Chapter 6 Preliminary Provisions on the Concepts of Logic

§19 Logic is the science of pure ideas, which are ideas formed by the most abstract elements of thinking. [Explanation] In this part of the preliminary discussion on the concept of logic, the provisions on logic and other concepts contained in this part are also applicable to many basic concepts in philosophy.These rules are created out of and with a comprehensive view of the whole. We can say that logic is the science of thinking, the rules and laws of thinking.But only thinking itself constitutes the universal determination or element that makes the Idea a logical Idea.Ideas are not formal thinking, but the whole developed by the specific rules and laws of thinking itself. These rules and laws are given by thinking itself, and they are by no means ready-made things that already exist outside.

In a certain sense, logic may be said to be the most difficult of sciences, because the subjects it deals with are not intuitions, nor, like those of geometry, abstract sensory representations, but purely abstract things, and require a Only with a special ability and skill can one go back to pure thought, hold on to pure thought, and act in pure thought.But in another sense, logic may also be regarded as the easiest science.Because its content is nothing but our own thinking, and the familiar determinations of thinking, and these determinations are at the same time the simplest, the most elementary, and the most familiar to everyone, such as: being and nothing, quality and quantity, being-in-itself and being-for-itself, one and many, and so on.However, this kind of familiarity has aggravated the difficulty of logical research.Because, on the one hand, we always think that it is not worth the effort to study such familiar things.On the other hand, for these concepts, the methods used by logic to study and understand them are different from the methods that ordinary people are already familiar with, or even the opposite.

The usefulness of logic depends on how much it can train the learner for other purposes.The education which the learner acquires through logic consists in the training of the mind, so that it may be really pure thought in the mind, for this science is the thinking of thinking. — But logic as the absolute form of truth, and especially logic as pure truth itself, is by no means simply something useful.But if that which is the noblest, freest, and most independent is also the most useful, then logic may be considered useful, but its usefulness is not only for the formal exercise of thought, but must be be appraised.

Note 1: The first question is: What is the object of logic?The simplest and clearest answer to this question is that truth is the object of logic.Truth is a noble term, and its substance is even more noble.As long as a person's spirit and mood are healthy, the pursuit of the truth will surely arouse a high degree of enthusiasm in his heart.But as soon as this point is mentioned, someone will ask rhetorically: "Are we capable of knowing the truth?" There seems to be a dissonance between us finite people and the truth that exists for itself and for itself. raises the question of finding a bridge between the finite and the infinite.God is truth; but how can we know him?This attempt to know the truth seems to be contrary to the virtues of humility and modesty.But it is for this reason that many people question whether we can know the truth, in order to justify a life of limited purpose in which they cling to mediocrity.Such humility is useless.Sayings like, "How can a poor earthly creature like me know the truth?" can be said to be a thing of the past.Another form of absurdity and arrogance arises in its place. Most profess to breathe directly in the truth, and young people are often inspired by this atmosphere to believe that they are born with religion and ethics ready-made. above truth.From the same point of view, it is especially said that all those grown-ups are mostly depraved, numb, and rigid in falsehoods.What the young people see is like the radiance of the morning glow, while the old people are trapped in the swamp and mud of the day.They admit that special branches of science should be dealt with anyway, but they also regard them as mere means to the external ends of life.In this way, it is not the humility mentioned above that hinders the understanding and research of the truth, but the pride and self-confidence that thinks that the truth has been completely obtained.The old pin their hopes on the young, because the young should be able to advance the world and science.But what the older generation expects of the young is not that they stagnate and become self-satisfied, but that they take up the serious and hard work of spirit.

There is also a humility against truth.It is an aristocratic disregard for truth, as we have seen, of Pilatus's attitude towards Christ."What is truth?" Barratt asks, meaning that everything is not the same thing, that nothing makes sense.What he meant was something like Solomon's: All is illusion—so that only subjective illusion remains. There is also a kind of shrinking that is enough to hinder the recognition of truth.People with lazy minds tend to say this: don't think that we are serious about philosophy.Naturally, we are also willing to learn logic, but after learning logic, we are not like that.They think that when thinking goes beyond the bounds of everyday appearances, they go to the devil's lair; it is as if they let themselves float on the ocean of thought, tossed to and fro by the waves of thought itself, and finally return to the world of impermanence. The sandy beach is as indifferent and gainless as when I first left this sandy beach.

What the consequences of this perception are, we can see it in the world.We can learn a lot of knowledge and skills, we can become routine office personnel, and we can also develop into specialized technical personnel for special purposes.But men, cultivating their spirits, striving for noble and holy causes, are quite another matter. And we can hope that in the youth of our time, a thirst for higher and sacred things seems to be stimulated in their hearts, and they will not be satisfied with mere external knowledge. Note 2: Everyone agrees that thinking is the object of logic.But our valuation of thinking can be very low or very high.On the one hand, we say: This is just a thought. ——This means that thought is only subjective, arbitrary, and accidental, but not the essence itself, not the real and actual thing.On the other hand, we can also value thought very highly, thinking that only thought can attain the supreme being, the nature of God, of which the senses know nothing.We say that God is spirit, and we cannot worship God apart from spirit and truth.But we admit that the sensible or sensuous is not spiritual, but that the inner core of the mind is thought, and that only the mind can know the mind.It is true that the spirit can also express itself as sensation (for example, in religion), but the sensation itself, or the manner of the sensation, is one thing, and the content of the sensation is another.Sensation itself is generally the form of all sensuous things, and this is common to man and beast.The form of this feeling may be able to grasp the most specific content, but this content cannot be achieved by this form.The form of sensation is the lowest form of attainment of spiritual content.The spiritual content, God himself, has truth only in or as thought.In this sense, thought is not mere thought, but the highest and, strictly speaking, the only way of grasping eternal and absolute existence.

