Chapter 6 Volume 4-1

Chapter One On the General Will Is Indestructible So long as several persons are united and consider themselves to be a whole, they can have but one will, and this will concerns their common existence and common happiness.Then all the energies of the state are vigorous and simple, its principles are brilliant and clear; there are no complex and contradictory interests here, the public welfare is everywhere clearly and precisely expressed, and it only needs to be seen by reason. to them.Peace, unity, and equality are the enemies of all intrigues in politics.Simple and upright people are hard to deceive just because of their simplicity; seduction and sweet talk are useless to them, and they are not even shrewd enough to be fools.When we see, among the happiest people in the world, hordes of peasants planning affairs of state under oak trees, and always doing it wisely; The shrewdness of a far-reaching and miserable country?

A country thus governed needs but few laws, and as new laws become necessary, the necessity is generally seen.He who first proposed those laws only said what all have felt; it is neither a matter of intrigue nor of eloquence to make into law what all have resolved to do , as long as he can be sure that others will do the same. What leads the theorists into the error is that they see only those countries which have been badly organized from the start, and therefore assume that it is impossible to maintain such a political system in these countries.They like to imagine all the nonsense with which a shrewd charlatan or an artful lobbyist can seduce the people of Paris or London.They didn't know that Cromwell would be locked in the bell tower by the people of Bern, and the Duke of Beaufort would be strictly controlled by the people of Geneva.

But when the bonds of social solidarity begin to loosen and the state begins to weaken, when individual interests begin to be felt and small societies begin to affect the larger society; then the public interest changes and becomes opposed.The vote is no longer governed by unanimity, the general will is no longer the consensus, and contradictions and disputes emerge; so that the best opinions do not pass without controversy. Finally, when the state is on the verge of ruin, it can only survive in an illusory and empty form, the social bond is broken in every heart, and the basest interests have the audacity to pretend to be the cause of public happiness. In the name of the sacred; when the general will is silent, everyone is guided by private motives, and no longer speaks as a citizen, as if the state had never existed; Pass all sorts of unjust laws for self-interest only.

Is it because of this that the general will will be eliminated or corrupted?No, the general will is always firm, unchanging, and pure; but it can yield to other wills that overwhelm it.Everyone who would separate his own interest from the public interest sees clearly that he cannot completely separate the two; It was nothing to him.But apart from this self-interest, he will claim the public good for his own interest as strongly as anyone else.Even when he sold his votes for money, he did not destroy the general will in his heart, he just avoided the general will.The mistake he made was to change the state of the question, to answer irrelevantly to the questions that were put to him; so that instead of saying with his vote, "This is good for the country," he was saying, "It is passed." This or that opinion is in favor of a certain person or a certain party." The law of public order in assemblies, then, is not so much to maintain the general will in assemblies as to constantly question it. , and let it reply frequently.

Of all the acts of sovereignty, but as far as the right to vote--a right which nothing can take from the citizen--I have here much to say.Furthermore, there are rights of speech, of proposals, of deliberation, of discussion, etc., which the government takes pains to reserve entirely to its own members.But these important subjects require another paper, and I cannot cover them all in this book. Chapter 2 On Voting It has been seen from the last chapter that the manner in which things in general are handled is sufficient to indicate with certainty the actual state of the moral climate, and the health of the body politic.The greater the unity of the people in the assembly, that is to say, the more the people's opinions tend to be unanimous, the more the general will will prevail; The predominance of individual interests and the decline of nations.

When the constitution of the state includes two or more estates—as in Rome, between the nobility and the plebeians, whose quarrels often disturbed the assembly of the people even in the best days of the republic—then the above This one seems less obvious.Such exceptions, however, are more likely to be external than real; for then there are, so to speak, two states within one state, owing to the inherent defects of the political community.This, though not true of the two together, is true of each of them separately.And in fact, even in the most turbulent times, as long as the Senate does not interfere, the people's votes are always very peaceful and always voted by a majority; since the citizens have only one interest, the people will There is only one will.

But at the other extreme of the cycle, unanimity can also emerge.That is when the citizens are all enslaved, having neither liberty nor will. Now horror and flattery turn the vote into a din; people stop discussing it, and people either praise or curse.Such was the disgraceful manner in which the Senate, under the Roman Emperor, expressed its opinion.Sometimes it does so with an absurdly cautious approach.Tacitus once pointed out that under Othon, when the senators were violating Vitellius, they shouted a terrible uproar at the same time, so that if Vitellius became the master, He had no way of knowing what each of them said.

