Chapter 29 The author's reply to the sixth set of objections made by many theologians, philosophers, and geometers

1. It is absolutely true that no one can be sure whether he thinks or exists without first knowing what the nature of thinking and the nature of being are.It is not for this that a deliberate or demonstrated knowledge is needed, still less knowledge of it, from which he knows he knows, knows he knows, to infinity, for there can never be such a thing for anything. but only if he uses this internal knowledge, which always precedes acquired knowledge, and which is so natural to all in matters of thought and being that, although Perhaps because of some preconceived notion that blinds the eyes to the real meaning of the speech, but to the sound of it, we can pretend that we do not have it, when in fact we cannot do without it.So that when someone finds that he thinks, and therefore obviously follows that he is, although he may have never bothered to know what thinking and what is being before, it cannot be that he does not know enough. thinking and being in order to be fully satisfied thereby.

2. It is absolutely impossible that a man who knows that he is thinking, and who knows what it means to be moved by motion, can believe that he is mistaken, when in fact he is not thinking, but merely being moved. of.For, having an idea or concept of bodily motion quite different from that of thought, it should be necessary to perceive that one is different from the other, though, in order to be too accustomed to ascribe several different properties to the same The subject, without any relation between these properties, may be such that he doubts or affirms that thinking is one and the same as being driven upon him.It must be noted, however, that some things of which we have different ideas, may be regarded as one in two ways, namely: either in unity and identity of quality, or only in unity of composition.Thus, for example, it is true that the idea of ​​shape and that of motion are not the same idea; the action by which I understand and the action by which I will will are not apprehended by one idea; flesh and bone have different ideas; Ideas are quite different from ideas of extension.Nevertheless, we understand very clearly:

The same substance is both suitable for form and capable of movement; thus form and movement are one in the unity of qualities, just as will and understanding are one in the unity of qualities.But the same is not true of the substances we consider under the form of bones and those we consider under the form of flesh, so that we cannot regard them as one in the unity of qualities, but only as It is a thing in the unity of composition, since the same animal has flesh and bones. The question now is to know whether we perceive that which thinks and that which has extension is the same thing in the unity of qualities; , between acts of the intellect and acts of the will; or rather, if they are not called one in unity of composition, because they are both in one man, as The bone and the flesh are the same in the same animal.And for me this is how I feel, because the difference or difference I see between a thing that has an extension and a thing that thinks, I don't think, any more than the difference or difference between bone and flesh Small.

However, people have used authority on this place to beat me.In order to prevent authority from doing harm to truth, I am obliged to reply to what is contradicted to me (that is, that no one has yet understood my argument) by saying: Although few people have ever carefully examined this argument, it is And a few others believed in understanding it, and were totally convinced.Moreover, we would rather believe the one and only witness who, after being in America, told us that he had seen anti-points, than believe a thousand others who deny the existence of anti-points on the sole ground that they do not know.

Likewise, those who have seriously weighed the value of reasons should place more weight on the authority of a single man who says he understands an argument well than on the authority of a thousand others, who have no It is reasonable to say that this argument has not been understood by anyone.For, though they do not understand the argument, it does not mean that other people do not understand it either, and their authority does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated because their inferences appear to be inaccurate. Finally, the question is put to me here, namely: If I divide up by my analysis the motions of my fine matter enough that I know and can make some very careful, presumably quite sensible It is paradoxical for people to realize that their thoughts are distributed among the movements of these bodies, that is to say (and I think this is what they mean) that our thoughts are nothing but bodily movements.To this I answer that, personally, I am quite sure, but I cannot promise to persuade others to believe it, however careful they may be, and however wise they may think.At least I cannot guarantee that some of those people believe that those people do not use their minds on purely intellectual things, but only on things of the imagination, as it is easy to see people doing. All distinctions and differences between thought and movement can be understood by decomposing some fine matter.For this difference can only be made from the idea of ​​a thinking being and that of a thing having extension or motion being quite different and independent of each other, and from something which we clearly and distinctly apprehend as distinct and independent unless It is by the omnipotence of God that the idea of ​​being inseparable is contradictory; and therefore, no matter how many times we encounter them together in the same subject, as thought and bodily movement are in a single We should not therefore think that they are the same in the unity of quality, but only in the unity of composition.

