Chapter 5 Chapter IV Of the Limits of the Authority of Society over the Individual

What, then, is a just limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself?Where does the authority of society begin?How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? If they each have aspects that concern them more specifically, they will each get their due.That part of life which is primarily concerned with the individual belongs to individuality, and that part of life which primarily concerns society belongs to society. Though society is not founded on a contract, and though it would be no good to invent a contract from which social obligations would be derived, yet each man, being protected by society, must have something to it. It is necessary that, since each in fact lives in society, each must observe a certain code of conduct towards the rest.This kind of behavior, first of all, does not harm each other's interests, does not harm each other, or some fairly definite interests that should be regarded as rights in the law expressly or implicitly; To bear his own share (to be fixed under a principle of justice) of the labor and sacrifice of its members in order to save them from injury and hindrance.If people try to avoid these conditions and refuse to fulfill them, the society has reason to implement coercion at all costs.Society can do more than that.Some actions of individuals will be harmful to others, or lack due regard for the welfare of others, but not to the extent of violating any of their acquired rights.At this time, the offender should be punished by public opinion, although not by law.In short, as soon as any part of a man's conduct so prejudicially affects the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will be improved by interference with it is a matter of open discussion. The problem.But when a person's conduct does not affect the interests of anyone other than himself, or need not affect them unless they wish (all persons concerned here are persons of full age and common understanding), then there is no There is no room for any such problems.In all such cases every man should enjoy complete legal and social liberty to act with consequences.

Regarding this doctrine, if someone decides that it is the saying that "everyone cleans the door for himself, and does not care about the frost of others", he thinks that it insists that human beings have nothing to do with each other in their lives, and insists that everyone does not have anything to do unless It is a great misunderstanding that one should not be involved in the good deeds or welfare of others when one's own interests are involved.There can be no doubt that disinterested service to the advancement of the good of others needs never to be diminished, but greatly increased.But disinterested charity can find other means of persuading men to do good, without using whips or battens, either literally or figuratively.If there is anyone who underestimates personal morality, I am the last one; personal morality is second only to, if it can be said to be second to, social morality in importance.The task of education is also to train both equally.But even in education, there is a difference between persuasion, persuasion, and coercion, and for those who have passed the education period, the teaching of personal morality should only be carried out in the former method.Human beings should help each other to distinguish between good and bad, and should encourage each other to choose the former and avoid the latter.They should also ever sharpen one another, to bring their higher faculties into ever-increasing use, to direct their affections and interests more and more towards wise rather than foolish, exalted rather than depraved aims and projects.But neither one nor any majority has the right to say to another adult that he should not spend his life doing something for his own good that he chooses to spend his life doing. thing.With regard to a man's well-being, he himself is the most concerned; and, except in some cases where the personal ties are strong, the interest which any other man has for his well-being is of little value compared with his own. Thin and superficial.

The concern that society has for him as an individual (except for his conduct towards others) is always partial and wholly indirect; and the individual, with regard to his own feelings and circumstances, is not the most ordinary man or woman. It has its own way of understanding, which is many times better than what anyone else can have.The interference of society in forcing the individual against his own judgments and purposes in matters which concern him alone can only be based on general presumptions; but such general presumptions may be quite wrong, and even if they are true, Nor should it be mistakenly applied to particular cases by persons who have but a mere superficial knowledge of their circumstances.In this branch of human affairs, then, individuality has its proper place to operate.In the conduct of men with respect to each other, general laws must be noticed and observed, so that men may know what they must expect; but in matters which concern only themselves, each man's individual automatism is entitled to free exercise. .All considerations to aid his judgment, and exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, and even thrust upon him; but he himself is the final judge.