From these different considerations arise some maxims by which we should regulate the manner of counting the votes and ranking the dissenting opinions, according to the degree of difficulty of identifying the general will, and according to the prosperity and decline of nations. There is only one kind of law which, by its very nature, requires unanimity; that is the social convention.For political association is the most voluntary act in the world; and since every man is born free and master of himself, no one else, under any pretense possible, can make him enslaved without his own sanction. .To assert that the son of a slave was born a slave is to assert that he was not born a man.

If, however, opponents arose when the social covenant was drawn up, their opposition did not invalidate the covenant, but merely prevented them from being included in the covenant; they were Gentiles among the citizens.But after the establishment of the state, residence constitutes consent; and residence in the territory constitutes submission to the sovereign. Apart from this original contract, the voting majority is forever binding on all others; it is the result of the contract itself.But one asks: how can a man be free and yet be compelled to obey wills which are not his own?How can opponents be free and yet be subject to laws to which they have not consented?

I would reply that the question was framed incorrectly.Citizens have assented to all laws, even those passed against their will, even those laws in which they were punished if they dared to violate any of them.The constant will of all the members of the nation is the general will; for this reason they are citizens and free.When a law is proposed in an assembly of the people, what they ask the people is not precisely whether the people approve or oppose the proposal, but whether it is in accordance with the general will; and the general will That is, their own will.Everyone expressed their opinion on this issue when they voted, so the declaration of the general will can be drawn from the calculation of the number of votes.Therefore, if an opinion contrary to mine prevails, it proves nothing but that I am wrong, that what I estimate to be the general will is not the general will.If my individual opinion should prevail over the general will, I would be doing something else than I intended; and then I would not be free.

This presupposes, of course, that all the features of the general will still exist in the majority; and if it does not exist there, then there is no longer any liberty, whichever side you take. I have sufficiently pointed out the practical means of preventing this abuse, when I have shown how in public discourse men substitute individual wills for the general will;As to the percentage of votes by which this will can be declared, I have also given the principles by which it should be determined.A difference of one vote can destroy equality, and a dissenting vote can destroy unanimity.But between unanimity and equality of both parties there are many distributions of unequal numbers, and for each of these we may fix the number according to the circumstances and needs of the body politic. There are two general maxims by which we may fix this ratio: the one, that the more important the discussion, the more nearly unanimous the opinion should be; The difference between the prescribed number of votes between the two parties should also be narrowed. In discussions where decisions must be made immediately, a majority of one vote is enough.The former of the two maxims seems to be more in line with the law, while the latter seems to be more in line with current affairs.But in any case, a combination of both must be relied upon to determine the best ratio at which we can declare a majority. CHAPTER III ON ELECTIONS Concerning the election of prince and magistrate—which I have already said to be a complex act—there are also two ways in which it can be done, viz., selection and drawing of lots.Each of these two has been used in various republics; and we still see a very complicated blend of the two in the election of the Grand Duke of Venice.Montesquieu said: "Election by