① "Understanding", the second French version is "Knowledge". ② "Understanding", the second edition of French is "Knowledge". 3. The Platonists and their followers mentioned here have been unanimously opposed by the entire Catholic Church and all philosophers today, so there is no need to talk about them.Besides, it is true that the Lateran Council ruled that angels could be painted, but that did not mean that they were physical.And even if people believed them to be so, there is no reason to think that their mind and body are any more inseparable than that of man; To conclude that it is corporeal, but only as our bodies are begotten from the bodies of our parents, our souls are begotten from the souls of their parents.As to dogs and monkeys, when I ascribe thought to them, it does not mean that there is no difference between soul and body in man, but rather that there is a difference between mind and body in other animals; this is What those same Platonists (whose authority we still boast to us) asserted with Pythagoras is as well known as their theory of transmigration.But, as for me, I have not only said that there is no mind in beasts (I am persuaded that there is a mind), but, moreover, I have proved it with reasons, which are very strong, and have been No one has spoken against it yet.And these are the very people who think that dogs know they are running when they are awake, and even bark when they are asleep, and they say this as if they are complicit with them and see everything that goes on in their minds. , these people prove nothing about what they say.For, though they go on to say that they cannot believe that the activities of beasts can be adequately explained mechanically without attributing them to senses, souls, life (that is to say, according to my interpretation, there is no thinking, because I have never objected to what people usually call life, corporeal souls and organs), on the contrary, they ignore any objection one can make, and insist that it is completely impossible, even very absurd.But this is not a proof, for no opinion is so true that it cannot be said in the same way that it cannot be believed, and it is not customary even to swear when we lack proof.Also, since I've seen some great people laugh at people who think there are antipodes in much the same way before, I mean don't take everything that seems absurd to some people as wrong.

① Haldan and Ross translated the English translation based on the Latin as: "The same thing can be said about any opinion, no matter how correct the opinion is; not only that, people are not used to swearing unless it is in their proof Where it doesn't make sense. " Finally, a few words to add: If monkeys, dogs, and elephants are really like machines in all their actions, some will say that all actions of man are like machines, and they will no longer want to admit that In man there are the senses and the intellect.Nor is this a reason, which proves nothing, except that perhaps there are some who take things so vaguely, and are so attached to their first, never well-examined views, that they not only refuse to To change these views, they would rather deny that they experience what is in their minds, because, seriously, we cannot always experience in our minds that we are thinking, and thus, although we are told that animals cannot do anything without thinking. activity, but no one can reasonably deduce from it that he does not think, except someone who always assumes that beasts think as we do, and who, in this matter, believes that he acts like beasts, therefore He preferred to cling to the idea that men and beasts acted in the same way, to the point that when people came to him and pointed out that beasts cannot think, he would rather not have his own. And it is a thinking that is known by reliable experience, and is unwilling to change the idea that he acts in the same way as the beast.I do not believe, however, that there are many of them; but if it is agreed that thought is no different from bodily motion, I am sure there will be many more who maintain (with more reason, of course) that brutes are as thoughtful as man, For they will see the same movement in beasts as in us; As rational as man is, they will have occasion to believe that in the beasts there are spirits of our kind.

