Chapter 18 Volume 10-1

SOCRATES: There are indeed many other reasons which convince me that we are doing the right thing in building this country, especially (I think) with regard to poetry. G: What kind of approach? S: It absolutely rejects any imitation.Note that now that we have identified three distinct components of the mind, I think there are now more obvious reasons for refusing to imitate. G: Please explain. SOCRATES: Oh, let us say in private,—you will not leak my words to the tragic poet or any other imitator—that this art is for all those who are not forewarned and do not know its dangers. The minds of the listeners seem to be corrosive.

G: Could you please explain further. SUE: I have to be straight.Although I have a certain respect and love for Homer since I was a child, I don't want to say anything wrong about him.For he seemed to be the patriarch of all these beautiful tragic poets.But, anyway, we must not place respect for the individual above the truth, and I must (as I say) speak my mind. G: You have to speak your mind. SOCRATES: Then listen to me, or better yet answer my question. G: Just ask. SOCRATES: Can you tell me what imitation is in general?It should be noted that I am not quite sure what its purpose is.

G: Then I don’t understand even more! Su: Actually, it’s not surprising that you know better than me, since it’s common for people with poor eyesight to see things more clearly than people with good eyesight. G: Exactly.But in your presence, even if I could see something, it is unlikely that I would be eager to tell you.You'd better see for yourself! Su: Then let's start discussing the problem with the usual procedure, shall we?Wherever we can call many things by the same name, I think we always assume that they have but one form or idea.do you understand? G: I understand. SOCRATES: Now let us take at random many things of a certain kind, say, for example, that there are many beds or tables.

G: Of course. Su: But in my opinion, there are only two ideas to summarize these many furniture: one is the idea of ​​the bed, and the other is the idea of ​​the table. Greg: Yes. Su: Also, we always say that craftsmen who make beds or tables focus on ideas or forms to make the tables or beds we use respectively; the same is true for other objects.Yeah?As for the idea or form itself, it cannot be produced by any craftsman, that is for sure.Yeah? G: Of course. SOCRATES: But now consider, what name would you give to such a craftsman? G: What kind of craftsman? SOCRATES: A kind of universal craftsman: he can make everything—everything made by craftsmen of all trades.

G: You're talking about a man of amazing dexterity. Su: Please wait a moment.In fact, right now you'll be saying the same thing as I am.Note that this same craftsman can not only make all utensils, but he can also make all plants, animals, and himself.In addition, he can also create everything in the earth, sky, gods, celestial bodies and the underworld. G: What a miraculous wise man! Su: Don't you believe it?Excuse me, do you not believe in such craftsmen at all?Or do you think that such a universal craftsman is possible in one sense and impossible in another?Or, did you know that you can "sort of" make all of these things yourself?

G: In what sense? Su: It's not difficult. There are many methods and they are quick.You can do this the quickest if you're willing to take a mirror and look around.You can very quickly make the sun and everything in the sky, very quickly the earth and yourself, and other animals, utensils, plants, and all the things we have just spoken of. Greg: Yes.But this is a shadow, not a real thing! SOCRATES: Well, what you said happens to be very helpful to our argument.Because I think painters also belong to this category of makers.Yeah? G: Of course it is. S: But I think you could say that his "production" is not really production.Yet the painter also "in a sense" makes a bed.Yeah?

G: Yes, he also made the shadow of the bed. Su: And, how about the carpenter who made the bed?Didn't you just say that what he made was not the form or idea that we recognize as the real bed or the essence of the bed, but only a specific and special bed? G: Yes, that's what I said. SOCRATES: Well, if he cannot make the essence of things, then he cannot make reality, but only something like reality (which is not really reality). Yeah?It is probably wrong to say that the carpenter who makes the bed, or any other craftsman, produces a thing in the fullest sense of the word.Yeah? G: In any case, this is not likely to be the view of someone who is good at our method of argument after all.

SOCRATES: Therefore, if someone says that this kind of thing is only a dark shadow compared with reality.This statement should not surprise us. ① Refers to the carpenter's bed mentioned in R597. G: We will certainly not be surprised. SOCRATES: Then, are we going to use the examples just now to study the nature of the imitator?That is, who are the real imitators? G: Just do it! Su: Then we have three kinds of beds below. One is the natural bed, which I think we should say is made by God.Or, is something else made? ①It is the essence of the bed, the concept of the bed. G: I don't think it was made by anything else.

