Chapter 10 C. The Third Attitude of Thought to Objectivity

direct knowledge or intuitive knowledge §61 Critical philosophy holds that thinking is subjective, and holds that the ultimate and irreducible determination of thinking is abstract universality and formal identity.Thinking is then regarded as opposed to truth, which is not an abstract universal but a concrete universal.In this supreme determination of thought, reason, categories are not valued. —The opposite view is that thinking is only a special activity, and therefore declares that thinking is incapable of knowing truth. §62 According to this theory, since thinking is a particular activity, it can only take categories as its entire content and product.But since the category is what the understanding insists on, it is a restricted determination, a form of knowing conditional, intermediary, and dependent things.Such a limited mind cannot be said to know the infinite and know the truth.Because this kind of thinking cannot pass from finite to infinite (it is against the proof of the existence of God).These categories of thinking are also called concepts.According to this statement, to grasp an object is nothing more than to know that object in the form of knowing conditional and intermediary things.So as long as the object is truth, infinite, or unconditional, we can only use our categories to change it into a conditional and intermediary thing.In this way, instead of grasping the truth with our thoughts, we distort it to make it untrue.

[Explanation] This is the only simple argument put forward in support of the claim that there is only immediate or intuitive knowledge of God and truth.In former times, various so-called anthropomorphic ideas of God were rejected as merely finite, unworthy of the knowledge of the infinite.God, therefore, becomes an extraordinarily empty being.But at that time, the general rules of thinking were not recognized as belonging to the concept of "anthropomorphism".Rather, it is believed that the role of thought is to sweep away many apparent finitudes in the Absolute. —This belief is quite in line with the prejudice common to all ages mentioned above (§5), that we can only arrive at truth by reflection.

But up to now, the determination of thinking has finally been recognized as anthropomorphism, and even thinking has been declared to be a limited activity. — Jacobi expresses this comment most clearly in the "Supplement" to Part VII of his Epistle on Spinoza's doctrine.He applies arguments drawn from Spinoza's philosophy to attack general knowledge.In his attack on knowledge he conceived of knowledge as mere knowledge of finite things, as merely the progression of thought from a series of finite things to finite things, each finite being mutually related to another finite thing. Condition each other.According to this view, interpretation and understanding are only indirect processes of explaining something through the mediation of something else.The content of all knowledge is therefore only particular, dependent and limited.Infinity, truth, God are outside these mechanical connections, and knowledge is limited within this range. ——The most noteworthy thing is that Kant's philosophy affirms that the limitation of categories mainly lies in the formal determination of their subjectivity. is also limited.Jacobi's particular emphasis was on the brilliant achievements of the natural sciences (exact sciences) in understanding the forces and laws of nature at that time.Of course, on the basis of this finite thing, one cannot find the infinite within it.It is true, as Lalande says, that he searched the whole universe [with a telescope], but did not find God (cf. § 60 note).In this sphere of natural science, the attainable universality, that is, the ultimate fruit of scientific knowledge, is only an indeterminate collection of finite things from the outside, in other words, matter.Jacobi is quite right to see that there is no other way out of this merely mediated process of knowledge.