The sciences whose object is thought, like thought, are highly or very lowly valued.Some people think that everyone can think without studying logic, just as everyone can digest without studying physiology.Even after man has studied logic, his thinking is still the same as before, maybe more methodical, but not much changed.If logic had no other task than to acquaint man with merely formal thinking, it would bring nothing new to the thinking which we are already equally capable of doing at ordinary times.In fact, the old logic only had this status.Moreover, on the one hand, the knowledge of thinking, even if it is a purely subjective activity, is a matter of honor and interest to man.Because the reason why man is different from beasts is because he can know what he is and what he does.And, on the other hand, logic, as the science of thinking, which is the only activity sufficient to experience truth and the highest being, would occupy a high place.If, therefore, the science of logic studies the activity of thinking and its products (and thinking is not an activity without content, for thinking can produce thoughts, and can produce the specific thoughts it needs), then the content of logical science in general is It is the supersensory world, and exploring this supersensory world means traveling in the supersensory world.Mathematics is the study of number and abstract objects of space.Mathematical abstraction is still a perceptual thing, although it is an abstract perceptual thing that does not have a specific existence.Thought goes so far as to "say farewell" [or break away from] this last sensibility, to be free, to abandon external and internal sensations, and to reject all special interests and tendencies.For logic with such a foundation, our valuation of it will of course be higher than the average person's usual opinion of logic.

Note 3: The need to recognize logic as having a deeper meaning than the science of purely formal thinking was intensified by religious, political, legal, and ethical interests.In the past, people thought that ideas were insignificant and could not be harmed, so they might as well let go of fresh and bold ideas.They contemplated God, Nature, and the State, and they were convinced that by thought alone men could know what truth was, not through the senses, nor through chance appearances and opinions.When they think in this way, the results gradually and seriously affect the highest relations of life.

Traditional rules and regulations have lost their authority due to the exercise of ideas.The constitutions of nations were sacrificed to thought, and religion was struck by thought; many solid religious ideas, which had been regarded as revelation, were destroyed by thought, and traditional religious beliefs were shaken in the minds of many.In Greece, for example, the philosophers rose up against the old religions and thus destroyed the beliefs of the old religions.Therefore, philosophers were expelled and executed for destroying religion and destabilizing politics, because religion and politics are intrinsically linked.In this way, thinking becomes a force in the real world, exerting an unusually large influence.That is why people began to notice the power of thinking, and then to examine its power carefully, trying to find that thinking boasted too much, and failed to do the work it had undertaken.Instead of knowing the nature of God, nature, and spirit, thinking in a word, instead of knowing truth, overthrows governments and religions.Therefore, it is urgent to defend the effect or utility of thinking, so examining the nature of thinking and defending the power of thinking constitutes the main interest of modern philosophy.

§20 From the superficial sense of thinking, then (α) first of all, in the usual subjective sense of thinking, thinking seems to be one of the many activities or abilities of the mind, juxtaposed with sensation, intuition, imagination, desire, will, etc. .However, the product of thinking activities, the form or determination of thought is generally a universal abstract thing.Thinking as activity can therefore be called the active universal.And since the products of thinking activities are universal, thinking can be called a self-realizing universal. As far as thinking is recognized as a subject, it is the thinker, and the abbreviation of the existing thinking subject is called me.