Su: The second one is the bed made by carpenters. Greg: Yes. Su: The other one is the bed painted by the artist, isn't it? G: Even so. SOCRATES: Therefore, the painter, the bed-maker, and the god make these three kinds of beds. G: Yes, these three types of people. SOCRATES: God either didn't want to or was compelled by some force not to make more than one natural bed, so he made only one essential bed, the real bed.God never made two or more such beds, and it never will have new ones again. G: Why? SOCRATES: Because, supposing that God made only two beds, there would be a third, and those two would take its form as their own, so that this third would be the bed of the true essence, and the two Not anymore.

Grid: Yes. SOCRATES: So I think God, knowing this and wishing to be the real maker of the real bed and not just a carpenter making a particular bed, made only one natural bed. G: It seems so. SOCRATES: Shall we then call God the creator of the nature of the bed?Or what else to call it? G: The name is certainly correct, since the natural bed and all other natural things are created by God. Su: How about a carpenter?May we call him the maker of the bed? Grid: Yes. S: Can we also call the painter a creator or maker of such things? G: Not at all. Su: Then what do you say he is the bed?

G: I think it would be most appropriate if we call painters imitators of the things made by those two kinds of people. Su: Very good.So you call the maker of a work that is separated from nature an imitator? G: Exactly. SOCRATES: The tragic poet, being an imitator, therefore, like all other imitators, is naturally separated from the king or from the real. ① metaphorical terms. "King" means "highest" and "truth". G: It seems so. SOCRATES: Well, we have agreed on imitators.But tell me, what kind of thing is the painter trying to imitate?Do you think each thing in nature itself or the craftsman's work? Grid: The work of a craftsman. SOCRATES: So is this the reality of the thing or the image of the thing? — This needs to be further clarified. G: I don't understand what you mean. SOCRATES: I mean the following: a bed, for example, if you look at it from different angles, from the side or from the front or from other angles, is it different from itself?Or it just looks different when in fact it is not different at all, and so is everything else.Yeah? G: It just looks different, in fact there is no difference. SOCRATES: Then please study the following question.When a painter paints about everything, is he imitating the thing as it is or as it seems? Is this an imitation of images or an imitation of reality? Ge: It is an imitation of images. Su: Therefore, there is a great distance between imitation and reality.And this seems to be why it can make anything when it has only a small part of the thing (and a small part of the appearance).For example, we say that a painter will draw us a shoemaker or a carpenter or some other craftsman.Although he himself knows nothing of these techniques, if he is a good painter, he can still fool children and some stupid people into making their portraits, such as carpenters, as long as they are displayed at a certain distance from the audience. Believe it. G: That's certainly true. SOCRATES: I think, my friends, that in all such cases we should bear in mind the following.When we are told that he has met a man who has mastered all arts, and understood all other things which only specialists in his field know, there is nothing which he does not know better than anyone else.Hearing these words we must tell him: "You are a simple man, and it seems that you have met and been deceived by a magician or a clever imitator. The reason why you think he is omnipotent is because You cannot distinguish between knowledge, ignorance and imitation." G: Couldn't be more correct. SOCRATES: Now we must consider the tragic poet and his leader Homer.Since we hear some say that these poets know all the arts, and all human things that pertain to good and evil, and also divine things.It should be noted that the average reader thinks like this: If a good poet wants to describe things correctly, he must use knowledge to create, otherwise it will not work.We have to think about this: Is this kind of reader encountering imitators like magicians; deceived by them, so that they look at their works without knowing that there is a double layer between them and reality, Is it easy to produce even if they don't know the truth (because their works are images rather than reality)?Or, is there some truth to what ordinary readers say, and do good poets still have true knowledge about the things they describe (which many readers think they describe well)? G: We must check it out. SOCRATES: Well, if a man can make both imitated things and images, do you think he would really dedicate himself to the work of making images as his highest aim in life? G: I don't think so. SOCRATES: I think that if he had true knowledge of what he imitated, he would have preferred to devote himself to the real thing than to the imitation.He would be enthusiastic about making many fine authentic pieces to keep behind him as a souvenir.He would rather be an object of admiration than a man who is the envy of others. G: I agree with you.In doing so, his honor and interest must be equally great. SOCRATES: So we don't ask Homer, or any other poet, to explain anything else to us; we don't ask: which of them is a doctor and not just a man who imitates a doctor, and which poet (no matter the ancient or present) were heard to have helped some sick man to recover, as Asklebis did, or that they taught medicine to some student, as Asklebis taught his disciples.We don't talk about other skills, and we don't ask them questions about it.We are concerned only with the greatest and best things that Homer wanted to talk about--questions of war and command, of the government of the city, of the education of men.It