§63 At the same time, Jacobi advocated that the truth can only be understood by the spirit, and believed that the reason why people are human is only because they have reason, and reason is the knowledge of God.But because indirect knowledge is limited to limited content, reason is direct knowledge and belief. (Explanation) Knowledge, belief, thinking, and intuition are the categories that often appear in this school of view.Jacobi, assuming that these categories are familiar to everyone, often uses them arbitrarily according to the simple appearance and distinction of psychology, while neglecting to examine their most important nature and concept.Therefore, we often find that knowledge is always opposed to belief, and at the same time, belief is defined as direct knowledge, so we must also admit that belief is a kind of knowledge.Again, it is also an empirical fact that what we believe must be in our consciousness, that is to say, of what we are sure we must at least know about it.Again we often see that thinking is opposed to immediate knowledge and belief, and especially to intuition.But if intuition can be defined as intellectual intuition, then intellectual intuition can only be called thinking intuition, unless we understand intellectual intuition with God as its object differently, and want to understand it as imaginary shadow. image or appearance.In the language of Jacobi's philosophy, the word belief can also be used to refer to everyday things that appear in the present sensibility.Jacobi says we believe we have bodies, we believe in the physical existence of sensuous things.But when we say that we have faith in truth or eternity, or that God has revealed to us in direct knowledge or intuition, we are not speaking of a sensible thing, but of a content which is universal in itself, only of the thinking object of mind.Again, when the individual means the ego, the personality, and not the empirical self or a particular personality, especially when we have in mind the personality of God, we are speaking of a pure personality, which is itself universal. In terms of sexual personality.A pure personality like this is thought, and only thought. --And pure intuition and pure thought are but one and the same thing.Intuition and belief, which at first always denote the definite meanings which the common sense attaches to these words, are distinguished from thought, and this distinction between them is almost universally known.But now we are to regard faith and intuition in the highest sense, that is, as belief in God, as intellectual intuition, that is to say, we are to exclude the distinction between intuition, belief, and thought.Intuition and belief, once elevated to this higher realm, can no longer be distinguished from thought.Yet people always think that by virtue of these empty literal distinctions they are speaking important truths, but they do not realize that the various statements they attack are the same as what they insist on.

The word faith used by Jacoby has a special convenience, because when the word faith is mentioned, it reminds people of the belief in Christianity, and makes people feel that the word faith seems to include Christian belief, and even think it refers to Christian belief.Jacobi's philosophy of faith, then, appears to be pious in nature, with the fervor of Christian piety.Based on this piety, he has a special freedom, and he can make arbitrary judgments with self-confidence and authority.But we must not be deceived by the occasional false appearance that the words are the same, but we must keep in mind the difference between the two.For one thing, Christian belief includes the authority of the church, but belief based on this philosophical standpoint only relies on the authority of personal subjective revelation.Furthermore, the Christian belief is an objective, rich in content, a system with doctrine and knowledge.However, Jacobi’s belief itself has no definite content. It can accept Christian belief as the content, but also allows any content to be mixed in. It can even include the belief that the Dalai Lama, the ape, or the bull is God. within it.In this way, his so-called belief is limited to the simple and empty God, the highest being.The word faith, then, in this self-professed philosophical sense, is nothing but a dry abstraction of immediate knowledge, and a purely formal category applicable to many very different things, whether As far as belief in the mind of the believer is concerned, or as far as the Holy Spirit is immanent in the human heart, or as far as theological theory is concerned, it must not be confused with the Christian faith, which has a rich spiritual content.

The so-called belief or direct knowledge here by Jacobi is actually the same thing as what is called inspiration, inner revelation, and truth bestowed by God elsewhere, especially the so-called healthy reason, common sense, and common opinion of people.All of these forms also have as a fundamental principle a content or fact that is directly present to consciousness. §64 This immediate knowledge affirms that what it knows exists, that the Infinity, Eternity, God, within our conceptions, also exists.That is to say, it affirms that within consciousness the certainty of their existence is directly and inseparably connected with this idea.

[Explanation] To object to this principle of immediate knowledge is something that philosophers seldom think of.They will be glad, on the contrary, to see that these ancient doctrines, which express the general content of philosophy, though in this unphilosophical way, become, within certain limits, the general beliefs of the age.One would wonder how it should be supposed that these principles—that truth is immanent in the mind, and that the mind can grasp it (cf. §63)—are contrary to philosophy.From the point of view of form, the principle that the existence of God is directly and inseparably connected with the thought of God, objectivity and the subjectivity which thought has in the first place, is of particular interest.It may even be said that the philosophy of immediate knowledge not only holds that the thought of God alone is inseparable from Being, but that even in intuition the determination of Being is inseparably connected with man's conceptions of his own body and of external things. . —If it is the business of philosophy to endeavor to prove, that is to say, to reveal, this unity of thinking and being, that is, contained in the very nature of thinking or subjectivity itself, is inseparable from being and objectivity, then whatever the nature of these proofs Whatever the value, at any rate, philosophy must be exceedingly satisfied when it sees its principles proven, and revealed to be also facts in consciousness, and thus correspond to experience.As for the difference between philosophy and direct knowledge, it is only because the attitude of direct knowledge is too narrow, or it can be said to be only in the attitude it adopts against philosophical thinking.

