Chapter One It is human nature to seek knowledge.Our willingness to use our senses is an illustration; even if it is not practical, people love senses, and among the senses, sight is the most important.Whether we are going to do something or not do anything, we love watching more than any other feeling.The reason is: among the five sense organs, the ones that can make us know things and show the many differences between things are the ones that can be seen. Animals are endowed by nature with faculties of sense, and some produce memory from sense, while others do not.Thus, the former are more sensitive and suitable for learning than those who cannot remember.Those who cannot hear, though sensitive, cannot be taught: bees, for example, and similar species; those animals which, in addition to memory, have hearing, can be taught.

Apart from humans, animals live by phenomena and memories, with little associated experience; but humans also live by technology and reason.Now man accumulates experience from memory; Repeated memory of the same thing finally produces the potentiality of this experience.Experience is very similar to knowledge and technology, but in fact, human beings get knowledge and technology from experience; Puluo said: "Experience creates technology, and if you don't have experience, you rely on opportunity."Many points gained from experience lead to general judgments about a class of things, and technology arises from this.It is experience to make the judgment that Gallia was afflicted with the disease, and Socrates and in many other cases; For example, if a phlegmatic or choleric person has a fever due to illness, it is beneficial to him--this is technology.

From a business point of view, it seems that experience is not inferior to technology, and even experienced people are more successful than those with theory but no experience.The reason is: experience is individual knowledge, technology is general knowledge, and business and production are related to individual things; because a doctor does not treat "people", he only treats "Galia" or "Socrates" or other Heals each with a name, and these happen to be "people".A doctor who has theories but no experience, who understands general principles but does not know the individual things contained in them, is often unable to cure the disease; because what he wants to treat are exactly "individual people".We believe that knowledge and understanding belong to technology, not to experience. We believe that technicians are smarter than experiencers (wisdom comes from general knowledge, not from individual knowledge); the former knows the reason, but the latter does not.By experience, one knows where things are but not why they are, and a technician knows why they are as they are.We also think that the master craftsmen in every trade should be more respected, who know more clearly and wisely than the common craftsmen, who know the reasons for their movements (we think the common craftsmen move by habit,— —similar to the actions of non-living things, burning like a fire-taking advantage of the natural tendency, carrying out their respective functional activities, not knowing the reason for their own actions); so we say that they are smarter, not because they are sensitive to actions It's because they have the theory and understand why.Generally speaking, this can be regarded as a sign of whether people have theories. Those who know why can teach others, but those who don't know why can't teach; therefore, compared with experience, technology is real knowledge; Experienced people cannot.

Again, we do not take our senses as wisdom; of course these give us the most important knowledge of individual things.But the senses can never tell us why anything is the way it is—such as why fire is hot; they only say that fire is hot. At the beginning, whoever invented any technology that surpassed the senses of the world was admired by the world; this was not only because these inventions had practical value, but what the world admired was that he was smarter and superior than others.Technological inventions multiplied day by day, some enriching the necessities of life, others increasing the amusements of mankind; and the inventors of the latter class were naturally regarded as more intelligent than the former, because the knowledge was not aimed at practical purposes.After the succession of all these inventions came knowledge which was neither necessary for life nor aimed at earthly pleasures, and which first appeared where men began to have leisure.Mathematics first flourished in Egypt because of the privileged leisure of the priestly class there.

In "Ethics" we have already spoken of the distinction between art and knowledge and the various senses; the subject to be discussed here is the so-called wisdom by which we explain the causes and principles of things; Man is wiser than those who have only some senses, technicians are wiser than experiencers, master craftsmen are wiser than craftsmen, and knowledge in the theoretical department should be more intelligent than in the production department.Wisdom, then, is evidently knowledge of certain principles and causes. Chapter Two Because we are seeking this knowledge, we must study the kind of knowledge of causes and principles that "wisdom" (Sophia) is.If we pay attention to our interpretation of "philosopher", we can have a clearer answer.Let us first assume: a philosopher knows all knowable things, although he may not know all the details of each thing; whoever can understand things that are difficult for everyone to know is also called wisdom (feelings are common to everyone and easy to get, this is not wisdom); and whoever is better at and more truly imparting the reasons for each subject of knowledge should also be wiser; the knowledge sought for the science itself is always greater than its application. And the knowledge sought is closer to wisdom, and higher learning is closer to wisdom than lower learning; a philosopher should do, not be done, he should not obey others, and those with less wisdom should obey him.

These are our interpretations of wisdom and philosophers.Thus the characteristic of erudition must belong to those who possess the highest general knowledge; for if something is not known, it cannot be said to be universal.And the most common are the most elusive to man; for they are furthest from perception.The most precise sciences are those which emphasize fundamental principles; and those which cover fewer principles are more precise than those which cover more supplementary principles, such as arithmetic and geometry (measurement).A science that studies causes is more profitable than a science that does not ask them; only those who know the causes of all things can teach us.In the pursuit of knowledge and understanding, among the most knowable things, the most obtainable will be the most (those who seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge, naturally choose the most real, which is the most knowable knowledge); principles and reasons are the most knowable; Once you understand the principle and reason, everything else can be understood from it. If you are a secondary academic, you will not understand it.These sciences must be superior to those of the lesser ones who can know the ultimate to which everything must go; this ultimate end is the "principal good" of a thing in an individual, and the "supreme good" of the universe in general.All of the above should be attributed to the same science; this must be a science that studies principles and causes; the so-called "good", that is, "ultimate", is originally one of the causes.

