Chapter 7 Third Meditation on God and His Existence

Now I will close my eyes, plug my ears, and detach from all my senses, and I will even exclude from my thoughts all images of physical things, or at least (because that is unlikely) I want to regard them as false; and in this way, since I only deal with myself and think only of my insides, I try to get to know myself a little better, to become more intimate with myself.I am a thinking thing, that is to say, I am a thing that doubts, affirms, and denies, knows little and does not know a lot, loves, hates, is willing, is not willing, and is also imagining , in feeling something.For, as I have just said, even though what I feel and imagine may never be outside of me, within themselves, yet I do know that this mode of thinking which I call feeling and imagining, is It is just a way of thinking, it must exist and appear in my heart.And although I didn't say much just now, I think I've said all that I really know, or at least what I think I know until now.

Now I want to consider more precisely whether there may be other perceptions in me that I have not yet felt.I do know that I am a thinking thing; but do I not therefore also know what I need to have in order for me to really know something?In this preliminary understanding, there is only a clear and clear perception that I know.To be honest, if in case something I know so clearly and distinctly should be false, the perception is not enough for me to know with certainty that it is true.Thus I feel that I have been able to formulate as a general rule that "whatever is clearly and distinctly understood to us is true."Even so, what I had previously accepted and admitted as very reliable and obvious, I later regarded as dubious and unreliable.What are those things?The earth, the sky, the stars, and whatever else I perceive through my senses.But what is it that I have understood clearly and clearly in these things?Of course it’s nothing else, it’s nothing more than the concepts or thoughts that those things present in my mind.And even now I do not deny that these ideas are in me.But there is one other thing which I once knew for sure, and habit led me to believe, and which I thought I saw very clearly, though I did not see it, namely that there was something outside of me, which Ideas arise from there, and are exactly like those things.I was mistaken in the matter; or, if I may have judged according to the truth, it was by no means any knowledge of the reasons for the truth of my judgment.But when I consider some very simple, very easy things about arithmetic and geometry, like three plus two equals five, and things like that, don't I at least grasp them clearly and know for sure that they are true? of it?Of course, if since then I have thought it possible to doubt these things, it must have been for no other reason than the idea that perhaps it was some God who gave me such a nature, Let me even get it wrong on some of the things that I think are the most obvious.But whenever this idea of ​​the supreme power of a God mentioned above comes to my mind, I am compelled to admit that, if he will, he can easily make me confuse even on what I believe to know very well. wrong.But on the other hand, whenever I turn to what I thought I understood very clearly, I am so persuaded by them that I cannot help saying these words myself: He will deceive me as much as he can, as long as I think I am something, and he can never make me nothing; or, since it is true that I exist now, he can never make me never, or have ever existed; Adding two adds up to more than five or less than five, or in such things as I can see clearly, not as I perceive it.

①French second edition: "Now, in order to further develop my knowledge, I will be cautious and carefully consider whether I can find anything else in my heart that I have not seen so far." ②French second edition: "In this preliminary understanding, only the clear and clear perception I said can make me know the truth." And since I have no reason to believe that there is a God to be a liar, and since I have also considered the reasons for proving that there is a God, the grounds for doubt based on this opinion alone are of course very rash, and are ( Let's just say) metaphysical.But, in order to exclude this reason, I should check, as soon as the opportunity arises, whether there is a God; and as soon as I have found that there is a God, I should also check whether he is a liar.For without knowing these two truths, I do not see that I can take anything as reliable.And in order that I should have an opportunity of doing this examination without interrupting the order of meditation which I have set out for myself, from the conception first found in my mind to the conception which may be found later in my mind, I must To divide my whole thinking here into classes, it must be considered in which classes there is really truth or error.

Among my various thoughts, some are images of things.The name of idea is only really suitable for such thoughts: for example, I think of a person, or a monster, or a sky, or an angel, or God himself.In addition, other thoughts have other forms, such as I want, I am afraid, I affirm, I deny; although I understand something as the subject of my mental action, I also use this action to make something to the idea I have of it; some of this class of thinking are called wills or affections, and others are called judgments. As for ideas, if they are in themselves and do not refer them to anything else, they cannot really be false; for whether I imagine a goat or a monster, they are equally real in my imagination.

