Chapter 18 Chapter 18 Several Replies to Criticism-1

After a person has been fashionable for a while, it is not very pleasant to find that people think he is out of date.It is not easy to accept this experience with grace.When Leibniz was old, he heard people praise Berkeley, saying: "The young Irishman who regards objects as untrue seems to have neither made his own point clearly nor presented sufficient arguments. I doubt He's trying to show off with some of his paradoxes." I can't say that about Wittgenstein, whom I have, in the opinion of many English philosophers, replaced.He does not use paradox to gain reputation, but his method is to avoid paradox with moderation.He was a very extraordinary man, and I doubt his disciples knew what he was like.

He is somewhat similar to two great men in history.One is Pascal, the other Tolstoy.Pascal was a talented mathematician, but he gave up mathematics because of his reverence for God.Tolstoy sacrificed his genius as a writer to a hypocritical humility in which the peasant was superior to the educated man, and A Black Slave Called to Heaven above all other novels. Wittgenstein played with metaphysical intricacies as well as Pascal with hexagons and Tolstoy with emperors.He surrendered his talents to common sense, in Tolstoy, to the peasants, both out of an impulse of pride.I admire his Tractatus, but not his later works.It seems to me that his later writings are a denial of his own highest talents, something like that of Pascal and Tolstoy.

Wittgenstein, Pascal, and Tolstoy, despite their betrayal of their own greatness, have suffered so much that they are justified.Wittgenstein's disciples did not suffer from this.They produced works, which I heard to be valuable, in which they presented arguments against my views and methods.In spite of my best efforts, I could see no real basis in their criticism of me.I don't know if it's because I'm being hoodwinked, or if there's evidence for it.On this point, I hope that reading my four debated articles will help readers make their next judgment.These four articles were published in several academic journals, and I reprint them here.These four articles are: (1) "On 'Philosophical Analysis', which is a review of a book by Mr. Ulson; (2) "Logic and Ontology", which is an examination of a book written by Mr. Warnack. The title of that chapter is "Metaphysics in Logic"; (3) "Mr. Strawson on Designation", which is to refute his criticism of my narrative theory; (4) "What is the mind?" ", which is a review of Professor Lyell's book "The Concept of Mind".

ⅠPhilosophical Analysis Mr. Ulson's book "Philosophical Analysis" comes very handy.This book succinctly presents some reasons why Wittgenstein and his disciples did not accept my philosophy and that of the logical positivists, and replaced it with a new philosophy. They firmly believe that this new philosophy is better than all previous philosophies.Mr. Ulson has done justice to the former opinions which he has discussed.I think his arguments in favor of the new opinions are convincing to those who follow them.I personally see no convincing force in the arguments advanced by Mr. Ulson.

In one important respect, from his own point of view, the book cannot but be considered flawed.He made it clear that he hadn't noticed anything that had been published in the past twenty years by the schools he was criticizing.The logical positivists and I have endeavored in every way to remedy all the shortcomings of our doctrine which we consider to be.But Mr. Ulson did not heed our efforts.On this point he simply followed the conventions of his whole school. When reading the works of this school, I have a strange feeling.If Descartes could be miraculously resurrected in the time of Leibniz and Locke, I have the same strange feeling that Descartes might have felt if he was resurrected in this way.Since 1914 I have devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to matters other than philosophy.During the period from 1914 to the present, three philosophies have successively dominated British philosophy: first, that of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, second, that of the Logical Positivists, and third. It is the philosophy of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.The first of these three has had a great influence on my own thinking, though I do not now consider it a wholly good influence.The second school, logical positivism, has my sympathies on the whole, although I disagree with some peculiarities of their doctrine.For the sake of convenience, I call the third school "dimension two" to distinguish it from the theory of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The doctrine of the Tractatus I call it "dimension one". The third faction of "dimension two" has always been completely incomprehensible to me.I think the positive theory of this school is superficial, and its negative theory is untenable.In Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I see nothing that I find interesting.I don't understand why a whole school of thought finds wisdom of importance in this book.Psychologically, this was unexpected.

I had an intimate acquaintance with the early Wittgensteins.He was a cool thinker, with a penetrating attention to difficult problems whose importance I recognized as much as he did.He has (at least I think so) genuine philosophical genius.On the contrary, later Wittgenstein seemed to be tired of serious thinking, and seemed to have invented a theory to make this kind of activity unnecessary.I absolutely do not believe that the doctrine that there are such lazy consequences is correct.But I feel that the strength of my prejudice against this doctrine is irresistible, because, if it is true, philosophy is at best a slight help to the lexicographer, and at worst an idle treat. It's just a kind of pastime.

Mr. Ulson's criticisms of me are partly due to misunderstanding, and partly to genuine philosophical differences. In order to clear up misunderstandings, I will try to state briefly the purpose and method of guiding my philosophical work. Like all philosophers before Dimension II, my main purpose has always been to know as much as possible about the world, to separate what counts as knowledge from what is dismissed as unfounded.If it weren't for "Wei Er", I thought it would not be worth mentioning this purpose. I thought this purpose should be taken for granted.But now we are told that it is not the world that we are trying to understand, but sentences, and all sentences are held to be true except those spoken by philosophers.This may have been overdone. The believers of "Wei Er" like to point out to people as if they were a kind of discovery. Although the sentences are straightforward, they also express doubts, orders or wishes.But that doesn't take us beyond the sentence.It is an odd formulation (some logical positivists have it) that the world of language can be completely divorced from the world of facts.

If you mention that a spoken sentence is a physical event formed by the movement of some matter, and a written sentence is composed of some marks written in one color on a background of another color, people will Think you're vulgar.You should forget that the things that people refer to when they speak have causes and effects that do not belong to language. Language is just as much a physical activity as walking and eating.Some logical positivists (notably Neura and Hempel, and at one time Canapoult) openly maintained that sentences cannot be reconciled with facts.They maintain that affirmative words are compared with affirmative words, not with experience, and we must never compare reality with propositions.Hempel maintains that the system we call true is "characterized only by the historical fact that this system is actually adopted by mankind, especially by scientists of our culture".I have already criticized this view in the pages 142ff. of "Inquiry into Meaning and Truth", and I will only state here the main points of my criticism.What the scientists in your "culture" say is a fact, so what they say is irrelevant, what matters is what the rest of your culture says they say.It does not seem to occur to these writers that when I see a printed sentence on a page, I encounter a fact of the senses.

