Chapter 8 CHAPTER VII: COMMUNICATIONS, CONFIDENTIALITY AND SOCIAL POLICY
In world affairs, two opposing and even contradictory trends have characterized recent years.On the one hand, we have unprecedentedly perfect domestic and international communication networks.On the other hand, the blind and excessive division of labor in military intelligence, under the influence of Senator McCarthy and his imitators, and their recent attacks on the State Department, have made our minds increasingly wary of leaks. The situation can only be compared with Venice in the historical Renaissance period.
The Venetian ambassadors had extremely accurate news-gathering agencies (which became one of the major sources of European history), and their national penchant for secrecy led to the extension of these agencies to the point where the state ordered the assassination of diaspora. Artisans, in order to maintain a monopoly on certain select arts and crafts. The modern game of "cops and robbers" - which seems to mark Russia and the United States, the two main contenders for world supremacy in this century - recalls the ancient Italian farce of "cloak and dagger" played in a more Perform on a large stage.
Renaissance Italy was also the region where modern science suffered childbirth.Science today, however, is a far greater enterprise than that of Renaissance Italy.It should now be possible for us to examine all elements of information and secrecy in the modern world in terms of a more mature and objective mind than in Machiavelli's time.This is especially the case in view of the facts stated above: the present study of communication problems has reached a degree of independence and authority which qualifies it as a science.What does this modern science have to tell us about the state and functions of communication and secrecy?
I wrote this book primarily for Americans.In the American environment, problems of information are evaluated in standard American terms: a thing is only as valuable as its entry into the open market as a commodity.This is the official orthodoxy, which is increasingly viewed with suspicion by residents of the United States.It may be worthwhile to point out that this doctrine does not represent a common ground of human values: it is neither comparable to the doctrine of the Church, which seeks the salvation of the human soul; Ideal to evaluate a society's doctrine quite.In the typical American world, the fate of information becomes something that can be bought and sold.
I do not mean to find fault with the morality and wisdom of the businessman's attitude.My task is to point out that this attitude leads to misunderstanding and mistreatment of information and related concepts.I will discuss this issue in several areas, starting with patent law.
Patent certificates grant inventors a limited monopoly on their inventions.To him, a patent certificate was a charter, and a charter was a chartered company.Behind our patent law and patent policy is the default philosophy of private property and the rights that come with it.This philosophy very closely represents the actual situation in the period which is now drawing to a close, when inventions were generally made in factories by skilled artisans.This philosophy does not even provide a barely viable picture of the inventive enterprise of today.
The standard philosophy of the patent office presupposes a skilled worker.He possesses what is commonly called a mechanical inventiveness, which, through a series of trials and failures, develops from a certain technique to a higher level, manifested in a specialized instrument.
The law of patents distinguishes the inventive talent necessary to make this new tool from that which is necessary to discover the scientific facts of the world.The latter inventive faculty is enumerated under the head of the discovery of the laws of nature; and in America, as in many countries with a similar industrial practice, the law denies the scientist any private right to the laws of nature which he may discover.It follows that, at one point, the distinction was purely practical, for the factory inventor had one tradition and background, and the scientist had a very different tradition and background.
One would obviously not mistake Daniel Doyce in Dickens' Liitle Dorrit for a member of the Mudfog Association he talks about elsewhere our.
Dickens praised the former as a technical worker full of common sense, with a strong thumb like a manual worker, and an honest attitude that always faces the facts; It's just a reputation nickname.Dickens slandered the latter as a band of useless dreamers, using ironic language that Steinft would not have thought unsuitable for describing the crooks of Naples.
At present, such an experimental institution of modern scientific research as the Bell Telephone Laboratories, even if it retains Doyce's practicality, is actually composed of the descendants of the McFly Society.If we regard Faraday (Faraday) as an outstanding and typical member of the early British Association for the Advancement of Science, then, to the researchers of today's Bell Telephone Laboratories, this chain is complete. Heaviside to Campbell and Shannon.
In the early days of modern invention, workers were far from mastering science.Locksmiths can then rate the level of mechanical ability.According to Watt, a piston is suitable for use in a steam engine cylinder only if a thin sixpence piece fits between the two.Steel is forged by skilled workers to forge swords and other weapons.Iron is the product of iron smelters, with strange shapes and mixed with slag.Daniel Dawys certainly has a long way to go before we can replace Daniel Dawys with a practical scientist like Faraday.The policy of Great Britain, even when embodied in an institution as clear-sighted as Dickens's "Ministry of Procrastination," would simply veto Dawys as the real inventor. No wonder, gentlemen of the McFever Society.Generations of bureaucrats the Barnacle family would torture Dawys like a ghost until they stopped making him run from office to office because deep down they were afraid of him, They are afraid that he will become the representative of the new industrial system and crowd them out; as for the gentlemen of the Maifo Association, they neither fear nor respect nor understand.
In the United States, Edison represented the official transition between the membership of the Doyce and Maifer associations.He was very much a Doyce himself, and he even wanted very much to be a Doyce in the name of it.But even so, he selected many people from the Mai Fu camp as his staff.His greatest invention was the invention of the Industrial Research Laboratory, which turned the invention into a business.General Electric, the various Westinghouse enterprises, and Bell Telephone Laboratories followed in his footsteps, employing hundreds of scientists, whereas Edison employed only a few dozen.Invention no longer meant the occasional insight of a factory worker; it became the result of careful and extensive research by a competent group of scientists.
Invention is now losing its equivalent as a commodity more and more, as organizations of the intellectual activity of emergent inventions are everywhere.What are the conditions for a thing to become a good commodity?In a nutshell, he said that the condition was that its value be essentially unchanged from one hand to another, and that at the same time the parts of the commodity should be mathematically additive like the money they are worth.The ability of self-conservation is a very convenient characteristic of good commodities.For example, a certain amount of electric energy has the same amount at both ends of the wire except for a small loss. Therefore, it is not too difficult to give a corresponding price to several kilowatt-hours of electric energy.The same applies to the law of conservation of matter.Our usual standard of value is the amount of gold, and gold is a particularly stable substance.
Information, on the other hand, is not so easy to conserve, because we have already mentioned that the amount of information transmitted by communication is related to a non-additive quantity called entropy. The difference between it and entropy is an algebraic symbol and a Possible numeric factors.Just because entropy has a tendency to increase spontaneously in a closed system, information also has a tendency to decrease spontaneously; just because entropy is a measure of disorder, information is a measure of order.Neither information nor entropy is conserved, and both are equally unsuitable as commodities.