Nor fear that there may be falsehood in the affections or in the will; and even though I may wish for some bad things, or even that they never exist, that does not mean that my wish for them is not true. Thus, only judgment remains.In judging I should be careful not to err.And the great and commonest error that can occur in judgment is that I judge an idea in me as being the same or like something outside me; I don't want to involve them in any other external things, and they certainly don't give me a chance of being wrong. Among these concepts, some I think are inherent to me, some are foreign and come from the outside world, and some are made and fabricated by myself.Because, I have the ability to comprehend what is generally called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, and I feel that this ability is not from outside, but from my nature; but if I hear any voice now, see I felt the sun, felt the heat, and up to this point I judged that these sensations emanated from something other than myself; The spirit is fabricated out of thin air.But perhaps I can believe that all these ideas belong to what I call foreign, from outside me, or that they are all innate to me, or that they are all made by me; for I do not yet know to discover their true origin.The chief thing I have now to do is to see, in relation to my ideas of what objects I feel to come from other than myself, what reasons I have for believing that they are the same as these objects.

The first reason is: I feel that this is what nature tells me; the second reason is that I myself feel that these ideas are independent of my will, because they are often presented to me involuntarily, as now , whether I like it or not, I feel heat, and for this reason I believe that this feeling or this idea of ​​heat is due to something different from me, viz. generated for me.Apart from judging that this foreign thing is not sending out anything but its image and imprinting it in my heart, I don't see anything that I think is more reasonable. ① French second edition: "I am sitting next to".

Now I must see whether these reasons are sound and convincing enough.When I say that I feel that nature tells me, I mean by the word nature only a certain tendency which makes me believe the thing, not a natural light which makes me know it. it is true.There is a great difference between the two; for I cannot doubt at all that the light of nature makes me see that it is true, as it has just made me see that because I doubt it, I would be able to deduce that I exist the same.I have no other function or ability to tell me what this natural light is pointing to me as true that is not true in distinguishing true from false, allowing me to be equally as to that function or capacity as I am to natural light. be trusted.As for inclinations, however, I find them to be natural to me, too, and I have often noticed that, when the question is a choice between good and evil, inclinations do not make me choose the evil any more than they make me choose the good. There is little time; that is why I do not rely on tendencies as regards truth and falsehood.

① is rational. ②French second edition: "These two arguments". The other reason, that since these ideas are independent of my will, they must come from elsewhere, I find equally unconvincing.As the inclinations I have just spoken of are in me, though they do not always agree with my will, so perhaps there is some faculty or power in me which produces these ideas exclusively without the aid of anything external. , though I am as yet ignorant of this faculty and faculty; for in fact it has hitherto always seemed to me that these ideas, too, are formed in me when I sleep, without the aid of the objects they represent.Finally, even if I agree that they are caused by these objects, it does not follow that they should be the same as those objects.On the contrary, in many cases I have often seen a great difference between the object and the idea of ​​the object.

For example, regarding the sun, I feel that I have two completely different concepts in my mind; one is derived from the senses, and should be placed in the category I mentioned above from the outside; according to this concept, I think it is very small.The other is from astronomical principles, that is to say, from some conception born with me, or produced by myself in whatever way, according to which I feel that the sun is more important than the whole earth. many times larger.These two ideas of the sun which I apprehend cannot, of course, be identical with the same sun; reason leads me to believe that the one which comes directly from its appearance is the least like it.

All this is enough for me to know that, until now, I have believed that there are things outside me, different from me, which, through my senses, or in any other way, transmit their ideas to me as images, and give me I have stamped their image not as a sound, considered judgment, but as a mere blind, reckless impulse. But there is another way of considering whether some of those things in which I have ideas in me exist outside me, for example, if these ideas are regarded as nothing more than certain modes of thinking, then I do not recognize any difference or inequality between them, they all seem to have been born of me in the same way.But if they are regarded as images, some of which represent one thing and others another, it is evident that they are very different from each other.For it is true that those ideas which represent substance to me undoubtedly have a little more than those which merely represent mode or accident, and contain in themselves (so to speak) more objective1 reality, that is, Say, share in a greater degree of being or fullness through appearances.Moreover, from which I have come to appreciate the idea of ​​a God who is supreme, eternal, infinite, unchanging, omniscient, omnipotent, universal creator of all things except himself, I say, undoubtedly in his have more objective reality in themselves than those ideas which represent to me finite substances.

