Chapter 12 -3

The animosity of rival sects, whether in common people or in Christian churches, is often stronger than that of hostile nations, and each of them is often more brutal towards the other.Men who earnestly formulate what may be called factional statutes often pay less attention to the laws of justice in establishing them than do the so-called framers of international law. The most radical patriots never present as a serious question whether one should maintain confidence in the enemies of the state. —But whether or not confidence should be maintained in rebels, and in heathens, has often been the most bitterly debated question among the most eminent scholars, both civil and ecclesiastical.It is needless to say that the rebels and the heretics were such unfortunate beings that, when things raged to a certain degree, they were on the side of the weak.Undoubtedly, when a country is thrown into disarray by factional struggles, there are always some - though usually very few - who, independent of circumstances, preserve their sober judgment.At best they are scattered individuals isolated from one another, distrusted by any party because of their frankness, and, though he may be the most intelligent man, must, for the above reasons, be the most intelligent man in the society. Insignificant people.All these men were scorned, ridiculed, and often loathed by the zealots of both parties.A true partisan hates and despises candor; and indeed no vice can disqualify him so effectively from a partisan as that virtue of innocence.Therefore, the true, respectable and impartial spectator does not exist in the vortex of the fierce struggle of rival parties.It is said that, for both sides of the struggle, there is hardly a bystander anywhere in the world.They even ascribed all their prejudices to the great Supreme Judge of the universe, and often believed that the holy deity was inspired by all their vengeful and merciless passions.Of all the passions, therefore, which corrupt the moral sentiments, partisanship and fanaticism are always the greatest corrupters.

On the subject of self-control, I would just like to add that our admiration for the man who continues to act with fortitude and tenacity in the midst of the deepest and most unpredictable misfortunes always means that he feels them very well. Intense, requiring very great effort to restrain or control him.People who are completely insensitive to physical pain do not want to be praised for enduring torture with fortitude and poise.A man who has no natural fear of death has no need of the virtues of calm and self-possession which preserve himself in the midst of the most appalling perils.Seneca said exaggeratedly: the philosophers of the Stoics even surpassed God in this respect; All thanks to myself and my own efforts.

But some people's feelings about certain things of immediate influence are sometimes so strong that all self-control is overpowered.Honor cannot control the terror of a man so weak-willed that he faints or falls into a state of convulsions when danger approaches.It may be doubted whether this nervous weakness is cured, as it is supposed, by gradual exercise and proper discipline.It seems certain that such a cowardly and weak man should never be trusted or employed. CHAPTER IV. Of the nature of self-deception, and of the origin and effect of general maxims. In order to impair the correctness of our judgments of the propriety of our own conduct, it is not always necessary that the true and impartial spectator be kept away from us.Our own strong and extreme selfish passions, when he is near or in your presence, are sometimes enough to cause the man within us to think far differently than the real situation would allow.

We examine our conduct on two different occasions, and try to see it with the eyes of an impartial spectator: first, when we intend to act; and second, after we have acted.On both occasions our opinions are often very unjust; and our opinions are often most unjust when they ought to be most just. When we contemplate action, the haste of passion does not often permit us to consider what we are doing with the candor of an impartial man.At that time, the same strong emotion which agitates us influences our own view of things, even when we try to put ourselves in the other's place and try to see him -- it makes them appear naturally in his In front of us—in looking at the object of our attraction, our own intense passions are constantly calling us back to our own place, where everything seems exaggerated and distorted by self-love.The way those objects appear to the other, and the way he takes them, we feel only, if we may say so, dimly, for a moment, that it will soon disappear, and even as long as they last Sometimes, it's not real at all.Even during that time we were not entirely free from the ardent and violent feelings which the particular situation aroused in us, nor could we consider what we were about to do with the impartiality of that impartial judge.Passions, therefore, justify themselves, as Father Malebranche says, and all seem reasonable and proper to their objects so long as we continue to feel them.

Indeed, after the action is over and the passion which inspired it has subsided, we are able to experience more dispassionately the feelings of the impartial spectator.What formerly attracted us is now almost as irrelevant to us as it was to the spectator, and we can now examine our actions with his frankness and impartiality.Today the man's mind is no longer disturbed by the same passion that disturbed him yesterday; and when the agitation of the emotion is completely extinguished in the same way as when the sudden attack of pain is completely extinguished, we will be as Know yourself like that imaginary man, and view your situation as in the one case, and in the other, as in the one case Look at your behavior.But our present judgments are often of lesser importance than they were before, and often produce nothing but vain regrets and useless confessions; and there is no guarantee that we will not make the same mistakes in the future.Even on such occasions, however, such judgments are seldom quite just.Our opinion of our own qualities is entirely determined by our judgments of our past behaviour.It is unpleasant to think of our own sins. So we often deliberately do not face up to those situations that may lead to unpleasant judgments.The man who operates on his own without trembling hands is thought to be a courageous surgeon; and is often thought to be the man who does not hesitate to lift the mystery of self-deception which obscures his observation of the defects in his own conduct. , is also a brave man.We often try very foolishly and feebly to rekindle the unjust passions which led us into the error; Going all out for a purpose, and just because we have committed injustice, because we are ashamed and afraid to see what we have been, and support injustice instead of looking at ourselves in a very unpleasant situation the behavior of.

How one-sided is man's view of the propriety of his own conduct, both when he acts and afterward; and how difficult it is for him to see his actions through the eyes of any impartial spectator.But if men are endowed with some special faculty of judging their own conduct, presumably a moral sense; if they are endowed with a special sensibility for distinguishing beauty from ugliness in passions and affections; It is within the horizon reached by this faculty that one can judge one's own actions more correctly than that of others, the circumstances of which are only dimly revealed. This self-deception, this Achilles' heel of humanity, is the source of a part of the confusion of human life.If we see ourselves in the way others see themselves, or in the way they would if they knew everything, some improvement is usually unavoidable.Otherwise, we can't stand this look.