You know, all the mistakes a man can make by disobedience to counsel and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to compel him to do what they think is good for him. Much heavier. I do not mean to say that no matter what a person's personal qualities or flaws, other people's perception of him should not be affected.This is neither possible nor desirable.If he excels in qualities which serve his own good, he is a natural object of admiration on this point.He is nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature.If he is seriously deficient in those qualities, a sentiment contrary to admiration will naturally follow in others.A certain degree of stupidity, and a certain degree of so-called lowness and depravity of taste (though the wording is not unoffensive) in a man will not justify others doing harm to him, but it must be. It should make him an object of dislike, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a man of rather strong opposite qualities cannot help feeling about him.A man who has done nothing wrong to anyone can do so that we have to judge him and feel that he is a fool or an inferior character; and this judgment and perception are things he is willing to avoid. , and thus do him a favor by forewarning him against other unpleasant consequences to which he is already susceptible.If this salutary service could be made much more casually beyond the common notions of politeness of the present day, and if one man could honestly say to another man that he thought he had faults without being thought rude or impertinent, It's a good thing.We also have the right to give effect to our unfavorable opinion of a person in various ways, not to suppress his personality but to make use of ours.We are not obliged, for example, to be with him; we have a right to avoid it (though this avoidance need not be ostentatiously ostentatious), because we have a right to choose the group with which we are most compatible.It is also our right, and perhaps our duty, to warn others to do the same, if we think that his example or conversation is likely to have harmful results for those with whom he associates.In some arbitrary useful service, we may prefer the other to his object, except that which is designed to help him improve himself.

In these various ways a man with certain defects which are directly personal may receive at the hands of others extremely severe punishments; but he receives these punishments only as natural and, so to speak, spontaneous consequences, rather than someone purposely punishing him for the sake of punishment.A man who is reckless, headstrong, conceited, unable to live on modest means of subsistence, unable to restrain himself from harmful indulgences, seeking bestial pleasures at the expense of emotional and intellectual pleasures--such a man can only hope to be admired by others. He can only hope that people will think him less favorably; and he has no right to complain of this, unless he has won their favor by special and superior social relations, so as to be entitled to their useful services, without being affected by his own shortcomings.

The point I am arguing here is that if a person only incurs bad judgments on his own interests and does not affect the interests of others with whom he has a relationship, he should bear the judgment. The only consequences are the inconveniences closely connected with that judgment.As for actions that are harmful to others, that needs to be treated quite differently.Infringe on the rights of others, inflict losses or accusations on others without justification for one's own rights, deal with others in a hypocritical or double-faced manner, bully others unfairly or unkindly, and even selfishly refuse to protect others Freedom from harm—all of which are proper objects of moral condemnation and, in grave cases, of moral revenge and moral punishment.Not only are these actions so, but the dispositions leading to them are also rightly immoral, and ought to be something that people disapprove of, or rather abhor.Cruelty, viciousness, and perverseness of temperament—these are the most antisocial and abhorrent of all emotions—jealousy, falsehood, and dishonesty, rage without sufficient cause, indignation unworthy of excitement , so as to overwhelm others, the desire to take extra advantage (the Greeks called it "injury"), the pride to be satisfied by putting others down, putting "I" and what "I" cares about above all else, And solipsism, which decides all questionable questions exclusively for its own benefit—all this is a moral evil, and constitutes a bad and abominable moral character.This is different from the shortcomings mentioned in the previous section that only concern oneself.Those shortcomings are not rightly considered immoral, nor do they constitute malevolence, however high they may be.They may be symptoms of a certain degree of stupidity or of a lack of personal dignity and self-respect; but they can only be objects of moral condemnation if the individual has to love himself for the sake of others without not knowing it and thus betrays his duty to others.What is called a duty to oneself is not a duty to society, unless circumstances make it a duty to others at the same time.If the term means anything more than prudence, it means self-respect or self-development; for which no one is accountable to his fellow-men, for they are not accountable to his fellow-men for the good of mankind. things.

The distinction between the loss of perceptions of others that a person naturally incurs due to a defect in self-prudence or personal dignity, and the condemnation he deserves for violating the rights of others is not merely a nominal one. distinguish. Whether he upsets us over things we think we have a right to control over him, or over things we know we don't have over him, is as much about us emotionally as it is about our behavior toward him. There is a huge difference.If he displeases us, we may express our dislike, and we may shun him just as we shun an object; but we do not therefore feel obliged to make his life uncomfortable.We will consider that he has received, or will receive, the full punishment of his fault; Punish him, but endeavor to lessen his punishment, by showing him how to avoid or remedy the misfortunes his actions have brought upon him.He may be before us an object of pity, perhaps of displeasure, but not of anger or indignation; we do not treat him as an enemy of society; The worst he can do is to let himself go, if we don't want to interfere in good faith by pointing out our interests to him.It would be a different matter if he violated, individually or collectively, the laws necessary for the protection of his fellow men.Then the evil consequences of his actions fall not on himself but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must avenge him, To inflict pain on him, care must also be taken to make the punishment sufficiently severe.In short, in this case he was a prisoner before our court, and we were not only bound to sit and judge him, but to arise in one form or another to execute our own sentence; and in In other cases it is not our duty to inflict upon him any pain, save that which happens to him which happens to occur in the exercise of the liberty which we all possess, which he also enjoys, to regulate our own affairs.