① "objective" (objectif), or "objectively" (objectivement) had a different meaning in the seventeenth century than it does today.The usage in Descartes is: only in terms of its conceptual existence is called "objective", or "objectively" existence.In the seventeenth century the opposite of the word "objective" was not "subjective" but "true" or "formal". Now, it is evident in the light of nature that there must be at least more reality in the dynamic, general cause, than in its effect: for where can the effect be obtained, if not from its cause? What about its reality?If the cause has no reality in itself, how can it transmit it to its effect? From this it follows that not only cannot something be made out of nothing, but also that which is more perfect, that is to say, contains more reality in itself, cannot be the result and ground of the less perfect.This truth is true both in those consequences which have the kind of reality which philosophers call actual or formal, or in those ideas from which one considers only what philosophers call objective reality. It is clear and obvious.For example: a stone that has not yet existed, if it was not produced by a thing, which itself formally or eminently3 has everything that goes into the organization of the stone, that is, it contains in itself the same things that the stone has. thing, or some other thing better, stone cannot now begin to exist; and heat cannot exist without heat if it were not produced by a thing at least as perfect as it in degree, degree, or kind. produced from objects.The same goes for other things.Moreover, the idea of ​​heat or of stone could not be in me if it had not been placed in me by a cause which contained in itself at least as much reality as I perceive in heat or in stone. .For, though that cause imparts nothing of their real or formal reality to my ideas, it should not on account of that cause be supposed to be less real; but it must be known that since every idea is the work of the mind , then its nature is such that it requires no other form of reality than that which it receives or takes from the mind or spirit, and the idea is only a mode of the mind or spirit, that is, Saying is just a way or method of thinking.The reason why an idea contains such an objective reality and not that one no doubt comes from a cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as the idea contains objective reality.For if we suppose that there is in the idea what is not in its cause, then this thing must have come from nothing.But this mode of being of a thing in the intellect in its idea, objectively or through representations, however imperfect it may be, cannot be said to not exist, and therefore cannot be said to originate from nothing. .Although the reality I consider in my ideas is only objective, I should not doubt that reality necessarily forms in the cause of my ideas, nor should I think that this reality exists objectively in the ideas. (4) For just as such modes of being belong objectively to them by virtue of their nature, so also do they formally belong to their causes (at least to their original, The main reason).And even though it is possible for one idea to give rise to another, this phenomenon cannot be endless, it must eventually reach a first idea, the cause of which is like a sample or a prototype in it. Formally, actually, contains all the reality or perfection that exists in these ideas only objectively or through appearance.Thus the natural light made it evident to me that ideas were in me like pictures or pictures, which, it is true, might easily diminish the perfection of that which they were based on, but could never contain anything. Something greater or more complete. ① One of the four causes in Aristotelian philosophy.Aristotle's four causes are: (1) material cause, (2) formal cause, (3) efficient cause, and (4) final cause. ② "formel" (formel), or "formellement" (formellement), used in Descartes is: It exists on what our ideas represent, that is to say, it really and truly exists on the object of our ideas. ③Existence of "eminence" refers to