If these writers are right, to ascertain the truth of what is printed on this page is not to look at the page, but to ask our friends what they say is printed on this page.We may use a fairy tale to illustrate Hempel's claim: One day, when other sources of wealth were not very prosperous (so the fairy tale goes), he went into a cheap restaurant in Paris.He asked for the menu.He looked at the menu and he ordered beef.All this since entering the restaurant is language.The food came and he tasted it.This is hit and miss.He called the restaurant owner and said, "This is horse meat, not beef." The restaurant owner replied, "I'm sorry, but scientists in my cultural circle include the phrase 'this is beef' in their Among the sentences admitted." According to Hempel himself, he naturally had to calmly admit that what the restaurant owner said was correct.This was absurd, and Kanapie soon realized it later.But believers in Dimension 2 have gone one step further.Concerning empirical propositions there have formerly been two propositions: one is that they are grounded in their relation to facts; the other is that they are grounded in their conformity to the rules of syntax.But the believers of "Dimension 2" don't care about any kind of basis, so that the language has gained an unfettered freedom that has never been enjoyed before.They think that the desire to "know the world" is an outdated folly.This is the main point of difference between me and them.

Whether about mathematics or physics, about perception or the relation of language to facts, my claims always proceed in one way.Granting that science and common sense are broadly explainable to show that they are essentially true, the question arises: What are the minimum assumptions from which such broad truths emerge? This is a specific question, and there is not only one answer. There is a minimum set of assumptions about the undefined terms used as starting points.There are some propositions (such as theorems of pure mathematics or theoretical physics) that can be deduced from such assumptions.Every reduction in the number of undefined terms or unprovable premises is a step forward, for it narrows the circle of possible error and puts less of a mortgage on the truth of the whole system.It is for this reason that I find mathematics reducible to logic.Kronecker said that God created the natural numbers, and mathematicians created the rest, namely, fractions, real numbers, imaginary numbers, and complex numbers.But on this view, the natural numbers themselves remain an infinite set of mysterious entities.We can take pleasure in discovering that we can sweep all of this into the dust-pit, and limit God's creation to purely logical notions of or, no, all, and some.Indeed, if such an analysis is done, the philosophical questions about what remains remain.But the number of problems is reduced, and it is easier to manage.In the past, we had to think that the existence of all natural numbers is somewhat like Plato's idea.Now it is no longer necessary to deny the existence of these numbers, but to no longer assert that these numbers do exist.That is to say, we need not make as many assumptions as before to maintain the truth of pure mathematics.

With regard to the empirical sciences a number of problems arise which do not arise in pure mathematics.It is also possible that most advanced empirical sciences (such as pure physics) can reach a minimum number of undefined terms and unproved premises.But even reaching this minimum number does not give us reason to believe that the system is true.Truths in pure mathematics are syntactic, as some logical positivists believe all truths are, but truths in empirical things have other grounds.I find it inconceivable that some philosophers would deny that the truth in an empirical proposition is due to its relation to one or more facts.The nature of this relation may not be easy to say, but a certain relation is involved, which can only be denied by those who are so lost in philosophy that they do not understand even the most obvious. Now let's take a very common example, for example: "Professor Z takes a walk every afternoon unless it rains." How do we know this is the truth?Let us forget for a moment that we are discussing philosophy, and think about the matter in a common-sense way.You know this to be true probably because Professor Z or Mrs Z told you that you have the utmost respect for their character.Maybe you are Professor Z's neighbor, and except for the bad weather, you saw him walk past your window.So far, I think, the matter is out of the question.But there is a problem as soon as