Chapter 42 C. Idea II. Knowing (Das Erkennen)

§223 The Idea exists freely and for itself, because it takes universality as the element of its existence, or in other words, the Idea is the objectivity itself as a concept, that is, the Idea has itself as its object.The Idea, as subjectivity determined as universal, is pure difference within itself—the intuition, which preserves itself within this identical universality.But the Idea, as a specific difference, is a further judgment which excludes itself as totality from itself and thus presupposes itself first as an external universe.There are then two judgments which, though potentially identical, have not yet achieved their identity.

§224 These two Ideas are identical in their potentiality and as life, but their relation is relative, and this relativity constitutes the determination of their limitation in this field.This is the relation of reflection, since in the relation of reflection the idea in its own distinction is only a first judgment, a presupposition, not yet a postulate.Therefore, for the subjective idea, objectivity is the world that appears directly in front of it, or the idea as life is the phenomenal world of individual existence.At the same time, as long as a judgment is the pure distinction of the Idea within itself (cf. the previous section), it is the same for the Idea to realize itself and to realize its other.So the Idea is convinced that it can realize the identity between this objective world and itself. ——Rationality appears in the world, has absolute confidence to establish the identity of the subjective and objective world, and can improve this certainty to become truth.Reason again possesses an inner impulse to reconfirm as nothing an opposition which seems to it to be nothing.

§225 This process can be summed up as cognition.In the single act of the cognitive process, the opposition between the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity is freely sublated.But this opposition is at first simply sublated.The cognitive process itself is thus directly tinged with the finiteness of this field, and the twofold movement split into rational impulses is posited as two distinct movements.On the one hand, the process of cognition accepts the existing world and makes it enter itself, into subjective representations and thoughts, thereby sublating the one-sided subjectivity of ideas and taking this true and effective objectivity as its content. , thereby fleshing out its own abstract certainty.On the other hand, the process of cognition sublates the one-sidedness of the objective world, and in turn, it regards the objective world as only an illusion, a collection of accidental facts and illusory forms.It also determines and transforms this aggregate by means of the inner nature of the subject, which is now taken to be the truly existing objectivity.The former is the impulse to know the truth, that is, the activity of knowing itself—the theoretical activity of ideas.The latter is the impulse to realize the good, that is, the practical activity of the will or idea.

(1) Know §226 The universal finitude of cognition, i.e., the finitude in a judgment, in the presupposition of the opposite (§ 224), for which the act of cognition itself contains its negation.This finiteness of cognition more precisely determines itself within its own Idea.This process of determination enables the two aspects of cognition to assume different forms from each other.Since both aspects are complete, they become reflective rather than conceptual relations to each other.To assimilate matter as given from without is thus to accept that matter into categories which are at the same time external to it, and which likewise appear to be distinct from one another.This process of cognition is actually reason acting as understanding.Therefore, the truth reached by this process of cognition is also limited.But the infinite truth at the conceptual stage is just a self-existing purpose, which is far beyond the reach of cognition.But even in this external activity of cognition, it is still guided by concepts whose principles constitute the internal thread of the progress of cognition.

Note: The limitation of cognition lies in presupposing a pre-existing world, so the subject of cognition appears to be a blank sheet of paper (tabula rasa).It is said that this view is derived from Aristotle, but in fact no one is further removed from this external view of knowing than Aristotle.This way of knowing itself has not realized that it is a conceptual activity. In other words, the conceptual activity is only in itself in this external cognitive process, not for itself.Most people always think that this cognitive process is passive, but in fact it is active. §227 When finite cognition regards the object distinct from it as a pre-existing being opposed to it, as a fact of the multiplicity of external nature or consciousness, it first assumes (1) that its form of activity is Formal identity or abstract universality.So its activity consists in decomposing the given concrete content, isolating the differences in it, and giving those differences the form of abstract universality; Open, through abstraction, to reveal a concrete universal, class, or force and law.