something that exists higher than oneself and includes oneself. A thing can exist in three ways: (1) exist objectively; (2) exist formally; (3) exist eminently.The first two have been seen in the previous note. ④French second edition: "And I should not imagine that since the reality I consider in my ideas is only objective, this reality does not necessarily have to exist formally or actually in these ideas not in the cause of these ideas, but as long as it also exists objectively in the cause of these ideas." The longer and more carefully I looked at all these things, the more clearly and distinctly I saw that they were true.But in the end what conclusion do I draw from this?That is: if the objective reality ① of an idea of ​​mine makes it clear to me that it ② exists neither formally nor preeminently in me, so that I myself cannot be its cause, the result must be in I am not alone in the world, but there is something else, which is the cause of this idea; besides, if such an idea did not exist in me, I have no arguments to convince me and make me know Nothing else exists but myself; for, I have searched carefully, but I have found no other evidence till now. ① French second edition: "Objective reality or perfection". ②French second edition: "This reality or perfection". Of all these ideas,1 except the one that represents me myself, which cannot here have any problem, there is one that represents me a God, and others that represent corporeal, inanimate things. Things, other ideas for me to represent angels, others for animals, and finally, still others for people like me.But as to the ideas which represent to me other men, or animals, or angels, I readily perceive that they may be compounded from my corporeal things and some other ideas God has, though apart from me, There are simply no other people, no animals, no angels.As for the idea of ​​corporeal things, I do not think there is anything so great and so good in them that I feel that they cannot come from me; Considering them the same way I considered the idea of ​​wax yesterday, I think there are very few things that I grasp clearly there, such as size or the extension of length, breadth, and thickness; The shape ③ formed by the boundary ②; the position maintained between the various objects formed by different shapes, and the movement or change of this position; substance, time and number can also be added.As for other things, like light, colour, sound, smell, taste, heat, cold, and other qualities which fall upon the sense of touch, they are so vague in my mind that I hardly know they are real. Or are they false, mere semblances, that is to say, ideas of real things which I do not know what the ideas of qualities are, or are they representations to me of imaginary, impossible things? .For, although I have suggested before that only in judgments can there be true, formal falsity, yet in ideas there can be some substantive falsity, that is, when ideas represent as something what is nothing. That's it.For example, I am so unclear and incomprehensible about the concept of cold and heat, so that I can't tell whether cold is just the lack of heat, or heat is the lack of cold, or both are real. properties, or neither; and since ideas are like images, there is no idea which does not appear to us to represent something, and if coldness is really nothing but the absence of heat, it is taken as something real and positive. The ideas represented to me should not be inappropriately called false, nor should other similar ideas be called; and I certainly do not need to attribute their authors to others than to myself.For if they are false, that is to say, if what they represent does not exist, then the light of nature makes me see that they arise from nothing, that is to say, they are in me only because my nature lacks something, Not very complete.If these ideas were true, even if they gave me so little representational reality that I could not even clearly distinguish what is represented and what is nothing, I see no reason why they should not be represented by myself. produced so that I cannot