The Creator, however, has not entirely left this weakness so grave; nor has she entirely allowed us to be deceived by self-love.Our constant observation of the behavior of others leads us unconsciously to formulate for ourselves certain general rules of what is proper and ought to be done, or what is inappropriate or ought not to be done.Certain actions of others shake all our natural affections.We hear the same abhorrence of those actions from everyone around us.This further reinforces, and even exacerbates, our natural sense of the inadequacy of those actions.We are satisfied that when we see others see them in the right light, we see them in the same light.We are determined not to repeat the same crime, nor to make ourselves the object of widespread accusation in this way for any reason.Thus we naturally lay down for ourselves a general rule of conduct, namely, to avoid all such conduct, which tends to render us loathsome, contemptible, or punishable, that is, of all those whom we most fear and hate. object of emotion.On the contrary, other actions arouse our approval, and we hear the same praise from everyone around us.

Everyone eagerly honors and rewards these acts.They arouse all those emotions we are born to most desire: human love, gratitude and admiration.We begin to aspire to practice the same behavior; and thus naturally we lay down another law for ourselves, namely, to scrupulously seek in this way all occasions for action. It is in this way that a general moral code is formed.They are ultimately founded on our experience of what we approve or disapprove of in every case, with our sense of right and wrong, and our natural sense of the merit and propriety of things.We initially approve or condemn particular acts not because, upon examination, they seem to conform or fail to conform to some general maxim.On the contrary, general rules of conduct are formed on the basis of what we find in experience to be favorable or disapproving of a certain behavior or behavior in a certain situation.To such a man, it is the first time to see a brutal murder committed through greed, jealousy, or unjust hatred while the victim still loves and trusts the murderer, to see the last moments of the dying man. and to hear him dying complain more of the treachery and ingratitude of his unfaithful friend than of the atrocities he had committed; this man need not ponder at all to understand how terrible such actions are: a most holy The law of conduct is how to prevent taking the life of an innocent person, which clearly violates that code and is therefore a reprehensible act.Evidently his abhorrence of the crime would have been instantaneous, and before he had established for himself any such general maxim.On the contrary, the general maxim which he may henceforth lay is presumably founded on the abhorrence which he must feel at the sight of this and any other like conduct.

When we read in history or romance accounts of noble or base deeds, our admiration for the former and our contempt for the latter do not arise from a belief in the existence of some general maxim. When considered, this maxim states that all good deeds are to be admired and all base deeds to be despised. Those general maxims, on the contrary, are all formed from our experience of what different kinds of conduct naturally do to us. An act of kindness, an act of respect, an act of terror, is an act which naturally arouses in the spectator affection, respect, or fear for the doer.There is no way of forming general criteria for deciding what actions are, and what are not, the objects of those emotions, except by actually observing what actions actually arouse those emotions in fact.

Indeed, if these general rules of conduct had been formed, if they had been universally acknowledged and established with unanimous feeling, we would often be in disputes about the degree to which certain acts of a complicated and unclear nature should be praised or blamed. , to these general maxims as to the criteria of judgment.On these occasions they are commonly cited as fundamental grounds for determining what is just and what is unrighteous in human conduct; a fact which seems to have led astray some very eminent writers who have framed their theories in such a way The system seems to hold that human beings' initial judgments of right and wrong actions, like the decisions of a judge in a court of law, are formed by considering first some general maxim and then whether a particular action conforms to this maxim.