Just from the history of early philosophers, it can also be seen that this kind of scholarship is not a kind of manufacturing scholarship.Throughout the ages, people began their philosophical explorations, starting from their astonishment at all things in nature; they were first amazed at all kinds of confusing phenomena, and gradually accumulated explanations bit by bit, to some more important issues, such as the movement of the sun, moon and stars The creation of the universe, making explanations.A man who is bewildered and amazed is ashamed of his stupidity (thus myths catalog all that is grotesque, and those who love myths are also lovers of wisdom); Engaged in academics, and no practical purpose.This is evidenced by the fact that:

This kind of scholarship begins when nearly all the necessaries of life, and the things that make a man happy and comfortable, are in possession.In this way, obviously, we do not seek wisdom for any other benefit; only because human beings are free, to live for their own survival and not for the survival of others, so we recognize philosophy as the only free learning and explore deeply, This is precisely the only scholarship established for its own sake. To acquire such knowledge is perhaps beyond human ability; in many ways, human nature is in prison.According to Xuemenides' words, "The secrets of nature are only known to God", and human beings should live in the knowledge of the world, not peeking at the secrets of heaven.If the poet's words are good and correct, then the gods will also be jealous. It is the old man who uses this wisdom (to reveal the secret) to win, and often encounter misfortune.However, the gods are not necessarily jealous (an old proverb says: poets lie too much), and there is no more glorious academic field in the world than this one.For the most sacred scholarship is also the most honorable, and it must be sacred in both respects.The science that is most proper to God is a divine science, and any science that deals with divine things must be holy; and so is philosophy: (1) God is supposed to be the cause of all things, and also to be the first cause of all things. One principle. (2) Such a science is either unique to God; or God can surpass human beings and know more.All other sciences are more practical than philosophy, but no science is better than philosophy.

However, in a certain sense, the result of practicing this discipline is exactly the opposite of the original intention of our above exploration.All people start with the surprise of Vientiane, such as puppets walking on their own, such as the winter solstice and summer solstice, such as "the diagonal of a square cannot be measured by sides", etc., saying that there is one thing in the world that cannot be measured even with the smallest unit Metering, which is astonishing to all who do not know why.However, the reality is exactly the opposite. According to the old proverb, "Thinking is the way to get it", people can understand the reason of things, and then they are not confused by things; for a geometer, if the diagonal becomes measurable, it is a strange thing in the world.

It has been stated here what the nature of the scholarship we seek, and what standards all research must meet. Chapter three Clearly we should seek knowledge of causes, since we can only say we know a thing when we have recognized its fundamental causes.The reasons can be divided into four and listed.One is the noumenon, that is, how is, ("why" aims to define the last or the first "why", which indicates a reason and principle) (the original cause); the other is the material or bottom layer ( The third is the source of change (causation); the fourth is the opposite of change, which is the purpose and original good, because this is the ultimate (extreme cause) of all creation and change.We have fully studied these reasons in "physical science", now let us call upon the sages who once studied "truth" and demonstrated "truth" to help us learn.They also talked about certain principles and reasons; understanding their views is beneficial to our exploration today, and seeking new explanations from those old theories may be used to prove that our theories are correct.

Most of the early philosophers believed that the only principle of all things was in the nature of matter.The nature of all things is constantly changing, and the noumenon is always the same. Therefore, they call it elements, and regard elements as the principle of all things. Therefore, they think that all things are deteriorating, but nothing is deteriorating. After all, species are always present; for example, we say that Socrates is beautiful and civilized, and what he calls beauty and civilization can first exist and then disappear, and it does not always exist, but Socrates always exists. Just so they say that things come into being or pass away without being born and passing away; for those who compose all things—whether as one (element) or as many (elements)—remain the same in the decay and decay of all things. But they did not agree as to the nature and project of these