be their author⑥.As for the distinct ideas I have of corporeal things, there are some which I seem to be able to derive from my own ideas, as I have ideas of substance, time, number, and the like. concept like that.For, I think of the stone as a substance, or a thing capable of being itself, of me as a substance,7 though I understand very well that I am a thinking thing without extension, whereas the stone is a thing with extension. That which does not think, so there is a marked difference between the two conceptions, but at any rate they seem to agree on the point of representing substance.In the same way, I think that I exist now, and besides this I remember that I also existed before, and I comprehend many different thoughts, and realize the number of these thoughts, when I get in my mind the ideas of time and number, and henceforth I can pass these two ideas on to everything else as I like. ① French second edition: "In all these ideas that exist in me". ② "Words and boundaries" refers to "length, width, and thickness". ③French second edition: "Shapes made of extended words". ④ "Just some illusion", the second edition of French is missing. ⑤ French second edition: "so that they cannot tell me". ⑥French second edition: "Then even if they give me so little representational reality that I cannot even distinguish what is represented from what is not, I see no reason why I cannot be its author". ⑦French second edition: "Then think that I myself am also an entity". ⑧French second edition: "both are". As for the other qualities from which the idea of ​​a corporeal thing is formed, namely, extension, shape, position, change, etc., they do not exist in me formally, because I am only a thinking thing; Mere aspects of substances, like the garments under which bodily substances appear to us,1 and I myself am a substance, they seem eminently contained in me. ① "Like some clothes, the physical entity is shown to us under the clothes", missing in the second French edition. So that leaves only the idea of ​​God, in which it is necessary to consider whether there is anything that can originate in me.By the name God, I mean an infinite, eternal, abiding and unchanging, independent of anything else, supremely wise, omnipotent, myself and everything else (if there is anything at all) ) of the entity from which it was created and produced.These advantages are so great and so eminent that the more I consider them the less I believe that the ideas I have of them can come from me alone. From all that has been said, therefore, it follows necessarily that God exists; for, though the idea of ​​substance is in me because I am a substance, I am nevertheless a finite being, and therefore I cannot have an infinite The idea of ​​a substantive substance, if not some truly infinite substance had placed this idea in my mind. I should not imagine that I apprehend the infinite not through a real idea, but only through the negation of the finite, as I understand stillness and darkness through the negation of motion and light; for on the contrary, I clearly see There is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one, and so I somehow have in my mind first the concept of the infinite rather than the finite, that is, the concept of God first and not of the finite. my own concept.For how could I have known my nature if I had not had in me the idea of ​​a being more perfect than mine, and by comparison with that being I could see the defects of my nature? Doubt and I hope, that is, I realize that something is missing in me, that I am not complete? It cannot be said that this idea of ​​God may be false in nature, that I can derive it from nothing, that is, because I am defective, it may exist in me, just like my previous ideas about heat and cold. for, on the contrary, this idea is so clear, so distinct, that it has more objective reality in itself than any other idea, so that naturally no idea is more objective than any other idea. It is more real and less likely to be suspected of being false and false. I say that the idea of ​​this supremely perfect and infinite