lot is the nature of democracy." I agree with this statement, but why is it so?Montesquieu went on to say: "The drawing of lots is a method of election which harms no one; it gives every citizen a legitimate desire to serve his country." This is no reason. If we note that the election of chiefs is a function of government, and not of sovereignty, we can see why the method of drawing lots is most democratic; The less action there is, the better the administration. Under all true democracies the office of the executive is not a cheapness, but a heavy burden; and it cannot be justly imposed on one person without it being imposed on another.Only the law can place this burden on the winner.Since the conditions of all are equal in the drawing of lots, and the choice depends on no one's will, there can never be any individual action which can alter the generality of the law. Under an aristocracy, the prince chooses the prince, and the government itself preserves itself; it is here that the method of voting is very expedient.The example of the election of the Grand Duke of Venice, far from overthrowing this distinction, confirmed it; that hybrid form was just suitable for a mixed government.For it would be a mistake to regard the government of Venice as a true aristocracy.If the people there have no part in the government at all, the nobles there are themselves the people.Much of the impoverished Panaporte would never approach any executive office, and its nobles had only the empty title of "His Excellency" and the right to attend the Great Council.That great assembly was as numerous as our plenary assembly at Geneva, and its most eminent members were no more privileged than our common citizens.Indeed, leaving aside the extreme differences of the two republics, the citizens of Geneva correspond precisely to the nobility of Venice, our natives and inhabitants to the citadins (citizens) and people of Venice, our countrymen to the Subjects of mainland Venice.Finally, however one may think of that republic, its government, besides its vastness, was never more aristocratic than ours.The only difference is that we don't have a chief for life, so we don't need to draw lots at all. In a true democracy there is no inconvenience in voting by lot; since all are there equal in morals and talents, as in character and wealth, it hardly matters whoever is chosen.Yet, as I have already said, there is no real democracy. When elections and lots are used together, elections should be filled where special talents are required, as in military offices; The judicial office, for in a well-constituted state these qualities are common to all citizens. Under a monarchical government, neither lottery nor election has any place.Since the monarch is the natural and unique monarch and administrator, the right to choose his subordinates can only belong to him.When the Abbot of St. Peter suggested that the Council of the King of France be greatly enlarged, and that its members be elected by vote, he did not think that he was suggesting a change in the form of government. I should also say something about the manner of voting and counting in the assembly of the people; but perhaps the history of the Roman political system may in this respect shed more lightly on all the maxims I am about to lay down.It would perhaps be instructive for a prudent reader to observe in some detail how public and private affairs were conducted in a meeting of two hundred thousand men. CHAPTER IV ON THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE OF ROMAN We have absolutely no reliable documentation of the early days of Rome.It even seems probable that most of what is said about Rome is allegory; The most lacking part.Experience daily teaches us from what causes revolutions in empires have arisen; but now that nations are no longer being formed, we are left almost by conjecture to explain how they came into being. The various established habits which we find at least show that they have an origin.Those legends which trace these origins, and which are founded on the highest authority and confirmed by the strongest reasoning, should be regarded as most certain.Such