[Explanation] Some of the regulations presented here and in the following sections must not be considered as my own views or opinions on ideas.But in these preliminary discussions, neither can be said to have a strict deduction or proof, but can only be counted as statements of fact (Eacta).In other words, in the consciousness of every human being, as long as he has a thought and examines his thought, he can empirically find that his thought has universality and the following characteristics.Of course, to observe correctly his consciousness and the facts in his representations requires a considerable prior training in attention and abstraction. The distinction between sensation, representation, and thought has been mentioned in this preliminary statement. This distinction is most crucial for understanding the nature and categories of cognition.Therefore, this distinction is first raised here to draw people's attention so as to help them understand it. — To define the sensuous, one should first trace its external source, the senses or sense-faculties.However, just calling the names of the sense organs cannot determine the content felt by the sense organs.The difference between sensible things and thoughts is that the former is characterized by individuality.Since the particulars (the most abstract particular being the atom) are also related to one another, all sensible things are particulars apart from each other (Aussereinander), whose exact abstract form is juxtaposition (Nebeneinander) and Succession to each other (Nacheinander) of.As for the appearance, it has such perceptual data as its content, but this content is set to be within me and has the stipulation of my things, so it also has universality, self-connection, and simplicity.In addition to the content of perceptual data, representations can also contain thinking data from self-consciousness, such as representations about law, ethics and religion, and even representations about thinking itself.It is not so easy to draw the distinction between these representations and the thoughts about them.For the representation has both the content of thought and the form of universality, and universality, which is necessary for any content in me, is also possessed by any representation.But generally speaking, the characteristics of appearance must be found in the individuality of content.It is true that law, justice, and similar regulations do not exist in sensible things in space and apart from each other.That is to say, as far as time is concerned, although these regulations seem to be continuous with each other, their content is not affected by time, nor can it be considered that they will disappear and change in time. But such latent mental determinations are likewise individuated on the broader ground of abstract universality immanent in general appearances.In this case of individuation, these spiritual determinations are simple and disconnected; for example, rights, duties, God.The superficiality in this situation is not to stay superficially on saying that right is right, God is God, etc., or to put forward some regulations, for example, God is the creator of the world, omniscient, omnipotent, etc.Like this, a variety of individualized and simple regulations or predicates, no matter whether they are internally connected or not, are barely connected together. Although these predicates are connected by their subjects, they are still external to each other.In this regard, appearance is the same as understanding, the only difference is that understanding can still establish the relationship between universality and particularity, cause and effect, etc., so that the isolated appearance determination of appearance has a necessary connection.On the contrary, the appearance can only make these isolated regulations arranged close to each other in the vague background of consciousness, only by one (auch) word to contact.The distinction between representations and thoughts is of still greater importance, since philosophy in general has no other choice but to transform representations into thoughts—and, of course, to transform mere abstract thoughts into concepts. work. We have pointed out above that all sensible things have individuality and mutual externality. Here we can add that individuality and mutual externality are also thoughts and universal things.In logic, it will be pointed out that the nature of thought and universal things is that thought is itself and the other of thought, and thought governs its other, and never lets the other escape its scope.Since language is the product of thought, there is nothing that language says that is not universal.What is meant only by myself is mine, i.e. belongs to my particular individual.But language can only signify in common, so I cannot say what I only mean.And what is unspeakable, such as emotions, feelings, etc., are not the best and most real things, but the most meaningless and unreal things.When I say: 'this thing', 'this thing', 'here', 'this time', I am speaking universally.Everything and everything is "individual", "this", and everything sensible is "here", "this time".Likewise, when I say "I," I mean this "I" that excludes everything else, but by "I" I mean every "I" that excludes everything else. Kant expressed this in a very clumsy way when he said that "I" accompanies all my representations, as well as my emotions, desires, actions, and so on. "I" is a universality for itself, and the commonality is also a kind of universality, but it is an external form of universality.All other people have "I" and "I" in common with me, just as all my emotions, my