But when Descartes put forward his principle of "cogito, ergo sum" (cogito, ergo sum), which can be said to be the pivot of diverting the interest of modern philosophy, he also said it in the way of direct and self-evident truth.If someone regards the proposition of Descartes as a three-stage inference, then this person probably does not seem to know much about the nature of the three-stage inference except for the character "so" in this proposition.For where do you find the middle term (medius terminus) in this proposition?Moreover, the middle term is far more important than the word "Gu" in the three-paragraph inference.If we must use the word "inference" and call the combination of concepts such as Cartesian "immediate inference", then this superfluous form of inference is nothing but the addition of different determinations without the middle term at all. The union of the media.In this light, the principle, expressed by the proponents of immediate knowledge, of the relation of existence to our ideas is more or less an inference. ——I borrowed some sentences from Descartes quoted by Mr. He Tuo (E.G.) from his essay "On Descartes' Philosophy" published in 1826 to show Descartes' own statement , that is, his proposition "I think, therefore I am", is not a syllogism. (Scattered in "Answer to the Second Refutation" (see), Chapter Four of "Methodology", and "Letter Collection" Volume One, page 118, etc.) From the first paragraph, I quote the following most important sentence.Descartes first said that we are thinking beings, which "is an original concept, not deduced from the syllogism".He went on to say, "When a person says I think therefore I am or I think therefore I exist, he does not use a three-stage inference to deduce existence from thinking."Descartes knew the conditions necessary for a syllogism, so he added that for the proposition to be a syllogism we must add a major premise: "Everyone who thinks is or exists. "In a word, but this major premise must first be deduced from the original proposition.

Descartes' various statements about the principle that my thinking and my being are inseparable, if this connection between I think and I am is presented and contained in the simple intuition of consciousness, it is also said that this connection is Absolute first is the most certain and clearest principle, so it is impossible to conceive of any extreme skeptical thinking that does not recognize this principle. ——His statements are so clear and definite that many of the statements of Jacobi and others about direct connection in modern times can only be regarded as superfluous restatements of Descartes' principles.

§65 This view of direct knowledge is not satisfied with pointing out that isolated indirect knowledge cannot grasp the truth, but its characteristic is that it insists on isolated direct knowledge and excludes any intermediary, that is, it has truth as its content.This isolation and exclusivity shows that this point of view is still trapped in the intellectual conception of metaphysics insisting on either-or, that is, in fact still trapped in the external indirect relationship. The so-called external indirect relationship is based on the insistence on Restricted or one-sided categorical relationships.Those who possess direct knowledge mistakenly think that they have gone beyond the limited range, when in fact they have not yet reached it.But on this point, let us not elaborate at this moment.This exclusive direct knowledge is recognized only as a fact, and in this introduction we can only examine it in terms of this external reflection.As for direct knowledge itself, I will explain it later when I discuss the logical relationship between directness and mediation.But such an external point of view as just now does not allow us to examine the nature or concept of the matter of immediate knowledge, because such an examination would lead us to mediation, and even to knowledge.Therefore, the real investigation based on logical standpoint must be sought within logic itself.