would certainly be fair for us to ask him to answer the following question: "My dear Homer, suppose that although you are the maker of the image we define as an imitator, you are not separated from the truth in virtue by two layers, but If you are only one floor apart, and you can know what kind of education and training can make people better or worse in public and private life, then, may I ask: Is there any city-state that is governed because of you, like Sparta because of Lycurgus, many other city-states of different sizes because they have other legislators? Which city-state says that its great rule is because you are their good lawgiver, and you are their blessings? Italy and Sicily Men owe it to Harlandes, we owe it to Solon. Who owes it to you?" Can he answer Homer? G: I don't think he can answer.Not even Homer's admirers themselves said that Homer was a good lawgiver. SOCRATES: Well, have you ever heard of any battles fought at Homer's command or under his patronage while he was alive? G: Never heard of it. SOCRATES: Then, as may be expected from a wise man longer than practical work, you have heard of Homer's many ingenious inventions in arts or other practical matters, like Thales of Miletus and Ana of Scythia. How about Halseys? ①Diogenes S. Laertius' "Words and Deeds of Famous Philosophers" i, 105, it is said that he is the inventor of the anchor and the potter's wheel. G: Never heard of any of them. SOCRATES: If he never held any public office, have you ever heard of any private school he founded, where the pupils were happy to be taught while he was alive, and who passed on a sort of Homeric model after his death, Just like Pythagoras?Pythagoras himself was especially venerated for this, and his successors still call a way of life the "Pythagorean model," and thus appear superior.Was it the same with Homer? G: Never heard of such a thing.You know, Socrates, that Homer's pupil Cleonphros, as a specimen of Homer's education, is perhaps even more ridiculous than his own name, if the legend about Homer is to be believed.Legend has it that he despised Homer during his lifetime. ① KρJT′φLAB Literally, it means "people of the meat-eating clan".It is said to be an epic writer from the island of Chios.Adam quotes his poem: "I am a great carnivore, and I believe that is injurious to my wit." (I, 3, 90) Su: There is such a legend.But, Glaucon, if Homer could really educate and improve people, if he had real knowledge and not only imitation, I think many young people would learn from him, respect and love him.Do you agree?Since Protagoras of Abdera, Proticas of Chios, and many other wise men were able to convince their contemporaries by private instruction that one cannot manage household affairs well without the education of wise men. Good country; they have won such love with such wisdom that their pupils only scarcely walk with them on their own shoulders.In the same way, if Homer could really help his contemporaries to acquire virtue, could people still let him (or Hesiod) wander and sing for a living? People would be reluctant to leave him, value him more than gold, and force him to live in their homes.If he cannot be retained, people will follow him wherever he goes until he is fully educated.Are you saying that my thoughts are right? G: Socrates, I think you are absolutely right. SOCRATES: Can we then affirm that all poets since Homer are mere imitators of virtue or other images of their own making, and are utterly ignorant of reality?This is just like what we said just now, although painters themselves know nothing about the craft of shoemakers, they can draw people who look like shoemakers, as long as they themselves and those who know how to judge things by shape and color feel like shoemakers. .isn't it? G: Exactly. SOCRATES: In the same way, I think we shall say that the poet, though he knows nothing but the technique of imitation, yet he can describe techniques splendidly by means of words, when he speaks of shoemaking in terms of rhyme, meter, and melody. , directing wars, or whatever, the audience, being as ignorant of these things as he was, knew things only in words, and always thought he could have described them better.Therefore, the charm of poetry caused by these musical elements is enormous; if the musical color of poetry is removed and it is turned into plain prose, I think you know what the poet's language will become look.I think you have noticed these. G: Yes, I've noticed. Su: They are like some faces that are not really beautiful, but only look good because of their youth, and now their youth has passed, and their beauty has disappeared: it is indeed like this. SOCRATES: Consider the following question again: the creator of the image, the imitator, is, we say, completely ignorant of reality and only of the appearance of things.Is that right? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Let's get the whole thing out of the way and don't leave it halfway. G: Please go on. Su: Let's say that a painter can paint the bridle and the bit, right? Grid: Yes. Su: But it is the cobblers and coppersmiths who can make these things, right? G: Of course. SOCRATES: Does the painter know what the bridle and the bit should be?Perhaps not even the shoe and coppersmiths who made them knew it, but only the rider who knew how to use them? G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Can we say that this is a truth that applies to everything? G: What do you mean? SOCRATES: I mean: there are three kinds of technology in everything you talk about: the technology of the user, the technology of the maker, and the technology of the imitator, right? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Isn't the goodness, beauty, and rightness of all utensils, creatures, and actions related only to use—as the purpose for which man and nature create everything? G: That's right. SOCRATES: It is therefore quite necessary that the user of any thing is the one who has the most experience with it, and that the user informs the maker of the properties of the thing as he sees it in use.For example, the person who plays the flute reports to the person who made the flute how the various flutes perform in performance, and orders which one to make, and the maker makes it according to his instructions. G: Of course. SOCRATES: So, one kind of person knows and reports about the good and bad of the flute, and the other kind trusts him and makes it according to his request. Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, the manufacturer can have a correct belief about the quality of this instrument (this is the belief when he has to follow his opinion when communicating with someone who has real knowledge about the instrument), while the user has a right belief about it. Can have knowledge. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Can the imitator have true knowledge from experience and use as to the beauty and correctness of the things he paints?Or can he have the correct opinion which he has obtained in his indispensable intercourse with men of true knowledge, by obeying the latter's demands for correct manufacture? G: None. SOCRATES: Then the imitator has neither knowledge nor correct opinion as to whether his imitation is good or bad. G: Obviously yes. SOCRATES: So the poet, as a kind of imitator, has the most beautiful wisdom about what he creates. ① This is a sarcastic statement, which should be understood in reverse.But Glaucon answered seriously. G: Not at all. Su: Although he doesn't know whether his creations are good or bad, he still continues to imitate them.It seemed that what he imitated appeared beautiful to the ignorant masses. G: Could it be otherwise? SOCRATES: We seem to have reached a sufficient agreement that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning about what he imitates.Imitation is just a game and should not be taken seriously.The poet who wants to be a tragedian, whether writing in iambic or epic, is especially an imitator. G: Definitely. SOCRATES: To be honest, isn't imitation related to things of the third level separated from the truth? Greg: Yes. Su: Also, which part of human ability is imitation? G: I don't understand what you mean. Su: What I mean is that an object of the same size appears different in human eyes when seen from a distance and up close. Ge: They are not the same size. Su: Seeing the same thing in water is different from seeing it straight and straight in water.Bumps and convexities on the outer surface of the same thing also look different due to the same visual error. And obviously, we have all sorts of turmoil in our minds.It is from this weakness in our nature that painting draws its charm, and it is from this weakness that magicians, and many other such artisans, exploit it. G: Really. SOCRATES: Haven't measuring, counting, and weighing been proved to be the happiest remedial acts to these weaknesses?They are not the ones that can help overcome the domination of our minds by "as if more or less", "as if large or small" and "as if light or heavy", by counting, measuring and weighing of it? G: Of course. S: These metering activities are the work of the rational part of the mind. G: It's the job of this part. S: But when it measures and indicates that some things are "larger" or "smaller" or "equal" than others, often at the same time it appears as if the opposite is the case. Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: But haven't we said that it is inadmissible for the same part of us to hold two opposite views of the same thing at the same time? G: Our words are true. SOCRATES: That part of the mind which is contrary to the measure cannot be the same part as the part which agrees with the measure. G: Of course not. SOCRATES: That part which trusts in measurement and calculation should be the best part of the mind. G: Definitely. SOCRATES: So the opposite part belongs to the lower part of our soul. G: Certainly. SOCRATES: So this is the conclusion we wanted to agree upon when we said the following.We have said that painting, and imitation art in general, in doing their work, creates works far removed from reality, communicates with that part of our soul which is far from reason, and seeks without health and truth as its goal. It learns. G: Definitely. SOCRATES: Imitation is therefore the base child of base parents. G: It seems so. SOCRATES: Does this apply only to what the eye sees, or also to what the ear hears, to what we call poetry? ① ①The two main forms of ancient poetry, epic and tragedy, were sung.So listeners use their ears. G: Probably applies to listening things too. SOCRATES: Let us not only believe in "probables" derived from pictures, but let us proceed to examine that part of the soul which imitative poetry touches, and see whether it is the baser or the nobler part of the soul. G: It has to be. SOCRATES: Let us put it this way, then: poetic mimesis imitates action— either compelled or voluntarily—and, as a consequence of these actions, they experience good or bad luck (supposedly) and experience pain or pleasure.Is there anything else? G: Nothing else. SOCRATES: Is the mind of man one in all these feelings, or, as in seeing, one can have divergent and opposite opinions at the same time in himself about the same thing, and in action Can there be division and self-conflict?But it comes to my mind: there is no need for us now to seek agreement on this point.For we have sufficiently agreed in the preceding discussion that our minds are at all times filled with innumerable conflicts of this kind. Grid: Yes. Su: Yes, yes.However, what was left out at that time, I think it must be brought up now. G: What's missing? SOCRATES: A good character, when he has bad luck, such as the loss of a son or something dear to him, as we said earlier, he will bear it easier than others. ①387D-E.