When those general rules of conduct are fixed in our minds by habitual reflection, they do a great deal in correcting self-love's distortions of what is proper and ought to be done in our particular situation. effect.The furious man, if he is driven by that passion, may regard the death of his enemy as but a small atonement for a wrong he thinks he has suffered, which is but a trifling provocation. angry thing.But his observation of other people's behavior made him realize how terrible this cruel revenge appeared.Unless he has very little education, he will in all cases make it an inviolable maxim to avoid such cruel vengeance.This maxim remains authoritative over him, preventing him from committing the crime of violence again.His temper, however, may be so violent that, if it were the first time he had thought of the conduct, he would doubtless have judged it to be quite right and proper, and one which every impartial spectator would approve of.But the respect for this maxim which past experience has given him will check the excesses of his passion and help him to correct what self-love would have suggested to him as to what he should do in the situation. overly extreme views.Even if, however, he should allow himself to be so agitated that he violated this maxim, he could not in such a case completely abandon his customary awe and respect for it.It is at the moment of action, at the moment when passion is at its highest point, when he hesitates and trembles at what he intends to do, that he is secretly aware that he is going to violate those codes of conduct, that is, when he is calm. The principles which he had resolved never to violate, which he had never seen violated without causing great discontent, he felt inwardly that the violation of them would soon make himself the object of said discontent.He is tormented by the anguish of indecision, till he finally makes a great resolution; he is terrified at the thought of violating this sacred rule, and at the same time he is impelled and impelled by the strong desire to violate it.He changes his resolutions from moment to moment; sometimes he resolves to stick to his principles and not indulge in some passion which might spoil the rest of his life with terrible shame and remorse; He feels a momentary peace of mind in anticipation of the safety and peace he will enjoy in experiencing the dangers of some contrary action.But the passion, which was soon reawakened, drove him even more violently to do what he had, just a moment before, determined not to do.Exhausted and dizzy with those endless changes of resolution, he finally, out of a sort of desperation, took the last momentous and irrevocable step; A feeling of dread and awe that one feels when one flees from an enemy and involuntarily comes upon a precipice, where one is sure to be met by anything more than pursues. All more sure of destruction.Such are the emotions that he will have even in action; and though he certainly feels less inappropriate then than later, yet, when his passions are vented and subsided, he begins to use To look at what he had done, and to really feel the sting of remorse and remorse starting to bother and torment him in ways he hadn't foreseen before. Chapter V. Of the influence and authority of the general maxims of morality, and the respect to which they are justly regarded as the laws of the Creator to the general maxims of conduct, is properly called the sense of duty.This is the most important principle in human life, and the only one by which most people can guide their conduct.The behavior of many people is very decent.Throughout their lives they avoid any serious reproach, yet they may never feel any appreciation of the propriety of their conduct.They respect some code of conduct that they believe has been established and act only accordingly.A man who has received a great favor from another may, because of his natural disposition, feel but a sliver of gratitude.If, however, he is morally well-bred, he will often notice how abominable the behavior which shows one's lack of gratitude appears; and how lovely the contrary behavior appears.Therefore, although his heart is not overflowing with any gratitude, he will still try to act as if his heart is grateful, and will try to show his benefactor the attention and attention that anyone who has a deep gratitude will do it.He will visit his benefactor regularly; he will show great reverence before his benefactor; Opportunity to make some proper return for past favors.He may do all this without any hypocrisy and reprehensible affectation, without any selfish intention of gaining new favors, without any intention of deceiving