[Explanation] The entire second part of Logic, the doctrine of essence, is mainly an examination of the unity established by immediacy and mediation itself. §66 So we can only stop here and treat direct knowledge as a fact.But in this way our investigation leads to the realm of experience, a psychic phenomenon.Viewed in this light, we must point out that it is among the most common of experiences that many truths we know well are the result of extremely complex, highly mediated investigations, which emerge effortlessly and directly. itself before the consciousness of the person acquainted with such knowledge.The mathematician, like every person trained in a science, has immediate and immediate answers to many problems, but he arrives at these solutions by very complicated analysis.Every learned person has many general views and basic principles directly presented in his consciousness, but these direct views and principles can only be the product of repeated thinking and long-term life experience.The proficiency we acquire in any kind of knowledge, art, and skill also includes such knowledge or action directly appearing in consciousness, or even directly manifesting in the activity of responding outwardly and flexibly from within his limbs. .In all these situations, the immediacy of knowledge not only does not exclude indirectness, but the two are combined in such a way that direct knowledge is actually the product and result of indirect knowledge. [Explanation] Similarly, direct existence and indirect existence are obviously combined. The germ and parent, in view of the branches and offspring they produce, can only be said to be immediate and original beings.But though the existence of the germ and parent is immediate, they are still rooted and derived; while the existence of branches and offspring, though intermediate, is still direct, because they exist.For example, I am in Berlin, my immediate existence is here, but the reason why I am here is mediated, that is, I have come here because of a journey. §67 As regards immediate knowledge of God, of laws and ethical principles, (which includes what are otherwise called instincts, innate ideas, or a priori ideas, common sense, and natural reason, etc., in short, this means A spontaneous primality, whatever its form.) This is a very common experience: That is to say, the content contained in this direct primitiveness always needs to be educated and developed before it can achieve self-awareness, which can also be said to achieve what Plato called "memory". (Another example is Christian baptism, although it is a ceremony, it also includes the obligation to further accept the teachings of Christianity.) In other words, as far as religion and ethics are concerned, although they are a kind of belief and direct knowledge, they are still completely mediated. Sexual conditioning, the so-called intermediary, refers to the process of development, education, and parenting. [Explanation] Advocates of the idea of ​​innate as well as opponents of the idea of ​​innate are equally dominated by mutually exclusive oppositions, that is to say, on both sides some general determinations and essentially immediate unions of the mind (if it may be so called) with the other There is an unbreakable opposition between a union which is produced in an external way and which is mediated through the given object and representation.Some people have refuted the theory of innate ideas empirically, thinking that since everyone has innate ideas, for example, since the principle of contradiction is common in everyone's consciousness, then they must know this principle.For the principle of contradiction, and other similar principles, count among innate ideas.We can regard this objection as a misunderstanding.For the principles here spoken of, though innate, do not thereby take the form of ideas or representations of which we are conscious.But this objection, taken against direct knowledge, is entirely pertinent, since the proponents of direct knowledge clearly claim that only what is within consciousness can be said to have the quality of direct knowledge.If we assume that people who hold the theory of direct knowledge also admit to some extent, especially in terms of religious belief, it must include Christian or religious upbringing and development, then when he talks about belief, he wants to erase the intermediary. It is inevitable to fall into prejudice.Or, since the necessity of upbringing is admitted, but the importance of mediation is not known, this is also too lacking in thinking. Note: When Plato's philosophy speaks of the memory of ideas, it means that ideas are dormant in man's mind, not that ideas are instilled into man's mind from outside, as the Sophists maintained.However, the recognition of knowledge as a kind of memory does not exclude the development