principles.Thales, the founder of such doctrines, said that "water is the cause of all things" (for which reason he declared that the earth was placed on water), and he probably derived his meaning from these facts: As all seeds grow in moistening, All things are nourished by moistening, and water is the source of moistening.He can also derive its meaning from the fact that heat is generated by moisture, and heat is maintained by moisture (whatever comes from is the principle of all things). Some people think that the ancient philosophers who have gone down to the present also have a similar concept of the universe in their records of the gods; Water is an oath, and it is called "Sdehe" under the false name.The oldest of things is the most revered, and that which is sworn by all shall be the holiest.It is difficult to determine when this kind of explanation about nature started in ancient times, but we can be sure that Thales once pointed out the number one cause of the world in this way.It is generally not appropriate to include Hippo in this school, because Hippo's thoughts are trivial. Anaximenes and Diogenes believed that air preceded water, the primordial substrate of all things; while Hippasso of Medapontin and Heraclitus of Ephesus put fire first.Empedocles started with the combination of the four elements (adding soil to the above three), he said that the four elements gather or scatter, increase or decrease, to form all kinds of things, and they themselves come from One, enter into one, the past and the present are the same, always remain the same. Anaxagoras of Crazomene, though older than Empedocles, was later in his studies than Empedocles, who said that the principles are infinite in number (not one, not four); The gathering and dispersing is birth and death, and all things are like water and fire, each of which is composed of "similar differentials", so birth and death are just the gathering and dispersal of many differentials, and each differential exists eternally. From these facts, one will say that the only cause of all things is matter alone; But academic progress, everyone has opened up new realms, and they have to do research on these topics.Even if everything in the universe is formed by the evolution of one element or several elements (substances), how does the birth and death come about, and what is the reason?This material "bottom" itself cannot change itself; neither wood nor bronze can change itself, wood cannot form a bed by itself, and bronze cannot form an image by itself. The cause of this evolution can only be found in another thing.To look for this is to look for what we call the second cause - the cause.Those who have made this kind of exploration for the first time are quite satisfied with saying that the "bottom" of the universe has a first cause; The whole universe is an unchanging "monad" in terms of genesis and destruction; the same is true for other evolutions. (This original belief was a common thought among early philosophers).This is their peculiar point of view.Those who insisted on the unity of the universe, except Parmenides, failed to find this other kind of cause, and Parmenides only said that in a certain sense, there are not only one cause, but two.But those who predominate in multiple elements⑤ are more likely to refer to this second cause. They regard cold and heat, and earth and wood as elements equally; they consider fire to be active, while water, earth, etc., are listed in the passive class. . Even in the age of miscellaneous theories, people already feel that these ideas are not enough to explain the creation of all things, and the second reason we mentioned above must be explored for the truth.Things, in their incarnation, attained their goodness, or their beauty, and fire, earth, and other similar elements were never the cause of those things' goodness, nor did the universe behave according to the ideas of these thinkers. It does not seem to be true to say that goodness or beauty has no cause, but only spontaneous and accidental phenomena.Then someone rose up and said that it was due to "reason"--as it is in the animals, it is the same in the whole universe.The order and arrangement of all things are due to this reason, so that he is indeed clearer than the vain talk of his predecessors.We know that this clear assertion came from Anaxagoras, but it is said to have been made earlier by Hermodimus of Crazomene.This assertion illustrates the principle that what makes things good is what makes them good. Chapter Four One may suppose that Hechot, or others like Parmenides, were the first to find such a thing as "passion" as a principle of existing things: for Hechot, when describing the creation of the universe, says: "Eros was the first deity whose plan was successful". Heshaot added: "First was Chaos, then the broad-breasted earth, ... Cupid was first among the gods". This implies that there must first be a cause of change in all existing things, and then things can come together.Which of these thinkers put forward this truth first, let us test it later.But you can see that