Chapter 11 Volume VI-2

A: So, what should we do? Sue: It should be exactly the opposite.When they are young, their studies and philosophizing should be adapted to children's receptivity; while they are growing up, they should mainly pay attention to their bodies, preparing them for philosophizing; as they grow older, when their When the soul begins to reach the mature stage, they should strengthen the training of the mind; when their physical strength declines and they have passed the age of political and military service, they should be allowed to be free and easy. Generally, they no longer take on heavy work and only engage in philosophical research. We want them to be happy in this world, and to be equally happy in another world when death comes.

A: I believe your words are very earnest, Socrates.It seems to me, however, that most of your audience will contradict you even more zealously, and will never be persuaded by you, Thrasymachus especially among them. SOCRATES: Please don't start a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, we have just made friends and were never enemies before.We will do whatever it takes to either convince him and others, or achieve something that will help them when they reincarnate as human beings and encounter such discussions. A: You predicted a long time. SOCRATES: No, it is nothing compared to eternity.However, it is not surprising if we cannot convince the public, because they have never seen our words become reality, what they have seen is only a man-made philosophy of blunt words-it is not like ours. Combine words like this naturally when making an argument.Never have they seen, much less often, a state governed by a man who, in words and deeds, resembled as closely as possible the highest good itself.Am I right?

A: Undoubtedly so. Su: My good friend!Nor have they heard enough of the just arguments of free men. —An argument whose purpose is to seek truth by all means for the sake of knowledge, and to shun those cunning and fastidiousness which only lead to opinions and disputes in court and in private discourse. A: They have never heard such an argument. SOCRATES: For these reasons, and in anticipation of them, we are obliged, despite our fears, by the truth, to declare that only when some necessity happens to compel those few uncorrupted philosophers who are at present called useless, come out to govern the city-state (whether they voluntarily or not), and make the citizens subject to their administration, or only when the sons of those who are in power, the sons of the king, or the man in power, the king himself, are inspired by the gods, truly When in love with true philosophy—only then can neither city, nation, nor individual be perfected.I see no reason to necessarily say that both premises (or either)

is impossible.If it is impossible, then we are rightly ridiculed and called dreamers.isn't it? A: Yes. SOCRATES: If, therefore, in very remote antiquity, or at present in some remote barbarian country unknown to us, or if some inevitable fate compelled the best philosophers to govern the state, we are ready to assert: The system we have conceived has been realized, or is being realized, or will be realized, as long as the goddess of philosophy controls the country.It's not impossible, we don't think it's impossible, but we admit it's difficult. A: I think so too. SOCRATES: You mean to say: the public doesn't think so?

A: Yes. SOCRATES: My good friend, don't blame the masses so completely.If you persuade and subtly change their aversion to learning not belligerently but gently, explain to them what kind of people you call philosophers, explain to them the nature and nature of philosophers as we have done recently. The studies that philosophers undertake, so that they can see that what you call a philosopher is not who they think they are, they will certainly be able to change their minds.Or, even when philosophers are examined as they are, don't you think they change their opinions and answers to questions anyway?Or do you think that a man would treat a mild man with roughness and envy a non-envious man, if he himself were a non-envious and gentle man?Let me answer for you: such a violent nature can only appear in a few people, not in many people.

A: You can believe it, I agree with you. SOCRATES: Don't you also agree that the root of the crowd's ill feeling towards philosophy is in pseudo-philosophers?These people break into places where they do not concern themselves, quarrel with each other, are full of hostility, and always make personal attacks-there is nothing so unbecoming of a philosopher. A: It is the most disproportionate. SOCRATES: O Admanthus!You must know that a man who is really absorbed in reality has indeed no time for petty human affairs, or for quarrels with hostility and envy; Neither harm nor be harmed, and act in an orderly manner according to the requirements of reason, so I try my best to imitate them and make myself like them as much as possible.

Or, do you think it is possible for a man not to imitate what he praises? A: Impossible not. SOCRATES: The philosopher, therefore, who is in intimate contact with the divine order, makes himself orderly and divine, so far as human power permits.But slander is ubiquitous. A: Indeed. SOCRATES: Well, if there is some necessity that compels him to actually apply the archetypes he sees on the other side to the human qualities of both the state and the individual, molding them (not only molding himself), you think he will show himself to be A poor craftsman of temperance, justice, and all civic virtues?