we state Mr. Ulson's objection to the analysis.Personally, I do not see the persuasiveness of Mr. Woolson's doctrine against analysis.Suppose you believe this statement because you have heard Professor Z say it.Do you have reason to deny that you heard some continuous voices when he spoke?The matter will be clearer if you have got this sentence by your own observation. You had an experience on a nice day, which you called "seeing Professor Z walk past my house".You don't have that experience on a rainy day.I see no basis for denying that the experience that produced your statement is complex.I dare say that Mr. Ulson and his like-minded people will not disagree with what I have said so far, but they will feel uncomfortable if my analysis goes any further.They'll say, "We all know what it means to say you saw Professor Z go past your window. If you're going to try to analyze that statement, you're going to fall into metaphysics." The condemnation of metaphysics in philosophy is already a bit like saying that someone is a danger to public security.I personally don't know what the word "metaphysics" really means.The only definition I can come up with that works everywhere is "a philosophical opinion not asserted by the author himself."Regardless of whether this definition is correct or not, when I add to the analysis the experience we call "seeing Professor Z walk through my window", I am not talking about philosophy, but about science. It is obvious to science and common sense that this involves a series of visual impressions.Each of these impressions has parts corresponding to Professor Z's head, torso and legs.And it is also obvious that a series of individual images (like a series of images in a film) can reproduce an experience much like your own experience of seeing Professor Z walk. Mr. Ulson, however, raises two different objections.On the one hand he maintains that no matter how far you analyze, you can never arrive at what is simple and indivisible.On the other hand, he maintains that the aggregated utterances obtained by analysis are not equal to the original utterance without analysis.We shall now consider these two objections one by one.With regard to what is simply indivisible, I see no reason for affirming or denying that it can be analysed. Wittgenstein and I in the Tractatus sometimes say that "atomic facts" are the last remnants of analysis.But it is not an essential part of the kind of analytic philosophy Mr. Ulson criticizes to think that such facts can be obtained.A discussion in 1918 is quoted in the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, reprinted by the Philosophy Department of the University of Minnesota, in which the following question and answer is included (p. 16): "Mr Carl: Do you think there are simple and not compound Fact. Is everything compound made of the simple? Are not the simples that make up the compound themselves compound?Mr. Russell: No fact is simple.As for your second question, it is of course a debatable issue, that is, whether a complex thing must contain simple components when it is analyzed.In my opinion, it is entirely possible to think that compound things can be analyzed to infinity, never reaching simplicity and being indivisible. I don't think this is correct, but it's certainly a matter of debate.Personally I think of composites - I don't like to talk about composites - but that facts are made of simples, but I admit that this is a difficult debate, and that the analysis may go on forever.Mr. Carl: You don't mean to say that if a thing is complex, you must be sure that there is a simple thing?Mr. Russell: No, I don't think it necessarily means that. ’ Since then I have become more convinced that there is no reason to expect analysis to reach anything simple. On this question, I would like to quote a passage from "Human Knowledge" (pp. 268-269): "The analysis of structure is generally carried out step by step. . . It can be seen that it is a compound structure. Bones are composed of bones, bones contain cells, cells contain molecules, molecules contain atoms, atoms contain electrons, positrons and neutrons; further analysis is hard to predict. With our For the purpose, bones, molecules, atoms, and electrons can be tentatively regarded as disorganized and unanalyzable units, but no matter at what stage, there is no definite reason to think that this is actually the case. The ultimate Units can become analyzable at any time. The question of whether there must be some units which cannot be analyzed because they contain no parts seems undecidable. This is also irrelevant, because when explaining the structure, we