is the maxim which I have sought to follow in inquiring how the freest and most powerful peoples in the world exercise their supreme power. After the founding of Rome, the nascent republic—that is, the founding contingent of Albanians, Sabines, and Gentiles—was divided into three classes; It's called a tribe.Each tribe is divided into ten curias, and each curia is further divided into several decurias, the leaders of which are the leaders known as Curleon and Decuriaon. Moreover, a body of a hundred cavalry or knights was raised from each tribe, called the Centuries; and this division, which was scarcely necessary in a city, was at first merely military.Yet it seems as if a great instinct had predisposed the small city of Rome to formulate for itself a form of government fit to be a world capital. Soon after this initial division, an inconvenience arose.That is, the tribes of the Albans (Ramncnses) and the tribes of the Sabines (TaciensAes) remained in their original condition, while the tribes of the foreigners (Luceres) were constantly enlarged by the constant influx of foreigners; It soon overtook the first two tribes.The remedy Servius found against this dangerous fallacy was to change the division; he abolished the division of races and replaced it by another according to the districts each tribe occupied in the city. .He divided the original three tribes into four, each of which occupied a hill in Rome and named it after the hill.Thus, by remedying present inequalities, he also prevents future inequalities; and in order to make this division not only of districts but of persons, he forbids the transfer of inhabitants from one district to another. one region; this prevents the various races from mixing with each other. He doubled the three ancient cavalry centurions, and added twelve more, but always by the ancient name; this was a simple and wise way, by which he distinguished the knights. Groups and people groups, and make the people have no complaints. To these four urban tribes Servius added fifteen other so-called rural tribes, since these were composed of the inhabitants who divided the country into an equal number of rural districts.The same number of new tribes were then added, so that the Roman people were at last divided into thirty-five tribes; and they remained fixed at this number till the end of the republic. From this distinction of town and country tribes came a most remarkable consequence; because no other precedent had been found before, and because the maintenance of Roman fashion and the expansion of its empire depended upon it.It must have been expected that the city tribes would immediately seize power and honor, and not hesitate to degrade the country tribes; but the opposite was true.We know of the early Romans' interest in country life.They owed this interest to their wise creators, who combined agriculture and war with liberty, and drove, so to speak, arts, crafts, intrigue, wealth, and slavery into the cities. In this way, all the famous people in Rome lived in the countryside and cultivated the land, so people used to look for the pillars of the republic only in the countryside.As this was the case of the noblest nobles in Rome, it was venerated by all; the simple and industrious life of country folk was preferred to the idle life of Roman bourgeois; The man who is but an unfortunate proletarian becomes a respectable citizen as soon as he becomes a laborer in the fields.It is not without reason that Varon has said that our noble ancestors laid in the country the foundations of those strong and brave men who defended them in war and fed them in peace.Pliny also affirms that country tribes are venerated because of the people who make them up; whereas idlers are disgraced to city tribes in order to humiliate them. .When Appius Claudius the Sabine returned and settled in Rome, he was laden with honors; he was incorporated into a village tribe, which was subsequently named after him.Finally, the freed slaves all belonged to the towns, and never to the country tribes; and there was never a single instance in the whole of the Become a citizen. The maxim was excellent; but it was carried