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life that is only about himself and that that involves others is something that many people would deny.They will ask: How can the conduct of one member of society, no matter what part, be a matter of indifference to the other members? Therefore, no one exists completely alone; if a person does something seriously or permanently harmful to himself, it is impossible for the harm not to extend at least to his relatives, and often to people outside his relatives.If he destroys his property, he does harm to those who depend, directly or indirectly, on its support, and generally reduces the general resources of the crowd by a greater or lesser amount.If he mutilates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings disaster upon all who depend upon him for some part of his happiness, but disqualifies himself from the ordinary servitude of his fellowmen, It may also be a burden to their sympathy or benevolence; the frequency of such an act would diminish the sum of goodness more than any crime.Finally, it is also said that even when a man's wickedness or stupidity does not directly harm others, his example is harmful; For the sake of thinking, he should also be forced to control himself.

It would be further said that, even if the consequences of wrongdoing could be confined to the wicked or thoughtless individual himself, should society give free rein to those who are manifestly unworthy of directing them?If it is admitted that children and minors are to be accorded protection against themselves, is not society equally bound to protect those who, though of mature age, are equally incapable of governing themselves? ?If gambling, drunkenness, urination, idleness, uncleanliness, etc., are as injurious to happiness, and as much in the way of progress, as many or most of the acts which laws outlaw, Why not try to ban them also under the condition of social convenience?To make up for the inevitable inadequacy of the law, should not public opinion at least organize itself into a strong police force against those vices, and to impose strict punishment on those found guilty of them? social punishment?It can be said that there is no such thing as restraining individuality or hindering new and original attempts in life.What is to be forbidden here is only things that have been tried and judged since the beginning of the world until the present day, things that experience has shown to be useless or unsuitable for any individual personality.A moral or intellectual truth must be regarded as established after the lapse of time and the accumulation of a certain amount of experience; Falling down the same precipice on which a man once stumbled and died.

I fully admit that the evils that a man does to himself affect those close to him badly, through their sympathy or interest, and, in a lesser degree, society generally.When, by such conduct, a man breaches a clear and assignable duty to one or more others, the case is classed outside the class of matters concerned only with himself, and should be placed under moral injustice. face to face questioning.If, for example, a person is unable to pay his debts through intemperance or extravagance, or if he has assumed the moral responsibilities of a family, he is unable to provide for his upbringing and education, this is certainly reprehensible, and even punishment is justified.But the point of reproach or punishment is his breach of duty to his family or creditors, not his profligacy.It would be equally as morally reprehensible if the sum which should have been assigned to them were to become useless by diversion into a most prudent investment.George Barnwell killed his uncle for his wife's fortune; but if he had done it for the sake of making a difference in business, he would have been hanged just as much.Again, a man who tends to cause distress to his family by indulging in bad habits, is certainly to be blamed for his unkindness or ingratitude; but he is equally to blame for developing habits which are not themselves evil , if it causes pain to those with whom he lives, or who, through personal ties, depend on him for his comfort.A mortal man who, being neither compelled by some more necessary duty, nor justified in his own choice, fails to give the interests and sentiments of others the consideration which they ordinarily deserve, becomes a The object of moral injustice; but this is for the consideration of that point, not for the reason why it is considered, still less for some faults that concern themselves only and may lead to remote causes.In the same way a man commits a social crime who, by a purely personal act, injures himself, and loses the capacity to perform some definite duty of duty to the public.No one should be punished for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk in the line of duty.In short, as soon as a matter has definite harm to individuals or the public, or has a definite threat of harm, it is taken out of the sphere of freedom and placed within the sphere of morality or law.