being is perfectly real; for, though it may be possible to conceive such a being as non-existent, the idea of ​​it which cannot be conceived does not represent to me anything real. , as I said not long ago about the cold. This idea is also very clear, very clear, because everything that my mind clearly and clearly perceives as reality and reality, and has any perfection in itself, is completely contained in this idea. Although I do not comprehend infinity, or (1) although there are in God an innumerable number of things which I cannot comprehend, and which perhaps can never be reached by thinking, this does not prevent the above-mentioned fact from being true; for my nature is finite. 2, cannot comprehend the infinite, because of the nature of the infinite; as long as I grasp 3 this truth well, if I understand it clearly, in which I know there is any perfection, there may be countless others. Other perfections, unknown to me, are all asserted to exist in God formally or preeminently, that it is sufficient that the idea I have of God be the truest, clearest, and most distinct of all the ideas in my mind. up. ① French second edition: "and". ② French second edition: "I am limited". ③French second edition: "Understanding". But perhaps I am a little more than I think, and perhaps all the perfections of my nature which I ascribe to a God are somehow latent in me, though they have not yet been produced, not yet acted upon by them. show up.In fact, I have experienced the gradual growth and fullness of my awareness, and I see nothing that can prevent it from growing more and more towards the infinite.Also, since this growth and perfection goes on like this, I see nothing that prevents me from obtaining in this way all other perfections of the divine nature.It seems, at last, that my power to attain these perfections, if it were in me, could imprint and draw upon me the ideas of these perfections.Nevertheless, when I looked a little more closely, I saw that this was impossible; for, first of all, even if my knowledge were indeed being perfected every day, there really was a great deal in my nature which was latent. Becoming a real existence, but all these advantages absolutely do not belong to, nor are they close to the concept of God that I have, because in the concept of God, there are not only potential things, but all real and real things.Especially from the fact that my knowledge is gradually increasing, step by step, isn't it inevitable and very reliable evidence that my knowledge is not perfect?Besides, although my knowledge is increasing, I still think that it cannot be actually infinite, because it can never reach such a high degree of perfection that it cannot be increased.But I apprehend that God is actually infinite to the point that no further heights can be added to his supreme perfection.In the end, it became clear to me that an ideal objective being cannot be produced by a mere potential being (there is really no such being), it can only be produced by a formal or actual being. produce. ①Second edition in French: "I see nothing to prevent it from growing like this more and more towards the infinite; since it goes on growing and consummating like this, I don't see why I can't acquire other aspects of God's nature in this way. all perfections, and in the end I do not see why my capacity for attaining them (if it is really within me now) is not sufficient to produce the idea of ​​these perfections". Of course, in all that I have just said, I see nothing that is not very easily recognizable by the light of nature to anyone who is willing to dwell on it; but when I turn my attention a little If I relax, my mind is clouded by images of sensible things, as if blinded, and it is not easy to remember why my idea of ​​a being more perfect than mine should necessarily be The reason a being that is actually more complete is within me. That's why I drop everything else now and just consider myself with this idea of ​​God, and whether I could exist without God.I asked: from whom do I get my existence?Perhaps from myself, or from my parents, or