the various forms in nature often contain relative qualities-not only neatness and beauty, but also disorder and ugliness, and there are often more bad things than good things, and more ugly things than beautiful things,— Then another thinker introduced "friendship" and "fighting" as separate reasons for the different qualities of these two series.If we follow Empedocles' point of view, understand the meaning of his words, and explain things according to his real meaning, then we can surely say that friendship (love) is the cause of all good, and fighting (hate) is the cause of all good. The cause of evil.In this way, if we say that Empedocles put forward (or was the first to put forward) the principle of "all good comes from the original good, and all evil comes from the original evil", the two of good and evil are because of the first principle in the world, it should not be wrong. The second of the four causes, which we have argued in "On Nature,"--the physical and the moving cause--has been grasped by these thinkers, but is still dark and incomprehensible; Those arguments are like the actions of an untrained boxer, who circles his opponent, sometimes strikes, and shows good skill, but never great boxing, so these thinkers like this, in what they say Not necessarily familiar; because they generally do not quote, or only quote within a limited range, the reasons they said.Anaxagoras cited "reason" as the mechanism of the creation of the world, but he usually used other reasons to answer questions instead of reason. He only suggested "reason" when he was exhausted and had no choice. .Empedocles' own reasons, although quoted more widely, are not sufficient, and they cannot be exempted from ambiguity in their citations.At least, he has used "you" as the reason for the separation of things and "dou" as the reason for the combination of things in many places.If all things in the universe are disintegrated by hatred and are reduced to their individual elements, then on the other hand, fire is thus reassembled together, and so are other elements; , those few elemental groups should be scattered among the objects again. Compared with his predecessors, Empedocles should be the first to divide the cause into two different and relative sources.He was also the first to assert that there are four material elements; but in fact, he often regarded the four elements as two elements, and listed fire on one side, and earth, air, and water as the same nature, on the opposite side.We can see his thoughts when studying his verses.Such is the principle taught by this philosopher that the number is either four or two. Leucippus and his colleague Democritus took "emptiness" and "substance" as elements, they took "substance" as "yes" and "emptiness" as "nothingness": they did not say that being is inseparable from nothing Yes, so when the emptiness does not exceed the reality, and the reality does not exceed the emptiness; they take this as the physical cause of everything.Those who believe that all things come from the change of the same underlying substance believe that "疎" and "secret" are the origin of change, and they also believe that the differences in elements lead to other kinds of qualitative changes.These differences, they say, are threefold: shape, order, position.They say that everything is "real" only because of the difference between rhythm, contact, and orientation; rhythm is shape, contact is order, orientation is position; for example, A and N are different in shape, AN and NA are different in order, The positions of Z and N are different.As for the question of change—where do things come from?How to change into dynamic? —These thinkers, like others, have lazily omitted. With regard to these two causes, the studies of the early philosophers seem to have reached this point. Chapter five Before and at the same time as these philosophers, the so-called Pythagorean school, known as the leader in mathematics, not only promoted the study of mathematics, but also immersed in mathematics. They believed that "number" is the origin of all things.Among the principles of nature, the first is the principle of "number". They saw that the generation and existence of many things should be attributed to number rather than to fire, earth or water.The change of value can become "morality", "soul", "rationality", and "opportunity"-similarly, everything can be explained by numbers.They also saw that the changes and proportions of the rhythm can be calculated by numbers,—therefore, they thought that everything in nature seems to be formed by numbers, and number is the first meaning in nature; They think that the element of number is the element of all things, and the whole universe is also a number, and should be a tune.They gather together the number and rhythm of things as signifiers, and arrange them so that the parts of the universe fit into a complete order; where they find gaps, they patch them up so that they can be justified.For example, 10 is considered to be the end of all numbers, the total number of the universe should also be 10, and the