But if a person's conduct neither violates any particular duty to the public nor causes any perceived harm to any individual other than himself, the harm to society produced by such conduct is only accidental or so to speak. If it is of a presumed nature, then this little inconvenience society can bear for the greater good of human liberty.If a man of full age should be punished for failing to take proper care of himself, I would rather say that it is for his own sake than that it is to prevent him from incapacitating his own faculties so as to be of no use to society. Benefit—the benefit that society does not pretend to claim.But I disagree with an argument that would suggest that society has no way of raising its weaker members to the common level of reasonable behavior except by waiting for them to do something unreasonable and punishing them legally or morally. standard.Society has absolute power over men throughout the early years of their existence; and men have a whole period of childhood and adolescence in which society tries to see whether it can make them capable of rational conduct in life.The current generation is both the host of the training and the host of the entire environment for the future generation.It is true that one generation cannot make the next very wise, because it is itself so sadly wanting of goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always the most successful in individual cases. but it is still quite capable of making the Fangxing generation, taken as a whole, as good as itself, and a little better than itself.If society allows a considerable number of its members to grow up to be mere children, incapable of accepting the role of rational consideration of remote motives, society itself is to blame for the result.Society is armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the preponderance of accepted opinion, which is always over those who are unfit to judge for themselves; an unstoppable natural punishment of those known; let society no longer affirm the need for a power to order and enforce obedience in matters that concern the individual alone, where justice and policy In all principles, the decision should always be made by the individual himself who bears the consequences.Nothing tends to discredit and invalidate better means of influencing conduct than by means of worse means.If there is any material of grandeur and independence in the characters of men who are compelled to be prudent or temperate, they will never fail to resist the pressure.Such a person will never feel that others have a right to control him in his own affairs, as they have a right to prevent him from doing them harm in their own affairs; The show of courage, the deliberate soaring before this usurped authority, the ostentatious gesture of doing the exact opposite of what it commands, is like the Puritan morality in the time of Charles II. Such is the brutishness of intolerant fanaticism.As for the need to protect society from bad examples set by wicked or self-indulgent persons, of course, bad examples can be poisonous, especially in the case of a bad example of doing something wrong for which one is not guilty. especially.But we are now talking of an conduct which, without doing others wrong, assumes great harm to oneself; There is no other way of thinking than the example of evil, for if the matter reveals wrong conduct, it also reveals that a just condemnation of that conduct can be assumed to follow it in all or most cases. Painful or discrediting consequences. The strongest of all the arguments against public interference