然力借以在因果锁链中展示自己的法则——从而是把力与因果相联系的环节——是自然的规律。但是，自然力和原因之间的混淆时有发生，这对思维保持清晰是有害的。似乎还没有一个人在我之前真正搞清这些概念间的区别，尽管对这种区别的要求长久以来非常迫切。自然力不仅被表达为“电、重力等等，被作为某某的原因”，而且甚至也常常被那些探求“电、重力”等等的原因的人当作结果，瞧，多么荒唐。然而，把一种力归入另一种力，从而达到减少自然力数量的目的，这是一件完全不同的事情，例如，现在人们就把磁力归为电力。每一个真正的力，也就是确实是最初的自然力——而且每一种根本的化学性质都属于这种力——本质上都是超自然的质，即不能从物理上，而只能形而上学地加以解释，换言之，是一种超越现象世界的一种解释。在混淆原因与自然力或者说把它们视为同一方面，曼·德·比兰在他的《物理学与道德学新论》一书中可以说走得最远，因为这个问题是他的哲学的基本问题。另外值得注意，当他谈到原因时，他几乎不单独使用“原因”这个词，而是说成“原因或力”，这很像上面（第8节）我们看到的斯宾诺莎在同一页里提到“理由或原因”多8次之多的情形。这两个作者显然地意识到，他们在把两个根本不同的东西等同起来，以便于根据不同的场合对它们随意使用；为了这个目的，他们要不断地在读者的脑海里呈现这种同一。 -------- ①见第二版第一卷第二六节第153页，第三版第160页。 因果律作为每一种变化的统辖者，以三种完全不同的形式在自然中表现自己：作为这个词之最严格意义上的原因，作为刺激，以及作为动机。无机物、植物和动物之间真正的本质区别正是以此为基础来划分的，外在的、结构的、更不用说化学的区别，都不能作为这种划分的基础。 狭义上的原因只是无机界变化的基础，就是说，这些变化构成了机械、物理、化学的主题。牛顿的第三基本定律：“作用力和反作用力大小相等方向相反”只对这种原因使用，确切地说，先在（原因）的状态经历一个变化与由此而生（结果）的状态是一致的。而且，只有在因果律的这种形式中，结果的程度才总是与原因的程度完全一致，这样才便于我们通过其中的一个精确地确定另一个。 因果律的第二种形式是刺激；它统辖着有机生命，也就是植物界以及无性繁殖的，或者动物生命中无意识的那一部分。这种形式的特点是缺乏第一种形式的显明标记，就是说，在这种形式中，作用力和反作用力不等，所产生的结果之强度无论如何都与原因的强度不一样；事实上，强化的原因反而可能产生相反的结果。 因果律的第三种形式是刺激。在这种形式中，因果律对严格意义上的动物生命起作用，即对所有动物有意识地选择完成外部活动起作用。动机的手段是认识，因此，需要理智对动机具有敏锐性。因此，动物的真实特征也就是具有一种认识、表象的能力。这样的动物，总是为了一定的目标和目的才去运动，而这一目标和目的是被它们认识了的，就是说，目标和目的肯定呈现给它们已作为不同于它们自身的东西，而这些东西是他们能够意识到的。因此，动物的确切定义是：“有意识之物”；因为没有其他的定义可以更好地概括动物的特征，或者说更经得起推敲。没有认识能力就没有由动机产生的运动，剩下的就只有由刺激引起的运动，即植物生命。因此，敏感性和应激性是不可分的。显然，动物以一种不同于刺激的方式起作用。因为前者的作用是短暂的，就是说只须一瞬间，这是因为它们在功效上不同于刺激，跟行动的持续时间、客体的接近等等无关。因此，一个动机只要被感觉到就会起作用；而刺激总要求外在的，甚至经常是内在的联系，而且毫无例外地需要一定的持续时间。 这里勾勒出因果律的三种形式已足矣。在我的获奖论文《论意志自由》①中有更加详细的论述。然而，我们仍有一个问题需要强调。原因、刺激和动机之间的不同很显然只是由于对存在物（beings）之各种不同程度的感受所造成的；感受力越强，影响力就可能越小：石头需要碰击，而人只需要使个眼色就会服从。这两者都是由一个充足的原因才运动的，因此，都具有同样的必然性。因为动机不过是带有认识的因果律；理智是动机的媒介物，因为它是最高程度的感受性。然而，即使如此，因果律丝毫都未丧失它的严密性和确定性；因为动机是原因，动机的作用带有同样的必然性，因为这种必然性是原因本身所带来的。因为动物的智力比较简单，因此它们只局限在对此刻上的东西加以直观，因此这种必然性很容易看出。人的理智是双重的：不仅能够直观，而且能够抽象、认识，抽象和认识已不局限在此刻的东西上。