Let us examine information or order in economic terms, using a pair of gold jewelry as an example.The value of gold jewelry includes two parts: the value of gold and the value of "facon", that is, the value of artistic processing.When we mortgage an old piece of jewelry to a pawnbroker or sell it to a jeweler, the fixed value of the piece of jewelry is limited to gold.Whether the value of the style is considered or not depends on many factors, such as the persistence of the seller, the popularity of the style when the jewelry was made, pure artistic skills, and the history of the jewelry from the perspective of the museum. Value and the persistence of buyers and so on.
Much wealth has been lost through ignorance of the difference between these two types of value, gold's and style's.The stamp market, the second-hand book market, the antique market, and the Dancon Pfeiffer furniture market are all man-made markets, because, apart from the real pleasure in owning such things, most of the style value is not just in the things themselves. rarity, and is related to the active purchasing power that exists temporarily to compete for the item.An economic crisis, which limits the possible purchasing power, can reduce the price of the thing four or five times, and a large fortune can be wiped out simply because of a lack of bidders.If another new fashion crowds out the old one from the attention of the far-sighted collector, the slowest goods are once again withdrawn from the market.There is no constant common denominator for the tastes of collectors unless they all reach the highest standard of aesthetic value.Thus even the prices paid for famous paintings reflect to a large extent the buyer's desire for fame and wealth and sophistication.
Treating works of art as commodities raises a host of questions of importance to information theory.First of all, except for those narrow-minded collectors who want to lock up all their collections forever, physical possession of artworks is neither a sufficient condition for people to appreciate it nor a prerequisite for people to enjoy it. necessary condition.In fact, there are several classes of art that are meant for public appreciation rather than private appreciation; the question of who owns it is almost irrelevant.A great mural does not necessarily serve as negotiable securities, and neither does the building on which it is painted on its wall.Whoever is the ostensible owner of these works of art is at least trying to distribute them to a certain number of people who frequent the buildings, usually anyone in the world.He couldn't put these works of art in a safe, and only took them out to enjoy them with a few connoisseurs during meals, nor could he seal them up as private property.Only a few wall murals were painted by accident in secret places, and Siqueiros painted one to decorate a large wall in a Mexican prison where he served his sentence as a political prisoner.
We will stop here with regard to the purely material possession of works of art.The issue of ownership in art is much more complicated.Let's look at the problem of reproduction of works of art.Undoubtedly, the most beautiful essence of artistic appreciation can only be obtained from the original, but it is equally true that a person who has never seen the original of a masterpiece can develop a wide and deep appreciation. The vast majority of the aesthetics of Quali can be conveyed by a good quality reproduction.The same is true of music.In appreciating a piece of music, the listener can gain something important if he attends the concert, but even so, in order to understand this performance, he has to learn in advance, prepare, and his appreciation will are improved so much by listening to good records that it is difficult to say which of the two experiences is more important.
From a proprietary perspective, the right to reproduce is governed by our copyright laws.There are, however, other rights that copyright law fails to enshrine, almost all of which raise the question of whether anyone is entitled to be, in a valid sense, the owner of an artistic creation.Thus, the question of what constitutes a true original arises.For example, during the early Renaissance, perspective was a new discovery of the artist, and an artist who skillfully exploits this element in his surroundings can give a person great pleasure.Durer, Da Vinci and their co-contemporaries exemplify the interest that the giants of the art world found in this new discovery.But since perspective is a technique which, once mastered, quickly loses interest, what was once great in the hands of the original author is now the object of every sentimental, business-minded artist designing a calendar. Can use the method freely.
What has been said before does not seem worth repeating; in order to evaluate the information value of a painting or a literary work, we cannot but know that it contains those things that have not been digested by everyone in the works of modern and ancient people. thing.Only independent information is nearly additive.The messages elicited by the second-rate replicators are far from independent of the previous ones.Thus, the stereotyped love story, the stereotyped detective story, the popular and successful stories in popular magazines, etc., are governed by the letter, not the spirit, of copyright law.There is no copyright law that prohibits a film from succeeding in seducing the middle and lower classes into an interest in this emotional state with a series of vulgar scenes.We have no means of copying new mathematical ideas, nor of new theories such as natural selection, nor of anything else new except to make identical copies of the same ideas in the same words.
Again, the prevalence of clichés is no accident; it is inherent in the nature of information.Ownership of information entails the following disadvantage: To enrich the general information of a society, the information must say something qualitatively different from the society's former public stockpile.In the great literary classics, a great deal of information of obvious value is even discarded simply because people are already familiar with their content.The student doesn't like Shakespeare because, to him, Shakespeare is nothing more than a bunch of familiar quotations.Only after one has studied the writer deeply and got rid of the part adopted by the shallow clichés of the time, can we rebuild the rapport with the writer and make a new evaluation of his works Come.
According to this point of view, the interesting thing is that some writers and painters, although they have opened the door of an era by extensive exploration on the road of sensibility and intellect, still have no respect for their contemporaries and followers for many years. has an almost destructive effect.A country like Picasso, who went through many periods and developed many art forms, finally uttered all the words that the tongue was about to say in this era, and finally changed the creations of his contemporaries and younger generations. It was dull.
Where is the inherent limit of the commodity nature of communication, it is difficult to cause everyone to think about this issue generally.Ordinary people think that the job of Micinas is to buy and collect art, not to encourage the artists of the time to create.Quite on a par with this, ordinary people believe that it is possible to store the military and scientific secrets of the country in quiet libraries and laboratories, just as it is possible for us to store weapons used in the last war on credit in Same in the armory.
Such people do go a step further: the information obtained in their own country's laboratories is the property of their own country morally, and if other countries use this information to work, it may not only be the product of treasonous behavior, but also Essentially theft.He couldn't imagine any kind of information without an owner.
In a world of constant change, the idea that information can be hoarded without it seriously depreciating is absurd.
It is no less absurd than the more plausible and false proposition mentioned later: After a war, we can collect our existing weapons, rub them with engine oil, seal them in rubber bags, and let them wait for the next war coming.However, considering the various changes in warfare technology, although rifles can still be well stored, tanks are far behind, and warships and submarines are even less of a problem.In fact, the effectiveness of a weapon is strictly determined by what weapon it is opposed to at a particular time, and by the whole conception of war at that time.This result has been confirmed more than once: a huge stockpile of weapons can lead military policy in the wrong direction, so.When we still have the freedom to correctly choose the necessary tools to prevent new disasters, we have created very favorable conditions for the arrival of new disasters.