start with It is by no means wrong to start with units that are later found to be complex. For example, the definition of a point can be said to be several types of events, but this does not prove that there is anything wrong in traditional geometry. Traditional geometry regards points as simple. The description of the structure is related to some units. These units are temporarily regarded as having no structure, but it must not be considered that in another situation, none of these units is possible. unrecognized structure." By not asserting that there are atomic facts, we do not therefore deny that there are atomic sentences.Whether a sentence is atomic or not is purely a question of syntax.A sentence is an atomic sentence if it does not contain words such as "all" or "some" or has no sentence as a part of it. For the reasons stated above, what Mr. Woolson says about the atomic facts is inappropriate. Now I come to the second point, that is, compound propositions are not equal to the collection of simpler propositions.His usual example is "Britain declares war in 1939" (which leads to the assumption that he is not a Scot).I cannot understand what he asserts about this proposition, because he asserts two points, which I think contradict each other.On the one hand, he says that the proposition cited above is not equivalent to some propositions about the activities of many English people, and on the other hand, he maintains that this proposition does not imply the recognition of such a entity as "Britain".He reconciles these two parts of his claim by firmly rejecting analysis altogether.You cannot speak of such a thing as "Britain" for this proposition, or (we might also say) such a thing as "War".But this proposition is not just a collection of meaningless words.It is about a great event with innumerable consequences.He never tried to prove that this proposition is not equivalent to some propositions about the activities of the British.I don't understand how he can prove it.The propositions contained in it are of course many. We could begin with a dictation machine, re-enacting the discussions of a cabinet meeting which resulted in a declaration of war.But we must go on to the Cabinet and the individual English peoples who empower it.He pointed out that, in imagination, a decision of the cabinet could also cause revolution, denying the power of the cabinet.That way, "Britain" wouldn't have declared war.But this only shows that the proposition "Britain declares war" contains something about the attitude of the British toward their government.I don't see him showing at all that if there were a sufficient number of such propositions, they would logically not imply the proposition "Britain declares war." On this point, there is another confusion which has to be cleared up, namely, a purely logical language problem.If you work in logical analysis, you need a language that is very different from the language you use every day.But you need this language only for logical analysis.This is stated on page 2 of Principia Mathematica: "The grammatical structure of language is adapted to various uses. It therefore has no singular simplicity to represent that produced by the deductive reasoning employed here." Several simple but extremely abstract concepts and processes. In fact, the abstract and simple nature of the concepts in this book is beyond the power of language. It is easier for language to express complex concepts. The proposition 'big whale' can best express the language Strengths, it expresses complex facts very concisely, but if the sentence "one is a number" is seriously analyzed in language, it will be unbearably lengthy. Therefore, it is specially designed to express the concept of deductive reasoning in this book The effect is simplicity when used with programmed symbols." Advocates of a special language for logical analysis do not mean that words like "whale" or "British" should be discarded.They are thinking that, given sufficient time and knowledge, the facts expressed by these words could be expressed without them, or any synonym.No logician would think that such a language is of practical use.He simply means that such a language is possible, that the possibility of such a language arises from the nature of the structure of the world. One thing this new school of philosophy does not want to be analyzed is the nature of empirical evidence.I think part of the difficulty is that when people start doing philosophy, they think they have to leave common sense behind.We all believe that the things we see exist, such as tables, chairs, sun, moon, etc., but we also