of the latent things in people's hearts, and development is nothing but an intermediary process.The same reasoning may be applied to the idea of ​​innateness advanced by Descartes and those Scottish philosophers.These concepts are only latent concepts in the first place, and must be regarded as inherent in human beings. §68 In the above-mentioned experiences the truth is always sought in the objects connected with immediate knowledge.This connection, though at first only a connection of external experience, is permanent insofar as it is sufficient to show itself essential and indivisible to empirical consideration itself.Again, if this immediate knowledge in experience itself is itself, as knowledge of God and divine things, this consciousness will generally be regarded as superior to sensuous, finite things and higher Out of immediate desires and inclinations in a natural mood.This elevation is the process of transitioning to and returning to belief in God and the divine.So this belief is immediate knowledge and certainty. But it does not therefore have no intermediary process as its premise and condition. [Explanation] We have already pointed out that the so-called proof of the existence of God starting from finite existence also shows this improvement.From this point of view, these proofs are not the inventions of artificial reflection, but the mediation of the mind's own, necessary tortuous progress, although in the usual form they are not adequately and correctly represented. . §69 The main interest of the immediate theory of knowledge is to point out the transition from subjective Ideas to (objective) Being (as indicated in §64 above), and to assert an original dismediated connection between Ideas and Being.The central point of transition from idea to being, even without considering the connections that emerge from experience, contains within itself a process of mediation.Moreover, in its [intermediary] stipulation, since it is real, it is not an intermediary process formed with and through external things, but contains premises and conclusions in itself. mediation process within. §70 The assertion of this view is that neither the Idea as a mere subjective thought nor as a mere being-for-itself is truth;—a being-mere-for-itself, a being unrelated to the Idea, is only Limited sensibility exists in the world.Therefore, this kind of statement is only a direct assertion that ideas can only be mediated by existence, and vice versa, existence can only be true if it is mediated by ideas.The principle of direct knowledge should reject the empty immediacy without definition, abstract existence or pure unity for itself, and insist on the unity of idea and existence.I am afraid that it is only because we do not think that we cannot see that the unity of two different determinations or categories is not merely a purely direct or random and empty unity. There is truth only when regulations are mediated. — Or we can say that each determination is only united with truth through the mediation of another determination. —The assertion that the determination of mediation is included in that immediacy itself is here shown to be a fact for which the understanding, in accordance with the fundamental principle of immediate knowledge itself, does not come out. be opposed to.Only the usual abstract intellect (understanding) can regard both immediacy and mediation, each as absolute, and imagine a solid gulf between them.In trying to unite the two parties, therefore, one creates an insurmountable difficulty for oneself.This difficulty, as we have pointed out, does not actually exist, and also disappears in the concept of speculative thinking. §71 The one-sidedness of direct epistemology has brought some regulations and consequences to itself. Apart from the basic principles discussed above, the main points need to be pointed out a little.First, since the criterion of truth is not the nature of the content, but the fact of consciousness, nothing can be claimed to be truth except subjective knowledge or conviction, except some content which I find in my consciousness. Another basis.In this way, what I find in my consciousness is extended to what is found in everyone's consciousness, and it is even said to be the nature of consciousness itself. [Explanation] In the past, the proof of the existence of God often put forward the argument of "consensus gentium" (Con-sensus gentium), which was first cited by Cicero. "All hearts are one" is indeed a very meaningful authority, and it is very natural to invoke this authority to say that something is in everyone's consciousness, so it must be based on the nature of consciousness, from the necessity of consciousness. And it's easy. But within this category of unanimity there is one major insight, which can be seen even by the most uneducated, namely, that the consciousness