total number of celestial bodies should also be 10, but there are only 9 visible celestial bodies, so they made "opposite earth"—the tenth celestial body— — Come make up the numbers.We have discussed these issues in more detail elsewhere. Our purpose in revisiting these thinkers is to see whether the principles they cite correspond to the reasons for what we say.These thinkers, obviously, think that number is the substance of all things in the universe, and its change and normal state are all due to number; while the elements of number are "odd" and "even", the odd number is limited, and the even number is infinite; "one" is derived from odd and even (Yuanyi can be odd or even), and the number of columns comes from Yuanyi; as mentioned above, the whole universe is a series of numbers. Others in this school say that there are ten principles, divided into two series: Limited Odd One Right Man Jing Nao Ming Shan Zheng Infinite Idols, Left Girls, Dark Evil Slant Alkmaine seems to have had the same idea, either he got it from those people, or those people got it from him; in short, their theories are similar, he said that people do not always go one way, but the world does not go the same way, for example White and black, sweet and bitter, good and evil, big and small.However, his "parallels" are slightly different from those of the Pythagoreans. His pairs can be picked up at hand, unlike the Pythagoreans who have a certain number and content. From these two schools, we know that "pairing" is the principle of things; as for the program of pairing, we should teach each school separately.But how these principles can be connected with the causes we have described, they do not explain; it seems that they attribute these elements to matter; From these old theories, we can fully recognize the true meaning of what the ancients said "nature is made of many elements"; High and low, and the degree to which what each school says is consistent with the actual natural phenomenon is also different.When we study the causes of nature here, we cannot discuss their viewpoints in detail. They say that reality is one, and they do not use "one" to create "realness". This is the same as some natural philosophers who regard reality as one. Those who regard one as matter to create reality are different, and they say differently from those people; natural philosophers add "change", and they say "the universe does not change".For our current research, a brief introduction is enough: Parmenides' so-called one seems to be "one in definition"; It is said that an infinite Zenofini (it is said that he is the teacher of Pap) was originally the founder of monism, and there is no clear discussion here. It seems that he did not fully understand the purposes of the two later schools, but when it comes to the whole universe , he said "one in God".We are now leaving aside the somewhat broad-minded Xenophanes and Merisus; but Parmenides is quite refined in many ways.He declared that "there is nothing other than being", and what exists must be one, so there will be no existence of non-existent (we have explained these in detail in "Physics"); When feeling that the non-one phenomenon of the world was inconsistent with his claim that "the definition of nature must be one", he proposed two causes and two principles, which he called heat and cold, that is, fire and earth; Assign heat to "yes" and cold to "no-yes". We have benefited greatly from these ancient philosophies that we are now discussing together. Some of these ancient philosophies regard matter as the first principle in the world, such as water and fire, and the like are all entities; some people say that there is only one entity, or that there is more than one kind, and as for the meaning of matter, everyone is the same .Another group of people cited motives in addition to physical causes; these people either said that there was only one motive, or that there were two motives. Philosophers, then, up to the Italian school and thereafter, dealt with these matters in obscure ways, except that they also actually cited two causes—one of which was the source of the movement.This source is either one or two.But the Pythagoreans also said that there are two meanings in the world, and added their unique reasoning, thinking that the finite and the infinite are not attributes of fire or earth or such elements, and "infinity" and "element One" is what they call the essence of things: this is the basis for "number" to be the essence of all things.That's how they state the problem; they set out to define how things are, but they treat the problem too simply.The definitions they make are not only superficial, but also hasty in thought; they mean that in the definition of interpreting things, the first term can be used as the substance of things, just as people because "two" is used to indicate "fold" For the first number, "two" is regarded as "times".But "double" and "two" are really different; if they are the same, one thing can become many things. ——They really made such an extended conclusion.There is so much we can learn from