This is the method of analysis. Note: People often speak of analytical and synthetic methods, as if it's up to us to use one or the other as we please.But in fact it is not the case.It all depends on the nature of the object itself which we want to know, which of the two methods derived from the concept of limited knowledge is more suitable.The cognitive process is initially analytical.The object is always presented in an individualized form, so the activity of the analysis method focuses on finding out the universality from the current individual things.Here thinking is only an abstract function or only the meaning of formal identity.This is the position taken by Locke and all empiricists.It has been said by many that cognition has no other work to do than to break up the presently given concrete object into many abstract constituents, and to observe these in isolation.

But we can see clearly at once that this will turn things upside down, and will make the cognitive function of understanding things as they are inherently contradictory.For example, a chemist takes a piece of meat and puts it on his retort, splits it up and decomposes it in many ways, and then tells people that this piece of meat is composed of nitrogen, oxygen, charcoal and other elements.But these abstract elements are no longer flesh.Likewise, when an empirical psychologist analyzes a single human behavior into its many different aspects, observes them, and insists on their separation, he is equally unable to recognize the truth of the behavior.Using analytical methods to study objects is like peeling an onion, peeling off the skin layer by layer, but the original onion is no longer there.

§228 This universality (2) is again a determined universality.Here, the activity of knowing proceeds along the three stages of the concept.This concept has not yet reached its infinity in limited cognition, and this is a concept that has been determined by reason. Accepting the object in the concept of this form is the method of synthesis. Note: The application of the synthetic method is just the opposite of the analytical method.The method of analysis progresses from the individual to the general.On the contrary, the comprehensive method starts from the universal (as a definition) and reaches the individual (theorem) through specialization (classification).

The synthetic method then manifests itself as the development of the moments of the concept within the object. §229 (1) We have a definition when, in the process of cognition, the object is first brought into a definite general conceptual form, whereby the class of the object and its universal determinateness are clearly stated.The data and proof of this definition are obtained by using the method of analysis (§ 227).But the general determinateness expressed in this definition is still only a sign, that is to say, only the external signs of the object are mentioned, and what is obtained is only a subjective understanding.

Note: The definition itself contains three elements of the concept: generality or the nearest genus proximity, particularity or the properties of the genus, and individuality or the defined object itself.The first question raised by definitions is: Where do definitions come from?The usual answer to this question is that definitions are arrived at analytically.But this again raises debates about the correctness of the proposed definition. To answer this kind of debate depends on what perception we use as the starting point for the lower definition, and what point of view we adopt in our minds.The richer the content of the object to be defined, that is to say, the more aspects it offers us to observe, the more varied the definitions we can give to this object.For example, there can be many different definitions about more complex objects such as life and country.On the contrary, geometry can give many good definitions, because the object it studies—space—is an extremely abstract object.Again, there is nothing necessary about the content of the object to be defined.We only need to admit that there is space, plants, animals, etc., and geometry, botany, zoology, etc. are not obliged to prove the necessity of the existence of these objects.In this case, neither synthetic nor analytical methods are equally suitable for philosophy.For the first task of philosophy is to prove the necessity of its object.However, there have been many attempts to use synthetic methods in philosophy.Spinoza started from the definition, for example, he said: Substance is that which causes itself.Many of his definitions have left behind many of the most speculative truths, but they are only expressed in the form of judgments.These words also apply to Schelling.