so far that at last a change was produced, and indeed a political malpractice. In the first place, that the censors, after long possessing the right to transfer citizens from one tribe to another at will, allowed the majority of the people to organize themselves into the tribe they wished to belong to; Deprived of one of the greatest capabilities of the supervisory power.Moreover, since the magnates incorporated themselves into rural tribes, and the freed slaves, after becoming citizens, remained with the people in urban tribes; tribes, in general, ceased to be local or regional. sexually.But all have become so intermingled that it is impossible to distinguish the members of the various tribes except by registers; and the idea of ​​the word tribe has thus been transformed from the physical into the personal, or rather, almost into a mere tribal. It's a false name. Also, the urban tribes, being more conveniently situated, are often the most powerful in the assemblies of the people, and sell out the country to those who do not hesitate to bribe votes from the shameless scum within them. As for the Curias, since the founders had established ten Curias for each tribe, the whole Roman people within the walls at that time constituted thirty Curias; each Curia had its own His own temples, gods, officials, priests, and a festival called the Road Festival, which resembled the village festivals of the later village tribes. When it came to Servius' new division, since the number thirty could not be equally distributed among his four tribes, he had no intention of touching them; It became another way of dividing the inhabitants of Rome.However, the question of the curia never arises either among the village tribes or among the people who constitute them; for these tribes have both become purely civil organizations and have adopted another The military system of Romulus was used to recruit troops, so the military division of Romulus became superfluous.Thus, although every citizen was organized into a tribe, there was often no one in the curia. Servius also made a third division, which has nothing to do with the first two, but which, because of its role, is the most important of them all.He divided the whole Roman people into six classes, distinguished neither by region nor by person, but by wealth.Thus the first tiers are full of rich people, the last tiers are full of poor people, and the middle tiers are people of moderate wealth.These six orders are subdivided into one hundred and ninety-three other groups, called centuries; and these groups are divided in such a way that the first class occupies more than half of them, and the last class constitutes only one of them. .Thus we see that the class with the least number is the class with the largest number of regiments, while the whole last class can only be counted as a subdivided unit, although this class includes the progress of the inhabitants of Rome. half. In order that the people might not see the consequences of this last form, Servius managed to give it a military air: he inserted two armored centuries in the second tier, and in the fourth Inserted two Centuries of Armorers; in each class, except the last, a distinction was made between youth and old age, that is to say, between those who were obliged to perform military service and those who had reached the legal exempt age. people; this distinction is more necessary than the distinction of wealth, and frequent censuses and statistics; finally he also requires that the meeting be held in the Mars field, and that all who are of service age must bear arms. The reason why Servius does not make the same distinction between young and old in the last class is that the people who make up the last class are never given the honor of taking up arms and defending their country; homeland before gaining the right to defend it.As for the innumerable bands of beggars that dot the armies of kings to this day, it is doubtful that not a single one of them was not scornfully driven out of their infantry by the Romans, who were then the defenders of liberty. who.In the last class, however, a distinction can be made between the