these sages and their successors. Chapter Six After the above-listed academic systems came Pabito's philosophy, which, while generally following these thinkers, was quite different from the Italian school.In his youth, he first became acquainted with Cratylus, so he was familiar with the teachings of Heraclitus (all sensible things are always in flux, and knowledge of things is impossible), and in his later years he also practiced the teachings of Heraclitus. hold these views.Socrates was busy talking about ethical issues, he forgot the natural world as a whole, but wanted to seek universal truth in ethical issues; he began to focus on finding definitions for things.Plato accepted his teaching, but he advocated moving the problem from sensible things to another kind of reality-for sensible things, since they are changeable and intangible, can be defined, and all general laws cannot. Made from here.This other class of things he called "Idia" (Italian) ιδEα, all sensible things are subject to the Italian, and are also tied to the Italian: many things that refer to the same Italian have the same name. same.But the word "reference" is new; the Pythagoreans said: the existence of things "effects" on "number"; Italian".As for how to "regulate" or "effect" the general formula, they leave it to everyone to figure out. He said that besides sensible things and general formulas, there are also mathematical objects, and mathematical objects have intermediate properties. They are different from sensible things because they are permanent and unchanged, and different from general formulas because each general formula is a separate entity. Mathematical things are often many similar. Since the general formula is the cause of all other things, he therefore holds that the elements of the general formula are the elements of all things. The combination of "big and small" creates number, so the thing of number is due to "big and small", and its formula is due to "one".He agrees with the Pythagorean school that the monad is the substance, and does not make other real claims, and also agrees with them that the number is the cause of all things; but when it comes to "infinity", he does not use Infinity (indefinite) is a simple principle, and it is composed of "big and small", and there are so-called "indeterminate two" - he is special about this point. He thinks that numbers exist independently of sensible things, which is also consistent with them. The Pythagoreans believed that things are numbers.He separated one and number from things and introduced general formulas. These differences with the Pythagoreans were probably caused by his study of the definition of things (early thinkers did not use dialectics at all); Another principle besides "one", as "undetermined two", is because he believes that except for prime numbers, every number can be made of "two" as a plastic material at will. That's not the case; it's not a sound theory.They created the general form only once, and many things can be made of matter, but what we see is a table made of one matter, and although there is only one person who made the table, he applied the table form to each table. And make many tables.So also is the relation between male and female; the female conceives once, and the male impregnates many females; these may be compared with those principles. So Plato maintains on these matters; and from the passages above it is evident that he takes only two causes, the original and the physical.The general form is the how-is of things from which all other things are made, and the monad is the how-to (principal cause) of the general form from which it is a general form; This also makes it clear that what the general formula is to the sensible things and the unitary is to the general formula, what is the underlying substance (material cause) that it implies, and this is the "two" of "big and small".Also, like his predecessors, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he assigned good causes and evil causes respectively to the two catechisms. Chapter seven We have briefly recounted the principles and facts mentioned by the predecessors, as well as their main points; although we have benefited a lot, the principles or reasons they said have all been specified in our "physics", Although they are related to each other, the content is still superficial.Some people take matter as the basic principle, but they have different views on these substances. Some people believe that there is only one kind of matter, and some people think that there is more than one kind. To give examples of each, this is Plato's so-called "big and small", the Italian school's so-called "infinity", Empedocles' so-called "four elements" (fire, earth, water, air), and Anaxagoras' so-called "infinity". "Similar differentials" make up endless things.For this reason, these, all have their own opinions; there are also those who mainly use air, fire, or water, and others should use something that is more dense than fire, and more dense than others. Still dilute substances are the main ones (some people have