of the individual is at the same time a particular and accidental consciousness.If this kind of consciousness is not investigated, if the special and accidental things in the consciousness are not excluded, in other words, if the universal things in the consciousness are not revealed through the hard work of reflection, the so-called unanimity of minds But it is only the common assent to a certain content, which is considered sufficient to establish a customary prejudice, and which therefore asserts that it belongs to the nature of consciousness.Therefore, if the requirement of thought is to seek its necessity from the universal and familiar, the statement of consensus is by no means sufficient to satisfy this requirement.And even if an admission of de facto universality would be a sufficient proof, it would not be sufficient to justify belief in God on this argument, since experience has taught us that there are individuals and peoples who have no belief in God. But simply asserting that I have found a content in my mind which I know with certainty to be true, and declaring that certainty is not due to my particular subject, but to the nature of the mind. —I am afraid that there is nothing in the world that is simpler and easier than this method. §72 Second, another consequence of the criterion of truth is that immediate knowledge is accepted as truth, that is, all superstition and idolatry can be declared truth, and any volitional claim that is unreasonable and contrary to moral content can be justified. .Indians do not rely on what we call intermediary knowledge, theory and reasoning, but believe in cows, apes, or Brahmans and lamas as gods.But the wills and inclinations of nature place their interest spontaneously in consciousness, and the purposes which are immoral also appear quite directly in consciousness.Both good and bad qualities signify a definite existence of the will, and the definite existence of the will is known, even most immediately, in interests and purposes. §73 Third, direct knowledge of God only tells us that God exists, but does not tell us what God is.For to be able to say what God is would be a kind of knowledge and would lead to mediated knowledge.Immediate epistemology, therefore, explicitly reduces the religious God to a vague god, confines himself to indeterminate supersensible things, and reduces religious content to a minimum. [Explanation] If it is really necessary, it is enough to be able to achieve and maintain a belief in the existence of a god, or even create a belief in the existence of a god, then we cannot but be amazed at the poverty of this age.It is an age to win a little religious knowledge for its supreme gain, and to fall back in the shrines of the churches to the strange [alien] gods that were worshiped in Athens thousands of years ago! §74 We must say a little more about the general nature of the form of immediacy.Because the form of immediacy is itself one-sided, its content itself is also one-sided and thus limited.Immediateness makes the universal a one-sided abstraction, and makes God an indeterminate being, but God can also be called spirit, in so far as God is understood as himself in himself, himself and himself mediated.Only in this way is God concrete, alive, and spiritual.Knowing that God is Spirit thus contains indirectness or mediation within itself.Second, the form of immediacy gives the particular something its own existence, its own relation to itself.But precisely because of this the particular thing itself is related to something else outside itself.From the point of view of the form of immediate knowledge, the finite particular is posited as absolute.And since immediacy is extraordinarily abstract, neutral to every content, it can, as such, accept any different content. So immediacy can recognize both the immoral and immoral content of the idol, as well as its diametrically opposed content.Only when we see that immediacy is not independent, but mediated by other things, can we expose its limitation and unreality.This insight, because the content contains intermediary, is also a kind of intermediary knowledge.Because what can really be regarded as the content of truth is not the thing mediated by other things, nor the thing limited by other things, but the thing mediated by itself, so the unity of mediation and direct self-connection. The clinging intellect, which thinks itself capable of dissolving finite knowledge, beyond the intellectual identity of metaphysics and enlightenment thought, still cannot help but take immediacy or abstract self-relationship, or abstract identity, as the principle and criterion of truth.Abstract thought (the metaphysical form of reflection) and abstract intuition (the form of immediate knowledge) are one and the same. Note: If the form of immediacy is maintained in opposition to the