A: Absolutely not. SOCRATES: But if the masses know that what we say about philosophers is true, they will still treat philosophers roughly and will not believe us: Which city can never be happy unless it is depicted by the artist according to the divine prototype? ① Plato here uses the image of an artist as a metaphor for a philosopher governing the country. A: If they had known this, they would not have treated philosophers roughly. But please tell me, how to draw this picture? SOCRATES: They will take the qualities of the city and the people as if they were a drawing-board, and first wipe it clean; it will not be easy; but at any rate, you know that the first difference between them and the other reformers is that Here: they will not set out to paint a person or a city, nor to set about legislation, until they have a clean object, or clean it themselves.

A: They are right. SOCRATES: Don't you think they're going to draw up a sketch of the political system after they've been wiped clean? A: Of course it is. Su: After the system was drawn up, I think they would look in two directions from time to time during their work, one direction to see absolute justice, beauty, temperance, etc., and the other direction to see what they tried to describe in human beings Their moben, adding the color of man in various ways to make him like a man, judged by that characteristic which Homer also called god-like when it appeared in man. A: Yes.

Su: I think they will probably have to rub and paint again, until they can paint the characteristics of human beings as God likes as much as possible. A: This painting should be the best one anyway. Su: At this point, those people who you originally thought were going to attack us with all their strength, don't they believe us a little bit?Shall we convince them that this painter of institutions is the man whom we have praised, and whom we have made them angry with when we suggested that the state should be entrusted to him?Will they be gentler when they hear what I just said about painters?