4. As to an atheist's knowledge, it is easy to point out that it is not accurate or reliable; for, as I have said before, the more impotent the man whom the atheist considers to be the creator of his being, the more impotent he is. There is occasion to wonder whether his nature is not so perfect as to be mistaken even in some things which he considers so obvious; It is impossible for this God to be a liar, so he will never be able to shake off this suspicion. ① "True", missing in the second French edition. 5. As long as one is willing to consider the form or essence of deceit to be a non-being, and a supreme being is never inclined to non-being, then we can see clearly that God cannot be a liar.All theologians agree with this truth, and we may say that it is the foundation of Christianity.The whole reliability of our faith depends on this.Because, if we think that God has lied to us a few times, how can we believe what He has revealed to me?Moreover, although theologians are in unanimity that those who go to hell are tormented by hellfire, yet their feelings are not deceived by the false idea that God has imprinted in their hearts a fire that burns them, but they Really tormented by fire.For just as the spirit of a living man, though not corporeal, is imprisoned in the body, so God, by his omnipotence, easily makes him suffer by corporeal fire after death, etc. (cf. Lord of Sentence, Book IV, No. 44).As for some passages in the Bible, if the opinion is not particularly against me, I do not think it necessary to answer; for these passages are not against me alone, but against all Christians.Take, for example, these opinions;

What can we know, the human soul is not like the animal soul.I was afraid that I would be considered arrogant if I preferred to find new answers instead of being content with answers that others had already given.As I have never engaged in theological studies, I only adopt a little when it is necessary for my own studies, and since I feel that I have no divine inspiration in my own heart to think that I am capable of doing the theological business, I therefore hereby declare that I will not answer objections like this in the future. Nevertheless, I am compelled to answer this time, fearing that my silence will give some people the opportunity to believe that my non-answer is due to my inability to give the passages of the Bible you have suggested. suitable explanation.Therefore I say, first of all, that passage of St. Paul's in 1 Corinthians 8:2 should be understood only as knowledge not connected with love, that is, the knowledge of atheists; for who If you really know God, you cannot but love him, you cannot but love him.This can be proved by the previous few sentences: knowledge can make people arrogant, but only love can build people up.A little later: If anyone loves him (that is, God), that person is known by God.For, thus, the disciple1 does not say that men cannot have any knowledge, for he admits that those who love God know him, that is, they have some knowledge of him; God does not know enough men, who, though they may think themselves knowledgeable in other things, do not yet know what they ought to know, nor how they ought to know, precisely because knowledge must be God begins and then makes all our knowledge of other things dependent on this knowledge, which I have explained in my meditations.Thus, my opinion is so openly affirmed on this point in the same passage written against me that I do not think that those who hold the contrary view can interpret the passage very well.Because if people think that if someone loves him (that is, God), this person is known to God, the meaning of the interpretation of this sentence is not the meaning in the Bible, and "he" does not refer to God, but It refers to those who are known and proved by him, then the disciple St. John in "1 John", chapter two, verse 2 ③: By this we know that we know him, if we keep his commandments.In chapter four, verse seven: Everyone who loves has been born of God, and knows God.This is exactly what I mean by interpretation.