proletarians and those who are called "capital".The former are not entirely reduced to the penniless, at least they provide the state with citizens; and sometimes even soldiers in emergencies.As for those who have nothing at all, those who cannot be counted except by the head, they are considered completely without status; they were the first to be recruited into the army at Marius. We do not here judge whether this third method of counting is good or bad in itself; but I believe it may be asserted that, if it were not for the simplicity of the manners of the early Romans, their disinterestedness, their interest in agriculture, their interest in commerce and profit, contempt of the country, this method cannot be put into practice.Is there any nation in modern times whose insatiable greed, restlessness, intrigue, endless ups and downs, and eternal ups and downs are able to make such a system last for twenty years without causing What about subverting the entire country?We must also remark that in Rome, fashion and public opinion were more powerful than this system, and corrected its defects; . From all this it is easy to understand why only five degrees are almost always mentioned, although in fact there are six.The sixth class neither provides soldiers to the army, nor votes in the Mars Church, and has almost no use in the republic, so it is not much taken seriously. Such was the case with the various divisions of the Roman people.Let us now turn to the role they play in the General Assembly.These legally convened assemblies are called popular assemblies; they are usually held in the public hall of Rome or in the church of Mars, and are divided into three types: the assembly of the curia, the assembly of the centurion, and the assembly of the tribe; The convening is based on which of these three forms.The Council of the Curia was the creation of Romulus, the Council of the Centuries of Servius, the Council of the Tribes of the Tribunes of the People.Only the Assembly of the People can approve any law, and elect any magistrate; and since there is no citizen who is not included in a curia, a century, or a tribe, every citizen Neither could be excluded from the right to vote, so the Roman people were truly sovereign both de jure and de facto. In order for the assembly to be called legitimately, and for its acts to have the force of law, three conditions must be met: first, that the body or magistrate which convenes the assembly must have the authority necessary for it; One is held on a statutory date; the third is that the divination must be auspicious. The reasons for the first provision need no further explanation.The second was a policy measure; thus, the assembly of the people was not permitted on the days of festivals and fairs, when the people of the country went to Rome to attend to their own business, and so had no time to be in the public assembly. one day.By virtue of the third article, the Senate was able to restrain a proud and excited people, and in time to check the enthusiasm of the treacherous tribunes; but the tribunes also found various ways to get rid of this bondage.Laws and the election of chiefs were by no means the only matters brought before the assembly of the people; the people of Rome also usurped the most important functions of government, and it was in their assembly, we may say, that the fate of Europe was determined.The variety of purposes of the meetings makes them take various forms according to the things to be voted upon. To judge these different forms, one need only compare them.The intention of Romulus in creating Curia was to contain the Senate with the people, and the people with the Senate, while he himself controlled both equally.Therefore, in this form, he gave the people the authority of the whole number to balance the authority of power and wealth he left to the nobles.However, in the spirit of the monarchy, Romulus still left more convenience to the nobles, because the protectors of the nobles could affect the majority of the vote.This admirable system of patron and protege is a masterpiece of politics and humanity; without it an aristocracy, so contrary to the spirit of the