explained that the basic elements should be like this).They also have their own understanding. These thinkers grasp only this one cause; but others refer to the source of change, for example, some take friendship and quarrel, or reason, or love as the basic principle. As for "how is", or the reality of the noumenon, no one has made a clear explanation.Those who believe in general formulas have hints at this; they do not take general formulas to be the matter of sensible things, nor monads to be the matter of general formulas, nor general formulas to be the source of movement, but to regard a general formula as When it is the source of movement rather than the source of stillness, this makes the general form the how of everything else and the monad the how of the general form. Although they also deduce the cause of action and change, as well as the cause of motion, they do not clearly recognize that this should be a cause in the natural noumenon.Men of reason, of love, ascribe these to the good; they think that motion begins here, but they do not see that it is for this that things come into being and exist.Likewise, those who say that monadity or existence is good, that it is the cause of noumenon, do not say that noumena was created and exists for the good.So they at the same time seem to know and do not seem to know that goodness is a cause of things; they only say that things have the property of goodness, and do not affirm that goodness is the ultimate cause of that thing. Then, all these thinkers can't find another new cause, which should prove that the four reasons we have stated are correct and cannot be added.Anyone who inquires about the cause of things should seek these four causes together, or choose one of the four causes.Let us proceed to examine the pros and cons of the various arguments and the difficulties they may raise on the question of first principles. Chapter eight Therefore, those who maintain that there is only one universe and only one substance, and that substance refers only to those entities with measurements, they have obviously gone astray in divergence.In spite of the existence of non-substantial things, they speak only of the elements of substantive things; in stating the general material phenomena of things and their causes of their generation and destruction, they leave out the cause.Also, they don’t talk about the substance of things, and don’t ask how it is (the original cause), which is also wrong; except for the “earth” (soil), they rashly regard the simple entity as the first principle, and do not pursue them— - fire, water, earth, air - how to generate each other is also wrong: because things are generated either by merging or by dissociation, which is very different from their innate nature and acquired nature. Because (a) the most basic elemental substances should be composed of the original things by their amalgamation, this quality should belong to the fine particles in the entity.People who use fire as their principle fit this argument most closely.The endowment of the physical elements mentioned by other schools is also similar to this meaning.At least this is the case, no one who advocates only one basic element has cited "earth" as the only element, obviously because the particles of the earth are too coarse.The other three elements have their own claims; as the basic elements, some people are based on fire, some are based on water, and some are based on air. (Why don't they belong to the earth like ordinary people? As the saying goes, "everything is earth (born from the earth, and to the earth when it perishes")." Heshaot said that of all entities, the earth was first formed; this opinion has long been This is the most primitive and popular opinion.) According to this differential argument, those who are dominated by earth, water, and air, and those who are dominated by certain elements that are denser than air and denser than water, are not as correct as the ones that are dominated by fire.但（乙）若说先于本性的当后于生成，组合物于生成论虽在后，于本性论便应在先，则与我们上面所述的相反者才算正确——那么就应该水先于气，地先于水。 主于一元素为原因的就是这些问题。主于不止一元素者如恩培多克勒，以万物具有四实体的论点，也未能免于疑难； 有些问题与我们上面所指的相同，另一些则是由他理论的特点所引出的。 我们常见到实体互生互成，火并不常是火，地也并不常是地（这曾在我们的自然哲学论文中讲过）；关于动变的原因以及四元素可否归结于一元素或两元素这问题，他讲得既不明确也不漂亮。照他的论点冷不生热，热不生冷；这样质变是不可能产生的。如果认为变化是可以产生的，这就得承认还有某些事物来涵容这些"对成"，还得有一个实是，它能成火亦能成水；这个恩培多克勒是不承认的。 至于阿那克萨哥拉，人们如果说他曾主张过两种元素，这与他有些论点是完全符合的；他虽没有明言这种观念，若有人从他的言语中指证这种观念，他就必须承认。说宇宙玄始一切事物是混杂的，这实在荒谬，因为照此说来，在未混杂以前，事物当有他的单净形式，而自然又何尝容许任何偶然的事物作偶然混杂；并且照这观念，诸秉赋与属性将可由本体析离（因为混杂了的事物应该能够析离）；可是人们如果紧随着他，将他所有的示意都贯串起来，似乎这又将显见他的思想相当清新。假如一切真没有一些可离析的，那么现存的本体也真将无可为之申说了。试举例以明吾意，这应没有白，没有黑，没有灰色，也没有它色，这就必须多无色；苟谓有色，这必得有诸色之一色。依这论法，相似地，也必须是无味；也没有其它的属性；因为这不能有任何质，任何度量，也不能有任何情况明确的物类。如其不然，事物就成为有色，或有味，或有可举说的特殊形态，但因一切事物悉归混杂，这就不可能了；因为这特殊形态必须是已析离了的属性，但他说除了理性，一切皆混，惟有理性独净不混。从这里，再跟上去，他就得说原理是"一"（"一"是单净而未混杂的）与"别"，（这"别"的性质就是某些倘未获得确定形式的"未定物"。）他并未明确表达出自己的思想，但他意向所指，后期的思想家似乎较他自己更清楚地捉摸到了。 总之，这些思想家所熟习的只是关于生灭与动变的理论； 他们就只为这些找寻原理与原因。但人们若开其视野，徧看一切存在的事物，一切可眼见与不可眼见的事物，而明白地于这两类事物加以研究，当会得知我们正该用更多时间来考查什么符合于他们的观点，而什么又不符合我们目前的探索。 毕达哥拉斯学派对原理与元素的想法比之那些自然哲学家较为奇怪，他们不从可感觉事物追求原理，而他们所研究的数理对象除了天文事物以外，都是一类无运动的事物。