① refers to Paul. ②In the second verse of the eighth chapter of "1 Corinthians" it is: "If anyone thinks he knows something, he still does not know as he should know." ③In the "New Testament" is the third section. Nor do I object to me what is said in the Book of Ecclesiastes; for it must also be noted that Solomon does not speak of the conduct of the heathen there, but of himself, for he was The sinner, who is the enemy of God, now repents of these errors, and admits that as long as he wishes to use the light of human wisdom to guide his actions, he does not connect with the light of God's wisdom, nor regard it as God's hand. a boon to him, he can never find what is wholly satisfactory, or what he sees is full of vanity.That is why in several places he asks people to convert to God and make penance, especially in chapter eleven, verse 9 where he says this: Know that for all these things God will judge you , ① continues until the end of the book.Chapter Eight, Verse Seventeen says: I saw all the deeds of God.Knowing that no one can find out what is done under the sun.No matter how hard he searched, he couldn't find it out, etc., it should not refer to all kinds of people, but only to the person he described in the previous section: there are people who don't sleep day and night, and don't close their eyes. .As the prophet wants to tell us here:

Too much work, too much study, prevents men from reaching the knowledge of truth; That's what I don't believe people who know me personally think they can settle on me.It must be noted, however, that the phrase: Written under the sun, because it is repeated so often throughout the book, and always refers to things of nature, does not include the subordination of these things to God, since God has Above everything, it cannot be said that He is included in that which can only be under the sun; therefore, what this passage really means is that whenever man does not know God, he cannot have a full understanding of what is natural. Realize that my view on this is consistent with that of the Prophet.Finally, in chapter three, verse 19, he says that as this (man) died, so did that (beast) die.And man cannot be stronger than beast.Evidently this refers only to the flesh; for here he speaks only of that which is of the flesh.Immediately afterwards, he talked about the soul separately, saying: Who knows that the spirit of man goes up, but the soul of a beast goes down to the ground?②.That is, who can, by the power of human reason, at least persist in what God has revealed to us, know whether or not the soul of man shall enjoy eternal bliss?In truth, I have tried to prove by natural reason that the soul of man is not corporeal; but as to whether it shall ascend, that is, whether it shall enjoy the glory of God, I admit that only faith can tell us. ①The original text of the French version of this book is: "Know that God will make you aware of all your actions." ②The original text of the French version of this book is: "Who knows whether the spirits of Adam's children are raised, and whether the spirits of animals are lowered?" 6. As regards the liberty of free will, there is no doubt that God's liberty is very different from man's liberty; for it does not make sense to say that God's will has not been indifferent from all eternity to everything that has been or will be. Yes, for we cannot conceive of any idea of ​​what is good or true, or what should be believed, or what should or should not be done, existed in the intellect of God before his will required him to do so. middle.And I am not talking here of a temporal precedence, but more importantly, I am saying that such an idea cannot be due to an orderly precedence or a qualitative precedence, or, as in scholasticism, The reason (raison raisonnee) is prior to God's will, so that the idea of ​​good obliges God to choose the one rather than the other.For example, God is willing to