his benefactor or the public.The motive of his action may be nothing but a respect for the established rules of duty, a serious and urgent desire to act in every way according to the rules of gratitude.In the same way, a wife sometimes does not feel for her husband that tenderness which befits the existing relationship between him or her.If, however, she is virtuous, she will try to be as considerate, attentive, faithful, and true as she has the affection, and irreproachable in all the cares that conjugal affection requires of her.Such a friend, such a wife, is certainly not the best friend or wife.While they may both fulfill their various responsibilities with earnestness and urgency, in many ways they fall short of the level of delicacy required, and they will miss out on much that can show gracious concern. Opportunities of mood; if he or she has the feelings commensurate with their status, they will never miss these opportunities.Still, they might be second best if not best friends or wives.None of them will be negligent in their primary responsibility if respect for the general rules of conduct has made a very deep impression on them.It is only a man of the luckiest type who can adapt his or her feelings and conduct completely to the slightest variation of his or her position, and can handle all occasions justly and appropriately.The rough clay that makes up the majority of human beings cannot be kneaded to such a perfect type.Yet almost any man will, by training, education, and example, be so impressed with the general maxims that he can behave with relative propriety on almost all occasions, and avoid any serious reproach throughout his life. Without this sacred respect for general maxims, there is no man whose conduct is very trustworthy.It is this respect which constitutes the most essential difference between the man of integrity and the base.The former firmly and resolutely enforces the maxims he believes in in every situation, and maintains a steady trend of behavior throughout his life.The latter behavior is capricious and unpredictable, with occasional dominance of mood, will, or interest.Nay, since every one is liable to such changes of mood, a man who, in his cool head, is most sensitive to the propriety of conduct, will often, on the most inadvertent occasion, act unreasonably, without respect for the principle of general maxims. behavior, and can hardly be attributed to any serious motive why he did it then.Your friend comes to visit you just when you are in the mood not to receive him.According to your mood at the time, you may well regard his visit as a rash intrusion; His coldness and disrespect.It is only your respect for the general norms of politeness and hospitality that keeps you from being so rude, since they do not allow you to do so.Your past experience has habituated you to respect these maxims, and enables you to behave on all such occasions with a general degree of propriety, and to keep to no sensible degree those changes of mood to which all men are prone. affect your behaviour.But without respect for these general maxims, even such an easy duty as civility, and which one seldom violates with any seriousness, is often thwarted, but justice, honesty, chastity, fidelity Waiting is often difficult to do.How much more so that people may have strong motives to violate some of their duties?The existence of human society depends on people's good compliance with these duties.Human society would collapse if respect for those important rules of conduct were not universally imprinted on the human mind. The above-mentioned respect is further strengthened by the perception, which begins as a vague conception of nature, and is later confirmed by reason and philosophy, that these important moral principles are the commands and precepts of the Creator. , the Creator will eventually reward those who obey and punish those who violate their duty. I say that this perception or understanding seems at first to be influenced by nature.Man's nature leads him to think that his affections and passions spring from mysterious beings—whatever they may be, have been objects of reverence for the religious in every country.There is nothing else, and nothing else can be thought of, that gives rise to human emotion.The unknowable gods that men imagine but cannot see must be molded into some likeness to the gods with whom they feel.In the days of pagan ignorance and ignorance, it appears that men formed their ideas of the gods so crudely that they indiscriminately attributed to gods all the natural affections of man, even those