On the other hand, economically, the British example shows that this is clearly true.Britain was the first country to undergo a full-scale industrial revolution; its heritage of narrow-gauge railways, obsolete and heavily invested spinning mills, and the limitations of its social institutions from the pre-revolutionary period made modern increasingly The needs of growth translate into serious crises that can only be overcome by a method equivalent to a social revolution and an industrial revolution.At present, even the most emerging countries, when they industrialize, can take advantage of the latest and most economical equipment, can build a railway system that meets modern needs, and use economically sized carriages to transport goods, and can live today. Instead of living in the age of a hundred years ago, however, all this continues to happen.
What is true of England is also true of New England.In New England, it was found that the modernization of industrial enterprises often cost a considerable sum of money, much more expensive than tearing down the old ones and rebuilding new ones elsewhere.Apart from the difficulties of relatively strict industrial laws and progressive labor policies, one of the main reasons for the reluctance of the textile industry to establish itself in New England, as the mill owners confess, was that they did not want to Bound by century-old traditions.It can be seen from this that even in the field where raw material processing plays a major role, the production process and labor protection must be continuously innovated and developed in the final analysis.
Information is not so much designed for storage as it is for circulation.A nation is most secure when the state of information and science is adapted to its needs—a nation where the importance of information is fully realized as the basis for our observation of the outside world. A stage in the continuum of effective action towards the outside world.In other words, record the results of scientific research in detail in books and articles and then mark them as "confidential documents"
Storing in libraries, no matter how huge the total amount, is not enough to keep us safe for any length of time, because the available information in the world is constantly increasing.For the human brain, there is no Maginot Line.
To reiterate, people cannot help but participate in the continuous flow of being influenced by and acting on the outside world while alive, and in this continuous flow, we are only intermediaries connecting the past and the future.In other words, to live in a world of constant change means to participate in the continuous development of knowledge, in the unimpeded exchange of knowledge.Under perfectly normal circumstances, it is far more difficult, and much more important, to ensure that we have sufficient applicable knowledge of the kind mentioned above than to ensure that a possible enemy does not have such knowledge.The overall approach of the military research laboratory is to take the opposite line from our own optimal use of information and optimal development of information.
During the Great War I was partly responsible for the solution of a certain type of integral equations, not only in my own work but in at least two projects which were quite unrelated to each other.I know that one of these two plans must have such an equation; as for the other plan, I believe that it should also appear during a preliminary discussion of participating in the work.Since there are three applications of the same idea, which belong to three entirely different military programs, have completely different degrees of secrecy, and are carried out in different places, it is impossible to tell any one of them to the other.As a result, what could have been used jointly by the three departments required three separate but identical discoveries.The resulting time delay is about half a year to a year, maybe even more.
In terms of pecuniary expenditure (which is of course insignificant in war), the total amounted to the annual wages of a large number of the highest paid personnel.It would take as much trouble for an enemy to gain an application of comparable value from this work as it would cost us to redo the entire work.You must know that it is impossible for the enemy to join our production seminars held informally or even arranged by secret agencies, so he has no chance to be in a position to evaluate and use our research results.
In all methods of estimating the value of information, the issue of time plays an important role.For example, a code or cipher that contains any degree of confidentiality is not only a lock that is difficult to open, but also a lock that takes a considerable amount of time to open correctly.Tactical intelligence suitable for small unit combat is almost certain to be outdated after an hour or two.Whether it can be broken by others within three hours is a matter of little significance. The most important thing is that the officer who received the message should be able to read it within two minutes.On the other hand, larger battle plans are too important to rely on codes of this limited secrecy.But even so, if it took an officer all day to decipher the plan after he received it, the delay would be more serious than any level of disclosure.Codes and ciphers concerning entire campaigns or foreign policy may and should be more impenetrable, but there is absolutely no code or cipher which cannot be broken within any limited time and yet contains a significant amount of information , rather than a small collection of discrete individual judgments.
Usually, the way to break a cipher is to find a use case of the cipher long enough that experts can figure out its encoding pattern.Generally speaking, there must be at least a minimum of repetition in these patterns, otherwise the very short and non-repetitive telegrams would not be decipherable.However, when a batch of telecommunication is compiled from the same type of cipher, even if there are various changes in the details of the cipher, there may be enough common points between these different telecommunication to lead to deciphering. The first thing is to find out the general type of cipher , and figure out that unique password.
Perhaps the greatest talent manifested in declassification is largely unpublished in the annals of the various secrecy agencies, but is to be found in the writings of the epigraphists.We all know how the Rosetta Stone understood the inscriptions engraved on it through the interpretation of some Egyptian hieroglyphs (that is, knowing that they are the names of the Ptolemys).But there is a work of decoding, whose significance is even greater.The greatest and unique example of this art of deciphering is deciphering the secrets of nature itself, which is what scientists do.
The discoveries of science explain the existence system for our own convenience, but the existence system was created without any consideration for our convenience.It turns out that the most durable things in the world that are suitable for secrecy and protected by complex code systems are the laws of nature.Therefore, in the possibility of cracking secrets, in addition to directly attacking people's secret means and document secret methods, we always have the possibility to attack the most essential letter code in all letter codes.It seems impossible to invent a kind of artificial code which is so difficult to decipher as natural codes such as atomic nuclei.
In deciphering the code, the most important thing, in terms of the information we can obtain, is that the information we read is not some obscure knowledge.The common way to confuse the decipherer is to mix in the real message an undecipherable message, that is, a bunch of meaningless messages, words that don't make sentences.In the same way, when we consider aspects of nature such as atomic reactions, atomic explosions, etc., the most isolated information that we can make public is the announcement that they exist.But when a scientist is confronted with a question he knows has an answer, his whole attitude changes.It can be said that he is already about 50% close to that answer.
From this point of view, it is quite appropriate to say that one of the mysteries about the atomic bomb, which should have been kept secret but which has become known and unhindered to all potential enemies, is the possibility of its manufacture .
The question is so important, and the scientific community believes it has an answer, that both the intelligence of scientists and the equipment of existing laboratories are so widely distributed that the work can be done anywhere in the world at a cost of After a few years of hard work, it can be realized almost independently.