create the world in time, not because he sees that it is better to create the world in time than in eternity, nor is he willing to make the sum of the triangles of a triangle equal to two right angles, nor is it because he knows It can only be like this, and so on.Rather, on the contrary, just because he would have created the world in time, so it is better than in eternity; likewise, just because he willed that the sum of the triangles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles, so it is now, and not Probably not; the same is true of everything else.And this does not prevent it from being said that the merits of the saints are the cause of their eternal benediction, for the merits of the saints are not the cause of what they prescribe what God wills, they are only the cause of which God eternally wills them to be an effect.Thus, a total indifference with God is a very great proof of His omnipotence.However, this is not the case with man. Since man has found the nature of good will and truth established and prescribed by God, and his will can only naturally tend to what is good, it is obvious that the more clearly man recognizes good He is true, the more freely he can accept good and true. Only when a person does not know what is better or more true, or at least when he does not see clearly enough to doubt it, does he take an indifferent attitude; The indifference appropriate to man's freedom is thus quite different from the indifference appropriate to God's freedom.And it is useless to say that the essences of things are indivisible, because, in the first place, there is no essence equally suitable to God and to creatures; We are free when our ignorance of the good and the true makes us indifferent, and chiefly also when our clear and distinct perception of a thing impels and compels us to pursue it. ① "Liberty", the second French edition is "The Reason and Essence of Liberty". 7. I think our senses are touched through the surface.I understand faces no differently than mathematicians or philosophers understand faces.They usually understand the surface, or at least should understand it, as distinct from the body, which they assume has no height.However, the name surface is used by mathematicians in two ways, namely: either considering only the length and breadth of a body and not its height, although there is no objection to it having a height, or only from the body's height. Considering it in one form, its height is negated at this time.Therefore, to avoid any kind of ambiguity, I say that the face I am speaking of is only a mode and cannot be a part of a body.Since a body is a substance, its mode cannot be a part.But I never deny that it is the end of the body, on the contrary, I think it can very rightly be called the surface, whether it is the surface of the body contained, or the surface contained by the body, as people say, both A contiguous object is one whose surfaces are joined together.For, frankly, when two bodies touch each other, their togetherness is only the same surface, which is not part of the one or the other, but the same aspect of both bodies, and although the two bodies been removed, it remains forever the same as long as something of exactly the same size and shape is replaced in their place.Even here (which the peripatetics call the outsourcing of the object) it can only be understood as an aspect that is not a substance but a mode.For we do not say that the place of a tower has changed, although the air surrounding it has changed, or that we have replaced it in its place by another body; part, nor the air that surrounds it.However, for a complete refutation of those who admit the accidental nature of reality, I consider those reasons which I have given to be sufficient, and no other.For, first of all, there is no sensation without contact, and nothing can be felt but the surface of a body.However, if there are real accidents, they must be different from this face which is only a mode; therefore, if there