which did not honor man. Emotions such as lust, appetite, greed, envy, and revenge are also included.Men, therefore, must attribute to the gods those passions and qualities which most honor man, for they still admire his superior nature, while those passions and qualities, love of virtue and benevolence, and aversion to Sin and injustice seem to elevate man to a state of godlike perfection.The injured man invokes Jupiter as a witness of his wrong, convinced that this god sees this phenomenon with an indignation that the most ordinary man feels when he witnesses an injustice. Spontaneously.He who injures feels himself the proper object of human loathing and resentment; a natural sense of dread leads him to ascribe these feelings to the will of those dreadful gods.He could not avoid these gods, he was powerless against their power.These natural hopes, fears, and suspicions were known by sympathy, and confirmed by education; and it was generally told and believed that the gods rewarded goodness and mercy, and punished disloyalty and injustice.Religion, therefore, even in its most primitive state, sanctioned moral principles of all kinds long before the days of reasoning and philosophizing.Religion-induced fear can compel people to act on their natural sense of responsibility.It is too important to human happiness that human nature does not consign it to slow and vague philosophical investigations. Yet these philosophical investigations, as soon as they began, confirmed those first premonitions of human nature.Regardless of how we think our sense of right and wrong is founded, whether on some tempered reason, on some instinct called morality, or on a certain In addition to natural performance, there is no doubt that we are born with this sense of right and wrong to guide our behavior in this life.This sense of right and wrong has a very obvious authoritative quality, which shows that they are established in us to be the supreme arbiter of all our actions, so as to supervise our consciousness, emotion and desire, and to indulge or restrain them. to what extent to make a judgment.Our senses of right and wrong are by no means equal, as some claim, to the other faculties and appetites of our nature, nor are the former more entitled to limit each other than the latter.No other faculties or acts can be judged by the nature of any other faculties.Love does not judge hate, and hate does not judge love.Although these two sentiments are opposed to each other, it is very inappropriate to speak of them as mutually agreeing or opposing.But to judge all our other natures, and to condemn or applaud them, is a special function of those faculties which we are now considering.They may be regarded as certain senses, and those other natures are the object of their judgment.Each sense is higher than the object it perceives.The eye does not desire beauty of color, the ear does not desire harmony of sound, nor the tongue desires delicious taste.These senses are the authority for judging the objects of one's feelings.What is delicious is mellow, what is pleasing to the eye is gorgeous, and what is pleasant to the ear is harmonious.The essence of each of the aforementioned properties is that it pleases the senses that experience it.Likewise, when our ears should be delighted with sounds, when our eyes should be indulged in seeing, when our palate should be gratified; when and to what extent our other natural instincts should be indulged or restricted, These are all determined by our right and wrong hearts.Whatever our heart of right and wrong is in favor of is appropriate, correct, and should be done; anything contrary to this is wrong, inappropriate, and should not be done.The sentiment favored by Right and Wrong is graceful and proper; its opposite is crude and inappropriate.Right, wrong, proper, inappropriate, graceful, rude, these words themselves signify only those things which please or displease the mind of right and wrong. Since the above-mentioned senses of right and wrong obviously serve as the governing nature of human nature, the maxims they prescribe should be regarded as divine commands and precepts, issued by those agents whom he has placed in us.All general rules are usually called laws.For example, the general rules that objects obey when they move are called the laws of motion.But the general maxims by which our consciences approve or condemn any feeling or action which comes under their scrutiny, are better known by the following names.They are more akin to what are called laws—the general rules established by the sovereign to direct the