§230 (2) The statement of the second link of the concept, that is, the statement of the stipulation of the general thing as a specialization, is to classify according to an external point of view. Note: It is said that classification must be complete.In this way, it is necessary to seek the principles or basis on which the classification is based.This principle must be quite comprehensive, and almost all classifications according to it can cover the entire range covered by the definition.But a further requirement is that the principle of classification must be deduced from the classified object itself.In this way, classifications are natural and not merely artificial, in other words, not arbitrary.For example, in zoology, the principle adopted for the classification of mammals is based on the teeth and claws of animals.This approach is understandable, since mammals are distinguished from each other by such parts of their bodies as teeth and claws.Using these as keys to trace back, it is not difficult to detect the general types of different types of mammals.In general, true classification must be based on concepts.And the concept contains three links, so the classification is generally divided into three parts at first.But as far as the particularity is manifested in two aspects, it is not unreasonable to adopt a classification method of dividing into four.In the sphere of the spirit, the division into three parts should be the main thing. We must say that it is Kant's contribution. He was the first to draw people's attention to the fact that the spirit should be divided into three parts. §231 (3) In concrete individuality, when the simple stipulation in the definition is recognized as a relationship, the object is the comprehensive connection of many different stipulations. ——This is a theorem.Since these determinations are different, the identity between them is a mediated identity.It is the task of "construction" to provide materials to form the intermediary link.And the mediation by which the knowledge of the necessity of that connection is achieved is itself the proof. [Explanation] According to the usual distinction between analytical and synthetic methods, which method to use seems to be completely arbitrary.If we try to assume that we start from the concrete which the synthetic method shows as the result, we can analyze it as a conclusion many abstract propositions, and these propositions form the premises and materials of the proof.Thus, algebraic definitions of curves become theorems in the geometrical method.Similarly, if the theorem of Pythagoras is used as the definition of a right triangle, some theorems in geometry that have been proved through analysis can also be obtained.The reason why the two methods can be chosen arbitrarily is that both start from an external premise.From the very nature of the concept, the method of analysis comes first.Gein first had to raise the given material of concrete experience into the form of general abstractions, which in turn had to be first presented as definitions in the synthetic method. However important and brilliantly fruitful these methods may be in their own sphere, it is self-evident that they are useless for philosophical cognition, for they presuppose that their mode of cognition is that of the abstract intellect, according to the formal of identity.Spinoza mainly uses the geometric method, although it is used to express the concept of speculation, but the formalism of this method is very obvious.Wolff's philosophy, in which the geometrical method has been carried to its pedantic heights, is, even in its content, intellectual metaphysics.After the geometric method and its formalism were abused in philosophy and science, the so-called construction method was replaced in modern times.Kant once made the following statement extremely popular: Mathematics constructs its concepts.The meaning of this sentence is nothing more than that what mathematics studies is not concepts, but abstract regulations of perceptual intuition.Since then, the term "conceptual construction" has been used to refer to the statement of perceptual properties abstracted from perception, without any conceptual specification; ways (but the rest are subject to personal arbitrariness and pleasure) and listed in a table.This all shows a Kantian formalism.Behind these practices, there is no doubt that ideas about ideas, the unity of concepts and objectivity, and ideas are concrete.But the so-called trick of construction is far from expressing this unity, which only the concept has.Moreover, the perceptual concreteness of intuition cannot express the concreteness of reason and ideas. Since the object studied by geometry is the perceptual yet abstract intuition of space, it can establish certain simple rules in space with abstract intellect without hindrance.The synthetic method of finite cognition therefore attains its perfection only in geometry.But the most notable thing is that in the process of the synthetic method, as soon as it encounters the immeasurable and unreasonable quantity, it hits a wall.For it is beyond the scope of rational principles to try to define further here.This is also enough to show an example where the words "reasonable" and "unreasonable" are often used upside down: usually, things that are "in line with reason (common sense) are considered reasonable, but the beginning and signs of rationality are regarded as reasonable." Many other sciences deal with objects far less simple than space or number, which often and necessarily reach the limits of the progress of the abstract intellect, but which they pass with ease. They have overcome the difficulty. They interrupt the sequence of the deduction process, accepting external conditions as they are convenient, and even taking opinions, appearances, perceptions or other external things in addition to violating the premise from which they started. As a starting point, this limited cognition itself is not aware of the limits of its method and its relationship to the content or object of cognition, so that it cannot recognize that it has necessarily accepted the definition of concepts in the process of defining and classifying. guide, but