are real accidents, they cannot be felt by us either.But who ever believes that they exist only insofar as he thinks they are felt by him?Secondly, to say that there are real accidents, because everything real can exist separately from any other subject, is a nonsense and a utter impossibility.It is entities, not accidents, that can exist separately.It is useless to say that actual accidents cannot be separated from their subjects by the power of nature, but only by the omnipotence of God; things, and God's ordinary power is no different from God's special power,1 which does not change the nature of things, since nothing is added to them; And if existence is a substance, then whatever exists without a subject by the power of God (however special it may be) must also be called by the name of substance.To be honest, I admit that a substance may be an accident of another; but when this happens, it is not the substance that takes the form of an accident, but the mode or manner.For example, when a piece of clothing is worn on a person, it is not the clothing that becomes accidental, but the being worn.As for the chief reason that has prompted philosophers to establish some real accidents, that without which we cannot explain how the perceptions of our senses are made, I promised that when writing the Physics Explain in detail the way each of our senses is touched by its objects.Not that I want people to believe me on this or on anything else, but because I believe that the vision I have explained in my Refraction can serve as sufficient evidence for the rest of the senses. ① "And God... is different", the second French edition is missing. 8. When people seriously consider the immensity of God, they see clearly that there is nothing that does not depend on him, not only everything that exists, but also order, law, good and true reason. To him, otherwise (as was said shortly before), it would not have been entirely indifferent to create what he created.For, if a good reason or phenomenon is prearranged by him, then he must require him to do something better.But, on the contrary, because he ordained himself to make the things of the world for this reason, as in Genesis, they are very good, that is, their good, The reason for this depends on his willingness to make them that way.And there is no need to ask in what kind of cause this good, and all other truths, whether mathematical or metaphysical, depend on God; It is therefore no wonder that they gave it no name, which nonetheless they gave it a name, for he may be called the efficient cause; The same reason, though the law itself is not a natural being, but only (as they say in the scholastics) a spiritual being.It is equally useless to ask how God could always make two times four equal eight, etc., for I admit that we cannot know; but on the other hand, I know very well that nothing can exist without God, whether What kind of beings, and to arrange things so that it is impossible to know that they could be otherwise than they are, if since we do not know and we cannot see It is quite contrary to reason that we should know something else and doubt something we know well.Do not think, therefore, that eternal truths depend on the intellect of man, or on the existence of things, but only on the will of God; who, as a supreme Lawgiver, eternally arranged and established these truths. 9. To understand what the reliability of the senses is, it is necessary to divide the senses into three stages.At the first stage, only what is to be considered by the external object directly within the bodily sense; this can only be the movement of the molecules of this faculty and the changes of shape and position produced by this movement.The second stage contains everything that arises directly in the mind as a result of the union of the mind with the bodily faculties which are moved and infected by their objects, such as pain, itching, Hunger, thirst, colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat, cold, and