in purely private conduct is that, if the public does interfere, it mostly interferes wrongly, and in the wrong places.On questions of social morality, on questions of duty to others, the public opinion, that is, the opinion of the suppressed majority, though often wrong, is probably more often right; For your own interests, you only need to judge how a certain behavior will affect you if you allow it to be carried out.But where the opinion of an equal majority is imposed as law on a minority where the conduct of individuals is concerned only, it is about half right and wrong; for in such cases the so-called public opinion at best is The opinion of certain men as to the good, evil, or misfortune of others; often not even this, but the public, with utter indifference to the pleasure or convenience of passing over the objects of their disapproval, to consider how and where they please themselves. It's all about not being happy.There are many who regard any action which they dislike as an injury to themselves, and resent it as if it were an outrage upon their feelings.We often see a religious man, when accused of despising the religious sentiments of others, to retort that it is others who despise his religious sentiments by adhering to his abominable cult or creed.The emotion of one man's insistence on his opinion, and the emotion of another being offended by his adherence to it, have as little resemblance as a thief wishing to steal a purse and the owner wishing to keep it. These two desires have nothing in common.A man's tastes are as peculiarly a matter of himself as his opinions or his purse.Anyone can easily imagine an ideal public, in which individual freedom and choice are ignored in all undecided matters, but only asking them to abstain from those behaviors that have long been forbidden by common experience. But where is the public ever seen to draw such a limit on its inspection mission?When did the public ever worry about so-called universal experience?In fact, the public, when it interferes with private conduct, thinks seldom of anything other than how heinous it is to do or think differently from its own; Moralists and speculative writers are delivered to mankind as religious and philosophical edicts.They teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel them to be so.They tell us to bind ourselves and all others by letting our own minds and hearts search for laws of conduct. So what can the poor public do?It is only by applying these teachings that their own private sense of good and evil, if there is any considerable agreement between them, is imposed on the whole world as obligatory. The evils here pointed out are not merely theoretical evils.I may be expected, perhaps, to cite here a few particular instances of how the public of this age and this country have improperly ascribed the nature of the moral law to that of its own choosing.I am not writing a treatise on the derangement of present moral sentiments; and such a weighty subject obviously cannot be discussed by epistemology and illustration. But in order to show that the principles I advocate are of serious practical importance, and that I am not defending against imaginary disasters, some examples are necessary.It is not difficult to ample examples to show that it is one of the most general natural tendencies of the whole human race to extend the boundaries of the so-called moral police without infringing on the most unquestionable legal liberties of the individual. As a first example, let us consider what aversion people feel when they see other people's religious opinions