There is at present in this country a naive belief that we are the sole proprietors of a certain technology called "know-how," which not only guarantees our success in all scientific and technological developments and in all major Inventive predominance, and, as we have said, guarantees us a moral right to this predominance. It is true that this "expertise" is the national ancestry of those who work on problems like the atomic bomb Irrelevant. It is no longer possible to keep Bohr in Denmark, Fermi in Italy, Szilard in Hungary and many other scientists involved in this work together for a long time. It is possible. Such a co-operation was possible in the past due to the extreme awareness of the exigencies of events and the general outrage aroused by the threat of the Nazis. Working together requires more than hyperbole; when it comes to rearmament, State Department policy often seems to get us in the way.
There can be no doubt that we have the most highly developed technology in the world capable of bringing together the energies of large numbers of scientists and large sums of money to carry out a project.But this should in no way make us overly content with our scientific position, since it is equally clear that we are producing a young generation who cannot contemplate any scientific project except by a great deal of manpower and money.The French and the English have produced instruments with a skill which an American schoolteacher would dismiss with contempt as a sloppy work of wood and string; Can't be found either, with very few exceptions.The current fashion for large laboratories is something new in science.
There are those of us who want to conceive of it as never being obsolete, however, when the scientific ideas of our generation become obsolete or at least provide far less return on our investment in knowledge But I do not foresee the ability of the next generation to come up with great ideas as the natural basis for great projects.
A clear understanding of the concept of information as applied to scientific work shows that two pieces of information are of little value if they exist independently, whereas if they are well combined in someone's mind or in a laboratory, they are worthless. can enrich each other.The following organization is completely incompatible with this requirement: each member of which walks on the predetermined road, when the scientific sentinel reaches the end of his patrol area, raises his gun, turns back, and walks along the road. way back.The mutual contact of two scientists can be extremely fruitful, can animate science, but only if at least one of the representatives of science is far beyond the front to be able to Draw on ideas from adjacent fields to form an effective set of ideas.The natural means of achieving this type of organization is to let each scientist's research direction be determined by his own field of interest, rather than assigning him a patrol zone in advance.
Such light organizations exist even in America; but at present they are the efforts of a few impartial men, not the framework of planning imposed on us by those who think they know what is good for us.We, the scientific masses, however, are not in the slightest responsible for the superficial incompetence of those appointed and self-appointed as our superiors, and for the dangers that exist today.It is the rich and powerful who demand the strictest secrecy of everything in modern science that may have military applications.This demand for secrecy is about the same as that of a sick civilized society who does not want to know the progress of its disease.As long as we continue to play deaf and dumb and think that everything is going well in the world, let's plug our ears and Baker hear the voice of "fathers and fathers prophesied war."