appearances, share me, and "accompanying" is something that belongs to me, as far as the abstract me is concerned. , "I" is pure self-relationship.In this self-relationship, "I" is withdrawn from my appearance, from my emotions, from the particularity of every mental state and every disposition, talent, and experience. "I", in this sense, is just a completely abstract universal existence, an abstract free subject.Therefore, "I" is the thinking as the subject. Since "I" is in all my representations, emotions, and states of consciousness at the same time, thinking is omnipresent, and it is a category that runs through all these regulations. Note: When we mention thinking, we always feel that it refers to a subjective activity, or one of our various abilities, such as memory, imagery, willpower, and so on.If thinking is a mere subjective activity and thus becomes the object of logic, then logic, like the other sciences, will have a definite object.But this is a bit arbitrary. Why do we just list thinking as the object of a special science, without setting up some special sciences to study activities such as will and imagination?The reason for the right of thought to be the object of special scientific investigation may be grounded in the fact that we recognize a certain authority of thought, that it expresses the true nature of man, and is the key to the distinction between man and beast.And even if we simply recognize and study thinking as a subjective activity, it is not without interest.A close study of thinking will reveal its laws and rules, and knowledge of its laws and rules can be acquired from experience.The study of the laws of thought from this point of view constituted the content of what is commonly called logic.Aristotle is the founder of this science.He revealed what he believed to be the power of thought.Our thinking is very concrete, but in the complex content of thinking, we must distinguish what belongs to thinking itself or to the abstract function of thinking.The function of thinking, a subtle intellectual connection, synthesizes all the contents of its thinking. Aristotle highlights this intellectual connection, this form of thinking itself, and defines it.The logic of Aristotle has been recognized by everyone until now. Although the medieval scholastics have deduced it, they have not added any material, but only developed the original material in more detail.It can be said that modern people's work on logic mainly abandons many logical rules inherited from Aristotle and the scholastic philosophers on the one hand, and incorporates many psychological materials on the other hand.A science whose main purpose is to know the workings of finite minds is true so long as the methods it adopts are suitable for dealing with the subjects for which it is set.There is no doubt that the study of this kind of formal logic has its uses. It can clear one's mind, as it is often said, and it can also teach one to practice concentration and abstract thinking. Dealing mostly with the appearance of confusing and intricate feelings.But in thinking abstractly we must concentrate on one point, and thereby acquire the habit of examining the workings of the mind.One can use the knowledge of the forms of finite thinking as a tool for the study of empirical science, and since empirical science proceeds in accordance with these forms, formal logic is also called instrumental logic in this sense.It is true that we can still go beyond the narrow practical point of view and say: the study of logic is not for practical purposes, but for the science itself, because exploring the best things is not for purely practical purposes.This is true on the one hand, but on the other hand, the best things are also the most useful things.For what is substantive, what is unshakable, is the bearer of particular ends, and promotes and realizes them.People must not put special ends first, but the best things can promote the realization of special ends.For example, religion has its own absolute value, but at the same time many other purposes are promoted and supported through religion.Christ said: "Seek first the kingdom of heaven, and other things will be added to you." Only when a being for itself and for itself is achieved can a special purpose be achieved. §twenty one (β) In the previous section, we recognized that the relationship between thinking and objects is active and is a reflection on something, so the product of thinking activities, the general concept, contains the value of things, that is, essence, inner substance, and truth. [Explanation] In §5, there is mentioned an old belief that the reality, immanence, essence, and substance on which all things are based, of all objects, qualities, and events are not directly present in front of consciousness, nor are they random. The first appearance of an object or that which an accidental impression furnishes consciousness with, whereas in order to obtain its true nature we must reflect upon it.This knowledge is