人拥有理性；因此，可以在清醒的意识中施展选择决定的能力，即能够一个接一个地权衡相互排斥的动机的利害关系；换言之，他能让这些动机在他的意志中展示其力量。这样，最强有力的动机被他选中，他的行动必然随之产生，如同一个球受力之后一定滚动一样。意志自由意指（不是教授们的废话，而是）“一个具体的人在具体的环境中可以有两种不同的行为方式。”但是，如果认为一条真理在超出纯粹数学的范围之后，还能获得如同数学真理一样的确定性，且能获得清晰的证明，那是十分荒谬的。在我曾获得挪威学会奖励的论文《论意志自由》中，这一真理获得更加清晰系统彻底的论证，这是前人未曾做到的，特别是意识方面的事实，而无知的人却据此认为是在验证上述的荒谬观点。霍布斯、斯宾诺莎、普里斯特利、伏尔泰，甚至康德②的学说在基本的方面是一致的。当然，我们的职业哲学家们不允许这种学说妨碍他们对于自由意志滔滔不绝的论述，仿佛这是一个已被理解并且从来未曾被质疑过的问题。但是，这些先生们是否想过，自然恩赐，让上述这些伟人降临人世，究意是为了什么？难道是通过哲学使他们（教授们）获得生计？因为我在我的获奖论文中已前无古人地证实了这一真理，而且皇家学会已经通过把我的论文放进档案馆里，认可了这一点无疑地说明了这个证明的价值，就这些要人所持的观点而言，他们当然要对这一有害的学说，可憎的异端大加抨击，以最终驳倒它。不仅如此，由于在我的另一篇论文《论道德的基础》中，我已经证明了康德的实践理性以道德律为名冠以绝对律令是毫无根据的，但是，康德的观点仍为这些先生们作为他们浅薄的道德体系的基石，因此，他们的这种义务感显得更加迫切。我已经清澈如水、无可辩驳地表明了这是一种无用的设想，稍具判断力的人都不会再去相信这种虚构。——“咳，他们大概会这样做。”——哦，不！他们非常谨慎，没有在这种难以捉摸的根据上冒险！他们的本事就在于沉默；沉默就是他们唯一用来反对智力、诚挚和真理的本领。自1841年以来，他们出版的粗制滥造的无用作品中，没有一本书对我的《伦理学》—— 无疑这是60年来出版的关于道德哲学方面的一本最重要的著作——有些许的注意，而且，他们对我和我的真理如此恐惧，以致几乎没有一本由研究机构或大学主办的人文杂志提到过它。ZittoZitto（安静，安静），为免除公众觉察出问题来，他们的整个策略就在于此。自我保护的本能无疑是这些狡诈的策略之根源。因为，这犹如一方面是一种以真理为其唯一目标、别无它求的哲学，另一方面则是一些微不足道的体系，这些体系的制造者在众说纷纭的大众舆论的影响下，他们的体系之所以被认可，那就是他们能很得体地处理公众的意见。如果哲学与这些体系相结触，那么，岂不是鹤立鸡群吗？他们对我的作品极端恐惧实际上是惧怕真理？毋庸否认，主张所有的意志行为都具有彻底的必然性这一学说，跟他们心爱的按照犹太教的模式塑造出来的老太婆的哲学假设构成了针锋相对的矛盾。然而，经过严格检验过的这一真理，决不会因此受到破坏，它作为一个确定的事实和标准，作为一个真正的“给我一个支点”，证实了所有老年妇女哲学的无用，说明了迫切需要建立一种完全不同的、无比深刻的关于宇宙和人的观点；——至于这一观点与一个职业哲学家为官方所尽的义务是否一致，则不在考虑之列。 -------- ①见《伦理学的两个基本问题》第30～34页。 ②“无论哲学家对意志自由会形成什么样的概念，出于形而上学的考虑、意志的现象、人类的行为，正如自然界中每一个其他事物一样，都是由自然界的法则所决定的”。（康德：《一般历史观念》，导论I）。“人类的所有行为，就它们是现象而言，都是根据自然界的秩序，由其经验特征和其他伴随的原因所决定的；而且假如我们追根问底地审视他的意志的所有表现，我们就会发现没有任何一个单独的人类行为不可以从它之前的条件中作为必然性而确定地推测出来。因此，就这种经验特征而言，不存在自由，然而，只有考虑到自由意志，我们才能在观察时探究人类，从人类学的角度出发，设法弄清其生理上的动因。”（，德文第1版第548页，第5版第577页，米勒英译本第474页。）“因此，有理由认为，假如我们有充分的能力认识人类的思维方式，考察它在内部和外部行为中的表现，认识每一个甚至是信号最微弱的动机，而且以同样的方式认识在这些行为中的所有其他原因，那么，我们就有可能像对待日食和月食那样，精确地计算它的下一步行为。”——《实践理性批判》，罗森克朗兹编，第四版，第230页和177页。