know that if we think about it, such beliefs are sometimes wrong.Common sense usually allows us to correct mistakes of this type. Our waking up from a dream is an example.But the common-sense approach, while generally correct, is not without error.It depends on the nature of one's experience.If you haven't heard the experience of broadcasting, you hear the sound of talking in the next room, and you will believe that there must be someone there.Some restaurants use mirrors to make the room look bigger.If you don't look closely, you can easily believe that what is reflected in the mirror is "real".When you are tired, sometimes you will hear a rattling sound, much like the sound of wind blowing electric wires.When you're in a frenzy, you might be able to hear the entire sentence in the command tone.Illusions are an old problem that has been passed down from Greek times to the present.I repeat, to some extent illusions can be determined by common sense.Up to this point, there will be no objection to this new philosophy.But if you want to be more precise and come up with some principles to avoid illusions, people will tell you that you are greedy for metaphysics. In fact, it is considered a crime to seriously consider the problem of perception.Physicists, physiologists, and psychologists have done a lot of scientific work to pursue the causal connection between objects and the perception of objects.Although this kind of work is done in the name of science, not philosophy, many philosophers who deny philosophy and support science are willing to ignore this kind of work.By neglecting this work, they fall into error.Only by resolutely refusing to analyze can they see this error. In particular, there is an argument that sounds plausible but does not stand up to scrutiny.It is said that you cannot understand a proposition of the form "every A is B" without the experience that many A's are many B's.This view arises from an incorrect analysis of the universal proposition.The proposition "Every A is B" does not consist of individual A's, so if you know what the word "A" means, you can understand the proposition even if you have never seen an "A".Not only can you know what the proposition means, but you might even know that the proposition is true.For example: "No one will think of all integers greater than 1,000 before the end of this century".I do not see anyone who can deny this proposition, although it is evident that a single instance of the truth it implies cannot be given before the end of the century.In fact, we need not limit ourselves to such a precise example.Any proposition concerning the future that is generally accepted to be true can illustrate this principle.The Nautical Calendar contained many quite correct predictions when it was published, but sailors did not therefore regard it as a work of occult metaphysics. The whole relationship between experience and empirical propositions is often misunderstood.There are two opposing misconceptions: on the one hand, blunt experience gives us less knowledge than we think; , even pushed to the point that cannot be experienced, is indispensable.I will say a little bit about both of these points. In philosophy the term "experience" is used very imprecisely.Few philosophers have bothered to define the term.The question of the relation between empirical knowledge and experience, like other questions, is best dealt with by starting with something general and unquestionable, and then examining it carefully to prove that this general Contains something more precise, but not so convincing at first glance. Let us begin with the general and unquestionable.There are quite a few propositions that we all believe to be true.We believe these propositions to be true because of our own experience.We believe there is a place called Cape Point, and that the Norman Conquest of England took place in 1066. Why do we believe these things are real?We believe these things to be true because we have heard others say them, or seen them said.If we had not heard or seen such a word, we would not know what it said.But hearing and seeing are different kinds of sensations.In this way, even with regard to ancient or remote things, what we think we know, so far as we know the matter, is not as far as the truth of the matter is concerned, but depends on our own feelings.I think it may be said without exception and without limitation that whatever fragment of empirical knowledge a man possesses he would not have had it not been felt in his own life.I think this is the fundamental truth on which empiricists rely. Here we must make a distinction.I don't mean