可是他们所讨论与探索的却正是这物质宇宙的诸问题；他们记述"诸天"之创造并观察诸天的各部分与其活动和演变；他们使用各项原理与原因来解释这些现象时，恰又与自然哲学家们所言略同——他们所谓"诸天"所包涵的事物原也不殊于这物质宇宙的万物。但我们已说过他们所提示的原理与原因本可以导向更高境界的实是，这些原理与原因在自然理论上也不如在那些更高境界中来得适用。可是他们并没有告诉我们世上倘只有"有限与无限"和"奇与偶"，动变如何可能，而没有动变，生灭又如何可能，或是经行于天宇间的列宿又如何能照现在的轨迹而行动。 又，人们倘承认空间量度由这些要素组成，或者就算这些已经得到证明，我们还得询问何以有些实体轻，有些则重？从他们所执的前提与所持的议论来判断，他们于可感觉事物与数理对象该是当作可相能转的；我推想他们所以不谈火或地或类比之实体，就因他们认为在数理对象之外，于可感觉事物已没有什么特殊的道理。 再者，我们怎样才能将这些信念结合起来，何以数与数的属性是一切存在事物的原因，是自古迄今一切天体现象的原因？何以世界只能按照他们所说的那些数目来组合，不能照其它数目？在某一特殊的区域中，他们安置了"条教"与"机运"，在这稍上或稍下安置"不义"与"分离"或"混合"并"指证"，这些庶事各都是一个数；可是这里各处先已安置有一套由数组成而具有量度的诸实体，——就是这样，抽象的众数与物质世界的众数是相同的数，抑或不相同的两类数呢？柏拉图说这是不相同的；可是他也认为数可以作事物之量度，也可以成为事物的原因，其分别恰是这样，事物本身的数是感觉数，为之原因之数则是理知数。让我们暂时离开毕达哥拉斯学派；我们所涉及于他们的已够多了。 章九 至于主张以意式为原因的人，他们为了掌握我们周围诸事物的原因，先引入了与诸事物为数一样多的形式，好象一个人要点数事物，觉得事物还少，不好点数，等到事物增加了，他才来点数。因为通式实际不少于事物，或是与事物一样多，这些思想家们在对事物试作说明时，从事物越入通式。 对于每一事物必须另有一个脱离了本体的"同名实是"，其它各组列也如此，各有一个"以一统多"〈意式〉，不管这些"多"是现世的或超现世的。 再者，我们所用以证明通式存在的各个方法没有一个足以令人信服；因为有些论据并不必引出这样的结论，有些则于我们常认为无通式的事物上也引出了通式。依照这个原则一切事物归属多少门学术，这就将有多少类通式；依照这个"以一统多"的论点，虽是否定，亦将有其通式；依照事物灭坏后，对于此事物的思念并不随之灭坏这原则，我们又将有已灭坏事物的通式，因为我们留有这些事物的遗象。在某些比较精审的论辩中，有些人又把那些不成为独立级类的事物引到了"关系"的意式，另有些论辩则引致了"第三人"。 一般而论，通式诸论点，为了意式的存在消失了事物，实际上我们应更关心于那些事物的存在：因为从那些论点出发，应是数〈２〉为第一，而"两"却在后，亦即相关数先于绝对数。此外，还有其它的结论，人们紧跟着意式思想的展开，总不免要与先所执持的诸原理发生冲突。 又，依据我们所由建立意式的诸假定，不但该有本体的通式，其它许多事物都该有（这些观念不独应用于诸本体，亦应用之于其它，不但有本体的学术，也有其它事物的学术；数以千计的相似诸疑难将跟着发生），但依据通式的主张与事例的要求，假如通式可以被"参与"，这就只应该有本体的意式，因为它们的被"参与"并不是在属性上被"参与"，而正是"参与"了不可云谓的本体。举例来说明我的意思，譬如一事物参加于"绝对之倍"也就参加了"永恒"，但这是附带的； 因为这"倍"只在属性上可用永恒作云谓。所以通式将是本体；但这相同的名词通指着感觉世界与意式世界中的本体（如其不然，则那个别事物以外的，所谓"以一统多"的，意式世界中的本体，其真义究又如何）。意式若和参与意式的个别事物形式相同，这将必有某些性质为它们所公有，"二"在可灭坏的"诸二"中或在永恒的诸"二"中均属相同。何以在绝对"二"与个别"二"中就不一样的相同？但是，它们若没有相同的形式，那它们就只有名称相同而已，这好象人们称呼加里亚为"人"，也称呼一木偶为"人"，而并未注意两者之间的共通性一样。 最后，大家可以讨论这问题，通式对于世上可感觉事物（无论是永恒的或随时生灭的）发生了什么作用；因为它们既不使事物动，也不使之变。它们对于认识事物也不曾有何帮助；因为它们甚至于并不是这些事物的本体，它们若为事物的本体。就将存在于事物之中，它们倘不存在于所参与的个别事物之中，它们对这些事物的存在也就无可为助。它们若真存在于个别事物之中，这就可被认为是原因，如"白"进入于白物的组成中使一切白物得以成其"白性"，但这种先是阿那克萨哥拉，以后欧多克索及他人也应用过的论点，是很容易被攻破的；对于这观念不难提出好多无以辩解的疑问。 又说一切事物"由"通式演化，这"由"就不能是平常的字意。说通式是模型，其它事物参与其中，这不过是诗喻与虚文而已。试看意式〈理型〉，究属在制造什么？没有意式作蓝本让事物照抄，事物也会有，也会生成，不管有无苏格拉底其人，象苏格拉底那样的一个人总会出现；即使苏格拉底是超世的，世上也会出现。同一事物又可以有几个模型，所以也得有几个通式；例如"动物"，与"两脚"与"人"自身都是人的通式。通式不仅是可感觉事物的模型，而且也是通式自己的模型；好象科属，本是各品种所系的科属，却又成为科属所系的科属；这样，同一事物将又是蓝本又是抄本了。 又，本体与本体的所在两离，似乎是不可能的；那么，意式既是事物之本体，怎能离事物而独立？在"斐多"中，问题这样陈述——通式为今"是"〈现成事物〉与"将是"〈生成事物〉的原因；可是通式虽存在，除了另有一些事物为之动变，参与通式的事物就不会生成；然而其它许多事物（例如一幢房屋或一个指环），我们可说它们并无通式，却也生成了。那么，明显地产生上述事物那样的原因也可能是其它事物存在与其生成的原因。 又，若以通式为数，它们如何能成为原因？因为现存事物是其它系列的数么？例如人是一个数，苏格拉底是另一数，加里亚又是另一数？那么，一系列的数又怎能成为另一系列数的原因？即使前一列是永恒的，后一列是非永恒的，这仍不足为之证明。如果在这可感觉世界中的事物（例如音乐）是数的比例，那么凡属数比就另成一级事物。假如这——物质——是一些确定的事物，数本身显然也将是某些对某些的比例。例如，假定加里亚是火，地，水，气间的一个比例，他的意式也将涵存若干底层物质；而人本身，不管他是否确是一个数或不是一个数，却总该是某些事物间的一个数比，而不是数本身；不应该因为这是〈某些底层物质的〉数比，就以意式为数。 又，众数可成一数，但怎能由众通式成为一通式？若说一个数，如一万，并不由众数组成而是由诸单位〈诸一〉组成，那些单位又何如？无论说它们在品种上是相似的或不相似的，都将引出许多荒谬的后果（无论是说一个定数中的诸单位相异，或说一个定数与另一定数中的诸单位相异）；它们既各无特质，将其何物以成其相异？这不是一个可赞美的观念，而且也与我们对单位的想法不符。 又，他们必须建立第二类的数，（在算术上运用这些，）并建立被某些思想家所引称的"间体"；这些又如何存在，从何发生？又或要问，在现世事物与理想数之间为何须要有间体？ 又，说是二中的两单位，每一个都应从一个先天之二中得来；但这是不可能的。 又，为什么一个数由若干单位合成之后就必须作为一个整体？ 再者，除了上述诸疑难外，单位倘有多种，则柏拉图学派就该象那些讲元素有四或有二的人一样，各各予以明析；但那些思想家将火与地称为元素，并不曾先阐明它们有何相同的底质——如都有实体——而是分别赋与"元素"这一通名。 事实上柏拉图学派所讲单位也象火或水一样，是全体匀和而同质的；若然，数便不是本体。明显地，如果有一个"绝对一"而以此为第一原理，则"一"当须具有双关命意以适应不同作用；如其不然，这就不能成立〈为类乎"元素"之单位〉。 当我们希望将实物抽象为原理时，我们将线叙述为"长与短"（"大与小"诸品种之一），面为阔狭，体为深浅。可是如何又面能含线，而体能含面或线呢？因为阔狭与深浅是不同类的。在这里并不包含有数，因为"多少"〈数〉与"长短"，"阔狭"，"深浅"〈量度〉也各非同类：明显地高级类不存现于低级类中。"阔"也不是一个可以包容深的科属，如果是这样，体将成为面属中的一个品种了。 又，图中所涵的点将由什么原理演化？柏拉图尝否定这一级事物，谓之几何寓言〈几何教条〉。他将线原理名为"不可分割线"——这个他时常论及。可是这些必得有一限止； 所以论证线如何存在，就跟着会说明点的存在。⑤一般说来，虽则哲学旨在寻求可见事物的原因，我们曾忽视了这旨趣（因为关于变化所由发动的原因我们从未谈到），而正当我们幻想自己是在陈述可见事物的本体时，我们执持了本体的次级存在，我们主张它们作为可见事物的本体之缘由都是空谈；我们先前已说过，所谓"参与"实际是假讬的。 通式对于我们所见艺术上的原因也没关系，对于艺术，整个自然与人类的理性是在作用着的，——这一种作用，我们认为是世界第一原理；但近代思想家虽说是为了其它事物而作数学研究，却把数学充当哲学。 又，人们可以照他们的讲法推想，作为本体的底层物质，作为本体的云谓与差异者，也属于数，亦即是说这些底层拟于物质而本身并非物质。这里我所指的是"大与小"，如同自然哲学家所说"密与疎"一样，为底层的初级差别；因为这些也就是"超越与缺损"的诸品种之一。至于动变，"大与小"若作为动变，则通式显然将被动变；它们若不作为动变，动变又将从何产生？自然的全部研究就此被取消了。 说事物悉归于一——想来这是容易为之作证的，实际还没有证明；因为所有例引的方法只证明有"绝对之一"〈本一〉存在，即便我们承认所有的假设——也未证明所有事物悉归于一。假如我们不承认通例〈普遍〉是一个科属，则"绝对之一"那样的结论也不可能引致；而且这在有些事例上原来也是行不通的。 在数之后，线与面与体怎样发生而能存在，以及它们具有那些意义，这也未能予以说明；因为这些既不能是通式（因为它们不是数）也不是"间体"（因为间体是一些数学对象），也不是可灭坏事物。这明显地是一个〈与上三类〉不同的第四类。 事物之存在涵融着许多不同命意，不辩明其复杂性而要觅取所有存在的要素，一般是不可能的，用这样含混的方式研究事物组成要素之性质是无益的。因为所能发现的要素只是本体的要素，至于什么是"作用"或"被作用"，或"深固"不可及处的要素，实际是不一定能发现的；所以说要统研一切现存事物的底蕴，或自意谓已掌握了一切要素，都是未必确到的。 我们怎能习知一切事物的要素？明显地我们不能先知而后学。开始学习几何的人，即使他娴于其它事物的知识，可是于所拟修习的几何这门学术当是全无知识的；其它类此。那么，若象有些人所主张的，世上有一门统括一切事物的学术，则修习这门学术的人该是先前一无所知的了。可是一切学习无论是用"实证法"或用"界说法"进行，必须先知道某些"前提"（知道一些或全部前提）以为依凭；界说〈定义〉的要素必须先已知道而熟习；用"归纳法"来学习也相似。若说知识真的基于宿慧，这很奇怪我们不知道自己具有这样伟大的知识。 又，人怎样得知一切事物用什么构成，知道以后又怎样能将自己所知向人表明，这也是一个疑难；因为意见可以互相抵触；例如关于某些字母，有人说I（ｚａ）是σ与δ与α三音注的拼合，另有些人则说这是另一个间注，与我们其它已熟识的音注没有一个相切。 又，如没有具备相应的官感，我们怎能认识各种不同感觉的各类事物？可是，如果象复杂的声调可由适当的通用字母〈音注〉组成一样，一切事物所由组成的要素苟为各官感都能相通的要素，那么我们应该就能〈看音乐或听图画〉。 章十 从以上所述，于是这明白了，人们似乎都在寻求我们在"物学"中所指明的诸原因，我们再没有找到过其它原因。但他们的研索是模糊的；他们有些象是说到了，又象全没说到。 因为古代哲学正当青年，知识方开，尚在发言嗫嚅的初学时期。虽是恩培多克勒也只会说骨的存在由于其中的比例，比例就是事物的怎是，亦即定义。相似地，肌肉与其它组织也应是元素的比例，否则就该都不是比例，照他这论点，肉与骨及其它不是因他所曾列举的——火，地，水，气——物质而存在，只因其间的比例而存在。这些引伸了的意思他自己并未明白说出，但我们今日为之引伸了，他是必得同意的。 关于这些问题，我们已表示了我们的想法；但让我们重复列举在这些论点上所可引起的疑难；这些于我们以后的辩析也许有所帮助。