cannot see where its limit is, let alone know that when it exceeds its limit, it has entered a new range, where the rules of the understanding are no longer effective, but they are still there is used in a crude manner. §232 The inevitability brought about by limited cognition in the process of proof is initially only an external inevitability stipulated for subjective knowledge.But in true or immanent necessity, cognition itself is freed from its presuppositions and starting points, its ready-made and given content.In other words, true necessity is in itself a concept related to itself.In this way, the subjective idea reaches in itself what is determined in itself and for itself, which is not given, and is therefore immanent in the subject.It then passes to the idea of ​​will. Note: The inevitability of cognition achieved through proof is just the opposite of the starting point that constitutes cognition.Knowledge has a given contingent content within its point of departure.But at the end of its movement, it knows that this content is necessary, and this necessity is achieved through the mediation of subjective activities. Likewise, at first this subjectivity was extremely abstract, a pure blank slate.But now it proves to be a decisive and guiding principle.This is the key to the transition from the idea of ​​knowing to the idea of ​​will.On closer inspection, the meaning of this transition is to show that the true universality must be understood as the concept of subjectivity, self-moving, active, and self-establishing. (2) will §233 The subjective idea, as self-determining and simply self-consistent content, is the good.Since the good has the impetus to realize itself, its relationship to the idea of ​​truth is just the opposite, so the good tends to determine the present world to suit its own purposes. —This will has on the one hand the certainty of defying the presumed prior object.But on the other hand, as a finite thing, it presupposes the idea that the purpose of the good is only subjective and the independence of the object. §234 The limitation of the activity of the will is thus a contradiction: that is, in the self-contradictory determinations of the objective world, the good end is both realized and not yet realized, both posited as non-essential and equally The main thing is both actual and at the same time only possible.This kind of contradiction is represented as the infinite progression of the realization of goodness, and in this process, goodness is clinging to only as a kind of should. K But in terms of form, the removal of this contradiction, the action involving the will, supersedes the subjectivity of the end, thereby supersedes the objectivity, and the opposition that makes both finite; and not only The one-sidedness of this subjectivity, and the sublation of subjectivity in general; (for this other new subjectivity, that is, a newly created opposition, is the same as the previous one, which is supposed to exist. There is no difference.) This return to itself is at the same time the remembrance of the content itself, which is the identity of the good and the subject-object in themselves—that is, recalling the precondition of the theoretical attitude of cognition (§224), Namely: the object itself is the real thing and the substantial thing. Note, the work of the intellect consists only in knowing the world as it is, whereas the effort of the will consists in making the world as it should be.What is immediately given is not to the will a fixed existence, but only an illusion, a vain thing in itself.Speaking of which.Then there are contradictions that confuse abstract moral views.This point of view is, in its practical connection, the point of view taken by Kant's philosophy and even by Fichte's philosophy.They believe that the good should be realized, and we must strive for the realization of the good, and the will is only the good that realizes itself.But if the world is already as it should be, the action of the will ceases.Therefore the will itself requires that its purpose has not been achieved.Thus the finiteness of the will has been correctly stated.But we can't stay in this kind of limitation forever, because the process of will itself is the process of sublating limitation and the contradictions contained in limitation through the activity of will.This reconciliation consists in the return of the will in its results to the presuppositions assumed by cognition, in other words, to the unity of the theoretical and practical ideas.The will knows that the purpose is its own, and the intellect reaffirms the conception of the world as reality.This is the correct attitude of rational cognition.That unreal, fleeting thing is only superficial, and cannot constitute the real essence of the world.The essence of the world is the concept for itself, so the world itself is the idea.All unsatisfactory pursuits pass away when we realize that the ultimate purpose of this world has been accomplished, and is continually being accomplished.Generally speaking, this represents the view of adults, while young people always think that the world is so bad that it must first be completely transformed.The religious consciousness, on the other hand, holds that the world is governed by divine providence, so that what it is corresponds to what it should be.But this kind of conformity between being and what should be is not rigid and without a development process.For the good, the ultimate end of the world, exists only because it continually creates itself.The difference still exists between the spiritual world and the natural world that the latter only continually returns to itself, while the former undoubtedly progresses onwards. §235 To posit the truth of the good as the unity of the theoretical and practical Ideas means that the good in itself is attained, while the objective world is the Idea in itself, just as the Idea also eternally posits itself as an end , and through its activities to promote the realization of the purpose.This kind of life, which returns to itself due to the limitation and distinction of cognition, and is identical with itself through the activity of concepts, is the speculative idea or the absolute idea.