republic, could not have survived.Rome alone has the honor of setting such an excellent example for the world, a system which has never been corrupted, but which has never been imitated by posterity. Since this form of the curia existed during the reign of the king until the time of Servius, and the rule at the end of the Tarkan dynasty was not considered legitimate at all; Law) is the term used to refer to the laws of the royal period. During the republic, the curias were often restricted to the four urban tribes, and included only the populace of the city of Rome; so these curias could neither fit with the senate, which was the head of the nobility, nor with the plebeians, though they were commoners. As the tribunes at the head of the wealthy citizens fit in.Thus they lost their credibility, and their prestige was so discredited that their thirty officers assembled and did what the Council of Curias should have done. The division of the Centuries was so favorable to the aristocracy that at first it was difficult to see that the Assembly of the People was named after the Assembly of Centuries from which the consuls, censors, and other ivory administrators were elected. Yes, then why the Senate has never been able to prevail in it.In fact, of the one hundred and ninety-three centuries which constituted the six classes of the whole Roman people, the first class accounted for ninety-eight of them; One class has more votes than all other classes combined.When all the Centuries at the first level agree, people simply stop counting votes; what is decided by the fewest is passed as the resolution of the majority.We may therefore say that in the Centuries everything is regulated by the amount of money far more than by the number of votes. This extreme authority, however, is cushioned in two ways.In the first place, the tribunes are as a rule, and the majority of the plebeians always belong to, the class of the rich; so they rival the prestige of the nobles in this first class. The second method is this: instead of letting the centuries begin by voting according to their grades—which always start with the first grade—you draw a centurion by lot and let the centurion alone An election is held; the same election is then repeated on another day with all the centurions by rank, and usually the result is the same.In this way, the authority to set an example is transferred from the rank to the lottery according to the principle of democracy. Another advantage arose from this arrangement, that the citizens of the country had time, between elections, to acquaint themselves with the merits of provisional nominations, and cast their votes when informed.But at last this was abolished under the pretense of speed, and the two elections were held on the same day. Rather, the tribal assembly was the parliament of the Roman people.The tribal assembly could only be called by the tribunes; at this assembly the tribunes were elected and passed laws made by the common people. The senate not only has no place here, but even has no right of presence; and the senators, being obliged to obey laws which they themselves cannot vote, are in this respect less free than the humblest citizen. But this injustice is so wholly misunderstood that it alone is sufficient to invalidate the whole decree of a public body which did not contain all its members.When all the nobles are present at the assembly with the rights they have as citizens, they are now mere individuals, and it is difficult to influence this form of voting by counting votes, because here the most insignificant proletarian It can also be the same as the Chief Elder. It follows, then, that besides the order produced by the various modes of distribution of so many people at the vote, these modes of distribution themselves cannot be reduced to forms of indifference; The reason why people choose this method has its relative effect. 这里无庸多谈细节，根据以上的阐述就可以得出结论说：部族大会最有利于人民的政府，而百人团大会则最有利于贵族制。至于库里亚大会，那里唯独罗马民众构成了其中的大多数，它就只能有利于暴君制与险恶的用心；所以库里亚大会便遭人非难，就连那些叛乱者们也都避免使用这种可能使自己的谋划过份暴露的办法。毫无疑义，罗马人民的全部尊严唯有在百人团大会里才能充分表现出来，唯有百人团大会才是全体的；因为在库里亚大会里没有包括乡村各部族，而在部族大会里又没有包括元老院和贵族。 至于计算票数的方法，在早期罗马人中间就像他们的风尚一样地简单，虽说还不如斯巴达那么简单。