differ from their own, and do not practice their own religious observances, and especially do not observe their own religious dietary laws.And cite a trivial example.Among the Christian creeds and behaviors, there is nothing that can arouse the great hatred of Muslims than eating pork.Few actions on the part of Christians and Europeans provoked such unadorned contempt from them as did Mohammedans towards this particular mode of relieving hunger.First, of course, this is an offense against their religion; but this is by no means sufficient to explain the degree and kind of their aversion, since alcohol is also forbidden in their religion, and anyone who participates in drinking is considered wrong by all Muslims. , but not as disgusting as that.Their distaste for the flesh of the "unclean beast" has a peculiar quality rather like an instinctive aversion. Once this unclean concept is thoroughly immersed in the emotions, it will continue to agitate and even personal habits are not limited to cleanliness The religious impure sentiments, so strongly expressed by the pagans, are an instance of this instinctive aversion.Now let us suppose that there is a people, of which Mohammedans are the majority, and that this majority then insists on the abstinence of pork within their borders; this is not a novelty among Mohammedans. ① The question is, can this be said to be a legitimate use of the moral authority of public opinion?If not, why not?This way of eating is really rebellious to such a public.And they do sincerely believe that this is forbidden by God.But the ban cannot be condemned as religious persecution.It may be religious in origin, but it cannot be said to be religious persecution, because no one's religion obligates eating pork.The only valid ground for condemning it, then, is that the public has nothing to do with private tastes and private affairs. 1 On this point, the case of the Parsee diaspora in Bombay may be cited as a curious case.The Bashi people are descendants of the Persian Zoroastrians, and they are a hard-working and enterprising tribe.When they fled to the West Indies to escape the rule of "cal ph" (cal ph is the title inherited from Muhammad's political and religious ruler-translator), the Indian authorities tolerated them and allowed They settled down on the condition that they were not allowed to eat beef. Later those areas fell under the rule of Mohammedan conquerors, from whom the Basí continued to receive favors, on condition that they abstained from eating pork.What began as a precept for obedience to authority has become second nature, and the Bashi still abstains from both beef and pork to this day.Such a double commandment, though not required by their religion, had long since become the custom of their tribes; and custom in the East is equal to religion. Consider again a case closer to home: in Spain, if anyone does not worship the Supreme Being after the Catholic model, most people regard it as a great disrespect, and consider it the highest offense against him; and there No other public worship is legal either.Throughout southern Europe a married priest is considered not only blasphemous, but lewd, unseemly, vulgar, and repulsive.What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincere sentiments and attempts to use them against non-Catholicism?If it is said that human beings are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in matters that do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible to exclude such cases without falling into a contradiction?And who can blame men for suppressing what they consider