conduct of his subjects.They are, like laws, the maxims of the free conduct of men; they are made, no doubt, by a legitimate superior, and have clauses of reward and punishment attached to them.The agent God has placed in us must torture those who violate the code with inner shame and self-condemnation; on the contrary, always reward those who follow the code with peace of mind, contentment, and self-satisfaction. There are many other considerations that may serve to support the above observations.When the Creator created man and all other rational beings, it seems that his or her intention was to make him or her happy.There seems to be no end other than happiness to be worthy of a Creator whom we must regard as infinitely wise and beneficent; Confirmation, it seems to us that the purpose of the Creator's actions is to promote happiness and prevent unhappiness.But, in acting under the impulse of right and wrong, we necessarily seek the most efficient means of promoting human happiness, and so, in a sense, we may be said to cooperate with our Creator, and to do our best to further the fulfillment of his plans.On the contrary, if we do not act in this way, we seem to be in some way hindering the Creator's plan for the happiness and perfection of mankind, and showing ourselves to be in some way an enemy of the Creator, if it may be called so.Therefore, in the former case, we will naturally pray to the Creator for special favors and rewards with confidence, while in the latter case, we will fear the retaliation and punishment of the Creator. Besides, there are many other reasons, many other natural dispositions which help to confirm and illustrate the same salutary teaching.If we consider the general maxims by which the fortunes and ills of the multitudes of this world are commonly determined, we shall find that even in a world where everything seems to be disordered, every virtue must have its due reward, Get that kind of compensation that best encourages it, promotes it; and it turns out that only the concurrence of anomalous circumstances will frustrate expectations.What are the most proper rewards for encouraging industry, thrift, and prudence?be successful in every endeavor.Is it possible that these virtues remain unrewarded throughout a lifetime?Wealth and the esteem of men are the proper compensation for these virtues, and it is unlikely that they will not receive it.What rewards most motivate people to be honest, just, and kind?The trust, respect and love of those around us.Many people do not seek greatness, but want to be loved.The honest and just man does not rejoice in riches, but in being trusted and trusted, which is the usual compensation for those virtues.But, by some extraordinary and unfortunate event, a good man may be suspected of a crime which he could never have committed. Therefore, he was unjustly hated and disgusted by people in the second half of his life.He could be said to have lost everything by such an accident, though he was a man of honesty and integrity.Likewise, a prudent man, despite his prudence, may die from an earthquake or flood.However, accidents of the first kind are perhaps more rare than those of the second; and honesty, justice, and kindness in gaining the confidence and love of those around us—what the above-mentioned virtues desire in the first place—do work. And foolproof, this is still true.A single act of a man is easily misunderstood, but the general tendency of his actions is less likely to be misunderstood.An innocent person may be thought to have done something wrong, but this is rare.On the contrary, a fixed view of his innocence will often lead us to exonerate him when he actually committed a crime, even though the inference that he has committed a crime based on known facts is very strong.Likewise, a rascal who commits a rascal's act when his character is unknown may escape reproach, or even gain approval from others.But no one who has been doing bad things for a long time can not be widely known to be a bad man, and can not be often suspected when he is really innocent. So far as the sentiments and opinions of men can punish or reward vice and virtue, both are here treated, according to the general course of things, beyond the limits of what is just and impartial. 虽然用这种冷静的哲学眼光来看，通常决定芸芸众生处境顺逆的一般准则似乎完全适应世人所处的境地，但是，它们并不同我们的某些天然感情相一致。我们对某些美德所天然持有的敬爱和赞美之情使我们希望把各种荣誉和酬答都归于它们，甚至把我们自己也必然认为适合于回报其它一些品质的荣誉和酬报归于这些美德，尽管它们往往不具备这些品质。相反，我们对某些罪恶的嫌恶使我们希望它们遭受各种各样的耻辱和不幸，包括自然属于其它品质的耻辱和不幸。宽宏大量、慷慨和正直受到我们如此深切的钦佩，以致我们希望看到它们还能获得财富，权力和各种荣誉——这些荣誉本来是同上述美德并无密切联系的一些品质，如节俭、勤劳和勤奋的必然结果。