In this new attitude of most scientists to scientific research lies a revolution in science that is far from being recognized by the public.Indeed, the authorities in charge of modern scientific research did not foresee the full consequences of what was happening.In the past, the direction of scientific research was mainly determined by the interests of individual scholars and the trend of the times.At present, there is a completely different attempt to direct scientific research to social security issues, so that all meaningful research approaches must be developed as much as possible with the purpose of strengthening an impenetrable scientific defense.Science today is no longer an individual enterprise, and the further advancement of the boundaries of science has produced not only a variety of weapons that we can use against possible enemies, but also the dangers associated with these weapons.This may be due to the fact that our weapons are either precisely those that can be used against ourselves more effectively than against any enemy, and the requirement is that our use of weapons such as the atomic bomb hazards such as radioactive contamination.As we actively and simultaneously seek means of attacking our enemies and defending ourselves, the accelerated pace of science has created an unprecedented need for new research.During World War II, for example, the focus of research in the laboratories at Oakleigh and Rose Alamos was how to protect the American people from the use of atomic bombs to protect them from possible enemies, and to protect them from the atomic radiation brought about by our burgeoning industry--this is one of our present immediate problems.
If there is no war, these dangers may not be encountered in the next twenty years.Within the framework of our present military thinking, the existence of these dangers has compelled us to formulate possible countermeasures with regard to new methods of employing these means on the part of the enemy.At present, this enemy may be Russia, but it is more a mirage created by our own imagination.In order to defend ourselves against this phantom, we must seek by all means new scientific means, each more terrible than the last.This great spiral of divine revelation has no end.
Above we have described a truly game-like lawsuit in which adversaries can and are compelled to use total deception, so that each is compelled to devise a strategy which inevitably takes into account the other's probable optimal play.
Whatever is true in the skirmishes of the courts is equally true in the mortal struggle of international relations, whether it takes the form of bloody shooting or mild diplomacy.
Secrecy, message jamming, and deception are all techniques designed to ensure that one side can use communication power and means of communication more effectively than the other side.在这样一场使用信息的战斗中，保持自己一方的通讯通路的开放和妨碍对方所支配的通讯通路的利用具有同等重要的意义。为了保密而全面制订出来的策略差不多总是要涉及保密以外的许多其他事情的考虑的。