disgraceful in the eyes of God and man?Nothing can be more powerful in proscribing what is considered privately immoral than doing so to suppress it for the sake of evil in some minds; unless we are willing to adopt the logic of the persecutors and say that we can persecute others because we They cannot persecute us because they are wrong, and we must be careful not to admit a principle which, when applied to ourselves, would be so indignant as to be regarded as so unjust. For the examples mentioned above, there are still people who can retort forcefully that those are contingencies that are unlikely to happen here; Interference is required to worship according to one's creed or intention and to marry or not to marry.But here is another example of interference with liberty, by no means saying that we are past its perilous period.Wherever, as in New England as well as in republican Britain, the Puritans tried—and with no small success—to abolish all public and almost all private entertainment, especially music, wherever they were powerful enough, , dances, public games, or other gatherings for recreational purposes, and plays.Even now in our country there are not a few very large groups whose pastimes are reprehensible in their moral and religious views; This is the prevailing force in the kingdom's current social and political situation, so it is by no means impossible for them to gain a majority in the parliament sooner or later.Now imagine how the rest of the crowd would be willing to allow their imminent entertainment to be limited by the religious and moral sentiments of a cadre of added Calvinists and Methodists?Would they not, with considerable firmness, call this pious and almost presumptuous member of society to think about their own affairs?In fact, this is exactly what people say when any government or public asserts that no one should be allowed to enjoy what it thinks is wrong.But if the principles upon which it is presumptuously presumptuous are admitted, there is no reason against its being influenced in the sentiments of the majority or other superior powers in the country; and if a religious belief like the early settlers of New England The day comes when a so-called declining religion succeeds in regaining its lost ground, as so-called declining religions often do, and we will all have to be prepared to accept the idea of ​​a Christian state as they understand it. Imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to become reality than the one just said.There is clearly a rather strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic organization of society, with or without popular political institutions.有人肯定说，在这个趋势实现得最称完备即社会和政府二者都最称民主的国度——美国，多数人怀有一种情绪，看见有人过着自己没有希望赛过的铺张讲究的生活就觉得讨厌，这种情绪竟颇象一条有效的关于费用开支的法律在起着作用，使得在合众国中许多地方一个拥有很大收入的人竟难想出一个要花掉这笔收入而不致引起公众非难的方式。虽然这类说法作为现存事实的表述来看无疑有很多夸大之处，但就这种民主情绪并结合到认定公众有权否定个人用钱方式这一观念来看，他们所描画的事态确已不止是可以意想的和可能的结果，而且也是竟许会有的结果。我们还可以进一步想想社会主义者的意见如果已有相当的传布，拥有不止很小的财产或者不是靠双手劳动挣得收入这件事就会在大多数人心目中变得甚不名誉。 原则上与这些意见相同的意见已经在技工阶级中广泛得势，并且对于那些主要地服从那个阶级的意见的人们也就是本阶级的成员们发生重大的影响。大家知道，在工业许多部门的操作中构成多数的坏工人都坚决主张，坏工人应当和好工人得到一样的工资；无论采取计件制也好，或者采取他种办法也好，都不应当允许有谁以较高技巧或辛勤努力挣得多于那些既无技巧也不努力的人们所能挣得的工资。他们并且使用一种道德的警察力量，间或也变成一种物质的警察力量，去阻止有技巧的工人和使用他们的雇主，不得因较有用的服务而受授较大的酬金。如果公众对于私事应当有什么管辖权的话，那我就看不出这些人还有什么不对；而某一个人的特有公众要对他的个人行为行使一般公众所行使于一般人们的同一权威时，我也就看不出怎样还能去责难它。 再进一步，我们不必细论那些假设的事情，我们还可以看一看，即在我们自己的今天，就有一些对于私人生活自由的重大侵占已在实际实行着；还有一些更重大的侵占带有颇能成功的指望正在威胁着；还有一些意见已经建议出来，不仅主张公众要有无限权利用法律来禁止一切它所认为错误的事情，而且为了不要漏掉它所认为错误的事情，也要禁止一切它所认为无辜的事情。 在防止纵饮烈酒的名义之下，一个英属殖民地的人民和差不多半个合众国的人民已经遭到法律的禁止，除为医疗目的外，不得使用任何经过发酵的饮料；禁止发售酒类事实上就是，如他们所意想的，禁止使用酒类。