other similar sensations, as we said in the sixth meditation, arise from the union, or (so to say) .Finally, the third stage contains all the judgments we are accustomed to make from youth as to the impressions or chances of movement of things around us in our senses.For example, when we see a stick, do not imagine that flying from the stick into the air, little flying images, commonly called "especes intentionnelles" (especes intentionnelles) come into my eyes; It is the light reflected from the stick that stimulates some movement in the optic nerve, through which it reaches the brain, as I have already said at length in "Refraction"; we and the beasts have in common this same movement of the brain. a movement which is made by the first stage of sensation.From the first stage proceeds the second, which reaches only the perception of color and light reflected by the stick.And it arises in this way: the mind is so closely connected with the brain that it even feels and seems to be touched by movements in it; and this is all that must be attributed to the senses, if we want to The senses are accurately separated from the intellect.For though from the sense of the color of which I feel its impression I judge that the stick outside me has color, yet from the extension of the color, from its point of termination, and from its position with me In relation to the parts of the brain, I decide what to do with the size, shape and distance of the stick, although people are accustomed to ascribe it to the senses, and in this respect I ascribe it to the third part of the senses. stages, but it is evident that it depends only on the intellect; I even pointed out in Refraction that size, distance, and shape are perceivable only by reasoning, which separates them from each other.But here there is only this difference, that we ascribe to the intellect new and not customary judgments about everything that appears to our senses, We ascribe to the senses those judgments which we are accustomed to make on the occasion of the impressions they make upon our senses; on the grounds that habit makes us reason and judge of them very hastily. (or rather remind us of some judgments we have made before), we cannot distinguish judgments in this way from mere perceptions or perceptions of our senses.From this, it is evident that when we say that the intellect is more reliable than the senses, we mean only that, as a result of some new observations we have made, the older we are, the better our judgments are than we have been since we Judgments made without reflection from childhood are the more reliable; there can be no doubt about this, for, indeed, there are neither sensations of the first stage nor of the second stage, since in both stages it is impossible There are errors, so that when it is said that a stick stuck in water appears broken by refraction, this appears to us in the same way as it is said that it is broken as a child judges it to be broken; We judge in this way, according to the stereotypes we have been accustomed to since our infancy.But I cannot agree with what they go on to say, that this error is not corrected by reason, but by touch; But this is not enough to correct the error of vision, but besides this, some reason is needed to tell us to believe our judgment after touching it in this place, and The reason for not trusting the judgments that sight seems to give me is not something we have had since childhood, and cannot be attributed to the senses, but to the intellect alone.Thus, even in this instance, the intellect alone corrects the error of the senses, and it is impossible to give any instance in which the error arises from believing in the activities of the mind rather than in the perceptions of the senses. 十、由于剩下要去检查的疑难是当作怀疑而不是当作反驳给我提出来的，我不敢过高估价我自己来贸然答应把我看到的今天仍然为那么多的学者所怀疑的东西都解释得相当清楚。虽然如此，为了尽我之所能并且为了我所从事的事业的利益起见，我将坦率地说一说我自己是用什么方式完全从这些怀疑中解脱出来的。因为，在这样做的时候，如果万一可以对有些人有用，我就有理由感到满足了；而如果对任何人都没有用，至少我将得到这样的满足，即人们不能指控我妄自尊大或鲁莽冒失。 