我们是处在这种人的地位上，他在生活方面仅有两种野心：一是想去发明能够溶解任何固体的万能溶剂，再是想去发明能够容纳任何液体的万能容器。不论这位发明家怎么做去，他都是白费功夫。何况，我已经讲过，任何一种秘密，当它的保护工作和人的诚实性有关时，就不可能比它的保护工作决定于科学发现自身的种种困难更为安全了。
我已经讲过，任何科学秘密的传播都只不过是时间问题；在这场博奕中，十年就是一段长时间了，而且，从长期着眼，武装我们自己和武装我们的敌人并波有什么区别。
因此，每次骇人的发现只不过加强了我们的屈从性，屈从于从事新发现的需要。如果我们的领导人对于这种情况没有新的认识的话，那它就不得不一直这样地继续下去，直到我们地球上的关于智能方面的全部潜力都耗费得一无所剩，再该有任何可能对旧的和新的人种的多种多样的需要作出建设性的应用为止。这些新武器出现的结果一定要使地球上的熵增加起来，直到热与冷、善与恶、人与物质之间的一切区别消失殆尽，变成了一颗灼热的、熔炉般的新星。
我们就象一群加大拉的猪一样，让当代的群鬼附身，科学战争的使人不由自主的性质正把我们驱使得晕头转向，倒栽葱地掉进自我毁灭的海洋中。也许，我们可以说，在那些自以为职在指导我们和那些掌管科学新计划的绅士们当中，许多人无非是见习术士，对制造怪事的符咒神魂颠倒，以致自己完全无力收场。在他们手里，甚至新发明的广告心理学和推销员心理学也变成了促使有才能的科学家免受良心谴责的方法，变成了破坏这些科学家所树立的旨在不使自己牵连到漩涡里去的障碍物的方法了。
让这些为了个人目的而招致魔鬼谴罚的聪明人记住：在事件的自然进程中，一次出卖良心就会出卖第二次。人性的尊严可以用巧妙分配行政管理蜜饯的办法来摧毁，代之而起的乃是有权有势的长官架子，只要我们可以得到更大一块的蜜饯，这副架势就会一直保留着。这种做法总有一天要变成我们自己安全的最大的潜在威胁。到了那个时候，当另外一个强国（它可以是法西斯国家或是共产主义国家）能够提供更大的奖赏时，我们的那些一再促使我们去保护他们所让出的利益的好朋友们就要以尽快的手段促使我们屈服和灭亡的。让那些从九泉深处唤起原子战争的幽灵的人们（为了他们自己的原故，如果不是为了我们）记住：他们一定不用等待太久的，一当我们的敌人取得成功的第一刹那到来时，就会把那些已经堕落了的人们置之于死地， ；
第七章：通讯、保密和社会政策在世界事务中，两种对立的甚至矛盾的趋势成为近些年的特点。一方面，我们有空前完善的国内的和国际的通讯网。另一方面，在参议员麦卡锡（McCarthy）及其模仿者的影响之下，军事情报盲目而过度的分工以及他们最近对国务院的种种抨击，使得我们的思想日益趋于谨防泄密的状态，这种情况只能用历史上文艺复兴时期的威尼斯来比拟。
威尼斯的大使们拥有极其准确的新闻搜集机构（它们成为欧洲史研究的主要来源之一），加上他们对于秘密有民族性的爱好，使得这些机构竟然扩展到这个地步：国家下令暗杀侨居国外的工匠，以此来维持某些精选的艺术品和工艺品的垄断地位。“警察和强盗”这一现代游戏——似乎标志着俄国和美国这两个本世纪世界霸权的主要竞争者——令人想起了古意大利的“斗篷和短剑”这出闹剧在一个更为广大的舞台上演出。
文艺复兴时期的意大利也是现代科学经受临盆痛苦的地区。然而，今天的科学是一项远比文艺复兴时期意大利的科学巨大得多的事业。我们现在按照某种比马基雅弗利时代更为成熟、更为客观的思想来考查现代世界中信息和保密方面的一切因素应该是可能的。鉴于前面讲过的事实，情况尤宜如此：目前关于通讯问题的研究，就其独立和权威的程度而言，已经达到使它有权成为一门科学了。这门现代科学对于通讯和保密的状况及其职能不得不告诉我们的东西是什么呢？
我写这本书主要是给美国人看的。在美国人的生活环境中，信息的种种问题都是按照标准的美国眼光来评价的：一物之有价值就在于它作为一项商品之进入公开市场的情况。这是官方的正统学说，它愈来愈会受到美国居民的怀疑。我们指出这个学说不能代表人类价值的共同基础，也许是值得的：它既不与教会的学说即寻求人类灵魂得救之路的学说相当；也不与马克思主义的学说即以实现人类福利的若干特定理想以评价一个社会的学说相当。在典型的美国世界中，信息的命运变成了某种可以买卖的东西。
我不是存心找岔子，去指摘生意人的态度是否道德和明智。我的任务是指出：这种态度导致了对信息及其有关概念的误解和错待。我将在儿个领域中讨论这个问题，先从专利法谈起。
专利证明书就是授予发明家对其发明物以有限的垄断权。对他说来，专利证明书就是特许状，而一个特许状就是一家特许公司。在我们的专利法和专利政策的背后，就是大家所默认的关于私有财产以及由此而来的种种权利的哲学。这种哲学非常近似地代表了目前正将结束的时期中的实际情况，在那个时期中，发明物一般是由熟练技工在工厂里做出来的。对于今天的发明事业讲来，这种哲学甚至提供不出一个勉强可用的图景了。
专利局的标准哲学就是预先假定有位技术工人。他具有一般所谓的机械发明才能，通过一系列的试验和失败，然后由一定的技术发展到更高的水平，体现为一种专门仪器。
专利法把制出这种新工具所必需的发明才能同另一种发明才能，即发现世界上的种种科学事实所必需的发明才能区别开来。后一种发明才能是列在自然规律的发现这个项目下面的；在美国，如同在许多具有类似的工业实践的国家里一样，法律否认科学家对他可以发现到的自然律有任何私有权。由此可知，在某个时候，这种区分完全是从实际出发的，因为工厂发明家有一种传统和背景，而科学家则有一种与之迥然不同的传统和背景的。
人们显然不会把狄更斯的《小多立特》（Liitle Dorrit）一书中的但尼尔?道意斯（Daniel Doyce）错认作他在别处谈到的麦佛协会（Mudfog Association）的会员们的。
狄更斯赞美前者是一位富有常识的技术工人，有手工工人的租壮的大拇指头，有永远面对事实的诚实态度；至于麦佛协会，那只不过是不列颠科学促进会早期的一个有损声誉的诨号而已。狄更斯诽谤后者是由一批一无用处的梦想家组成的团体，他所用的讽刺语言，斯成夫特不会认为不适于用来描写拿普大的骗子手们的。
目前，象贝尔电话实验室这样一个现代科学研究的实验机构，即使它还保持着道意斯的实用性，实际上都是由麦佛协会的子孙们所组成。如果我们把法拉第（Faraday）看作不列颠科学促进会早期的一个卓越而典型的会员的话，那么，到了今天的贝尔电话实验室的研究人员，这根链条就是完整的了，它经由麦克斯韦和亥维塞（Heaviside）到坎贝尔（Campbell）和申农（Shannon）。
在现代发明的初期，工人远没有掌握科学。锁匠就能评定机械能力的等级。按照瓦特的看法，一个活塞是否适用于蒸气机气缸，就看一个薄薄的六辨士铜币能否刚好塞进二者之间。钢是技术工人炼制出来的，用来铸造刀剑和其他武器。铁是炼铁工人的产物，形状七古八怪，还混着矿渣子。在我们能有一位象法拉第那样善于实践的科学家来代替但尼尔?道意斯之前，他的确得走一段很长的道路。大不列颠的政策，甚至当这种政策是由目光如豆的、象狄更斯小说中的“拖沓部”那样的机构体现出来时，它会直截了当地把道意斯当作真正的发明家，而否决了麦佛协会的绅士们，这是不足为奇的。世代相传的官僚主义者柏纳可的家族（Barnaclefamily）会把道意斯折磨得象个鬼，直到他们不再叫他一个机关又一个机关地奔走为止，因为他们内心深处是害怕他的，怕他变成新工业体系的代表人而把他们排挤掉的；至于麦佛协会的绅士们，他们既不害怕，也不尊敬，更不了解。
在美国，爱迪生（Edison）代表了道意斯和麦佛协会会员之间的正式过渡。他本人非常象个道意斯，他甚至非常想做一个名符其实的道意斯。但虽然如此，他从麦佛阵营中挑选出许多人作为自己的职员。他的最大发明就是发明了工业研究实验室，把发明事业变成了生意经。通用电气公司、威斯汀豪司公司的各个企业以及贝尔电话实验室都是步着他的后尘的，雇用了好几百个科学家，而爱迪生只不过雇用了几十人而已。发明已经不再意味着工厂工人偶而有之的洞察力了，它变成了一批胜任其事的科学家进行细致而广泛的研究的成果。