虽然这个法律之窒碍难行已使有些采用过它的省分，其中还包括这个法律所因以命名的那个省分，不得不重予废止，可是我们这里仍然有人努力发动，并且还有许多自命为慈善家者以颇大的热情加以推进，要在我国也鼓动出一个同样的法律。为此目的而组织的协会，或如它自称的“联盟”，已因公开了一分来往信件而获得一些名声——这信件是联盟书记与那为数极少的主张政治家的意见应当根据原则的英国公众人物之一的通讯。史丹雷勋爵（Lord Stanley）之参加这次通讯，估计会增强那些深知象他在某些公开状态中所显出的一些品质竟不幸出于政治生活中头面人物之身是怎样稀罕难得的人们已经寄托在他身上的希望。联盟的机关据称“深以承认任何可被曲解来替执迷和迫害作辩解的原则为可悲”，于是就着手指出协会的原则与那种原则之间的“一条不可逾越的鸿沟”。他说，“我看，凡关于思想、意见、良心的问题，都在立法范围之外；凡属于社会行动、社会习惯、社会关系这些只应服从干国家所秉有而非个人所秉有的抉择权力的问题，则在立法范围之内”。这里却没有提到与二者都不相同的第三类，即并非社会的而系个人的行动和习惯，虽然饮用发酵饮料的行动无疑正是属于这一类。售卖发酵饮料是贸易，而贸易即是社会行动。 可是这里所控诉的不是侵犯了售卖者的自由而是侵犯了购买者和消费者的自由，因为国家故意使他无从得到酒就正是禁他饮酒。但是这位书记先生说，“作为一个公民，只要有人以社会行动侵犯了我的社会权利，我就要求有权利用立法手段来限制他”。现在且看所谓“社会权利”的定义又是什么。 “假如说有什么事侵犯了我的社会权利，那么出售烈性饮料无疑就是这种事。这事破坏了我首要的安全权利，因为它经常制造和促进社会紊乱。这事侵犯了我的平等权利，因为它从制造穷困中博取利润，而这穷困却要由我纳税来资助。这事还妨害了我的道德和智力自由发展的权利，因为它在我的道路四周布满了危险，因为它削弱了社会力量和败坏了社会道德，而这社会正是我有权利向它要求互助和交往的”。请看这样一套“社会权利”的理论——与它相似的理论以前大概还没有在语言文字上表现得这样清楚的呢——其内容不外是说：每个个人都具有绝对的社会权利要另外的每一个人在每一方面都做得象他所当做的一模一样；不论是谁只要在最小的细节上于此稍有所失，就算破坏了我的社会权利，我因而就有权向立法机关要求解除这种不平之苦。这样一条怪异的原则实在比任何一樁干涉自由的个别行动都要危险得多：它把每一樁破坏自由的行动都释为正当；它不承认有权利要求任何一点自由，只有暗持意见永不宣布的自由或许可以除外，因为凡属我认为有害的意见一出于任何人之口，就侵犯了联盟所赋予我的一切“社会权利”。这个教义又无异于派定全体人类彼此之间都秉有一种相互关切，每人对于他人都是要求者，每人都要以自己的标准去规定他人道德上的，智力上的、和甚至躯体上的完善。 非法干涉个人合法自由的另一重要事例是关于历行安息日制度的立法，这已不是仅在威胁中的干涉，而是久已见诸实行并且取得胜利结果的了。毫无疑义，只要生活急务许可，要在每周中有一天屏绝日常业务，这确不失为一种高度有益的习俗，虽然除犹太人外还未当作宗教义务来束缚任何人。并且，由于这个习俗若不在工业阶级间取得普遍赞同就不能得到遵守，所以在有些人一工作就会迫使他人也必得工作的情况下，法律为着对每人保证他人也遵守这个习俗，就规定较大的工业活动在特定的一日停工一天，这也是可以的，而且也是对的。但是这个理由系以他人直接关心每人是否遵守这一习惯为根据，所以若应用于个人可以自愿使用其休假时间的自由职业就有所不合。至于要用法律来限制娱乐，那更是在最小程度上也说不过去的了。不错，某些人一天的娱乐就是另外一些人一天的工作；但是，多数人的快乐——且不说这又是很有用的休养苏息——也就值得少数人为之劳动，只要这职业是自由选择也是能够自由放弃的话。厂工们会想，假如大家都在星期日工作，就等于必须做七天的工作而得六天的工资，这完全是对的；但是既然大量的服役已经停止，那些为着他人享乐而仍须工作的少数人所挣收入就可按比例得到增加；而且他们也不是有义务必须从事那些职业，假如他们宁愿休假而不愿领得补贴的话。如果还要找进一步的补救办法，也可以由习俗为那些工作特殊的人在一周中另定一天为假日。这样看来，要为在星期日限制娱乐这事作辩护，唯一的根据只能是说那娱乐在宗教上为错误；而这样一个立法动机正是无论怎样予以抗议都不嫌过于认真的。这真是所谓“关心上帝倒成为对上帝的伤害了”。要对在我们人类并无伤害而假定对全能上帝有所触犯的事情施以报复，乃是社会或其任何职员受之自上的一个使命，这一点还有待于证明。认定每人有义务使他人信奉宗教，这个观念正是历来一切宗教迫害的基础，承认了它，就充分证明宗教迫害为正当。现在有人一再力图在星期日停止火车旅行，有人一再抗拒在星期日开放博物馆，还有诸如此类的事；此中所迸发的情感虽没有旧时迫害者的残忍性，但所表示出来的心理状态则基本上是一样的。这就是决心不容他人做他们的宗教所许可的事，只因它不是迫害者的宗教所许可的事。这也是深信上帝不仅憎恶信仰有误的人的行动，而且认为我们不予阻挠也就不能免于罪戾。 在上文所举那些一般轻视人类自由的事例之外，我不禁还要加述一种干脆迫害的言论，这种言论是我国报章杂志上每当感到要去注意摩门教主义（Mormonism）的可注意的现象时就迸发出来的。这是一椿出乎意料也颇有教益的事实，有一种明言直陈的新启示和建立在它上面的一个宗教，纯系出于显而易见的欺骗，甚至连创始人也没有什么非常品质足立“威望”而作支柱，居然在今天这个报纸、铁路以及电报的时代里竟为千百万人所信仰，并且成为一个会社的基础；关于这可说的很多。我们这里所关心的是，这个宗教象其他的和更好的宗教一样，也有其殉教者；它的先知兼创始人竟为其教义之故而被一群暴民处死；它的其他许多附从者也遭到同样无法无天的强暴而送掉性命；他们集体地被强行驱逐出作为他们成长之地的祖国之外；而现在，在他们已被驱入沙漠当中的荒凉巢穴之后，我们国内还有许多人公开宣布应当（不过不方便）派遣一支远征军去对付他们，去用武力强使他们与他人的意见归于一致。摩门教主义之所以激起这种冲破宗教宽容的通常约束而迸发出来的强烈反感，主要是因为它在条款中认可了一夫多妻制；这个婚姻制度虽为回教徒、印度人以及中国人所允许，但在使用英国语言和自认为基督教徒的人们行来则会激起不能压熄的深恶痛绝。说到摩门教的这个制度，没有人会比我对它有更深的不谅的了；除因为其他原故外，还因为它远非自由原则所能赞许，是对于自由原则的直接破坏，因为它不过是把群体中一半人身上的枷锁扣紧钉牢，而把另一半人从他们对于那一半人的相互义务中解放出来。可是我们仍须记住，这种关系也和任何其他形式的婚姻制度下的关系一样，是有关的可能为它所苦的女人一方面的自愿的事；并且不论这事实看来怎样可怪，它到底在世人的普通观念和习俗中有其解释，那就是说，世人既教导女人把结婚看作一件必要的事，那便不难理解许多女人就会宁愿为诸妻之一，聊胜于不得为妻。对于其他国家，当然不必要求它们也承认这种结合，或者在摩门教的意见方面解除部分居民遵守本国的法律的义务。但是，当这些倡导者已经在他人的敌对情操面前作了远远超过所能合理要求于他们的让步；当他们已经离开了与他们的教义不能相容的国土而在大地上一个遥远角落首辟一块人类可以居住的地方并把自己安置下来之后；我就实在难于看出，人们除根据暴虐原则外还能根据什么原则去阻挡他们在自己所欢喜的法律之下在那里居住下去，只要他们既不侵略其他国族，又允许凡不满意于他们的办法的人都有离开那里的完全自由。新近有一位作家，并且还是一位在某些方面颇有名声的作家，建议（用他自己的字眼）不用十字军而用一个“文明军”去对付这个多妻制的群体，去结束掉在他看来是文明中的倒退。这在我看来也是倒退，但是我理会不到任何群体会有权利去强使另一个群体文明化。只要坏法律下的受难者一天不向别的群体乞求援助，我就一天不能承认与他们完全无关的人们应当插足进去，应当只因远在数千里之外的、无关涉的人们认为足致诽谤就要求把全体直接有关的人看来都感满意的事态强予结束。他们可以，假如他们高兴，派遣传教士前去用说教的办法反对它；他们也可以用任何公平的手段（压制宣教者不得开口则不是一个公平的手段）去反对相同的教义在本国人民间有所进展。如果还在野蛮称霸世界的时候文明就能战胜野蛮，而在野蛮已被相当压服之后反倒自认害怕野蛮会复活起来征服文明，那是没有必要的。一种文明如果竟能这样见折于自己已经征服的敌人，那必是它本身先已变得如此退化堕落，以致无论它的指定牧师和宣教者或者一切其他的人都已没有能力或者不愿自找麻烦去为它而挺身奋斗。假如真是这样，那么这种文明就该接受停止前进的通知，愈早愈好。它再走下去，也只是从坏走到更坏，直到被富有精力的野蛮人破坏净尽然后再生（象西方帝国那样）为止。