that, when I see a table, I say to myself, "I have a vision. I believe that this perception has an external cause, which I call a table." Of course, that is not the case. .At the time I had this feeling, I believed that the table was an object from the outside world.This feeling is an integral part of my reason for believing, but not necessarily part of what I believe.However, I may have learned, from past experience of delusions, that this belief, which my present feelings produce, is sometimes wrong.I think that the philosophers I criticize agree with me in denying the massive, indiscriminate skepticism that simply does not admit that sensation is about something other than sensation source of knowledge about things.My disagreement with this new school of philosophy is that I think it's worth the trouble to examine when and where there are scientific reasons for feeling presumably wrong.And to inquire further, what general principles are to be contained in our common rejection of radical skepticism as to the origin of external knowledge from our senses. So I come to the second of the two points I just mentioned.Physics and physiology make it clear that if we know anything about anything in the external world, it is solely due to the causal chains from that thing to our own nerves and brains.That is to say, the thing we know is the unexperienced cause of the experienced effect. It has been objected to me that if a cause is wholly unexperienced, the inferences drawn concerning that cause cannot stand.It seems to me that those who say this are making two mistakes.On the one hand, as we have already said, his mistake was misrecognition, and if we have no experience with some A, we cannot understand the judgment of the form "all A is B"; the other mistake is not noticing, denying that there is It is possible to make inferences about things that cannot be experienced, with devastating consequences.I do not see in this new school of philosophy any awareness of the problems that arise in this way.This new school of philosophy may be able to find an answer, and it may not.But so far, it has not made such an effort.To be honest, as long as it encounters a difficulty, its way of dealing with it is to say like the "March Hare": "I'm tired of this, let's change the subject." As far as we know, it is a pity that Mr. Ulson did not understand the later development of logical atomism when discussing logical atomism.For example, in his book on proper names, he concludes (p. 85): "The views of logical atomism on language are the main reason for the difficulty of this school. Their doctrine of proper names is their An important part of the opinion of language must not be considered insignificant." In my Knowledge of Man I dealt with proper names at considerable length, occupying many pages.I do not think that what I have said in that book can stand any reproach from Mr. Ulson, or represent an abandonment of the doctrine of philosophical analysis.I rather like Mr. Ulson to criticize what I say in that book from the point of view he advocates. In conclusion, we have a few general remarks concerning the views held by Mr. Ulson.There have always been those who are against analysis.They are the very people who oppose every advance in science.Had Mr. Ulson been born at a time when the belief that earth, air, fire, and water are the four elements had begun to be doubted, he would have opposed common sense and custom to this scientific investigation of a more proper analysis of matter.The progress of modern physics is nothing but a more refined analysis of the material world.At first it was thought that the atom was almost unbelievably small.But in the eyes of modern physicists, each atom is a complex world like the solar system.No one in science would ever dream of thinking that analysis is illegitimate.At the beginning of the first chapter of a book that has just come out I read: "What are the properties of the raw materials of those simple bricks out of which all matter is made?" road.If a person without musical training listens to a symphony, what he gets is a complete and general impression.As for the conductor, you can tell from his gestures that he heard a whole, and he analyzed the whole into some parts.The advantage of analysis is that it yields knowledge not otherwise available.When you know that water is made of hydrogen dioxide, your previous knowledge about water does not exist, but you do gain a power to understand many things. This power is observation without analysis. What can't be given to you.If Mr. Ulson had been trained in the use of Chinese ideograms from his childhood, he must have strenuously opposed the phonological analysis that led to the invention of the alphabet.To make the above arguments in defense of philosophical analysis does not, of course, mean that this or that particular philosopher analyzes correctly, but only that his effort to analyze is justified. Although I am well aware of the importance of analysis, this is not the most important reason I object to this new philosophy.