现在，由于到处都有从事应急发明的智力活动的组织，发明正日益失去它的作为商品的等同物。一物之成为好商品的条件是什么呢？扼要他说，这条件就是：它的价值要能从一手转到另一手时本质地不变，同时，该商品的各个部分应当如所值的金钱那样地在数学上是可加的。自身守恒的能力乃是好商品所具有的一种对人非常方便的特性。例如，一定量电能，除了微少的损耗外，在导线的两端数量相同，因此，给若干千瓦一时的电能以相应的价格就不是太难的事情了。同样的情况也适用于物质守恒定律。我们通常的价值标准是黄金的量，而黄金就是一种特别稳定的物质。
信息，在另一方面，不是那么容易守恒的，因为我们前面已经讲到，通讯所传递的信息量是和一个叫作熵的非可加量有关，它和熵的差别是一个代数符号和一个可能的数值因子。正因为熵在闭合系统中有自发增加的趋势，所以信息也就有自发降低的趋势；正因为熵是无秩序的量度，所以信息是秩序的量度。信息和熵都不是守恒的，都同样地不适于作为商品的。
让我们从经济角度来考察信息或秩序，以一副金首饰为例。金首饰的价值包含两个部分：金子的价值和“款式”（facon）的即艺术加工的价值。当我们拿一副旧首饰抵押给典当商或卖给珠宝商的时候，这副首饰的固定不变的价值仅限在金子方面。至于款式方面的价值之受到考虑与否，那得取决于许多因素，诸如售者的坚持，首饰制造之时该款式的流行与否，纯艺术方面的技巧，从博物馆角度看待这副首饰的历史价值以及购者的坚持等等。
由于不了解金子的和款式的这两种类型的价值之间的区别，许多财富丧失掉了。集邮市场、旧书市场、古董市场以及丹康?菲弗家具市场全都是人为的市场，因为除了拥有这类东西会给物主以真正的快乐外，绝大部分的款式价值不仅是在于事物自身的稀有性，而且是和暂时存在的竟相购买该物的活跃的购买力有关。经济危机限制了可能的购买力，它可以把该物的价格降低四、五倍，于是一大笔财富就会仅仅因为缺乏竞购者而化为乌有。如果另一种新的流行款式在有远见的搜藏家的关注之下而排挤了旧的款式时，那么最滞销的货物就会又一次地退出市场。搜藏家们的鉴赏力是找不到一个恒定不变的公分母的，除非大家都达到了审美价值的最高标准。因此，对名画所付的价格甚至在很大程度上也反映了买主想得到富有和内行的名气这种愿望的。
把艺术品当作商品，就产生了一大批对于信息论讲来具有重要意义的问题。首先，除了那种生性偏狭的搜藏家要把自己全部收藏品永远封锁起来外，艺术品的实物占有既非人们对它欣赏而得到快乐的充分条件，亦非人们对它欣赏而得到快乐的必要条件。事实上，有几类艺术品本来是供大家欣赏的，而不是供私人欣赏的；谁占有它的问题差不多无关宏要。一幅伟大的壁画未必可以作为流通的证券，墙上绘有这幅壁间的建筑物也未必可以有此用途。无论表面上谁是这些艺术品的所有者，他至少耍把它们分给经常往来于这些建筑物之中的一定量的人们，通常是世界上随便什么人都可以分享。他没法把这些艺术品放到保险柜里，只在吃饭的时候拿出来跟几个行家心满意足地观赏它们，他也没法把它们当作私人所有物而全数封存起来。仅有极少数的壁囫是偶然地在秘密地方画出的，夕奎罗斯画了一幅用来装饰墨西哥监狱的一面大墙，这所监狱是他作为政治犯而服刑的地方。
关于艺术品的纯实物占有问题，我们就说到这里。艺术中的所有权问题就复杂得多了。让我们来观察一下艺术品的复制问题吧。无庸置疑，艺术欣赏中最美妙的精华部分只能从原作中得到，但同样正确的是，一个从未见过名作原本的人也能培养起广泛而深刻的鉴赏力的，同时，艺术创作中的美学魁力绝大部分可以通过质量良好的复制品传达出来。音乐的情况也是如此。在欣赏一支乐曲时，听者要是出席演奏会的话，那是可以得到某种重要的东西的，但虽然如此，为了理解这诈演奏，他要预先学习，作好准备，他的欣赏力将会通过聆听好唱片而得到如此之大的提高，以致我们很难说二者之中哪一种经验更加重要些。
从所有权角度看，复制权是由我们的版权法来规定的。但是，版权法无法规定别的一些权利，这些权利几乎都向我们提出了这样的问题：任何人都有资格在有效意义上成为艺术创作的所有者。于是，何谓真正原作这个问题就出现了。例如，在文艺复兴初期，透视法是艺术家的新发现，一位艺术家巧妙地开拓周围环境中的这个因素是能够给人以巨大愉快的。图勒（Durer）、达芬奇（DaVinci）及共同时代人就体现了当时艺术界巨擘从这个新发现中所找到的趣味。但是，由于透视法是一种一经掌握就会很快地对它失去兴趣的技法，所以本来在原作者手中是伟大的东西，现在却是每一位多愁善感的、讲生意经的艺术家在设计月份牌时都能运用自如的手法了。
前面已讲的东西看来不值得再讲了；要想评定一幅画或一部文学作品的信息价值，我们就不能不知道它含有那些为大家对今人和古人的作品所未曾消化了的东西。只有独立的信息才是近乎可加的。第二流复制家所引申出来的信息对于前此发出的信息而言就远不是独立的了。因此，千篇一律的恋爱故事，千篇一律的侦探小说，通俗杂志中为一般人所欢迎的、成功的故事等，都是受着版权法的字面支配，而不是受着版权法的精神支配的。禁止一部电影以一连串低级趣味的镜头来引诱中、下层群众对这种感情状态产生兴趣而取得成功的版权法是不存在的。我们既没有复制新的数学观念的方法，也没有复制新学说例如自然选择说的方法，也没有复制其他任何新东西的方法，除非用同样的话对同样的观念作出全同的复制。
重说一下，陈词滥调之得以流行，不是偶然的，它是信息本性所固有的现象。信息的所有权必然要碰到下述的不利条件：要使社会上的一般信息丰富起来，该信息就必须说出某种在本质上异乎社会上原先公共贮藏的信息。在伟大的文艺经典作品中，大量具有显见价值的信息甚至都会被人抛弃，仅仅因为大家已经熟悉它们的内容了。学生不喜欢莎士比亚，因为依他看来，莎士比亚无非是一堆熟悉的引句。仅当人们对这位作家有了深入的研究，摆脱了当时浅薄的陈词滥调所采用的那个部分之后，我们才能同这位作家重建信息方面的联系（rapport），并且对他的作品作出崭新的评价来。
依据这个观点，使人感到有意思的事情是：有些作家和画家，虽然在感性和知性的道路上进行了广泛的探索而打开了一个时代的大门，却对自己的同时代人和多年的追随者有着几乎是破坏性的影响。象毕加索（Picasso）这样的国家，经历过许多时期，发展过许多艺术形式，最后才说出了这个时代的话到舌头就要说出的全部的话，终于使自己的同时代人和晚辈的创作变得索然无味了。
通讯之商品性质的固有界限何在，很难引起大家普遍地来考虑这个问题。普通人都认为米西纳斯的工作就是购买和收藏艺术品，而不是鼓励当时的艺术家去进行创造。与此完全类似的情况是，普通人相信有可能把国家的军事机密和科学机密贮藏在安静的图书谊和实验室里，正象我们之有可能把上次战争中使用过的武器赊藏在军械库里一样。
这种人的确还进一步地认为：在本国的实验室里得到的信息从道义上讲来就是本国的财产，如果别国利用这种信息的活，那不仅有可能是叛国行为的产物，而且在本质上就是盗窃。他想象不出任何一种没有所有者的信息。
在变动不居的世界中，能把信息贮藏起来而不使其严重地贬值，这种想法是荒诞的。
它的荒诞程度不下于后述一种更加似真而假的主张：在一次战争之后，我们可以把现有武器收集起来，擦上机油，再用橡皮袋封裹，让它静候下一次战争的来临。可是，考虑到战争技术的种种变化，步枪虽然还可以很好地贮藏起来，坦克就差远了，而军舰和潜水艇就更谈不上保存的问题了。事实上，武器的功效严格决定于它在特定时期中与什么武器相对，又决定于那个时期关于战争的整个观念。已经不只一次地证实了这个结果了：贮藏的武器堆积如山是会把军事政策引上错误道路的，所以。在我们还具有正确选择为防止新灾难而准备必要工具的自由时，我们恰恰给新灾难的到来创造了非常有利的条件。
在另一方面，即在经济方面，英国的例子表明，上面所讲的情况显然是真实的。英国是经过全面工业革命的第一个国家；它从革命前期继承下来的是窄轨铁路、设备陈旧而需要大量投资的纱厂以及它的社会制度的局限性——这一切都使得现代的日益增长的种种需要转化成严重的危机，只能用一种相当于社会革命和工业革命的办法来克服。在现在，纵使最新兴的国家在工业化的时候就能够利用最新的和最经济的设备，就能够建立起合乎现代需要的铁路系统从而用大小合乎经济要求的车厢来运输货物，就能够生活在今天的时代里而非生活在百年之前，然而，这一切都在继续发生着。