form of mediation, immediacy becomes one-sided, and every content belonging to the form of immediacy also tends to be one-sided.Roughly speaking, immediacy is abstract self-relationship, and thus abstract identity, abstract universality at the same time.If universality for itself takes only the form of immediacy, it can only be abstract universality.And from this point of view, God can only have a completely indeterminate meaning of existence.As such, we might also say that God is spirit, but this is empty talk, since spirit, as consciousness and self-consciousness, at any rate involves the distinction of the conscious self from itself and from other things, and therefore mediation. inside. §75 The third attitude of critical thought towards truth can only be taken in the manner that this point of view itself directly expresses and admits.The immediate theory of knowledge, which regards direct knowledge as a fact, and says: there is a direct knowledge without mediation, without relation to other things, or relation to itself only in itself, is wrong.Likewise, the claim that thought progresses only through other mediated (limited, conditional) categories is also not true, since it forgets that when thought is mediated by something else, it can Abandon this intermediary. But to show that there is in fact a progress of knowledge which proceeds neither directly nor indirectly, takes logic itself and all philosophy as a sample. §76 If we try to compare and examine the principle of immediate knowledge with the naive metaphysics from which we proceed above, we can see that Jacobi's theory of immediate knowledge is a return to the beginning of this metaphysics in modern times, that is, to the flute. Karl's philosophy.Both Jacobi and Descartes maintained the following three points: (1) The simple inseparability of thinking and the being of the thinker, - "I think therefore I am" (cogito ergs sum), with my being, my reality, my existence directly revealed in my consciousness, are exactly the same. (At the same time, Descartes clearly declared that the thought he understood refers to the general consciousness. (See "Principles of Philosophy", Chapter I, Section IX). This kind of thinking is inseparable from the existence of the thinker, and is absolutely first ( rather than indirect, proven) principles and most certain knowledge. (2) The existence of God and the idea of ​​God are inseparable.The existence of God is included in the concept of God itself. In other words, the concept of God must not be without the regulation of existence, so the existence of God is inevitable and eternal. (3) With regard to the immediate consciousness of the existence of external things, they all agree that there is nothing but the consciousness of the senses.It means that we have this perceptual awareness, which is the most insignificant piece of knowledge.The only thing we are interested in knowing is that immediate knowledge of the existence of external things is false and illusory, and sensible things themselves have no reality.The existence of external things is only accidental and a false appearance of disillusionment.External things have essentially only being, and their being is separate from their concept and essence. §77 But there are some differences between the two views: (1) Descartes' philosophy started from these unproven and unprovable premises, and then reached a more expanded and developed knowledge. In this way, it promoted the rise of modern science.On the contrary, Jacobi's theory (cf. §62) in recent times has reached a very important conclusion in itself, that is, it holds that knowledge through limited mediation can only know limited things, but cannot grasp the truth, and the truth about God Consciousness can only stay at the stage of completely abstract belief mentioned above. (2) The modern point of view, on the one hand, does not change the usual method of seeking scientific knowledge proposed by Descartes, and the way of research is exactly the same as that of empirical science and finite science.But on the other hand, this point of view abandons this method as soon as it comes to knowledge whose content is infinite, and because it knows no other method, it abandons all methods of knowing that which has infinite content.因此，这种观点便放纵于想象与确信之狂妄的任意中，沉溺于道德的自大和情感的傲慢中，或陷入于粗鲁的独断和枯燥的辩论中，所有这些，都强烈地反对哲学和哲学的研究。哲学当然不容许单纯的武断或妄自尊大，也不容许任意无端的往复辩论。 §78 所以我们首先必须放弃，在知识或内容方面，一个独立的直接性与一个同等独立、无法与直接性联合的中介性之间的对立。因为这种对立只是一个单纯的假设和一个任意的武断。同样，所有一切别的假设和成见，不论其出于表象，或出于思维，都须在走进哲学的大门之前摒弃不用。因为哲学对于类此的想法，首须加以考察，而对于它们自身的意义和种种对立，也须加以理解。 〔说明〕怀疑主义，可以作为彻底怀疑一切认识形式的否定性科学，也可以作为一个导言，以揭露那样的假定的虚妄性。但是怀疑主义的导言，不仅是一种不令人愉快的工作，而且也是一段多余的路程，因为，有如下面即将指陈的，辩证过程或矛盾进展本身就是一个积极的科学的主要环节。再则，怀疑主义只能在经验中去寻求有限的形式，而且只能接受这些形式作为给予的材料，而不能加以逻辑的推演。对于这种彻底的怀疑主义有其需要，犹如坚持科学的研究必须先有普遍的怀疑，或者完全不需任何前提。真正讲来，在要求纯粹思维的决心里，这种需要实通过自由而达到完成了。所谓自由，即从一切“有限”事物中摆脱出来，抓住事物的纯粹抽象性或思维的简单性。