随着我的沉思里所包含的理由之后，当我第一次得出结论说人的精神是实在有别于肉体的，它甚至比肉体更容易认识，以及在那里论述的其他许多东西的时候，我实在感觉到不得不对这些东西表示同意，因为我在这些东西里没有看到任何东西不是按照逻辑规则从非常明显的原则得出来的。虽然如此，我承认我并不因此完全相信，并且我遇到和天文学家们遇到过的同样事情，那些天文学家们，由于一些强有力的理由相信了太阳比整个地球还大许多倍之后，却不能不断定在看它的时候它比地球小的多。但是，在我根据我对物理或自然的东西的同样原则做进一步的考虑时，首先检查在我心里的每件东西的概念或观念，然后把这些概念或观念仔细地彼此分开，在这之后我就认识到没有什么东西是属于物体的性质或本质的，除非它是一个有长、宽、高的广延的实体，它能够有许多形状和不同的运动，而它的这些形状和运动不过是一些样态，这些样态是从来不能没有物体的；可是颜色、气味、滋味，以及其他类似的东西，不过是一些感觉，它们在我的思维之外没有任何存在性，它们之不同于物体是与疼痛之不同于引起疼痛的箭的形状或运动是一样的，最后，重量、硬度、可热力、引力、净化力，以及我们在物体里看到的其他一切性质，都仅仅包括在运动或静止之中，包含在诸部分的外形和安排之中。 所有这些见解都和我从前关于这些东西的意见大不相同，因此，在这以后我开始考虑我为什么从前有那些不同的见解，我找到主要原因是自从我的幼年以来，我关于自然的东西做过许多判断，比如对于有助于保存我幼小的生命的东西的那些判断，我一直保存了我从前关于这些东西有过的那些见解。由于我的精神在年轻时代不能很好地使用肉体的感官，而且由于精神过于和肉体结合在一起，不能离开感官去进行思维，因此精神只能很模糊地知觉各种东西。虽然它对它的本性有认识，在它本身里有的关于思维的观念并不比关于广延的观念少，可是，由于它领会任何纯粹理智的东西同时也总是想象物质性的东西，因此它把二者当成一个东西，把它对于理智的东西的一切概念都归之于物体。而且由于我从此以后一直没有从这些成见中解脱出来，我对什么都认识得不够清楚，把什么都假定为物体性的，虽然我时常把这些东西本身做成的这样一些观念都假定为物体性的，而实际上它们与其说是代表物体的概念不如说是代表精神的概念。 举例来说，当我过去把重量领会为一种实在的、结合到大块物体之上的性质时，虽然我把它叫做性质，因为我把它连系到它所在的物体上，可是，由于我加上实在的这一词，我认为事实上这是一个实体，就象一件衣服一样，从它本身上看，它是一个实体，虽然把它连系到一个穿衣服的人时，它可以说是一个性质；同样，虽然精神是一个实体，可是就其结合到一个肉体上来说，它可以说是一个性质。而且，虽然我领会重量是布满全部有重量的物体上，可是我不把构成物体的性质的同样种类的广延归之于它，因为，这个广延排除各部分的任何互相贯串的性质；而且我认为，在一块一尺长的金子或其他什么金属里的重量有和一块十尺长的木头里一样多的重量；甚至我认为这个重量可以包含在一个数学的点里。不仅如此，当这个重量平均铺开到整个物体上时，我看到它可以把它的全部力量使用到它的每一个部分上，因为，不管用什么方式把这个物体悬挂在一根绳子上，物体用它的全部重量牵引着绳子，就好象全部重量都包含在接触绳子的那一部分里似的。当然我今天还没有领会到精神不是这样在肉体里铺开，即我把它领会为整个地在整体里，整个地在每一个部分里。但是，更好地显示出这个重量的观念是部分地从我所具有的我的精神的观念抽引出来的，是我认为重量把物体引向地心，就象它本身有对地心的什么认识似的。因为，肯定的是，它这样做似乎不可能没有认识，而什么地方有认识，什么地方就一定有精神。虽然如此，我还把别的一些东西归之于重量，这些东西不能同样被理解为精神。举例来说，重量是可分的，可量的，等等。 可是，在我把所有这些东西加以考虑，仔细地把人的精神的观念同物体和物体性的运动的观念加以分别时，并且我发现我从前具有的其他一切观念，无论是实在的性质也好、实体性的形式也好，都是由我的精神做成的之后，我没用很大的力气就从在这里所提出的一切怀疑中摆脱了出来。因为，首先，我不再怀疑我对我自己的精神有一个清楚的观念，对这个精神我不能否认我有认识，因为它对我是这样亲切，同我这样紧密地结合在一起。我也不再怀疑这个观念是完全不同于其他一切东西的观念的，它本身一点都没有属于物体的东西。因为，在仔细追求了其他东西的真正观念，并且甚至认为一般地把它们全部都认识了之后，我在它们之中没有找到任何东西不是完全与我的精神的观念不同的。而且我看到在这些东西（它们虽然是一起在我的思维之中的，可是给我表现得彼此不同，精神和物体就是这样）之间的分别要比那些东西之间的分别大得多，对那些东西我们可以分别思维，想这个而不想那个，我们从来看不见它们在我们的精神里在一起过，虽然它们不能分开存在。举例来说，就象上帝的广大无垠性可以为我们所领会而用不着想到上帝的正义那样。但是在我们的精神里两个不能同时出现，而且不能相信上帝是广大无垠的而不是正义的。同样，人们也可以很好地认识上帝的存在而一点也不知道非常神圣的三位一体的三位，而这是如果没有信仰之光的光照，任何人都不能很好理解的；但是，三位一体的三位一旦被很好地理解，我否认人们在他们之间能够领会在神圣本质上有任何实在的分别，虽然可以在关系上有分别。 最后，我看到有些物体不思维，或者不如说我非常清楚地领会到某些物体可以没有思维时，我更愿意说思维不属于物体的本性，而不愿意做出这样的结论，说思维是物体的一个样态，因为我看见一些别的物体（即人的肉体）能思维，这时我不再害怕一心从事我的分析工作居然会误入歧途，因为，实在说来，我从来没有看见过，也没有了解过人的肉体能思维，而是看到并且了解到同一的人们，他们既有思维，同时也有肉体。而且我认识到这是由于思维的实体和物体性的实体组合到一起而造成的，因为，单独考虑思维的实体时，我一点都没有看到它能够属于物体，而在物体的本性里，当我单独考虑它时，我一点没有找到什么东西是能够属于思维的。 但是，相反，把各种样态都拿来检查一下，不管是物体的还是精神的，我看不出有一个样态，它的概念不是完全依附于事物的概念本身，而这个概念就是事物的样态的。同样，从我们经常看见两个东西结合在一起这件事，我们不能因此就推论说它们是一个东西；但是，从我们有时看见两个东西之一而没有另一个东西的时候，我们就很可以结论说两个东西是不同的。不要让上帝的能力阻止我们得出这个结论；因为，认为我们清楚、分明地领会为两个东西的一些东西是由一个在本质上同一的东西做成的而决不是组成的，这比认为可以把一点分别都没有的东西分开，同样是说不通的。从而，如果说上帝把思维的功能放到某些物体里（就象他事实上把它放在人的肉体里那样），他什么时候愿意，什么时候就可以把它们分开，这样一来，思维实际上不能不是与这些物体有分别的。 而我从前甚至在摆脱我的感官的成见之前就很懂得二加三等于五，等量的东西减去等量的东西，剩余的东西也相等，以及诸如此类的许多东西，我对此一点也不奇怪，虽然那时我不认为人的灵魂和它的身体有分别，因为，我看得很清楚，在我幼年时在这些一般为大家都接受的命题上我没有判断错，这是因为那时我对这些命题不习惯，因为小孩子们不学二与三加到一起，因为他们不能够判断它们是否是五的数目，等等；恰恰相反，自从我最幼年时期起，我把精神和肉体（我模糊地看到我是由它们组合成的）领会为一个东西；而把许多东西合成一个，把它们当成一个东西，这是一切不完满的认识的差不多一般的毛病：这就是为什么必须在以后要不惮其烦地把它们分开，并且通过更准确的检查，把它们互相区别开来的原故。 不过我非常奇怪，一些很有学问的并且三十年来习惯于做形而上学思考的人们，读了我的沉思七遍以上之后，却相信如果我用我检查它们看看它们是否是一个敌对的人物提出来的同样的精神去把它们重读一遍我就不会那么重视，不会对于它们所含的道理有一个如此有利的意见，以致相信每人都应该向这些道理的真理和连系的力量和份量屈服。因为他们自己在我的推理中指不出任何一个错误。当然，如果他们认为我使用这样一个分析法使我得以用这种方法来推翻正确的论证，或者给错误的论证涂脂抹粉，使任何人都发现不了错误的话，那么他们归之于我的东西大大超过了我应该接受的程度，而且也超过了应该归之于任何人的程度；因为相反，我大声疾呼，我从来没有追求别的东西，除非是这样的一种方法，用这种方法人们可以肯定真正理由的可靠性，发现错误的和似是而非的理由。因此我看到有些非常有学问的人还不同意我的结论我并不那么感到奇怪，反而我很高兴看到；在如此认真地反复读过我的理由之后，他们并没有谴责我提出什么不合适的东西，或者得出什么不是合乎规格的东西。因为他们在接受我的结论上的困难很可以被归之于他们根深蒂固的判断习惯，他们判断的不是这些结论里所包含的东西，就象天文学家们所看到的那样，他们不能想象太阳比地球还大，虽然他们有足够的理由证明这是千真万确的。但是，除非是因为这些推论是完全正确和无可置疑的而外，我看不出可能有什么别的理由说明为什么无论是这些先生们或者是我知道的任何人，直到现在都没有在我的推论里挑什么毛病；因为主要的是，这些推论所依据的原则并不是模糊不清的，也不是大家不知道的，而是从一些最可靠、最明显的概念里得出来的，这些概念是人的精神从对一切事物的普遍怀疑起，然后从一切种类的成见中解脱出来以后得到的；因此必然不能有就连理智较差的人都能够很容易看得出来的错误。这样，我认为我不无理由做出这样的结论，即：我所写的那些东西并没有被那些有学问的人们（他们在认真读了多次之后还没有被那些东西说服）的权威所削弱，反而被他们的权威本身所加强，因为，在那么仔细认真的检查之后，他们却没有在我的论证里指出任何错误和谬论来。