每个人都高声唱出自己的一票，由一个记录员依次把它们记下来；每个部族中的多数票便决定了本部族表决的结果，各部族间的多数票就决定了人民表决的结果；库里亚和百人团也是这样。唯有正直在公民中间占有统治地位，人人都耻于公开地投票赞成一种不公正的意见或一个不体面的臣民的时候，这种办法才是好的；但是当人民腐化而可以进行贿选的时候，那就适宜于采用秘密的投票方法了，为的是可以用不信任来制止贿选者，并且也可以给那些流氓无赖们提供一种不至于沦为卖国贼的办法。 我知道西赛罗是谴责这种改变的，而且他把共和国的灭亡部分地归咎于这一点。可是，我虽然也能体会西赛罗的权威在这里所应有的份量，但我却不能同意他的意见。相反地，我认为正是由于这类的改变做得太不够了，才促成了国家的灭亡。正像健康人的营养不宜于病人一样，我们也决不能要求把适用于善良人民的同样的法律拿来治理腐化了的人民。没有什么比威尼斯共和国的悠久的历史更能证明这条准则的了；威尼斯共和国的影子至今还存在，就完全是因为威尼斯的法律仅仅适用于坏人。 于是，每个公民都被分给一张票，每个公民在投这张票时都可以不让别人知道他的意见是什么。同时，关于收票、计票、比较数字等等，还确定了一些新的手续。但是所有这些都未能防止负责这项职务的官吏们的忠诚不经常受到怀疑。最后，为了防止投票的舞弊与交易，还制定过种种禁令，而票数目之多却正好表明了它们的无效。 到了末期，罗马人就常常不得不乞援于种种非常的权宜手段来补救法律的不足了。有时候，他们就假托神迹，然而这种办法只能欺骗人民，却不能欺骗统治人民的人；有时候，乘候选人还没有来得及进行阴谋活动之前，就突然召集一次大会；有时候，因为看出人民已被人争取过去要参与为非作歹的一方了，于是就一味空谈，把整个议程都消磨掉。然而野心家终于规避了这一切。可是，最难于置信的却是：在这样的流弊泛滥之中，这么广大的人民，幸而赖有他们那些古代的成规，竟从未停止过选举行政官、通过法律、审判案件以及处理一切公私事务，而且几乎和元老院亲身做起来是同样地轻松顺利。 第五章论保民官制 当人们不能在国家的各个组成部分之间确定一个严格的比例的时候，或者是一些不可消除的原因在不断地改变着它们的比率的时候，于是人们便创立了一种特殊的行政机构；这一机构并不和其他部分一道构成共同体，但它能使各个项目恢复正确的比率。它或是在君主与人民之间，或是在君主与主权者之间，或者如果必要的话，同时是在这两方面之间，形成一种联系，也可以说是一个比例中项。 这个团体，我称之为保民官制，它是法律与立法权的守护者。它有时候可以用来保护主权者以对抗政府，就像人民的保民官在罗马所做的那样；有时候，可以用来支持政府以对抗人民，就像目前十人会议在威尼斯所做的那样；并且有时候，又可以用来保持一方与另一方之间的平衡，就像监察委员在斯巴达所做的那样。 保民官制决不是城邦的一个组成部分，而且也不应该具有立法权或行政权的任何一部分；但也正好是在这一方面，保民官的权限才最大；因为他虽不能做出任何事情，却可以禁止一切事情。作为法律的保卫者，它要比执行法律的君主与制订法律的主权者更为神圣、更为可敬。这是我们很明显地可以在罗马看到的；罗马的那些高傲的贵族们总是鄙视所有的人民，但他们却不得不在一个平凡的、既无占卜权又无司法权的人民官吏的面前低下头来。 保民官制如果控制得高明，可以成为一个良好体制的最坚固的支柱；但它所具有的力量只要稍微多一点，就会颠覆一切的；至于软弱，那却不是保民官制的属性了，只要他真有了权力的话，那就绝不会少于他所必需的权力。 当保民官篡夺了他只能作为其调节者的行政权的时候，并且要行使他只能是加以保护的法律的时候，则保民官制就会蜕化为暴君制。在斯巴达还能保持它的风尚时，监察委员的庞大权力是不足为患的；但在腐化开始之后，那就加速了它的腐化。被这些暴君们所杀害的阿基斯，终于由他的继承者复了血仇；监察委员们所犯的罪行与所受的惩罚，同等地加速了共和国的灭亡；于是到克里奥门尼斯之后，斯巴达就再也无可称道了。罗马也是经历了同样的道路灭亡的；而且保民官以法令所篡夺的过度的权力，靠着原是为了自由而制订的法律的帮助，最后竟成为那些摧毁了自由的皇帝们的保障了。至于威尼斯的十人会议，则它是一种血腥的法庭，它对于贵族与对于人民是同样地可怖；而且当它堕落之后，它远不是高尚无私地在保护法律，反而只是在暗中进行那些骇人听闻的勾当。 保民官制，正像政府一样，会随着它的成员的增多而削弱。罗马人民的保民官，最初人数是两个，后来是五个，他们还希望把这个数目再增加一倍；而元老院也就让他们这样做，元老院料定他们会彼此掣肘的，后来的情形果然不出所料。 要防止如此之强而有力的团体篡夺大权，最好的方法——而这样的一种方法至今还不曾有任何一个政府注意过——就是不让这种团体成为永久性的，而是规定它必须有各种宣告它中断的间歇期。这些间歇期也不应该太长，以免使滥用职权得以有时间滋长；它们可以由法律来规定，使人能在必要时很容易通过非常委员会加以缩短。 这种方法在我看来并没有什么不便，因为正如我已经说过的，保民官制既不构成体制的一部分，所以去掉之后也不会损害体制；而且这种方法在我看来还是有效的，因为一个新恢复起来的行政官并不是从他的前任所具有的权力出发，而是从法律所赋予他的权力出发的。 第六章论独裁制 法律的僵硬性会妨碍法律得以因事制宜，所以在某些情况下就能使法律成为有害的，并且在危机关头还能因此致使国家灭亡。程序以及种种手续上的拖延，都需要一段时间，有时候这是局势所不容许的。很可能出现千百种情况都是立法者所根本未曾预料到的；因而能够察觉到我们并不能预见一切，这本身便是一种极其必要的预见了。 因此，就绝不能要求把政治制度坚硬化到竟致于取消了那种使法律中止生效的权力的地步。就连斯巴达也都曾让它的法律休眠过。 然而，唯有最大的危险才值得去冒变更公共秩序的危险；并且除非是在涉及国家生死存亡的时候，否则人们是决不应当停止法律的神圣权力的。在这种罕见而又显著的情况之下，人们便以一种特殊的行为而把维护公共安全的责任托付给一个最值得信任的人。这一委托可以按危险的种类而以两种方式进行。 如果为了挽救危局，只需扩大政府的活动就够了的话；那末，便可以把政府集中在它的一个或两个成员的身上。于是，这里所变更的便不是法律的权威，而仅仅是行使法律的形式。 如果危险已到了这种地步，以致法律的尊严竟成为维护法律的一种障碍；这时候，便可以指定一个最高首领，他可以使一切法律都沉默下来，并且暂时中止主权权威。在这种情况下，公意是无可怀疑的；并且很显然，人民首要的意图乃是国家不至于灭亡。采取这种方式时，立法权威的中止并不就是消灭；行政官可以使立法权威沉默，却不能使之发言；他可以控制它，却不能代表它；他可以做一切事情，但是不能立法。 第一种方法是罗马元老院所采用的，它以一种庄严的仪式授权执政官来保障共和国的安全。当两个执政官之一任命一个独裁者的时候，则所用的便是第二种方法了；这种办法是阿尔比给罗马做出了先例的。 当罗马共和国肇始时，他们每每求助于独裁制；因为国家还没有一个足够巩固的根基，能够仅凭宪法的力量就可以自保。这时候，罗马的风尚使得在别的时代里曾经是必要的种种防范措施都成为多余；人们既不用害怕独裁者会滥用他的权威，也不用害怕他会企图在任满之后仍然保持他的权威。相反地，好像这样大的权力对于被赋以这种权力的人反而是一种负担，因此，独裁者总是急于摆脱这种权力；仿佛取代法律的地位乃是一种非常之痛苦而又非常之危险的职位似的。 于是这里的危险就不在于滥用权力而在于贬低权力了，这就使我要指责罗马早期对这种至高无上的行政官制度的运用是不够审慎的。因为当人们把这种制度滥用于选举、奉祀以及种种纯形式的事务上的时候，就有理由要耽心它在必要的关头反而会变得不够坚强，并且人们也会习惯于把仅仅是用之于无谓的仪式方面的这种官衔看成只是个空头衔。 及至共和国的末期，罗马人已经变得更为慎重了，可是他们又同样毫无理由地吝惜独裁制，正像以往他们滥用独裁制那样。很容易看出，他们的戒心是缺乏根据的，当时首都力量的薄弱，在它内部那些行政官的面前反而成了安全的保障；一个独裁者在某种情况之下可以保卫公共自由，但永远不能觊觎公共自由；罗马的枷锁并不是在罗马本身之内铸成的，而是在它的军队里面铸成的。马留乌斯对苏拉以及庞培对凯撒都没有进行什么抵抗，这就足以说明以内部的权威去抵抗外来的武力，可能期待着什么结果了。 这种谬误使得罗马人犯了重大的错误。例如，关于卡提里那事件并未任命一个独裁者，就是这样的一种错误：因为这一事件既然只是罗马城内的问题，至多也只是意大利某几个省区的问题；所以一个独裁者运用法律所赋予他的无限权威，是很容易消除阴谋的。但那次阴谋只是由于有种种幸运机缘的偶合才被阻止；而这种机缘却是人类的审慎所永远不应当期待的。 元老院并不这样做，反而满足于把它的全部权力都交给执政官；从而就发生了西塞罗为着行动的有效而不得不在一个根本要点上逾越了这种权限。如果说开头一阵的欢悦竟使得人们赞同了他的行为的话，那末到后来人们又要他对公民违反法律的流血事件负责，就也应该是公正的；而对于一个独裁者，就不能加以这种谴责了。然而这位执政官的辩才却迷惑了大家；他本人虽然是罗马人，可是他爱自己的光荣更甚于爱自己的祖国；他追求的与其说是保卫国家的最合法而又最妥当的办法，倒不如说是要使自己享有这一事件的全部荣誉的办法。于是他就很公正地被当作罗马的解放者受到尊敬，而又很公正地被当作法律的破坏者受到惩罚。无论对他的判决的撤销是多么光彩，但那确实只能是一种恩赦。 此外，无论这一重要的委任是以什么方式来授予能，但最重要的是必须把它固定在一个很短的期限之内，绝对不能延长。在需要建立独裁制的危机关头，国家很快地不是毁灭就是保全；当紧急需要过去以后，独裁制不是变成暴君制，就是徒有虚名。在罗马，独裁者的任期只能是六个月，他们大部分都是在期满之前就退任的。如果任期规定得再长，他们或许还会企图再加以延长，就象十人会议对于任期一年所做过的那样。独裁者只许有时间来应付使他被选为独裁者的那种紧急情况，但不许有时间来梦想其他的计划。