some other cause of never being as perfect as God; for nothing more perfect than God, or as perfect as God, cannot be conceived. If, then, I am independent of everything else, if I myself am the author of my being, I must ① doubt nothing, I must ① have no more hope, and finally, I must ① lack no perfection whatsoever. ; for I myself give to me whatever has an idea in my mind, and then I am God. ① "Must", missing in the second edition of French. I should not imagine that what I lack may be more difficult to obtain than what I already have; It's much harder for me to gain awareness of many things that I don't know that are just some accident of this entity.And then there can be no doubt that if I myself have given me more than I have just said, that is, if I am the author of my generation and being, then at least I will not lack something that is easier to obtain , that is, at least nothing implicated in my conception of apprehending God, for none of those things I find more difficult to obtain;出来（假定我自己）是我所具有的其他一切东西的来源的话），因为我会体验到我的能力止于此，不能达到那里①。 ①法文第二版：“当然，如果我给了我比我刚才说的更多，也就是说，如果我自己是我的存在体的作者，那么我至少不会否认我自己能更容易有的东西，就像我的本性缺少无数的认识那样，我甚至不会否认我自己看到包含在上帝的观念中的任何东西，因为那些东西里边没有一件是我觉得更难做的或更难取得的；假如其中有一件是更难的，它当然会那样向我表现出来（假定我自己是我所具有的其他一切东西的来源的话），因为我会在这上面看到我的能力到头了。〔原文两处“不会否认我自己”（jenemeseraispas denie），其中denie（否认）疑是denue（缺少）之误。〕 虽然我可以假定我过去也许一直是象我现在这样存在，但是我不会因此而避免这个推理的效力，也不能不认识到上帝是我的存在的作者这件事是必要的。因为我的全部生存时间可以分为无数部分，而每一部分都绝对不取决于其余部分，这样，从不久以前我存在过这件事上并不能得出我现在一定存在这一结论来，假如不是在这个时候有什么原因重新（估且这样说）产生我，创造我，也就是说保存我的话。 事实上，这对于凡是要仔细考虑时间的性质的人都是非常清楚、非常明显的，即一个实体，为了在它延续的一切时刻里被保存下来，需要同一的能力和同一的行动，这种行动是为了重新产生它和创造它所必要的，如果它还没有存在的话。因此，自然的光明使我看得很清楚，保存和创造只是从我们的思想方法来看才是不同的，而从事实上来看并没有什么不同。所以，只有现在我才必须问我自己，我是否具有什么能力使现在存在的我将来还存在，因为，既然我无非是一个在思维的东西（或者至少既然一直到现在严格说来问题还只在于我自己的这一部分），那么如果这样的一种力量存在我心里，我一定会时刻想到它并且对它有所认识。可是，我觉得象这样的东西，在我心里一点都没有，因此我明显地认识到我依存于一个和我不同的什么存在体。 也许①我所依存的这个存在体并不是我叫做②上帝的东西，而我是由我的父母，或者由不如上帝完满的什么其他原因产生的吧？不，不可能是这样。因为，我以前已经说过，显然在原因里一定至少和在它的结果里有一样多的实在性。因此，既然我是一个在思维的、在我心里③有上帝的观念的东西，不管最后归之于我的本性④的原因是什么，必须承认它一定同样地是一个在思维的东西，本身具有我归之于上帝本性⑤的一切完满性的观念。然后可以重心追问这个原因的来源和存在是由于它本身呢，还是由于别的⑥什么东西。因为如果是由于它本身，那么根据我以前说过的道理，其结果是它自己一定是⑦上帝，因为它有了由于本身而存在的能力，那么它无疑地也一定有能力现实地具有它所领会⑧其观念的一切完满性，也就是说，我所领会为在上帝里边的一切完满性。 如果它的来源和存在是由于它本身以外的什么原因，那么可以根据同样的道理重新再问：这第二个原因是由于它本身而存在的呢，还是由于别的什么东西而存在的，一直到一步步地，最终问到一个最后原因，这最后原因就是上帝。很明显，在这上面再无穷无尽地追问下去是没有用的，因为问题在这里不那么在于从前产生我的原因上，而在于现在保存我的原因上。 ①法文第二版：“不过，也许”。 ②“我叫做”，法文第二版里缺。 ③“在我心里”，法文第二版是“本身”。 ④“归之于我的本姓”，法文第二版是“我的存在”。 ⑤“本性”，法文第二版里缺。 ⑥“别的”，法文第二版里缺。 ⑦“它自己一定是”，法文第二版是“这个东西是”。 ⑧“所领会”，法文第二版是“本身有”。 也不能假定也许我的产生是由很多原因共同做成的，我从这一个原因接受了我归之于上帝的那些完满性之一的观念，从另外一个原因接受了另外什么的观念，那样一来，所有这些完满性即使真地都存在于宇宙的什么地方，可是不能都结合在一起存在于一个唯一的地方，即上帝之中。因为，相反，在上帝里边的一切东西的统一性，或单纯性，或不可分性，是我在上帝里所领会的主要的完满性之一；而上帝的一切完满性的各种统一和集合①的观念一定不可能是由任何一个原因（由于这个原因，我同时也接受了其他一切完满性的观念）放在我心里的。因为，如果这个原因不让我同时知道它们是什么，不让我以某种方式全部认识它们，它就不能让我把它们理解为连结在一起的、不可分的。 ①“集合”，法文第二版缺。 至于①我的父母，好象我是他们生的，关于他们，即使凡是我过去所相信的都是真的，可是这并不等于是他们保存了我，也不等于他们把我做成是一个在思维的东西，因为他们不过是②把某些部置放在这个物质里，而我断定③在这个物质里边关闭着的就是我，也就是说，我的精神（我现在只把精神当作了我自己）；所以关于他们，在这里是毫无问题的； 可是必然得出这样的结论，即单从我存在和我心里有一个至上完满的存在体（也就是说上帝）的观念这个事实，就非常明显地证明了上帝的存在。 ①“至于”，法文第二版里是“最后，至于”。 ②法文第二版：“我习惯地相信他们由之而产生了我的那种物质性的行动，与产生这样一种实体二者之间没有任何联系；而他们之有助于生下了我，最多是他们”。 ③法文第二版：“我一向断定”。 我只剩去检查一下我是用什么方法取得了这个观念的。 因为我不是通过感官把它接受过来的，而且它也从来不是①象可感知的东西的观念那样，在可感知的东西提供或者似乎提供给我的②感觉的外部器官的时候，不管我期待不期待而硬提供给我。它也不是纯粹由我的精神产生出来或虚构出来的，因为我没有能力在上面加减任何东西。因此没有别的话好说，只能说它和我自己的观念一样，是从我被创造那时起与我俱生的。 ①法文第二版：“不是通常”。 ②“我的”，法文第二版缺。 当然不应该奇怪，上帝在创造我的时候把这个观念放在我心里，就如同工匠把标记刻印在他的作品上一样；这个标记也不必一定和这个作品有所不同。可是，只就上帝创造我这一点来说，非常可信的是，他是有些按照他的形象产生的我，对这个形象（里面包含有上帝的观念），我是用我领会我自己的那个功能去领会的，也就是说，当我对我自己进行反省的时候，我不仅认识到我是一个不完满、不完全、依存于别人的东西，这个东西不停地倾向、希望比我更好、更伟大的东西，而且我同时也认识到我所依存的那个别人，在他本身里边具有我所希求的、在我心里有其观念的一切伟大的东西，不是不确定地、仅仅潜在地，而是实际地、现实地、无限地具有这些东西，而这样一来，他就是上帝。我在这里用来证明上帝存在的论据，它的全部效果就在于我认识到，假如上帝真不存在，我的本性就不可能是这个样子，也就是说，我不可能在我心里有一个上帝的观念；我再说一遍，恰恰是这个上帝，我在我的心里有其观念，也就是说，他具有所有这些高尚的完满性，对于这些完满性我们心里尽管有什么轻微的观念，却不能全部理解。他不可能有任何缺点；凡是标志着什么不完满性的东西，他都没有。 这就足以明显地说明他不能是骗子，因为自然的光明告诉我们，欺骗必然是由于什么缺点而来的。 不过，在我把这件事更仔细地进行检查并对人们能够从其中取得的其他真理进行考虑之前，我认为最好是停下来一些时候专去深思这个完满无缺的上帝，消消停停地衡量一下他的美妙的属性，至少尽我的可以说是为之神眩目夺的精神的全部能力去深思、赞美、崇爱这个灿烂的光辉之无与伦比的美。 因为，信仰告诉我们，来世的至高无上的全福就在于对上帝的这种深思之中，这样，我们从现在起就体验出，象这样的一个沉思，尽管它在完满程度上差得太远，却使我们感受到我们在此世所能感受的最大满足。