对英格兰是正确的东西，对新英格兰同样是正确的。在新英格兰，人们发现，工业企业的现代化常常要花去很大一笔的费用，这比拆掉旧的并在别处重建新的还要费钱得多。除了把制订相对严格的工业法和进步的劳工政策所面临的种种困难完全不计外，纺织工业之所以不愿意建立在新英格兰的主要原因之一，如工厂主的坦白表示，就在于他们不愿意受到百年传统的束缚。由此可知，即使在原料加工占主要地位的领域中，生产过程和劳动保护归根到底也要不断地革新和发展的。
信息，与其说是旨在贮藏，不如说旨在流通。在一个国家里，如果信息和科学的状况适应于国家的种种需要，则它就会得到最大的安全——在这个国家里，信息的重要性是充分地得到实现的，它是作为我们观察外界并对外界作出有效行动的连续不断的过程中的一个阶段。换言之，把科学研究的成果详细记载在书籍和文章里而后标明“密件”
存入图书馆，无论共数量如何巨大，都不足以在任何时间长度内保证我们的安全，因为世界上的有效信息是在不断地增加着的。对于人脑说来，没有马奇诺防线。
重说一下，人活着就不免要参加到受外界影响并对外界作出行动的连续流中，而在这个连续流中，我们只不过是承前启后的中介物而已。换个意思说，活在不断变化的世界中就是意味着去参加知识的连续发展，参加知识的畅通无阻的交流。在完全正常的情况下，要保证我们具有上述这种足够敷用的知识远比保证某一可能的敌人没有这种知识困难得多，而且也重要得多。军事研究实验室的全部措施却是采取了与我们自己最优地使用信息并最优地发展信息的相反路线的。
在这次大战期间，我在一定程度上负有解某一类型积分方程的责任，这种方程不仅存在于我自己的工作中，而且至少还存在于两个彼此完全无关的计划中。我知道这两个计划中有一个一定是要出现这种方程的；至于另一个计划，我在一次初步参与该项工作的商讨中相信它也是应该出现的。由于同一思想有三种应用，它们从属于三个完全不同的军事计划，有着完全不同的保密程度，又在不同的地方执行，所以无法把其中的任一方面的信息告诉其他。结果是，三个部门本来可以共同使用的成果，却要求有三个彼此无关而又完全相同的发现。由此带来的时间耽误大约半年至一年之久，也许还要多些。
从金钱开支方面看（这在战争中当然是不重要的），总数相当于一大批最高薪人员的年薪。一个敌人要想从这项工作中取得价值相当的应用，其麻烦程度就跟我们把全部工作重新做过的损失相当。要知道，敌人是不可能加入我们非正式举行的甚至是在保密机关布置下的生产讨论会的，因而他就没有机会处在评价和利用我们的研究成果的地位上。
在估计信息价值的一切方法中，时间问题有着重要的意义。例如，一种含有任何程度的、内容十分机密的信码或密码，不仅是一把难以打开的锁，而且是一把需要用相当时间才能正确打开的锁。适用于小单位战斗的战术情报几乎可以肯定在一两小时后就会过时。它能否在三小时内被别人破开乃是一个意义不大的事情，最最重要的是，收到该项消息的军官应该能够在两分钟内把它读出。另一方面，较大的作战计划就太重要了，不能依靠这种保密程度有限的密码。但虽然如此，要是一位军官收到这项计划后需要花费一整天时间才能译解它，则贻误军情就会比任何程度的泄密更为严重。关于整个战役或外交政策的信码和密码可能是而且应该是更加不易破解的，但是，绝对没有这样一种信码或密码，即不能在任何限定时间内破密，又能含有重要的信息量，而非一小批互不关联的个别判决。
通常，破密的方法就是寻找该密码的一个足够长的用例，于是专家就可以弄清它的编码模式。一般说，这些模式至少得有最低程度的重复，不然的话，那些非常简短而又没有重复的电讯就无法译出了。但是，当一批电讯从前后完全相同的密码类型编出时，那怕编码细节有种种变化，这些不同的电讯之间可以有足够多的共同点导致破密，首先是弄清密码的一般类型，然后弄清该专用密码。
也许表现在破密工作上的最伟大的才能绝大部分没有在各种保密机关的年鉴上发表出来，但在题铭学家的著作中是可以看到的。我们都知道罗塞达石是怎样通过对埃及若干象形文字的解释（即知道了它们是托勒密们的名字）而后认懂刻在上面的铭文的。但是，有一种译码工作，其意义更加伟大。这种译码艺术的最伟大的独一无二的例子就是把自然界自身的秘密译解出来，而这就是科学家的本份。
科学的发现就是为了我们自己的方便而对存在系统作出解释的，但存在系统之被创造出来时丝毫也没有为我们的方便着眼。结果是，世界上最经久的、适于保密的并受复杂信码系统保护的东西就是自然界的规律。因此，在破密的可能性中，除对人的保密手段和文件的保密方法直接进行攻击外，我们总有可能去攻击一切信码中最具本质意义的信码。要想发明一种象原子核这类天然信码那么难于破密的人工信码，看来是办不到的。
在译解信码时，就我们能够获得的信、而言，最重要的事情莫过于我们读到的消息不是莫明其妙的知识。迷惑译码人的普通方法就是在真正消息中混杂进去一种无法译解的消息，即混进一堆无意义的消息，混进不成句子的单字。同样，当我们考虑诸如原子反应、原子爆炸这类关于自然方面的问题时，我们能够公之于众的最最孤立的信息就是宣布它们存在着。但当科学家接触到一个他知道有答案的问题时，他的整个态度就改变过来了。可以说，他已经有百分之五十左右接近于那个答案了。
从这个观点看来，我们完全可以恰当地说，本来应该保密的、但已经成为人人皆知而且毫无障碍地为一切潜在敌人所知的关于原子弹的秘密之一，就是制造它的可能性。
问题如此重要，科学界又相信它是有答案的，那么，科学家的智能和现有实验室的设备两者既已分布得如此之广，这就使得这项工作随便在世界上什么地方只要花上几年功夫就可以近乎独立地得到实现了。
目前在这个国家里有一种天真的信仰，认为我们是某种技术即叫做“专门技能，，（know-how的唯一所有者，这种专门技能不仅可以保证我们在一切科学技术的发展和一切主要发明方面占居优势地位，而且，如我们已经讲到的，可以保证我们对这种优势具有道德方面的权利。诚然，这个“专门技能”是和那些研究象原子弹之类问题的人们的民族血统毫不相干。要长期保证丹麦的玻尔（Bohr）、意大利的费米（Fermi）、匈牙利的斯杰拉德（Szilard）以及许多其他与这项工作有关的科学家在一起合作，那是已经不可能了。这样一种合作过去之所以成为可能，乃是由于大家极度地意识到了事变的迫切需要，由于纳粹的威胁激起了普遍的愤怒。为了使这批科学家在重整军备的长期间中合作共事，所需要的就不仅仅是夸张的宣传；在重整军备方面，国务院的政策似乎经常使我们受累不浅。
用不着任何怀疑，我们具有世界上最高度发展的、能够汇集大批科学家的力量和大量的金钱来实现某项计划的技术。但是，这丝毫也不应该使我们过分满足于我们的科学地位，因为同样清楚的是，我们正在培育着除非依靠大量的人力和金钱就无法考虑任何科学计划的年青一代。法国人和英国人以其技巧制造出了大量仪器，一位美国的中学教师则会轻蔑地把它看作是用木头和绳子马马虎虎做成的东西；但是，这种技巧在我们年青一代中再也找不到了，只有极少数的例外。目前流行的大型实验室是科学中的新事物。
我们之中有那么一些人却要把它设想作永远不会陈旧过时销东西，然而，当我们这一代的科学思想变得陈旧无用或者至少给我们的知识投资带来的收益大为减少的时候，我却预见不到下一代人会有能力提出什么了不起的思想作为了不起的计划的天然基础。
对于应用在科学工作上面的信息概念的明确理解说明了两项信息如果独立并存，其价值是不大的，反之，如果它们能够很好地结合在某人心中或某个实验室里，那它们就能够彼此丰富起来。下述组织是与这种要求完全不相容的：其中的每个成员都在预先规定的道路上行走，当科学哨兵走到自己的巡逻区域的尽头时，举枪，向后转，沿来路回去。两位科学家的相互接触，是会产生极为丰富的成果的，是会使科学生气蓬勃起来的，但是，这只有在下述情况中才能产生：至少有一位科学代表者远远地越过前沿阵地从而能够把邻近领域的思想吸取过来形成一套有效的思想方案。实现这种类型的组织的天然手段就是采取这样的办法：让每位科学家的研究方向由他自己的兴趣范围未确定，而不是预先给他指定一个巡逻地带。
这样轻松的组