另一方面，欺诈、虚伪、残忍和狂暴在每个人的心中激起的轻蔑和憎恶使我们看到它们得到某些好处便会感到气愤，尽管在某种意义上可以说，由于它们有时具备勤奋和勤劳的品质，这些好处它们是应该得到的。勤劳的坏蛋耕种土地，懒惰的好人任其荒芜。谁该收获庄稼呢？谁该挨饿，谁该富足呢？事物的自然进程有利于坏蛋，而人们的天然感情则偏向于具有美德的人。人们认为，前者因其上述的好品质会带给他的好处而过分地得到了补偿，而后者则因其懈怠必然会带给他的痛苦而受到了比应受的要严厉得多的惩罚。人类的法律——人类感情的产物——剥夺勤劳和谨慎的叛国分子的生命和财产，而以特殊的回报来酬答不注意节约、疏忽大意但忠诚而热心公益事业的好公民。这样，人就在造物主的指引下，对物的分配进行造物主本来自己会作出的某种程度的改正。造物主促使人们为达到这一目的而遵循的各种准则与造物主自己所遵循的那些准则不同。大自然给予每一种美德和罪恶的那种报答或惩罚，最能鼓励前者或约束后者。她单纯考虑这一点，而很少注意到，在人们的思想感情和激情中，那些优良品质和不良品德似乎还具有不同程度的优缺点。相反，人只注意到这一点，因而力求使每种美德得到他心目中恰如其分的敬爱和尊重，并使每种罪恶得到他心目中恰如其分的轻视和憎恶。造物主所遵循的准则对她来说是合理的；人类所遵循的准则对人类来说也是合理的。但是，两者都是为了促成同一个伟大的目标：人世间的安定，人性的完美和愉快。 虽然人这样从事于改变在事态的自然发展所造成的物的分配情况，虽然人像诗人所描述的神那样老是用特殊的手段来进行干预，以支持美德和反对罪恶，并且像神那样力求挡掉射向好人头部的箭，而促使那把已经举起的利剑迅即向邪恶者砍去，但是，他并不能完全按照自己的想法和愿望来决定两者的命运。人的微弱的努力不能完全控制事物的自然进程，这一进程太快太猛，非人力所能阻止。 虽然指引这一进程的规则似乎是为了最明智和最高尚的目的而制订的，但是这些规则有时却会产生使人的全部天然感情激动不已的后果。大集体压倒小集体；有远见并作好一切必要准备的事业家胜过那些反对他们而既无远见又无准备的人； 每一种目的只能以造物主规定的那种方法来实现，这一切似乎不仅是一种必然和不可违反的规则，而且是一种激励人们勤劳和专心致志的有用和合宜的规则。此外，由于这种规则，在暴虐和诡计居然胜过真诚和正义时，什么样的义愤不会在每个旁观者的心中激起呢？对无辜者所受的痛苦，人们会多么悲痛和同情，对压迫者所获得的成功又会产生多么强烈的愤恨？我们对冤屈感到伤心和愤怒，但是，我们常常发现自己完全无力加以纠正。因此，当我们对在这个世界上能否找到一种能够阻止非正义的行为取得成功的力量丧失信心时，我们自然而然地会向上天呼吁并希望我们天性的伟大创造者在来世亲自做他为指导我们的行为而制定的各种原则促使我们在今世努力做的事。希望他亲自完成他教导我们着手执行的计划；并希望在来世，根据每个人在今世的所作所为给予报答。这样，我们就会变得相信来世，这不仅是由于我们的弱点，不仅是出于人类天性的希望和担心， 而且也是出于人类天性中最高尚和最真诚的本性，出于对美德的热爱，对罪恶和非正义的憎恶。 “这与神的伟大相称吗？”能言善辩而富于哲理性的克莱蒙大主教以丰富的想象力热情而夸大地说，尽管有时听起来似乎不够礼貌：“听任自己创造的世界普遍处在混乱之中，这与神的伟大相称吗？听任邪恶的人几乎总是胜过正直的人；听任无辜的君王被篡位者废黜；听任父亲为野心勃勃的逆子所杀害；听任丈夫因受凶悍不贞的妻子的打击而死亡，这与神的伟大相称吗？难道处于显贵地位的神可以像观看某种新奇的游戏那样袖手旁观那些令人伤感的事件而不担负任何责任吗？因为神是伟大的，他就应当在这些事件面前表现出软弱、不公正或是残暴吗？因为人是渺小的，就应当听任他们胡作非为而不予惩罚。或者为人正直而不给报偿吗？啊，上帝！如果这就是你的性格，如果我们如此敬畏崇拜的上帝就是你，我就不再承认你是我的父亲，是我的保护者，是我悲伤时的安慰者，是我软弱时的支持者，是我的一片忠诚的报答者。那你就不过是一个懒惰而古怪的暴君，这个暴君为了自己狂妄的虚荣心而牺牲人类的幸福，他把人类带到这个世界上来，只是为了把他们作为他空闲时的消遣品或由他任意摆布的玩物。” 判断行为功过的那些一般准则就这样逐渐被看成某个无所不能的神的规则， 这个神在观察我们的行为，并在来世报答遵守这些规则的人和惩罚违反它们的人。这种考虑必然使上述规则具有新的神圣的意义。我们行为的最高准则应当是尊重造物主的意志，对于这一点凡是相信神存在的人是决不会怀疑的。违抗神的意志这一想法本身似乎就意味着大逆不道。一个人如果反对或无视具有无限智慧和无限权力的神给他下的命令，那这人该是多么自负，多么荒唐！一个人如果不尊重造物主出于无限仁慈给他规定的戒律，即使他没有因为违反这些戒律而受到惩罚，这个人又该是多么不合人情，多么令人厌恶！一个人对自己行为是否得当的感觉在此也得到自身利益这种强烈动机的充分支持。我们知道，虽然我们可以避免别人注意或者逃脱世人的惩罚，但我们总是避不开造物主的眼睛，如果作出不正当行为就会受到他的惩罚，这是能够限制最不受约束的激情的一种动因，至少对某些人是如此，他们由于经常反省，对这个想法已经很熟悉了。 正是这样，宗教加强了天生的责任感，因此，人们通常会非常相信似乎深受宗教思想影响的那些人，诚实正直。人们认为，这些人的行为除了受到对别人行为同样起调节作用的准则的约束外，另外还有一种约束。人们认为，不但重视名誉，也重视行为的合宜性，不但重视他人的称许，也重视自己的称许，这样的动机对世俗的人有影响，对信仰宗教的人同样有影响。但是信仰宗教的人还有一种约束，这就是，他不干则已，一干起来就要像那位至尊的神在场那样审慎，这位至尊的神最终会根据他的实际行动给予补偿。因此，人们对他那循规蹈矩和一丝不苟的行为颇为信任。无论什么地方只要那儿宗教的固有原则未被某个卑鄙的宗教小集团闹宗派和派性的狂热所破坏，无论什么地方只要那儿宗教所要求履行的首要责任是各种道德责任，无论什么地方只要那儿没有人被告诫要把琐屑的宗教仪式看成是比正义和慈善的行为更直接的责任，只要没有人真的相信通过献祭、 宗教仪式和愚蠢的祈求就可以在神的同意下从事欺诈、叛变和暴行，那么，世人在这方面的判断就毫无疑问是正确的，并且完全有理由对笃信宗教的人的行为的正直给予加倍的信任。 第六章在什么情况下，责任感应该成为我们行为的唯一原则；而且在什么情况下，它应该同其它动机一起发生作用宗教赋予美德的实践如此强烈的动机，并且通过如此有力地抵制罪恶的诱惑来保护我们，以致许多人误认为宗教原则是行为的唯一值得称赞的动机。他们说： 我们既不应该因感激而报答，也不应该因愤恨而惩罚；我们既不应该根据天然的感情保护自己不能自助的孩子，也不应该由此赡养自己老弱多病的双亲。所有对特定事物产生的感情都要从自己的心中驱除干净，某种伟大的感情应当取代其它一切感情，那就是对造物主的爱，那就是使自己变成他所喜欢的人的愿望，那就是用造物主的意志来指导自己全部行动的愿望。我们不应该因感激而感谢，我们不应该因仁爱而宽厚，我们不应该因热爱祖国而热心公益，也不应该因对人类之爱而慷慨和正直。在履行所有那些不同的责任时，我们的行动的唯一原则和动机， 应当是造物主要求我们去履行它们的责任感。现在，我不准备花时间专门考察这种观点；我只是要指出，我们不要期待看到这种观点为任何宣称信奉下面这样一种宗教的人所接受，在这种宗教中，第一条戒律是，要以自己的全部心意、全部灵魂和全部精力去敬爱我们的造物主，第二条戒律是，像热爱自己一样去热爱自己的邻人；我们实际上是为了自己的缘故而热爱自己，并不仅仅因为被要求才去这样做。责任感应当是我们行动的唯一原则，这在基督教的戒律中是找不到的； 但是，正像哲学甚至常识告诉我们的那样，责任感应当是某种指导性的和决定性的原则。然而，可能会出现这样一个问题：在什么情况下我们的行动应该主要地或全然地产生于某种责任感，或出自对一般准则的尊重；在什么情况下某些其它的情感或感情应该同时发生作用，并产生主要的影响。 这个问题的答案——或许不能用任何一种非常准确的方式得到——将依两种不同的情况而定：第一，根据促使我们全然不顾一般准则而行动的那种情感和感情是天然令人喜欢的还是天然令人讨厌的而定；第二，根据一般准则本身是精确无误还是含糊不清而定。 1.首先，我要说，我们的行为在何种程度上应该来自天然令人喜欢或天然令人讨厌的情感和感情，或者全部来自对一般准则的尊重，都将依这种情感和感情本身而定。 所有那些亲切的感情可能促使我们去做的优雅和令人钦佩的行为，应该来自对一般行为准则的任何尊重，同样也应该来自激情本身。一个人为另一个人做了好事，如果后者只是出于冷淡的责任感而不带有感情地给予报答，前者就会认为自己没有很好地得到报答。当一个丈夫认为非常顺从自己的妻子只是考虑到妻子的地位必须维持的某种关系才使自己的举止活泼起来时，他是不会对她感到满意的。虽然一个儿子竭尽孝道，然而，如果缺乏他应当充分感受到的那种充满感情的对双亲的敬意，那么父母也会公正地抱怨他态度冷漠。同样，一个儿子也会对这样的父亲感到十分不满，他虽然履行了父亲的全部责任，但是不具有可以期待从他身上得到的父爱。对于所有这样的亲切的、具有社会性的感情，看到责任感是用来压抑它们而不是增进它们，是用来阻止我们做得过分而不是促使我们做应该做的事情，更令人感到愉快。看到一个父亲不得不抑制自己的父爱，看到一个朋友不得不约束出乎本性的慷慨行为，看到一个受到某种恩惠的人不得不抑制自己的过分的感激心情，会给我们带来愉快。 对于那些邪恶和非社会性的激情，具有相反的准则。我们应当抱着出自内心的感激和慷慨态度，不带任何勉强地给予报答，不必过分考虑报答是否适宜；但是，我们总是应当勉强地施加惩罚，更多地是出于施加惩罚是合宜的感觉，而不是出于任何强烈的报复意向。再也没有什么比那个人的行为更为得体，他对极为严重的伤害的愤恨，似乎更多地来自它们应当愤恨并且是合宜的愤恨对象的感觉，而不是来自他自己的那种极不愉快的激情；他像一个法官那样，仅仅考虑判断每种特定的冒犯应当给予何种报复这种一般准则；他在贯彻这条准则时，其同情冒犯者将要受到的痛苦的程度甚于自己所受的痛苦，他虽然愤怒但不忘怜悯， 有意用最温和及最有利的方式去解释这条准则，对冒犯者给予极其正直的人们能够一致通情达理地接受的各种减缓。 根据前面的评述，因为自私的激情在其它方面介于社会性的和非社会性的感情之间，所以，它们在这一点上也是如此。在所有平常的、不重要的和普通的情况下，以私人利益作为目标的追逐，应当来自对指导这种行为的一般准则的尊重， 而不是来自这些目标本身所引起的任何激情；但是，在更为重要和特殊的场合， 如果目标本身看来并没有以很值得重视的激情来激励我们，我们就会变得麻木不仁、缺乏感情和没有风度。为了赚到或节省一个先令的钱而焦虑不安或终日盘算， 在他的一切邻人看来，他就会堕落为一个极为庸俗的商人。他必须在自己的行动中表现出：听任自己的经济状况一直如此窘迫，无意为钱财本身而锱铢必较。他的经济境况也许使他必须极端节省，非常勤勉；但是，那种节省和勤勉的每个特定的努力必须出自对极其严格地给他规定这种行为趋向的那条一般准则的尊重， 而不是对个人的俭约或收益的关心。