我最不赞成之点是，我觉得这派新哲学不必要地放弃了哲学在历史上历来所追求的任务。自泰勒斯以来的哲学家们是努力想法来了解这个世界。关于达到这个目的，大多数的哲学家是过于乐观了。但是即使他们没有达到目的，他们还是给后继者供给了材料，给了激励以做新的努力。我完全看不出这派新哲学是继续了这个传统。它把世界或我们对于世界的关系置之于不顾，它所讲的只是糊涂人能说糊涂话的各式各样的方法。如果哲学的贡献只是在此，我就无法认为哲学是一门值得研究的学科。把哲学限于这种不关重要的事，我所能想象到的唯一理由是想把哲学和经验科学截然分开。我认为这样把二者分开是没有益处的。一种哲学若要有价值，它必须建筑在一个广大而坚实的知识基础之上，此知识不限定是哲学知识。这种知识是土壤，这种土壤是哲学这棵树的活力的来源所自。哲学不从这块土壤吸取养料不久就会枯萎，停止生长。我认为乌尔逊先生以其所具的才干极力拥护的哲学就不能免于这种下场，他这番才干本是可以用于一个更高尚的主张的。 Ⅱ逻辑与本体论本文的目的是先讨论Ｇ．  E．渥纳克的《逻辑中的形而上学》，发表于安托尼?夫路教授所编的《概念分析论文》中，其次是谈一谈我个人对于这个题目的意见。我先说几句概括的话。渥纳克先生是属于“哲学速成”那一派，这个名称的起因是因为这派把哲学弄得比从前容易得多。要当一个有学力的哲学家只须研究一下弗洛的《近代英文用法》就行了；研究院的学生可以进一步念《国王英语》（标准英语）。但是用这本书的时候要加小心，正如这本书的书名所说的，这本书是有些陈旧的。渥纳克先生说，我们不应该“把整饬单纯的逻辑强加之于复杂的语言上”。他是意在讨论存在量辞。他以为必须指出，逻辑学家常用彐这个符号来表示的一些命题在平常的语言里就要用各种不同的语句来表示。因此，他认为用彐来代表的那个一般概念是不重要的或是假造的。我觉得这是极其荒谬的推论。也许我可以借一个寓言来说明其荒谬性。 很久以前，有一个部落住在一条河的两岸。有人说这个河叫做“伊西斯”，住在这个河岸上的人叫“伊西斯人”，但是这也许是后来添到那个原来的传说上去的。这个部落的语言里有“鲦”、“鳟”、“鲈”、“梭鱼”这些字，但是没有“鱼”这个字。一群伊西斯人在河的下游远一些的地方捉住了一条我们所说的鲑，马上大家就热烈地争论起来。其中一些人坚持说这个东西是一种梭鱼；另一些人坚持说这个东西是不洁的、可怕的，无论是谁提这件东西就要把他从部落里赶出去。正在这个关头，一个住在另一个河岸边的生人来了。这条河是被人看不起的，因为流得慢。那个生人说：“在我们的部落里我们有'鱼'这个字。这个字对于鲦、鳟、鲈、梭鱼都可以用，也可以用于引起这场争论来的那个东西。”这些伊西斯人很怒。他们说：“这些新奇的字有什么用？凡是在河里捉住的东西在我们的语言里都有个名字来叫它，因为总是一个鲦、鳟、鲈或梭鱼。 你尽可以举出在我们的这条神圣的河的下游所发生的这件事来反对这种意见，我们却认为，定出法律不许再提这件事，是节省语言。因此我们认为你的'鱼'那一个字是卖弄学问，没有用处。 " 这一个寓言并不是歪曲渥纳克先生的关于存在量辞的论证，意在讥讽。存在量辞是一个一般概念，正和“鱼”相似。 用于名辞，它和鲦相似；用于宾辞，它和鳟相似；用于关系，它和鲈相似；其余可以类推。在日常谈话中，我们用不同的字来表示不同的事物，逻辑学家则用存在量辞，这是因为没有研究过逻辑的人还没有得到用彐来代表的那个一般概念，正和寓言中伊西斯人还没有得到“鱼”那个一般概念一样。渥纳克先生说存在量辞混淆普通语言所辩别的事物。这正如伊西斯人说谁用“鱼”这个字，谁就是混淆鲦和梭鱼。渥纳克先生谈到普通语言中那种不简单化是极可贵的。我不否认在普通语言中有些区别在逻辑中是不加划分的。在普通语言中我们也表示我们的情绪。如果我们说某人是一个十足的无赖，或说可惜某人的行为还没有完全合乎道德律，这两句话所表示的事实是一个，但是我们在这两句话中对于这一件事实情绪上所取的态度是不同的。 逻辑学家们曾做过一番努力，对于渥纳克先生自称所讨论的那些问题加以澄清。这番努力渥纳克先生故意有意识地加以抹杀。他玩弄“冥界的英灵殿是属于神话的”这个命题。 他并没有提到有一个仔细周到的学说，这个学说的意思是说，看来好象是讲英灵殿的一些命题其实是讲“英灵殿”。这个学说也许对，也许不对，但是，假装以为没有这样一个学说，我以为是没有理由的。他在这一篇文章的开头告诉我们，他所讨论的中心问题是：有没有抽象的实体？然后他进而反对逻辑学家对于“有”这个字的解释。并且以此为理由（至少我在他的文章里找不出别的理由来）他放下了他的中心问题，没有解答。显然，在他看来，他的中心问题是无法回答的。他正确地指明，使用“某物”这个辞在普通的话里并不包含这样一个东西存在的意思。他举了“某种东西是一个素数”这个命题作例子。他说这是一个古怪莫明其妙的命题。他没有想到，数理逻辑的语言在精确和普遍性上要超过普通的语言。 如果你有十二个东西和十二个名称，大概普通的语言是把这十二个名称用于这十二个东西上。普通的语言有两个相反的缺点：往往一个字有多种意义和许多字只有一个意义。第一个缺点可以用下面的句子来说明：“罗马拉斯是否曾经存在过是难决定的，因为有理由来怀疑现存的关于罗马存在的第一个百人团的传说的可靠性。”与此相反的缺点是，措辞不同而意义相同。这有渥纳克先生关于下面的这些话可作例证，我们有时候说：“有素数”，“狮子仍然存在于非洲”，“在月亮上有阴影”。他好象认为最后这一句话并不含有阴影存在的意思。他认为说“阴影存在”是要不得的，他的唯一理由是，大多数人不这么说。逻辑学家们以为，如果一种语言中一个东西有一个名称，则这种语言就更可取。我说“更可取”，我的意思并不是说在日常应用中“更可取”，而是说试图关于世界做精确的陈述的时候“更可取”。 现在我单讲“存在”这个问题。我认为我的这个主张对于避免混乱是很重要的，我的主张是，通常用法的“存在”这个辞产生了造句法上的混乱，而且是好多形而上学上的混乱的来源。请以下面的一个推理为例：“我现在的感觉存在；这是我现在的感觉；所以这一个存在”。我认为这两个前提也许可以成立，可是结论是荒谬的。这意思用普通的语言无法说得清楚。这是一个对于普通语言不利的论证。我认为其中所包含的唯一正当的概念是彐这个概念。这个概念可以表明如下：假定有一个包含一个变项x的fx式，并且，如果给这个变项指定一个值，这个式就变成一个命题，我们说（彐x）?fx这个式的意思就是至少有一个ｘ的值，就这个值来说，fx是正确的。我个人认为还是拿这个来做“有”的定义好，可是，如果我拿这个来做“有”的定义，我不能把我的意思说得使人了解。 当我们说“有”的时候，不可从这个命题的正确就来推断我们说有的那个什么就是（用一个含混的辞句说）世界内容的一部分。数理逻辑承认“有数目”这个命题，逻辑哲学承认“数是逻辑上的虚构或符号上的方便”这个命题。数是类的类，类是符号上的方便。想把彐翻译成普通的语言一定要使我们陷入困难，因为所要传达的这个概念是制造普通语言的人所不晓得的。“有数目”这个命题须用一个精密的方法来解释。我们必须先从一个命题函数开始，假定是fx，然后把“有f'这种性质的事物的数目”加以界说，然后给“数”下一个定义为“不论什么，只要它是具有某种性质的事物的数目，就都是数”。这样我们就得到“ｎ是一个数”这个命题函数的定义。我们就看出，如果我们把给“１”所下的定义代替ｎ，我们就得到一个真正的命题。所谓至少有一个数，就是这个意思。但是在普通语言中很不容易说明我们不是主张数是有柏拉图哲学上的那种真实性。 逻辑之与本体论的关系事实上是很复杂的。在某种程度上，我们可以把这个问题的有关语言的几方面和与本体论有关的一些方面分开。至少在理论上有关语言的一些问题可以得到正确的解决。但是本体论上的一些问题是含混得多。可是纯乎语言上的问题有一个本体论上的背景，虽然这是一个不清楚的背景。句子是由字组合而成的。如果句子能够对于事实有所断定，至少其中有些字必须与另外某种东西之间有一种关系，那种关系就叫做“意义”。如果饭馆里的一个侍者对我说：“我们有很新鲜的龙须菜”他若是说明他这话纯粹是属于语言方面的，并不是指任何实际上的龙须菜，我要是因此生了气，这是不能怪我的。在所有的普通语言中都包含这一点本体论上的拘束。但是字与字以外的事物的关系是随字的种类而有不同，这就产生了词类学说的一种逻辑形式。如果一个句子要有意义，除非是一个纯粹逻辑上的句子，其中的一些字必须指什么东西，但是别的一些字则不一定如此。如果世界上没有“女王”这个辞和“英国”这个辞所指的东西，则包含“英国的女王”这个短语的一个句子就不能有意义，但是不一定有“的”这个字所指的东西。为使一些我们觉得明白的命题具有意义，这些命题不能不具备一些东西，数理逻辑之于本体论的意义就是在于减少这些应具备的东西的数目。这样进行削减，其唯一的理由是为避免轻率没有保证的臆说。如果我们平常经验上的命题要有意义，这些命题（假如不是语言上的）就必须指字以外的什么东西。这样就发生了一个纯粹专门性的问题：使我们能够断言我们以为是事实的那个最小语汇是什么？ 假定这个问题解决了，我们还有这样一个本体论上的问题：如果我们的字要有意义，我们的句子要表示意思，一方面，我们的字与句子之间必有什么关系存在，另一方面，字与事实之间必有什么关系存在呢？我们可以先从我们的语汇里除掉所有那些在语言上有一个定义的字，因为我们总是可以拿定义来代替这些字。有时候（除掉微细的地方）一个字和一个物的关系是相当清楚的：我们知道“得威特?Ｄ?艾森豪威尔”这个名称所表示的那个东西是什么；我们知道那些颜色的名称是指什么；其余可以类推。但是还有一些字我们就觉得麻烦一些：如果我们说“亚力山大先于凯撒”，我们就觉得（也许是不正确的）亚力山大和凯撒是实有其人。但是“先于”这个字又怎么样呢？在不得已的时候，我们可以想象一个只由亚力山大、或只由凯撒或只由他们两个人所组成的宇宙。 但是我们不能想象一个只由“先于”所组成的宇宙。正是因为有这一类的事，大家才相信实体而怀疑普遍。于此又可以看清语言的需要，但是这些需要在形而上学上的函意是不清楚的，没有“先于”这一类的字，我们就没有办法，但是这一类的字不象专名那样能够指明宇宙所由造成的某一块砖。 “有普遍吗？”这个问题可以有不同的解释。首先，它可以用存在量词的意思来解释。我们说：“有一些句子包含两个名称和一个关系辞，没有这类的句子，有许多我们自己相信知道的关于事实的断语就是不可能的”。我们还可以说，正如这些句子里的名称是指出事物，关系辞就不能不指示语言以外的某种东西。亚力山大先于凯撒是一件事实，这件事实不只是由亚力山大和凯撒而成。显而易见，关系辞的作用是使我们能够对一些事实有所断定，否则这些事实是说不出的。到这一点为止，我以为我们是站在稳固的基础之上的。但是我想，绝不是因此就有一个叫做“先于”的那么一个“东西”，只有有关系的时候才能把关系辞用得正确。 这也同样可以用于宾辞。当宾辞或关系辞从表面上看来是变项的时候，奎尹觉得特别有困难，请以这样一个命题为例：“拿破仑具有一个大将的一切特长”。这必须作以下的解释：“不管f是什么，如果'x是一个大将'蕴含fx，不管x是什么，那么结果就是f（拿破仑）。”这好象是说，给f补充了一个我们竭力想避免的内容。我以为这个困难确实是有的，我也不知道怎么解答。毫无疑问，没有代表宾辞或关系辞的变项是不行的，但是我觉得一种专门方法应该是有的，用这种方法就能保持名称与宾辞、关系辞之间的本体论上的地位的差别。 数理逻辑的作用不是要在本体论上疑不能明的地方把它建立起来。而是要把指示一个事物意义明瞭的那些字的数目减少。从前有一种通常的见解，以为所有的整数都是实体。那些不这样极端的人至少也相信１这个数目是一个实体。我们无法证明不是如此，但是我们能够证明在数学上是找不到证据的。 最后，“有普遍吗？”这个问题的意义是暧昧不明的。按某些解释，对这个问题的回答当然是肯定的；按另外一些解释，现在好象没有明确的回答。我对于普遍在本体论上的地位的意见见于《对意义与真理的探讨》的末一章。 Ⅲ斯特劳逊先生论指称Ｐ．F．斯特劳逊先生在一九五○年的《心》杂志里发表了一篇文章《论指称》。 这篇文章又在《概念的分析论文》一书里重印出来，这本书是安托尼?夫路教授选编的。 下面的引证是根据这篇重印的文章。这篇文章的主要目的是驳斥我的叙述学说。因为我发现我所敬重的几位哲学家认为这篇文章已圆满地达到了它的目的，我认定应该有一个答辩，首先我可以说，在斯特劳逊先生的任何论证里，我完全看不出一点确实性来。究竟这是因为我上了年纪，还是有什么别的原因，我不得不请读者来判断。 斯特劳逊先生的论证的要点是在于把我一直认为是性质不同的两个问题弄成了一个，即，叙述问题和自我中心问题。 我已经用了相当多的篇幅讨论了这两个问题。但是因为我认为这是两个不同的问题，我在讨论其中的一个问题的时候，我就没有讨论另一个。因此斯特劳逊先生就有了借口，以为我忽略了自我中心这个问题。 他小心地选择了材料来助成他的借口。在我最初说明叙述学说的那篇文章里，我特别讨论了两个例子：“现在的法国国王是秃头”和“斯考特是《威弗雷》的作者。”后边这个例子不合斯特劳逊先生之用，因此，除了马马虎虎地提了一点以外，他对于这个例子完全置之不理。关于“现在的法国国王”，他抓住有自我中心性质的“现在”这个字，他好象不能理解，如果我用“在一九○五年”这些字代替了“现在”这一个字，他的全部论证就要瓦解了。 也许不是全部，其理由在斯特劳逊先生动笔以前我就说过了。但是不难举出一些别的例子来，这些例子用的是完全没有自我中心的叙述短语。我倒喜欢他把他的学说用于以下的句子：“负一的平方根是负四的平方根的一半”，或“三的立方是直接在第二个完全数之前的整数。”在这两句里都没有自我中心的字，但是解释叙述短语的问题正和有自我中心的字是一样的。 在斯特劳逊先生的文章里，没有一个字暗示到我曾考虑过自我中心的字，更没有暗示到关于自我中心的字他所主张的学说正是我用了很多篇幅颇为详尽地说明了的那个学说。他的关于这类字的主张的要点是，这些字指什么完全要看什么时候用这些字，在什么地方用这些字。他这样说是完全正确的。关于这一点，我只需从《人类的知识》（第１０７页）中引一段就够了：“这”是指用这个的字的时候占据注意力中心的任何东西。非自我中心的字中那个不变的性质是和被指的事物有关的某种东西，但“这”每次用的时候是指不同的事物。 其不变的性质不是被指的那件事物，而是这个字个别使用的关系。不拘什么时候用这个字，用这个字的人是注意某个东西，这个字就是指这个东西。 如果一个字没有自我中心的性质，就没有必要分清用这个字的不同的场合。至于自我中心的字，我们必须有这种区分，因为这类字所指的是和使用这个字有某种关系的一种东西。 我也不能不提一提我讨论过的一件事（第１０１页以下），那是我和一位朋友在一个黑暗的夜里走路。我们失去了联络。 他喊道：“你在哪儿？”我答道：“我在这儿。”把世界加以科学的叙述，最要紧的事是把一个论断中自我中心的成分减到最低限度，但是能做到这个地步是程度问题，若是有关经验的材料，就永远不能完全做到。这是因为所有属于经验的字的意义最终是有赖于用实物表示的定义，用实物表示的定义有赖于经验，而经验是有自我中心的性质的。但是，我们能够用自我中心的字来叙述非自我中心的东西；正是因为这一点，我们才能使用普通的语言。 这一切也许对，也许不对。但是，不管对不对，斯特劳逊先生不应该把这个学说说得好象是他发明的，而其实是在他写文章以前我就提倡过这个学说，固然也说不定他没有完全了解我的话的意思。关于自我中心，我不再说什么，因为我认为斯特劳逊先生把自我中心和叙述问题连在一起是错误的，我之所以这样想其理由我在前边已经说过了。 我难以了解斯特劳逊先生关于名称这个问题的主张。他在文章中指我的时候，他说：“合乎逻辑的专名是没有的，（在这个意义之下的）叙述是不存在的”（第２６页）。 但是他在一九五六年十月份的《心》杂志中写文章涉及到奎尹的时候，他又有不同的论调。奎尹有一个学说，就是，名称是不必要的，名称永远可以用叙述来代替。这个学说使斯特劳逊先生颇为震惊，他震惊的理由我是看不出来的。可是我要让奎尹为自己做辩护，他自己是能照管自己的。为达到我的目的，要紧的事是把斯特劳逊先生放在括弧里的“在这个意义之下的”这几个字的意思说明白，就我根据上下文所能看到的，他是反对相信有些字只有因为有某种这些字所指的东西，这些字才是有意义的，如果没有这个某种东西，这些字就是一些空洞的声音，就不是字。在我这一方面，我认为如果语言要与实际有什么关系，这类字是不能没有的。用实物表示定义的办法可以让人看得明白这类字是不能没有的。我们怎么知道“红”和“蓝”这类字是什么意思呢？除非我们看见过红、看见过蓝，我们是不能知道这些字的意思的。若是在我们的经验中没有红、没有蓝，我们也许想出某种细致的叙述的方法来，我们能用这种叙述来代替“红”这个字或“蓝”这个字。举例来说，如果你是和一个盲人交谈，你可以把一个红热的火箸拿近他，让他感觉到这热度，然后你可以告诉他，红就是他所会看见的，如果他能看见的话。当然你就不能不用另外一种细致的叙述来代替“看见”这个字。任何这个盲人所能了解的叙述不能不用表示他以往的经验的字。若是个人的词汇里的主要的字和实际没有这种直接的关系，语言一般说来就没有这种关系。若是没有“红”这个字所指的东西，斯特劳逊先生试试看能不能给“红”这个字以通常有的意义。 这又把我向前引到一点。“红”平常是当做一个宾辞看，是指一个共相。为适合哲学上的分析，我倒愿意有一种语言，在这种语言中，“红”是一个主辞。固然我不能说把它称为共相绝对是错误，我不能不说这样称呼它是引起混乱。这一点关连到斯特劳逊先生所说的我的“在逻辑上是不幸的那个名称学说”（第３９页）。他不屑于提一提为什么他认为这个学说“在逻辑上是不幸的”。我希望他在将来什么时候关于这一点对于我们会有所开导。 这把我引到一个基本分歧之点，这是我和斯特劳逊先生所附和的那许多哲学家们之间的分歧。他们认为普通的语言就够好的，不但对日常生活说是如此，而且对哲学来说也是如此。正相反，我认为普通语言中充满了暧昧与粗陋。要想把它弄得精密正确，就需要在词汇和句法这两方面把普通语言加以改变。大家都承认物理学、化学和医学每一门都需要一种语言，这种语言不是日常生活上的语言。我就看不出为什么只有哲学不许也这样想法子接近精细和正确。请以日常语言中的一个最普通的字为例，就是“日”这个字。这个字的最庄严的使用是见于《创世纪》的第一章和《十诫》中。为想把安息“日”弄得神圣，正宗犹太人就只得把“天”这个字弄得精确，这个精确的意义是这个字在通常的话里所没有的。他们给这个字的定义是：从日落到下一个日落的那段时间。 由于力求精确的一些别的理由，天文学家们有三种日：真太阳日、平均太阳日和恒星日。 这有不同的用法：如果你是说明亮的时间，用真太阳日合适；如果你被判处十四天徒刑不能用别的法子代替，用平均太阳日合适；如果你是想法估计潮汐在防碍地球自转上的影响，用恒星日合适。所有这四种日——十诫、真、平均和恒星日——都比“日”这个字的普通用法精确。如果天文学家们服从一些近来的哲学家们所显然赞助的禁令，不要有精确性，则整个天文学就是不可能的了。 为了有专门性，不同于日常生活上的语言的专门语言是不可少的。我觉得那些反对语言上的新的东西的人，如果他们是生活在一百五十年前，想是坚持用尺和两，以为公分和克有断头台的气味。 在哲学里，造句法需要加以改正更甚于词汇。我们所习以为常的主辞——宾辞的逻辑其为便利的原因是有赖于这样一件事实，就是，在地球的平常的温度下是有大体不变的“东西”的。在太阳的温度下就不是如此。在我们惯常的温度下也只大体上是如此。 我的叙述说原不是为分析那些说含有叙述的句子的人的心情的。斯特劳逊先生称“法国的国王贤明”这个句子为Ｓ，他这样说我：“他之所以能得到这个分析，显然是由于问他自己，在什么景况之下我们可以说凡是说Ｓ这句话的人是做了一个真的断言”。 我觉得这并没有把我所做的说得正确。假定（当然决不会真有这样的事）斯特劳逊先生竟然那么卤莽，说他的女零工偷东西，她愤怒地回答道：“我从来不会没有害过人”。 假定她品行端正，我以为她是说了一句正确的话，虽然若按斯特劳逊先生说话的时候所用的造句法的规则来说，她所说的话应该有这样的意义：“至少有一个时候我伤害了整个人类”。斯特劳逊先生不会以为她是要这样说，虽然他不会用她的那种话来表示她原来的那个意思。与此相仿，我是想求得一种更准确细密的思想来代替大多数人在脑中常有的那些混乱思想。 斯特劳逊先生反对我说，如果法国没有国王，则“法国国王贤明”是伪的。他承认这句话具有意义而且不真，但是不承认是伪的。这只是一个语言上的便利的问题。他认为“伪”这个字有一个不可改变的意义，若把这个意义加以调整就是罪孽深重，可是他小心地避而不告诉我们这个意义是什么。我个人觉得给“伪”这个字下个定义更便利些，这样，每个具有意义的句子不是真就是伪。这纯粹是一个语言上的问题。虽然我不愿意自以为有普通用法来做我的支持，我觉得他也无法说有这种支持。举例来说，假定在某个国度里有一条法律说，如果谁认为宇宙的统治者是贤明的这句话是伪的，谁就不能当公务员。我以为一个公然自认是无神论者的人如果利用斯特劳逊先生的学说而说他并没有认为这个命题是伪的，我们就要认为这个人有些不老实。