attainable only through reflection. Note: Even children have learned to some extent the ability to reflect.For example, children must first learn how to connect adjectives and object nouns.Here he must pay attention to observe and distinguish similarities and differences.He must keep in mind a rule and apply it to particular things.This rule is nothing but a universal thing.Children also make special things follow this general rule.Another example is that we have a purpose in life.So we went back and forth on various ways to achieve this end.The purpose here is the general, or guiding principle.In accordance with the end we determine the means or means to that end.Likewise, reflection plays a role in the moral life. To reflect here is to recall the idea of ​​justice or duty, that is, of the generality that we have to follow as fixed rules to guide our conduct in the particular situation at hand.This general rule must be contained in our particular behavior and be known through it.Another example is that in our study of natural phenomena, there is also reflection in action.For example we observe thunder and lightning.This is a phenomenon we are all too familiar with, and a fact we are often aware of.But people are always not satisfied with the mere superficial familiarity, which is just a perceptual phenomenon, but want to go further behind it, to know what it is really like, and to grasp its essence.So we reflect on it, wanting to know the cause of something different from mere appearance, and want to know the inside of something different from the mere outside.In this way we analyze phenomena into two sides (entzwei), inner and outer, force and manifestation, cause and effect.Here, the inside, the power, is still universal and permanent, not this lightning or that lightning, not this plant or that plant, but the universal that persists in all special phenomena. .Perceptual things are individual and perishable; as for the permanent things among them, we can only know them through reflection.What nature presents to us is an infinite variety of individual forms and individual phenomena, and we have the requirement to seek unity in this variety.Therefore, we make comparative studies, and try to know the generality of each thing.The birth and death of individuals are impermanent, while the class is something that persists in it and reappears in each individual. The existence of the class can only be recognized by reflection.The same is true of the laws of nature, such as those concerning the motion of the planets.The planets in the sky, tonight we see here, tomorrow night we see there, this kind of irregular situation, we always feel afraid to trust in our hearts, because our hearts always believe in an order, a simple, constant and universal Provisions.With this belief in mind, I reflect on this messy phenomenon, and recognize its law, and determine the general mode of planetary motion. According to this law, every change in the position of the planet can be understood and measured.The same method can be used to study the forces that govern the enormous complexity of human behavior.In this respect we also believe in a general governing principle.From all these examples above it can be seen that reflection always seeks the universal principle which is fixed, permanent, self-determining, governing the particular.This general principle is the nature and truth of things, beyond the grasp of the senses.For example, duty or justice is the essence of behavior, and the reason why moral behavior becomes truly moral behavior is that it can conform to these universal regulations. When we define the universal in this way, we find that the universal is opposed to its opposite.Its opposite is that which is simply immediate, external and individual, as opposed to that which is indirect, internal and universal.Note that the universal as the universal does not exist outside.A class as a class cannot be perceived, and the law of planetary motion is not written in the sky.Therefore, it is generally unseen and unheard by people, but only exists for the spirit.Religion leads us to a universal which is all-encompassing, an absolute from which everything else arises, which is also not an object of the senses, but only of the spirit and thought. §twenty two (γ) After reflection, the original content in sensation, intuition, and representation must be changed, so only through the change mediated by reflection can the true nature of the object appear in front of consciousness. Note: Whatever is produced by reflection is the product of thinking.For example, Solon's laws for the Athenians may be said to have sprung from his own mind.But on the other hand, we must regard the laws of the community (such as Solon's) as the opposite of mere subjective ideas, and we must also recognize the essential, real and objective things from them. .In order to discover the truth in things, it is not enough to rely on attention or observation alone, but to exert subjective (thinking) activities