现今，他的过度节俭不应当是由于他希望由此节省那三便士；他在自己的店里照料，也不应当是出于他想由此得到那十便士的激情：前者和后者都只应当出于对一般准则的尊重，这条一般准则极其严格地规定了他在自己生活道路上对待一切人的行动方案。在这里构成了吝啬鬼和真正节省和勤勉的人的品质之间的差别。前者为了少数的钱财本身而挂虑担忧；后者关心它们只是因为他给自己订下了生活计划。 对有关私人利益的很特别和很重要的目标来说，情况完全不同。一个人不去为了这些目标本身而相当认真地追求它们，就显得卑劣。一个君主不费心征服或保护某一领地，我们会看不起他。一个没有官职的绅士，在他可以不用卑劣的或非正义的手段去获得一份财产或者一个比较重要的官职时不尽力而为，我们几乎不会对他表示尊重。一个议员对自己的竞选显得毫不热心，他的朋友就会认为他完全不值得拥戴而抛弃他。甚至一个商人不力争获得人们认为非凡的一笔生意或者一些不寻常的利润，也会被他的邻居们看成是一个胆怯的家伙。这种勇气和热忱就是有事业心的人和无所作为的人之间的差别。私人利益的那些重大目标—— 它们的得或失会极大地改变一个人的地位，成为恰当地被称作抱负的激情的目标；这种激情保持在谨慎和正义的范围之内时，总是受到世人的钦佩，即使超越了这两种美德而且是不正义的和过分的时候，有时也显得极其伟大，引起人们无限的想象。因此，人们普遍钦佩英雄和征服者，甚至也钦佩政治家，他们的计划虽然毫无正义可言，但是非常大胆和宏伟；例如黎塞留主教和雷斯主教的那些计划就是这样。贪婪和野心两种目标的不同仅仅在于它们是否伟大。一个吝啬鬼对于半便士的追求同一个具有野心的人征服一个王国的意图一样狂热。 Ⅱ.其次，我要说，我们的行为应该在何种程度上出自对一般准则的尊重， 将部分地依它们本身精确无误还是含糊不清而定。 几乎所有有关美德的一般准则，决定谨慎、宽容、慷慨、感激和友谊的功能是什么的一般准则，在许多方面都是含糊不清的，允许有很多例外，需要作出如此多的修正，以致几乎不可能完全通过对它们的尊重来规定我们的行为。常见的以普遍经验为基础的有关谨慎的一些谚语式的格言，或许是对行为所能提出的最好的一般准则。但是，非常呆板和固执地信奉这些格言，显然是极其荒唐可笑的迂腐行为。在我刚才提到的一切美德中间，感激或许是含义最精确、最少例外的一般准则。要是力所能及，我们就应当对自己所得到的帮助作出相等的报答，如有可能，还应当作出更大的报答，这似乎是一条非常清楚明了的准则，并且是一条几乎不会有任何例外的准则。然而，根据最肤浅的考察，这条准则好像是极其含糊不清的，并且允许有一万种例外。如果你的恩人在你生病时护理了你，你也就应当在他生病时护理他吗？或者，你能够以某种不同的报答来偿还自己欠下的人情吗？如果你应当去护理他，那么你应当护理他多长时间呢？和他护理你的时间与你护理他的时间相同，或者更长些，那么应当长多少呢？如果你的朋友在你贫困时借钱给你，你也就应当在他贫困时借钱给他吗？你应当借多少钱给他呢？ 你应当在什么时候借给他呢？Now?tomorrow?或者下个月？借多长时间呢？显然， 不可能规定任何一条在一切情况下都能对这些问题给予准确答案的一般准则。他和你的品质之间的差异，他和你的处境之间的不同，都可能使你非常感激他而又正当地拒绝借给他半个便士；相反，也可能使你愿意借钱给他，甚或借给他的钱十倍于他借给你的数目，而又正当地被指责为极为邪恶的忘恩负义之徒，其所承担的义务连百分之一也未完成。然而，由于有关感激的各种本分或许是所有那些要求我们实践的善良美德之中最神圣的，所以，如我所述，决定它们的一般准则是最准确的。确定友谊、人道、殷勤、慷慨等所要求作出的行为的那些一般准则， 更不用说是很模糊和不明确的。 但是，有一种美德，一般准则非常确切地规定它要求作出的每一种外在的行为，这种美德就是正义。正义准则规定得极为精确，除了可以像准则本身那样准确地确定，并且通常确实出自与它们相同的原则者外，不允许有任何例外和修改。 如果我欠某人十镑钱，无论在约定归还之日还是在他需要这笔钱之时，正义都要求我如数归还。我应当做什么，我应当做多少，我应当在什么时候和什么地方做， 所有确定的行为的本质和细节，都已确切地规定和明确。虽然过于固执地信奉有关谨慎或慷慨的普遍准则可能是笨拙的和呆板的，但是，忠实地遵循正义准则却没有什么迂腐可言。相反，应当给予它们最神圣的尊重；并且，这种美德所要求作出的行为，从来不像当实践它们的主要动机是对要求作出这种行为的那些一般准则的出于本心的虔诚的尊重时一样十全十美。在实践其它一些美德时，指导我们行为的，与其说是对某种精确格言或准则的尊重，不如说是某种有关合宜性的想法，是对某一特定行为习惯的某种爱好；我们应当更多地考虑的是这一准则所要达到的目的和基础，而不是准则本身。但是，对正义来说情况就完全不是这样： 不折不扣并且坚定不移地坚持一般正义准则本身的人，是最值得称赞和最可信赖的人。虽然正义准则所要达到的目的是阻止我们伤害自己周围的人，但违反它们常常可能是一种罪行，尽管我们可以假托某种理由声称这种违反不会造成任何伤害。一个人常常在开始用这种方式行骗，甚至在自己打算行骗时，就变成了一个坏蛋。一旦他想背离那些不可违背的戒律要求他非常坚定和积极地坚持的东西， 他就不再是可以信赖的人，没有人可以说他不会滑向某种或深或浅的罪恶之渊。 窃贼认为，如果他从富人那里偷窃他猜想他们也许容易失去，以及他们也许不会知道失窃的东西，就并没有犯罪。奸夫认为，如果他诱奸朋友的妻子而能瞒住其奸情，那个丈夫不会怀疑，而且并没有破坏那个家庭的安宁，他就没有犯罪。一旦我们开始陷入这种精心设计的骗局，就没有什么严重的罪行我们不可能犯下了。 正义准则可以比作语法规则；有关其它美德的准则可以比作批评家们衡量文学作品是否达到杰出和优秀水平而订立的准则。前者是一丝不苟的，准确的，不可或缺的。后者是不严格的、含糊的、不明确的，而且告诉我们的与其说是如何臻于完美的确实无疑的指示，还不如说是有关我们应该指望臻于完美的一般设想。一个人可以根据规则学会完全正确地合乎语法地写作；因而；或许，可以学会公正地行动。虽然有些文学评判准则可以在某种程度上帮助我们纠正和弄清楚我们对完美可能抱有的一些模糊看法，但是，却没有哪种准则能确实无误地引导我们写出杰出或优秀的文学作品。同样，虽然某些准则能使我们在某些方面纠正和弄清楚我们对美德可能抱有的一些不完善的想法，但却没有哪种准则可以使我们确实学会在一切场合谨慎、非常宽宏或十分仁慈地行动。 有时会发生这种情况：由于极为真诚和迫切地想以自己的行为获得人们的赞同，我们反而可能误解恰当的行为准则，因而被应当用来指导我们的原则引入歧途。在这种情况下，期待人们完全赞成我们的行为是徒劳无益的。他们不能理解影响我们行为的那种荒谬的责任观念，也不会赞成随之而来的任何行为。然而， 那个由于存在不正确的责任感或所谓错误的道德心而受骗犯罪的人，其品质和行为仍有一些可敬之处。无论他因此而怎样不幸地被引入歧途，由于他存在着高尚而富有人性的东西，仍然是人们同情而不是憎恶或愤恨的对象。人们对人类天性中存在弱点深感遗憾，这种弱点使我们如此不幸地受到欺骗，即使在我们非常真诚地为臻于完美而努力，并且尽力按照能够合理地指导我们的最好的原则行动时，也是这样。错误的宗教观念，几乎是以这种方式把我们的天然情感引入歧途的唯一原因；那种赋予责任准则莫大权威的原则，只能在相当大的程度上歪曲我们对它们的想法。在其它一切场合，常识足以指导我们即使不是最为合宜地行事， 也离最为合宜地行事相距不远。假如我们急切地希望做得好些，那么，我们的行为大体上总是值得称赞的。所有的人都一致同意：服从造物主的意志是首要的责任法则。但是，就也许会加到我们头上的特定的戒律而言，它们彼此就大不相同。 因此，这时彼此之间应当最大限度地克制和容忍；虽然维护社会的安定需要惩罚各种罪行，而不管它们由以产生的动机是什么，但是，如果它们明显地来自有关宗教责任的错误观念，则一个善良的人总是会比较勉强地加以惩罚。他决不会对他所判处的那些人感到他对其他罪犯感到的那种愤慨，而且正是在他惩罚他们的罪行的时刻，他会对他们那效果不好的坚定和献身精神感到惋惜，有时甚至感到钦佩。伏尔泰先生最好的一出悲剧《穆罕默德》很好地表现了我们对产生于这种动机的罪行所应当持有的情感。在那一悲剧中，一对青年男女具有极其纯洁和善良的性格，除了彼此过于相爱这种使我们更加喜爱他们的弱点之外，没有其它任何弱点，他俩在某种最强烈的错误的宗教动机的唆使下，犯下了可怕的凶杀罪， 使一切人性原则受到冲击。一位年高德劭的老人，尽管是他俩宗教上的死对头， 但曾对他俩显示极为亲切的感情，他俩对他也曾怀有非常恭敬和尊重的心情，这位老人实际上是他俩的父亲，虽然他俩不知道这一点，但是，造物主显然要借助于他俩的手来把这位老人作为祭品，并且命令他俩去杀死这位老人。在他俩准备实施这一罪行时，他们受到下述两种想法之间的斗争所引起的极度痛苦的折磨？ 即：不可推卸；另一为对这位老人的体恤、感激和尊敬，以及对他们将要杀死的这个人的仁慈和善行所产生的敬爱。这样的表演显示了任何戏剧中所曾表现过的最吸引人的或许还是最有教益的一个场面。然而，责任感最终战胜了人类天性中所有可亲的弱点。他俩实施了强加于他们的罪行；但是立即发现了自己的错误， 以及他们受到的欺骗，因而被恐怖、悔恨、愤怒等折磨得身心俱裂。当我们确信正是宗教把一个人引入歧途，而不是以宗教为借口来掩盖某些最坏的人类激情时，我们就应该像对不幸的赛伊德和帕尔米拉所怀有的情感那样，同情每一个这样被宗教引入歧途的人。 因为一个人也许会根据某种错误的责任感作出错误的行为，所以天性有时也会占据优势，并且与之相反地引导他作出正确的行为。在这种情况下，我们看到那种动机占据我们认为应该占据的优势，不会不感到高兴，虽然那个人自己很软弱因而不那样想。然而，由于他的行为是出于软弱而不是原则所造成的，所以我们决不会比较满意地加以赞赏。一个执拗的罗马天主教徒，在圣巴多罗买大屠杀中，为怜悯心所驱使，以致救出了一些不幸的新教徒——他曾经认为自己的责任是去毁灭他们——这似乎不值得获得我们会给予他的那种高度的赞扬，他只是带着完全的自我赞同的心情作出上述宽大行为。我们也许会对他具有仁慈的性情表示高兴，但是，我们仍然会带着某种遗憾的心情来看待他，这跟应当对完善的美德表示的钦佩是截然不同的。就其它一切激情而言，情况不复如此。我们见到它们合宜地自我发挥作用不会不感到高兴，甚至在某种错误的责任观念指导这个人约束它们的时候也是这样。一个非常虔诚的贵格会教徒在被人打了一耳光时， 不是泰然容忍，而是忘记了他自己对我们救世主的格言所作的字义解释，以致给予那个侮辱了他的畜生适当的惩戒，当然不会使我们感到不快。我们会对他的这种精神感到愉快和高兴，并且因此更加喜欢他。但是，我们决不会用那样一种尊重和敬意来看待他，这种尊重和敬意是应该给予在同样情况下根据什么是应该做的这种正义感采取合宜行动的人的。凡是带有自我赞同情感的行为都不能严格地称作美德。