①474A. A: If they understand the truth, they must be much gentler. SOCRATES: And what grounds can they have against it?Can they deny that philosophers love reality and truth? A: That would be ridiculous. SOCRATES: Can they deny that this nature which we describe is a close relative of the highest good? A: No way. SOCRATES: Can they deny, then, that men of this nature, properly brought up, are perfectly good philosophers, so long as they exist?Or would they rather think that the kind of man we are against is a perfectly good philosopher? A: Certainly not. SOCRATES: Well, they will still speak to us when we say that neither the city nor the individual citizen can put an end to evil until the philosophers have become rulers of the city, nor can the institutions which we have conceived in theory come to fruition. angry? A: Maybe less angry. SOCRATES: May we say that they are not only less angry, but have become so moderate and so convinced that shame alone (if nothing else) would have made them agree with us? What? A: Certainly. SOCRATES: Let us therefore assume that they agree with this assertion.Would anyone then object to the other assertion: that it is possible for the descendants of kings or rulers to be born with the gift of philosophers? A: There is no objection. SOCRATES: Now that such philosophical geniuses have been born, will anyone argue that they must be corrupt?And though we admit that it is difficult to keep them free from corruption, can anyone say that not even one of all these people can ever be free from corruption at all times? A: How can someone make such an assertion? SOCRATES: But it is true that one of such a man is enough, and if there is a city-state that obeys him, he can implement all his ideal system here, although no one believes in this system at present. A: Yes, one person is enough. SOCRATES: Because, being the ruler there, he instituted those laws and customs which we have described, and the citizens are willing to obey them--which is not impossible indeed. A: Indeed. SOCRATES: Then, is it any strange impossibility that other people agree with us? A: I don't think so. SOCRATES: Besides, the fact that it is possible, I think this is sufficient evidence that these things are the best. A: It fully demonstrates this point. SOCRATES: So our conclusion about legislation seems to be that our plans are best if they can be carried out; and that, though difficult, it is not impossible. A: The conclusion is this. SOCRATES: Now that this question has finally come to an end, shouldn't we proceed to discuss the rest of the questions?Questions include: How are the rescuers of our national system produced, that is, by what learning and training?And, at what age will they start each subject? A: Yes, these issues must be discussed. SOCRATES: I have deliberately avoided the difficult problem of marrying a woman and having children and appointing a ruler, because I know that absolute truths arouse hatred and are difficult to achieve.But it doesn't do any good to avoid them, because they still have to be discussed anyway.The issue of women and children has been dealt with, and it can be said that the issue of rulers needs to be discussed from the beginning.We said, if you remember, that when they were put to the test of pain and pleasure, they had to prove that they were patriotic, that they had to prove that they would not change whether they were met with hardship or terror or whatever. One's own patriotism; those who cannot hold to this must be rejected, those who can stand any test without change, like gold that is not afraid of fire, must be appointed as rulers, let him be honored in life and rewarded after death .We have talked briefly about this kind of thing, but at that time, because we were worried about causing the controversy just now, we quietly changed the direction of the discussion. A: What you said is absolutely true, I remember. SOCRATES: My friends, we did not dare to say these words as boldly as we do now.Let us now boldly assert that the philosopher must be identified as the most perfect guardian. A: Well, that is the idea. SOCRATES: You know, such people are of course very few, because the talents of all kinds - which we have maintained that they should have as the basis of education - It is rare to be born together in the same person, and the various talents are mostly separate. A: What do you mean? Su: Quick to learn, strong in memory, quick-witted, sensitive, and other such qualities, as well as aggressiveness, open-mindedness, you know they are rarely willing to grow together, and live in order and peace and stability A man possessed of all these qualities would be led around with dexterity at the command of chance, and would lose all stability. A: Your words are true. SOCRATES: But a man of stable nature--one may prefer to trust such a man--is not easily affected by terror in war, but he is also not easily affected by learning, as if numb. , can't learn.When there is something intellectually demanding of them to work on, they doze off and yawn endlessly. A: That's right. SOCRATES: But we have maintained that a person must have the best of both worlds and combine them properly, otherwise he cannot receive the highest education, honor and power. A: Yes. Su: Don't you think such people are rare? A: Of course it is rare. SOCRATES: They must, therefore, be put to the test of toil, terror, and pleasure, as we have said before, and we now add something that has not been said before: we must put them "drilled" in many studies, note See if their souls are capable of the greatest study, or, if they are as afraid to undertake it, as some are afraid of physical contests. ①Below 412C. ②The biggest learning or translated as the most important learning, the highest learning.They all refer to learning the concept of kindness.See 505A below. A: You are right to investigate in this way, but what do you mean by maximum learning? SOCRATES: You may recall that we compared the definitions of Justice, Temperance, Courage, and Wisdom after we had identified three qualities in the soul. ①435A436B. A: If I don't remember, I don't deserve to listen any more. Su: Do you also remember what you said earlier? ①435D. A: What do you say? SOCRATES: We have said in a certain way that to know these virtues to the fullest requires another, more winding and longer road, after which they can be seen clearly.But it is possible to tentatively provide an explanation of the same level as the preceding argument.You said then that in your opinion that was enough.The research was therefore subsequently continued in a manner which I found to be rather imprecise.But whether you are satisfied with this method is up to you. A: I think this method allows me and these people here to see the standard. Su: No.My friends, any level that is even a little bit short of real things is by no means a standard.Because any imperfect thing cannot be used as a standard for other things.Although some people sometimes think that they have done enough and do not need to study further. A: Many people have this kind of inertia. Su: Indeed.But to the defenders of the city and its laws, this is the worst. A: Yes. SOCRATES: The Guardians must therefore take a longer and more tortuous way, and must study as hard as they exercise their bodies; otherwise, as we have just said, they will never be able to achieve the maximum that is their peculiar mission. Learning proceeds to completion. A: These subjects are not the biggest?What greater subject than justice and the other virtues we have described? Sue: Yes, there are bigger ones.Even with respect to such virtues as justice itself, we must not be content with looking at its sketches as we do now, but we must pay attention to its final product.Is it not absurd that the greatest problems should not be considered worthy of the most complete and thorough understanding, since we have labored so hard to gain the most complete understanding of these lesser problems? A: Indeed.But you think we'll let you go without asking: what is the biggest learning, and what do you think it has to do with it? Su: I am mentally prepared for this, so you can ask whatever you want.But I believe you have heard it many times, and now you either don't understand it, or you are trying to make things difficult for me.I tend to think it's the latter possibility.For you have heard me say many times that the idea of ​​the good is the greatest matter of knowledge, and that knowledge of justice, etc., is useful and beneficial only if it is deduced from it.Now I am almost convinced that you know, and this is what I am about to treat, and you have heard me say, that we know very little of the idea of ​​the good; and that if we do not know it, no other knowledge will do us any good, Just as other things are of no use to us if we possess them and do not possess their good.Or if we have everything and not the good, what do you think it is good for?Or what good is it to know everything else but not the beautiful and the good? ① Still using a painter to compare a philosopher. A: Really, I don't think it's beneficial. Su: Besides, you also know that everyone thinks goodness is happiness, and wiser people think goodness is knowledge. A: Yes. SOCRATES: You know, my friend, that those who hold the latter view cannot say what they mean by knowledge, and are finally forced to say that they mean knowledge of the good. A: It's ridiculous. SOCRATES: First they accuse us of not knowing the good, and then when they define the good they make us seem to know the good.How is this not ridiculous?Because, they say it is the knowledge of the good, they use the word "good" here as if we must know what it means. A: Exactly. SOCRATES: Don't those who define the good as happiness have the same serious confusion?In other words, don't they have to admit that they also have evil pleasures when they have to? ①When they couldn't tell what their so-called "pleasure" meant, they were forced to say that it was about "good pleasure".This is also tantamount to acknowledging that there are also evil pleasures. A: Certainly. SOCRATES: In consequence I think they amount to admitting that the same thing is both good and evil.right? A: Certainly. SOCRATES: So there are great and numerous controversies on this issue—isn’t it obvious to everyone? A: Indeed. Su: Excuse me, have you not seen the following situation?In matters of justice and beauty, most people would rather be just and beautiful as they are thought to be than real justice and beauty, in what they do, say, or possess.As for the good, no one is satisfied with what an opinion thinks is good, and everyone pursues the real good, and here "opinion" is not respected by anyone. A: Indeed. SOCRATES: Every soul seeks the good, and makes it the aim of all its actions.Men have an intuition of its existence, but are not sure of it; because they cannot fully understand what goodness is, and cannot establish a firm belief in it, as in other things; The ingredients, they don't recognize either.On such a great question, I ask, Can we allow the best man in the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so ignorant? A: Absolutely not. Su: In short, I think that if a person does not know how justice and beauty are good, he is not qualified to be a guardian of justice and beauty.I surmise that no one knows justice and beauty well enough before he knows good. A: Your guess is very good. SOCRATES: Therefore, the state can only be fully on track if a guardian with these knowledge oversees the political system of the city-state. A: This is an inevitable truth.But, Socrates, do you maintain that the good is knowledge or pleasure, or something else? SOCRATES: I have known you all along, and I know that you will not be content to know what other people think on these matters. A: Socrates, you should know that for a person like you who has been studying these issues for so long, I think it is wrong to talk about other people's opinions instead of your own. S: But, do you think a person has the right to talk about what he doesn't understand, as if he understands it? A: Of course that shouldn't be the case; but it doesn't hurt to talk about what one thinks as an opinion. S: Have you ever noticed that opinions apart from knowledge are all ugly?It is also blind to pick the best out of them; or do you think that those who are out of reason and have some right opinion are any different from blind people who are right? A: No difference. SOCRATES: So, do you want to see the ugly, the blind and the distorted when you can know the bright and the beautiful from others? Glaucon: Really, no.But, Socrates, you are almost at your destination, so don't turn back.Haven't you given an explanation of justice, temperance, etc.?Now you only need to give Shan a similar explanation, and we will be satisfied. SOCRATES: You know, so I am at least as satisfied myself as you are, my friends.But I'm worried that I can't do it with my ability; enthusiasm alone can't draw a tiger, and it will make a joke.For the present, my dear friends, let us not try to explain what the good is.Because it is still too difficult to explain clearly what I am trying to figure out in my heart, and I can't do it no matter how hard I try.But about the Son of Good, the thing that looks a lot like Good, I'd love to talk, if you'd like to hear it.If you don't like to hear it, forget it. Ge: All right, just tell us about your son; anyway, next time you have to pay off the debt, tell us about your father. Su: I really hope that I can pay off the debt and talk about the father at once, instead of only paying the interest and talking about the son, so that you can also hear both aspects of the principal and the interest.But no matter what, you'd better accept the interest first, son of kindness.But please be careful, don't let me accidentally make a mistake and miss your attention. ① The Greek word EQ′B has many meanings, including: (1) child; (2) interest.There is a pun here. G: Well, let's try to be careful.You just talk. SOCRATES: Good; but first I must come to an agreement with you, and let you recall a statement which I have mentioned in the course of this discussion and which I have mentioned many times elsewhere. G: What do you say? Su: On the one hand, we say that there are many kinds of beautiful and good things, and that there are many kinds of beautiful and good things. When we define them, we also use plural forms of words to express them. G: That's what we do. SOCRATES: On the other hand, we have said that there is beauty itself, goodness itself, and all such things in themselves; corresponding to each of the above-mentioned multiples, we have assumed a single idea, and assumed it to be a unifier, and call it the reality of each individual. G: That's what we said. SOCRATES: We say that things as multiples are objects of seeing, not of thinking, and ideas are objects of thinking, not of seeing. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then, with what of ours do we see what is visible? Grid: Use vision. S: Don't we still use hearing to hear what can be heard, and use other senses to feel other things that can be felt? G: Of course it is. SOCRATES: But have you ever noticed how hard the Creator of the senses went to make our eyes see and things to be seen? G: I haven't noticed that at all. SOCRATES: So let's study this question in this way.Do hearing and sound need something else in order for the one to hear and the other to be heard, without which the one cannot hear and the other cannot be heard? G: Not at all. ① ① Plato's scientific concept at that time probably believed that there was no such medium. SOCRATES: I think that many other senses - let's not say all other senses - don't need this kind of thing.Yet you know what it feels like to need something like this? G: I don't know. SOCRATES: Have you not noticed the need of sight and visible things? G: Why is there such a need? SOCRATES: You know that although there is vision in the eye, and those who have it try to make use of it, and although there are colors, if there is not a third thing which is natural and especially suitable for this purpose, then You know, the human eye can't see anything, and colors can't be seen. G: What kind of thing are you talking about? SOCRATES: I'm talking about that which you call light. G: You are quite right. SOCRATES: If, therefore, it is admirable alone, then the bond which connects sight and visibility is not a little less admirable than that which connects other senses with sensibility! ① or: important. ②There seems to be a contradiction between the statement below 507D and here that there is a bond connecting other feelings. G: It should be respectable. SOCRATES: Can you name which god in the sky whose light enables our eyes to see well and things to be seen well? G: Everyone will agree that you mean obviously the sun. Su: So is the relationship between vision and this god like this? G: How? Su: Whether it is the vision itself, or the organ called the eye where the vision is located, it does not mean that it is the sun. G: Of course not. SOCRATES: But I think that of all the sense organs, the eye is most like the sun. G: Yes, it is most like the sun. SOCRATES: The power which the eye has, as a jet, is taken from the jet which the sun emits, is it not? Greg: Yes. Su: Therefore, the sun is not the vision on the one hand, but on the other hand is the cause of the vision, and is seen by the vision. Are these not also facts? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: So we say that the son of good in the visible world—that which resembles it—means the sun.The sun is to sight and visible things just as good itself in the intelligible world is to intellect and intelligible things. G: Why is this so?Please explain to me again. SOCRATES: You know, when the colors of things are no longer illuminated by the sunlight of the day, but only by the twilight of the night, and you look at them with your eyes, your eyes are dimmed, almost blind, It's as if you don't have clear vision in your eyes at all. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: But I think that when your eyes look at what the sun shines on, your eyes see clearly, and the same eyes appear to have vision. Greg: Yes. Su: The human soul is like the eyes.When he beholds objects illuminated by truth and reality, he knows them, understands them, and apparently has reason. However, when it turns to look at the dim world of birth and death, it has only opinions, which become blurred, and only fluctuating opinions, and it seems to be irrational again. G: That's right. SOCRATES: Well, now you must admit that this which gives the object of knowledge truth and the subject of knowledge the ability to know is the idea of ​​the good.It is the cause of truth in knowledge and understanding.Truth and knowledge are both beautiful, but the idea of ​​the good is more beautiful than both—you will not be wrong to admit this.Just as we can regard light and vision as the sun but not the sun in the previous metaphor, here we can also regard truth and knowledge as good, but we cannot regard them as good.The good is far more honorable. G: If goodness is the source of knowledge and truth, and surpasses both in beauty, what a beautiful thing you speak of!Of course you can't mean to say it's happiness, right? SOCRATES: I never mean that.I would like to ask you to study this metaphor again! G: How to discuss? SOCRATES: I think you will say that the sun not only enables the objects of seeing to be seen, but also causes them to be born, to grow and to be nourished, though the sun itself does not produce. G: Of course not. SOCRATES: You would also say that the objects of knowledge derive not only their intelligibility from the good, but also their own being and reality from the good, although the good itself is not reality, but is superior in rank and power to reality. thing. Ge: [very funny]: Ah!The sun god Apollo testifies!Can't exaggerate any more than this! Su: The responsibility lies with you. You forced me to express my thoughts on this issue! Ge: Please continue to talk about your thoughts; if you have anything to say about Sun Yu, please don't miss it anyway. Sue: Yes, there is still a lot to say. G: So please don't miss anything, even a little bit. SOCRATES: I will do my best; but I think many things will have to be omitted. G: Don't omit it. SOCRATES: Imagine, then, that, as I say, there are two kings, one ruling over the known world, the other over the visible world—I do not say "heavenly" lest you think I am playing with terminology—you are One must understand two things: the visible world and the knowable world. G: Yes, I understand. SOCRATES: Then represent them by a line: divide the line into two unequal parts, and then divide each part into two parts in the same proportion.Assume that of the two parts divided the first time, one part corresponds to the visible world, and the other part corresponds to the intelligible world; The first part in the visible world interval may represent the image.By image I mean first a shadow, and second a reflection in water or a smooth solid or something like that, you know what I mean? G: I know what you mean. Su: Let’s talk about the second part: the first part is its image, which is the real object of the first part, which is the animals around us, all natural objects and all artificial objects. G: Well, that's it. SOCRATES: Would you say that the ratio of these two parts of the visible world expresses the ratio of degrees of truth or unreality, that images are to objects as the world of opinion is to the world of knowledge? G: Very willing to say that. Su: Please go on to investigate the method of dividing the knowable world. G: How is it divided? Su: That's how it is divided.This world is divided into two parts. In the first part, the soul takes as images those objects in the visible world that have their own images; research can only start from assumptions, and not from assumptions to principles, but from assumptions. The assumption descends to the conclusion; in the second part the soul, on the contrary, rises from the assumption to the principle above the assumption; it does not use images, as in the previous part, but only, and entirely with ideas. G: I don't quite understand what you mean. S: In that case, let's try again, and you'll understand me better when I explain a bit in the preface.I think you know that people who study geometry, arithmetic, and things like that, first assume even and odd numbers, various figures, three kinds of angles, and other such things.They regard these things as givens, as absolute suppositions, about which they assume nothing to be explained to themselves or others, which is known to everyone.From these hypotheses they proceed, and by a coherent reasoning they arrive at the conclusions they seek. G: Yes, I know that. S: You also know that although they use various visible figures and discuss them, it is not these figures that are actually in their thinking, but the things that these figures imitate.What they are talking about is not some particular square they draw, or some particular diagonal, etc., but the square itself, the diagonal itself, etc.The figures they made were real objects, with their shadows or images in the water.But now they take these things again for images, and what they really want to see are realities that can only be "seen" by thought. Greg: Yes. Su: Therefore, although such things do belong to the category of what I call knowable things, there are two exceptions: First, assumptions must be used in the process of studying them. Since the soul cannot break through and go beyond these assumptions, it cannot Moving upwards to reach the principle: Second, in the process of studying them, the objects in the lower part of them are used as images—although these objects also have their own images, which are clearer than their own images more important. G: I understand what you mean about geometry and subjects akin to geometry. SOCRATES: As to the other part of the knowable world, you must understand that I mean the kind of knowledge which Logos himself attains by dialectical force.Here the hypothesis is not used as a principle, but only as a hypothesis, i.e., as the starting point of a certain stage from which to rise to a world higher than the hypothesis, to the absolute principle, and on reaching the absolute原理之后，又回过头来把握那些以绝对原理为根据提出来的东西，最后下降到结论。在这过程中不靠使用任何感性事物，而只使用理念，从一个理念到另一个理念，并且最后归结到理念。 格：我懂得你的意思了；但是懂得不完全，因为你所描述的这个过程在我看来不是一件简单的事情。不过无论如何我总算懂得了，你的意思是要把辩证法所研究的可知的实在和那些把假设当作原理的所谓技术的对象区别开来，认为前者比后者更实在；虽然研究技术的人〔在从假设出发研究时〕也不得不用理智而不用感觉，但是由于他们的研究是从假设出发而不上升到绝对原理的，因此你不认为他们具有真正的理性，虽然这些对象在和绝对原理联系起来时是可知的。 我想你会把几何学家和研究这类学问的人的心理状态叫做理智而不叫做理性，把理智看成是介乎理性和意见之间的东西的。 苏：你很懂得我的意思了。现在你得承认，相应于这四个部分有四种灵魂状态：相当于最高一部分的是理性，相当于第二部分的是理智，相当于第三部分的是信念，相当于最后一部分的是想象。请你把它们按比例排列起来，给予每一个以和各部分相当程度的真实性。 格：我懂你的意思，也同意你的意见，并且愿意按照你的意见把它们排列起来。