in order to change the form of what is directly present in the present.This may seem at first to be a bit reversed, and seems to defeat the purpose of seeking knowledge.But in the same way we can say that the substantive can only be attained by the transformation of the immediate by means of reflection, a belief common to all ages.It was not until modern times that some people first questioned this point and insisted on the distinction between the products of thinking and the things themselves.It is said that things in themselves and our knowledge of things in themselves are quite different things.This separation of thought from things themselves, especially as developed by Kant's critical philosophy, is in direct opposition to the confidence of earlier ages that it was unquestionable that things (Sache) corresponded to thoughts.This opposition of thought and thing is a turning point in the interest of modern philosophy.But man's natural beliefs do not regard this opposition as real.In everyday life we ​​also reflect, but are not particularly conscious of the attainment of truth by reflection alone; We think with nothing else but the firm belief that thoughts and things agree, and that belief is extremely important.But there is an unhealthy attitude in our age which is sufficient to give rise to doubt and despair, to think that our knowledge is only a subjective knowledge, and to mistake this subjective knowledge as the last thing.Truth, however, should be objective and should be the standard by which all personal beliefs are determined, and as long as a personal belief does not meet this standard, the belief is false.On the contrary, according to recent views, subjective belief itself, insofar as it is merely a belief in subjective form, is good regardless of its content, so that there is no criterion for judging its truth or falsity. ——We have said before that "the mission of the human heart is to know the truth". This is an old belief of mankind. , its own truth must be what thinking thinks, so thinking is to reveal the truth of the object.The task of philosophy is only to make the nature of thinking that human beings have believed in since ancient times to be clearly realized.Therefore, there are no new inventions in philosophy, and the statements we put forward through our reflection here are already the beliefs inherent in everyone. §twenty three (δ) Since reflection can reveal the true nature of things, and this thinking is also my activity, then the true nature of things is also a product of my spirit, as a thinking subject, as I am It is a product of the simple universality of my own being, or of my freedom, which is completely self-existing. [Explanation] We often hear the expression of thinking for ourselves, as if it contains a great meaning.In fact, no one can think for others, just as no one can eat for others.So the words are repeated.Freedom is directly included in thinking, because thinking is a universal activity, so it is an abstract self and self-relationship. As far as the content of the book is concerned, it also contains various regulations on things and things at the same time.Therefore, if we talk about humility or humility and pride in philosophical research, humility or humility lies in not attaching any special characteristics or actions to subjectivity, so in terms of content, only thinking deeply into the essence of things can be counted. True thought; thought in its form is not the private particular state or action of the subject, but an abstract self-consciousness freed from all particularity, any quality, situation, etc., and letting only the universal act, in this In activities, thinking is only one with all individuals.In this case we can at least say that philosophy is free of pride. —So when Aristotle requires thought to maintain a noble attitude, the nobility he said should consist in getting rid of all special opinions and speculations, and letting the essence of things reign. §twenty four Thought, according to this definition, can be called objective thought, and even those forms of thinking that are initially used to be only conscious in ordinary formal logic can also be counted as objective forms.Logic thus merges with metaphysics.Metaphysics is the science that studies things grasped by thought, and thought is capable of expressing the essential nature of things. [Explanation] The relationship between certain forms of thought, such as concepts, judgments, and inferences, and other forms, such as the law of causality, etc., can only be studied within logic itself.But at least so much can be clearly seen at present, that is, when thinking wants to form a concept of things, this concept and its most direct formal judgments and inferences will never be determined by some unfamiliar and external regulations and relations. formed. Reflection, as mentioned above, can go deep into the commonness of things, and the commonality itself is a link in the concept.To say that the intellect or reason is in the world says the same thing that objective thought implies.This statement is still somewhat inconvenient, because the general habit is to think that thought is only of the mind or consciousness, and the word objective is originally used to designate only non-mental things. Note 1: When we say that thought, as objective thought, is the inner nature of the world, it seems that this implies that natural things are also conscious.In this regard, we still feel a kind of contradiction. On the one hand, thinking is regarded as the inner activity of things, and on the other hand, the difference between human beings and natural things lies in thinking.We must therefore say that nature is a system of thought without consciousness, or, as Schelling put it, nature is an inflexible (Versteinerte) intellect.In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is better to replace the word thought with thought regulation or thought category. ——据前面所说，逻辑的原则一般必须在思想范畴的体系中去寻求。 在这个思想范畴的体系里，普通意义下的主观与客观的对立是消除了的。这里所说的思想和思想范畴的意义，可以较确切地用古代哲学家所谓“Nous（理性）统治这世界”一语来表示。——或者用我们的说法，理性是在世界中，我们所了解的意思是说，理性是世界的灵魂，理性居住在世界中，理性构成世界的内在的、固有的、深邃的本性，或者说，理性是世界的共性。举一个切近的例子，如我们指着某一特定的动物说：这是一个动物。动物本身是不能指出的，能指出的只是一个特定的动物。动物本身并不存在，它是个别动物的普遍本性，而每一个存在着的动物是一个远为具体的特定的东西，一个特殊的东西。但既是一个动物，则此一动物必从属于其类，从属于其共性之下，而此类或共性即构成其特定的本质。譬如，把狗的动物性去掉，则〔狗便失其为狗〕，我们就无法说出它是什么了。任何事物莫不有一长住的内在的本性和一外在的定在。万物生死，兴灭；其本性，其共性即其类，而类是不可以单纯当作各物共同之点来理解的。 思想不但构成外界事物的实体（Subatanz），而且构成精神性的东西的普遍实体。在人的一切直观中都有思维。同样，思维是〔贯穿〕在一切表象、记忆中，一般讲来，在每一精神活动和在一切意志、欲望等等之中的普遍的东西。所有这一切只是思想进一步的特殊化或特殊形态。这种理解下的思维便与通常单纯把思维能力与别的能力如直观、表象、意志等能力平列起来的看法，有不同的意义了。当我们把思维认为是一切自然和精神事物的真实共性时，思维便统摄这一切而成为这一切的基础了。我们可以首先把认思维为Nous这种对思维的客观意义的看法，和什么是思维的主观意义相结合。我们曾经说，人是有思想的。但同时我们又说，人是有直观、有意志的。就人是有思想的来说，他是一个有普遍性者，但只有当他意识到他自身的普遍性时，他才是有思想的。 动物也是具有潜在的普遍的东西，但动物并不能意识到它自身的普遍性，而总是只感觉到它的个别性。动物看见一个别的东西，例如它的食物或一个人。这一切在它看来，都是个别的东西。同样，感觉所涉及的也只是个别事物（如此处的痛苦，此时感觉到的美味等）。自然界不能使它所含蕴的理性（Nous）得到意识，只有人才具有双重的性能，是一个能意识到普遍性的普遍者。人的这种性能的最初发动，即在于当他知道他是我的时候，当我说我时，我意谓着我自己作为这个个别的始终是特定的人。其实我这里所说出的，并没有什么特殊关于我自己的东西。因为每一个其他的人也仍然是一个我，当我自己称自己为“我”时，虽然我无疑地是指这个个别的我自己，但同时我也说出了一个完全普遍的东西。因此我乃是一纯粹的“自为存在”（EuBrsichsein），在其中任何特殊的东西都是被否定或扬弃了的。这种自为的我，乃是意识中最后的、简单的、纯粹的东西。我们可以说：我与思维是同样的东西，或更确定地说，我是作为能思者的思维。凡是在我的意识中的，即是为我而存在的。我是一种接受任何事物或每一事物的空旷的收容器，一切皆为我而存在，一切皆保存其自身在我中。每一个人都是诸多表象的整个世界，而所有这些表象皆埋葬在这个自我的黑夜中。由此足见我是一个抽掉了一切个别事物的普遍者，但同时一切事物又潜伏于其中。所以我不是单纯抽象的普遍性，而是包含一切的普遍性。 平常我们使用这个“我”字，最初漫不觉其重要，只有在哲学的反思里，才将“我”当作一个考察的对象。在“我”里面我们才有完全纯粹的思想出现。动物就不能说出一个“我”字。只有人才能说“我”，因为只有人才有思维。在“我”里面就具有各式各样内的和外的内容，由于这种内容的性质不同，我也因而成为能感觉的我，能表象的我，有意志的我等等。但在这一切活动中都有我，或者也可以说在这一切活动中都有思维。因此人总是在思维着的，即使当他只在直观的时候，他也是在思维。假如他观察某种东西，他总是把它当作一种普遍的东西，着重其一点，把它特别提出来，以致忽略了其他部分，把它当作抽象的和普遍的东西，即使只是在形式上是普遍的东西。 我们的表象表现出两种情况；或者内容虽是一个经过思考的内容，而形式却未经过思考，或者正与此相反，形式虽属于思想，而内容则与思想不相干。譬如，当我说，忿怒、玫瑰、希望等词时，这些词所包含的内容，都是我的感觉所熟习的，但我用普遍的方式，用思想的形式，把这些内容说出来。这样一来，我就排斥了许多个别的情况，只用普遍的语言来表达那个内容，但是那个内容却仍然是感性的。反之，当我有上帝的表象时，这内容诚然是纯思的，但形式却是感性的，象我直接亲自感觉到的上帝的形式那样。所以在表象里，内容不仅仅是感性的，象在直观里那样，而且有着两种情况： 或者内容是感性的，而形式却属于思维；或者正与此相反，内容是纯思的，而形式却又是感性的。在前种情况下，材料是外界给与的，而形式则属于思维，在第二种情况下，思维是内容的泉源，但通过感觉的形式这内容表现为给与的东西，因此是外在地来到精神里的。 附释二：逻辑学是以纯粹思想或纯粹思维形式为研究的对象。就思想的通常意义来说，我们所表象的东西，总不仅仅是纯粹的思想，因为我们总以为一种思想它的内容必定是经验的东西。而逻辑学中所理解的思想则不然，除了属于思维本身，和通过思维所产生的东西之外，它不能有别的内容。 所以，逻辑学中所说的思想是指纯粹思想而言。所以逻辑学中所说的精神也是纯粹自在的精神，亦即自由的精神，因为自由正是在他物中即是在自己本身中、自己依赖自己、自己是自己的决定者。所以思想与冲动不同。在一切冲动中，我是从一个他物，从一个外在于我的事物开始。在这里，我们说的是依赖，不是自由。只有当没有外在于我的他物和不是我自己本身的对方时，我才能说是自由。那只是被他自己的冲动所决定的自然人，并不是在自己本身内：即使他被冲动驱使，表现一些癖性，但他的意志和意见的内容却不是他自己的，他的自由也只是一种形式上的自由。但当我思维时，我放弃我的主观的特殊性，我深入于事情之中，让思维自为地作主，倘若我参杂一些主观意思于其中，那我就思维得很坏。 如果依前此所说，认为逻辑学是纯粹思维规定的体系，那末别的部门的哲学科学，如象自然哲学和精神哲学，似乎就是应用的逻辑学，因为逻辑学是自然哲学和精神哲学中富有生气的灵魂。其余部门的哲学兴趣，都只在于认识在自然和精神形态中的逻辑形式，而自然或精神的形态只是纯粹思维形式的特殊的表现。譬如，我们试取推论来说（不是指旧形式逻辑的三段论法，而是指真正的推论），我们可以看见推论是这样的一个规定，即特殊是普遍与个别这两个极端结合起来的中项。这种推论的形式，就是一切事物的普遍形式。因为一切事物都是将普遍与个别结合起来的特殊。但自然软弱无力使得它自身不能够纯粹地表述出逻辑的形式。自然所表述的软弱无力的推论，可用磁力为例来说明。在磁针的中间或无差异点，把它的两极结合起来，这两极虽说彼此有差别，但直接地就被这磁针结合为一。物理学也可教我们从自然中认识到共性或本质。物理学与自然哲学的区别，只在于自然哲学能使我们在自然事物里意识到概念的真正形式。——由此可见逻辑学是使一切科学生气蓬勃的精神，逻辑学中的思维规定是一些纯粹的精神力量。这些思维规定就是事物内在的核心，但是它们同时又是我们常常挂在口边上的名词，因此又显得是异常熟知的东西。但是这类熟知的东西往往又是我们最无所知的东西。例如，存在就是一纯粹思维规定，但我们平时决没有想到把存在或是作为考察的对象。大家平时总以为，绝对必远在彼岸，殊不知绝对却正在目前，是我们凡有思想的人所日用而不自知的。所有这类的思维规定大都包含在语言里面，所以儿童学习文法的用处，即在于使儿童不自觉地注意到人们平日思维中的种种区别。 人们惯常说，逻辑只是研究形式，它的内容却来自别处。 其实，我们可以说，逻辑思想比起一切别的内容来，倒并不只是形式，反之，一切别的内容比起逻辑思想来，却反而只是〔缺乏实质的〕形式。逻辑思想是一切事物的自在自为地存在着的根据。要有相当高教养的人，才能够把他的兴趣指向这种逻辑的纯粹规定。对这些逻辑规定加以自在自为的考察，还有一层较深远的意义，即在于我们是从思维的本身去推演出这些思维的规定，并且即从这些思维规定的本身来看它们是否是真的。我们并不是从外面把它们袭取而来，并勉强给予定义，我们也不见把它们拿来与它们出现在我们意识中的形态漫加比较而指出其价值和有效性。因为如果这样做，我们就会从观察和经验出发，例如，这样说：“力”这个范畴有效，是由于我们习惯于在某种情形下和在某种意义下使用力这个词。只要这个定义与我们对于通常呈现在我们意识中的对象的表象相符合，这样的定义也可说是正确的。在这种方式下，一个概念的规定，并不是按照它的自在自为的本质，而是按照一个〔外在的〕前提，这前提将会成为判断这一概念正确与否的标准和尺度。但在逻辑学范围内，我们用不着这类外在的标准，我们只须让那本身活泼自如的思维规定循着它们自己的进程逐步发展。 关于思想规定真与不真的问题，一定是很少出现在一般意识中的。因为思想规定只有应用在一些给予的对象的过程中才获得它们的真理，因此，离开这种应用过程，去问思想规定本身真与不真，似乎没有意义。但须知，这一问题的提出，正是解答其他一切问题的关键。说到这里，我们首先必须知道，我们对于真理应该如何理解。通常我们总是认为我们的表象与一个对象相符合叫做真理。这说法预先假定有一个对象，我们的表象应与这对象相符合。但反之，从哲学的意义来看，概括地抽象地讲来，真理就是思想的内容与其自身的符合。所以这与刚才所说的真理的意义，完全是另一种看法。但同时，即在平常习用的言语中，已经可以部分地寻得着较深的（哲学的）意义的真理。譬如我们常说到一个真朋友。所谓一个真朋友，就是指一个朋友的言行态度能够符合友谊的概念。同样，我们也常说一件真的艺术品。在这个意义下，不真即可说是相当于不好，或自己不符合自己本身。 一个不好的政府即是不真的政府，一般说来，不好与不真皆由于一个对象的规定或概念与其实际存在之间发生了矛盾。 对于这样一种不好的对象，我们当然能够得着一个正确的观念或表象，但这个观念的内容本身却是不真的。象这类正确的同时又是不真的观念，我们脑子里面可以有很多。——唯有上帝才是概念与实在的真正符合。但一切有限事物，自在地都具有一种不真实性，因为凡物莫不有其概念，有其存在，而其存在总不能与概念相符合。因此，所有有限事物皆必不免于毁灭，而其概念与存在间的不符合，都由此表现出来。个别的动物以类为其概念，通过个别动物的死亡，类便从其个别性里解脱出来了。 在刚才所解释的意义下，把真理认作自身的符合，构成逻辑学的真正兴趣。因为在通常意识里，关于思维规定的真理问题就完全不会发生。因此，逻辑学的职务也可以说是在于考察思维规定把握真理的能力和限度。这问题于是归结到这里：什么是无限事物的形式，什么是有限事物的形式，在通常意识里，我们对于有限的思维形式从来没有怀疑过，而是听任其无条件地通行有效。但按照有限的规定去思维和行动，就是导致一切幻觉和错误后果的来源。 附释三：我们可以用种种不同的方式去认识真理，而每一种认识的方式，只可认作一种思想的形式。我们总是首先通过经验去认识真理，但经验也只是一种形式。一说到经验，一切取决于用什么样的精神（Sinn）去把握现实。一个伟大的精神创造出伟大的经验，能够在纷然杂陈的现象中洞见到有决定意义的东西。理念是当前存在的，也是现实的，并不是某种远在天外隐在物后的东西。伟大的精神，譬如象歌德这类的精神，静观自然，透视历史，能创造伟大的经验，能洞见理性原则，并把它发抒出来。此外还有一种认识真理的方法，就是反思，反思的方式用思想的关系来规定真理。但这两种方式还不是表述自在自为的真理的真正形式。认识真理最完善的方式，就是思维的纯粹形式。人采取纯思维方式时，也就最为自由。 认为思维的形式是最高的形式，认为思维的形式可以把握绝对真理的本来面目，是一般哲学通有的信念。要证明这信念，其意义首先在于指出认识的其他形式都是有限的形式。 那高超的、古代的怀疑主义，当它指出所有那些有限的认识形式本身都含有矛盾时，也曾完成了这项工作。但当古代的怀疑主义在攻击理性时，也须采取一些理性的形式，而且首先把某些有限的东西掺杂在理性的形式之中，以便把握住它们。有限思维的全部形式将会在逻辑发展的过程中依次出现，而且是依必然的次序而出现。这里在导言部分，只得权且以非科学的方式把这些形式当作给予的材料。在逻辑研究本身，不仅要指出这些形式的否定方面，而且要指示出它们的肯定方面。 当我们把认识的各种形式加以互相比较，第一种形式，直接知识，容易被看成最适宜、最美和最高的一种形式，这种形式包括道德观点上所谓天真，以及宗教的情绪，纯朴的信赖，忠、爱和自然的信仰。其他两种形式，首先反思认识的形式，其次，哲学的认识，就超出了那种直接的天籁的和谐。 由于这两种形式有这种共同点，所以通过思维以把握真理的方式，容易被看成是人类一种骄傲，一种全凭自己固有的力量以认识真理的骄傲。但这种观点包含一种普遍的分离（Trennung），这种分离的观点当然会被认为是一切罪恶的根源，或原始的犯罪，因此要想返回本真，达到和解，似乎非放弃思想，摒绝知识不可。这里所说的离开了自然的统一〔或谐和〕，自古以来，各民族的先哲，早已意识到这种精神上的奇异的分裂。在大自然里，这样的内心的分裂没有出现，自然事物也不知道作恶。 关于人的堕落的摩西神话，对于这种分裂的起源和后果曾经给了我们一个古老的观念。这个神话的内容形成了宗教信仰的理论基础，即关于人的原始罪恶及人有赖于神力的解救之必要的学说。在逻辑学的开端，对人的堕落这个神话加以考察，也许是很适宜的事，因为逻辑学以知识为研究的对象，而这个神话也牵涉到知识的起源与意义的问题。而且哲学不应回避宗教的问题，也不应放弃自己批评的职守，好象只要宗教对哲学取容忍态度，哲学便自觉满意，一切可不闻不问似的；同样，另一方面，哲学也不可抱这样的看法，以为这类神话和宗教观念既已受了各民族数千年的尊敬，似乎已经毫无问题，可以置之不理。 试就人类堕落的神话加以仔细考察，便可看出，有如上面所说，这神话却表达了知识和精神生活间的普遍关系。精神生活在其素朴的本能的阶段，表现为无邪的天真和淳朴的信赖。但精神的本质在于扬弃这种自然素朴的状态，因为精神生活之所以异于自然生活，特别是异于禽兽的生活，即在其不停留在它的自在存在的阶段，而力求达到自为存在。但这种分裂境地，同样也须加以扬弃，而精神总是要通过自力以返回它原来的统一。这样赢得的统一乃是精神的统一。而导致返回到这种统一的根本动力，即在于思维本身。这就是“击伤的是他的手，医伤的也是他的手”的意思。 神话中曾经这样说：亚当和夏娃，最初的人，或典型的人，被安置在一个果园里面，园中有一棵生命之树，有一棵善与恶知识之树。据说，上帝曾告诫过他们，禁止摘食知识之树的果子。关于生命之树暂且不提。这里所表示的意思，显然是说人不应寻求知识，而须长保持天真的境界。即在其他有较深沉意识的民族里，我们也发现有同样观念，认为人类最初的境界是天真无邪和谐和一致的。这种看法，就其认为“分裂状态”（Entzweiung）是所有人类无法避免的，不是最后安息之所而言，显然是对的。但如果认为这种自然素朴的境界是至善境界，那就不对了。精神不只是直接的素朴的，它本质上包含有曲折的中介的阶段。婴儿式的天真，无疑地，有其可歆羡和感人之处，只在于促使我们注意，使我们知道这天真谐和的境界，须通过精神的努力才会出现的。在儿童的生活里所看见的谐和乃是自然的赐予，而我们所需返回的谐和应是劳动和精神的教养的收获。基督曾说过：“如果你不变成同小孩一样”等语，足见他并不是说我们应该长久作小孩。 再则，在摩西的神话里，使人离开那原始的谐和的机缘，乃是一外在的诱力（即蛇的引诱）。其实，个人进入对立面，即是人本身意识的觉醒，这种受外力引诱是每个人所不断重演的历史。所以蛇的引诱象征善恶的分别，也包含在神性之内。而这种对于善恶的知识，实际上也是人所分享的。当人分有了这种知识时，他便享受了禁果，而与他自己的直接的存在破裂了。对自己的觉醒意识的初次反思，人们发现他们自身是裸体的。赤裸可以说是人的很朴素而基本的特性。他认裸体为可羞耻包含着他的自然存在和感性存在的分离。禽兽便没有进展到有这种分离，因此也就不知羞耻。所以在人的羞耻的情绪里又可以找到穿衣服的精神的和道德的起源，而衣服适应单纯物质上的需要，倒反而只居于次要地位。 其次，尚须提一下上帝加诸世人的所谓谴责或灾难。天谴观念所着重之点，即在于指出天谴主要的关涉到人与自然的对立。男子应该汗流满面去劳动，女子应该忍受痛苦去生育。此种劳动，细究起来，一方面固是与自然分裂的结果，一方面也是对于这种分裂的征服。禽兽对于足以满足其需要之物，俯拾即是，不费气力。反之，人对于足以满足其需要手段，必须由他自己去制造培植。所以，即就他对于外界事物的关系来说，人总是通过外物而和他自身相联系。 摩西的神话，并不以亚当和夏娃被逐出乐园而结束。它还意味着更多的东西：“上帝说，看呀，亚当也成为相似于我们当中的一分子了，因为他知道什么是善和恶。”这些话表明知识是神圣的了，不似从前那样，把知识认为是不应该存在的东西了。在这里还包含有对于认为哲学只属于精神的有限性那样说法的一种显明的反驳。哲学是认识，也只有通过认识，人作为上帝的肖像这一原始的使命才会得到实现。这个神话又说到：上帝把人从伊甸园里驱逐出去了，以便阻止他吃那生命之树。这话的真义即在于指出就人的自然方面来说，他确是有限的，同时也是有死的，但就他在认识方面来说，他却是无限的。 教会上有一熟知的信条，认为人的本性是恶的，并称本性之恶为原始的罪恶。依这个说法，我们必须放弃一种肤浅的观念，即认原始罪恶只是基于最初的人的一种偶然行为。其实由精神的概念即可表明本性是恶的，我们无法想象除认人性为恶之外尚有别种看法。只要就人作为自然的人，就人的行为作为自然的人的行为来说，他所有的一切活动，都是他所不应有的。精神却正与自然相反，精神应是自由的，它是通过自己本身而成为它自己所应该那样。自然对人来说只是人应当加以改造的出发点。与这个有深刻意义的教会信条原始罪恶说正相反对的，便是近代启蒙时期兴起的一个学说，即认人性是善的，因此人应忠于他的本性。 人能超出他的自然存在，即由于作为一个有自我意识的存在，区别于外部的自然界。这种人与自然分离的观点（Standpunkt der Trennung）虽属于精神概念本身的一个必然环节，但也不是人应该停留的地方。因为人的思维和意志的有限性，皆属于这种分裂的观点（Standpunkt der Entzwieung）。在这有限的阶段里，各人追求自己的目的，各人根据自身的气质决定自己的行为。当他向着最高峰追求自己的目的，只知自己，只知满足自己特殊的意欲，而离开了共体时，他便陷于罪恶，而这个罪恶即是他的主观性。在这里，初看起来我们似乎有一种双重的恶，但二者实际上又是一回事。就人作为精神来说，他不是一个自然存在。但当他作出自然的行为，顺从其私欲的要求时，他便志愿作一个自然存在。所以，人的自然的恶与动物的自然存在并不相同。因此自然性可以更确切地说是具有这样的规定，即自然人本身即是个别人，因为一般说来，自然即是个别化的纽带。所以说人志在作一自然人，实无异于说他志在作一个个别的人。和这种出于冲动和嗜欲、属于自然的个别性的行为相反对的，便是规律或普遍的原则。这规律也许是一外在的暴力，或具有神圣权威的形式。只要人老是停留在自然状态的阶段，他就会成为这种规律的奴隶。在自然的本能和情感里，人诚然也有超出自己的个别性的善意的、社会的倾向，同情心，爱情等等。但只要这些倾向仍然是出于素朴的本能，则这些本来具有普遍内容的情欲，仍不能摆脱其主观性，因而总仍不免受自私自利和偶然任性的支配。 §25 根据上节所说，客观思想一词最能够表明真理，——真理不仅应是哲学所追求的目标，而且应是哲学研究的绝对对象。但客观思想一词立即提示出一种对立，甚至可以说，现时哲学观点的主要兴趣，均在于说明思想与客观对立的性质和效用，而且关于真理的问题，以及关于认识真理是否可能的问题，也都围绕思想与客观的对立问题而旋转。如果所有思维规定都受一种固定的对立的限制，这就是说，如果这些思维规定的本性都只是有限的，那末思维便不适合于把握真理，认识绝对，而真理也不能显现于思维中。那只能产生有限规定，并且只能在有限规定中活动的思维，便叫做知性（就知性二字严格的意思而言）。而且思维规定的有限性可以有两层看法。第一、认为思维规定只是主观的，永远有一客观的〔对象〕和它们对立。第二，认为各思维规定的内容是有限的，因此各规定间即彼此对立，而且更尤其和绝对对立。 为了说明并发挥这里所提示的逻辑学的意义和观点起见，对于思维对客观性的各种态度将加以考察，作为逻辑学进一步的导言。 〔说明〕在我的一书里，我是采取这样的进程，从最初、最简单的精神现象，直接意识开始，进而从直接意识的辩证进展（Dialektik）逐步发展以达到哲学的观点，完全从意识辩证进展的过程去指出达到哲学观点的必然性（也就因为这个缘故，在那本书出版的时候，我把它当作科学体系的第一部分。）因此哲学的探讨，不能仅停留在单纯意识的形式里。因为哲学知识的观点本身同时就是内容最丰富和最具体的观点，是许多过程所达到的结果。所以哲学知识须以意识的许多具体的形态，如道德、伦理、艺术、宗教等为前提。意识发展的过程，最初似乎仅限于形式，但同时即包含有内容发展的过程，这些内容构成哲学各特殊部门的对象。但内容发展的过程〔在逻辑上〕必须跟随在意识发展的过程之后，因为内容与意识的关系，乃是潜在〔与形式〕的关系。因此对于思维形式的阐述，较为烦难，因为有许多属于哲学各特殊部门的具体材料，都部分地已经在那作为哲学体系的导言里，加以讨论了。本书的探讨，如果只限于用历史的和形式推理的方式，那就会有更多的不方便之处。但本书主要的是在发挥一种根本见解，即指出，一般人对于认识、信仰等等的本性的观念，总以为完全是具体的东西，其实均可回溯到简单的思想范畴，这些思想范畴只有在逻辑学里才得到真正透彻的处理。