Chapter 62 Book IV The World as Will Revisited §62

We have already discussed that the initial, simple affirmation of the will to live is simply an affirmation of one's own body.That is to say, how the will expresses itself in time through actions is limited to how the body expresses it in space in its form and purposiveness.This affirmation manifests itself in the preservation of the body, by the exercise of its own powers [for the purpose].What is directly related to the preservation of the body is the satisfaction of the sexual drive, and since the sexual organs belong to the body, in this sense the satisfaction of the sexual drive also belongs to the preservation of the body.The voluntary, totally unmotivated relinquishment of the gratification of the sexual impulse is already the negation of the will-to-live, the voluntary annulment of the will-to-live from the knowledge that has already arisen and which acts as a tranquilizer.Accordingly, such a denial of one's own body appears as a contradiction between the will and its own appearance.This is because in the human body, although the sexual organs are the objectification of the will to reproduce, they do not want to reproduce now.Precisely because of this, and because to deny one's body is the denial or annulment of the will to live, such renunciation [lust] is a difficult and painful self-denial.But we will talk about this later. —But since the will expresses in countless juxtaposed individuals the self-affirmation of its own body, it can easily go beyond this affirmation in one individual with the egoism which all things possess, [and go far beyond ,] until the negation of the same will manifested in other individuals. [This is] the intrusion of the will of the previous individual into the certain sphere of the will of another, for the former either destroys or injures the other's body itself, or compels the forces in the other's body to serve its own will. Instead of serving the will manifested in another's body.That is to say, if this individual takes the power of another body from the will that appears as another body, and thereby adds to his own power that is in the service of the other's will, it is by denying the power of the other body. The will manifested in the body affirms his own will by being beyond himself. — Such an intrusion into the positive sphere of another's will has always been clearly recognized, and the concept of this intrusion is marked by the word "injustice."Because although both sides of [unrighteous giving] do not have a clear and abstract understanding like we do here, they both immediately recognize this problem emotionally.To suffer injustice, because one's own body is negated by another individual, is to feel an intrusion into the affirmative sphere of one's body, which is an immediate mental pain; Depression due to [material] loss is different and completely separate.On the other hand, in the aspect of injustice, there is such a recognition that in the body, he is the same will as the will that also manifests in the body of the other party at the same time, but this will is so strongly affirmed in one of its phenomena. itself, so that it becomes the negation of the same will in other phenomena by being out of the sphere of itself and its own power; and this will, seen as itself, struggles against itself, eats itself, precisely because of its intensity. its meat. —But this knowledge, I would say, is not acquired in the abstract all at once by the perpetrator of injustice, but [only] as a vague perception.People call this feeling "blame of conscience", or in a more narrow sense here, it may be called "sense of injustice".

Here we have analyzed the concept of injustice in its most general abstraction.Specifically, the barbaric act of cannibalism is the most complete, most appropriate, and most easily pointed out manifestation of injustice.This is the most pronounced type of injustice at the highest level of the objectification of the will, the terrible situation of the will's greatest struggle against itself.And the highest level of will objectification is man.In murder, second only to cannibalism, the reproach of conscience, whose significance we have just abstractly and dryly pointed out, immediately follows with terrible clarity as the murder is committed, and leaves a lifetime of rest on the peace of mind. Wounds that cannot be healed; for our trembling at the murder that has been committed, as well as the trembling and shrinking at the murder that is about to be committed, is consistent with [people's] infinite nostalgia for life.And all living things, precisely because they are manifestations of the will to live, are permeated by this nostalgia. (In addition, we will analyze in more detail the feeling or conscience that follows injustice and vicious behavior in a later point, and make it rise to conceptual clarity.) To be regarded as essentially the same as murder, only In a different degree than homicide, it is the deliberate bodily mutilation or mere injury of another, as well as any act of beating. —Injustice is also manifested in restraining other individuals, in enforcing him as a slave; and finally in usurping other people's property.If property is the fruit of another's labor, then appropriating another's property is essentially the same as enslaving another, and the relationship between the two is equal to that of injury alone to murder.

This is because according to our interpretation of injustice, property cannot be taken away if it is not injustice, and property can only be obtained by others' own labor.So to take another's property is to take one's physical strength from the will objectified in that person's body, so that this physical strength can serve the will objectified in another body.Only in this way, although the injustice does not violate the human body of another person, but an inanimate thing, which is completely different from the other body, he still invades the positive sphere of the other person's will; because the other person's physical strength And labor is tantamount to blending with this thing and equating it.It follows from this that all real property, that is, moral property, is originally and uniquely grounded in the work of labour; as it was quite universally admitted before Kant, and just as This is what one of the oldest codes puts it clearly and beautifully: "The wise men who are familiar with the ancient times say that whoever uproots the field from the woods, sweeps it clean, and plows it, the cultivated land is his; It belongs to him who was the first to mortally wound a gazelle." (Manu's Code IX, p. Errors are peculiarly intertwined, which I think can only be explained by Kant's old age.Even this can be explained that he bases his ownership of property on preemptive possession.But how can I immediately give myself a legal right to a thing by simply declaring that I will not allow others to use it?Obviously, such a declaration itself requires a legal basis, rather than the declaration itself being a legal basis as Kant thought.If there is no other basis than one's own declaration to monopolize a thing, then how can it be said that others' disrespect for this request means that this person is essentially, that is, morally, acting unrighteously?How can it disturb the conscience of others in this matter?This is very clear and easy to understand [reason], that is to say, there can be no legal appropriation at all, the only thing that can be is the legal possession of a thing, the legal acquisition, [and this is] due to the original A thing uses its own labor [to come].Therefore, as long as a thing has been preserved by the toil of another man, improved, improved, or prevented from an accident, even if it is such a small toil as to pluck or lift a wild fruit, but To take such a thing is obviously still the fruit of the plunderer who has taken away the labors expended on it, and is still evidently making the other's body serve his will rather than his own; To affirm his own will to deny another's will: this is called injustice. —On the contrary, to simply enjoy a thing, without any processing or taking any security measures to prevent damage, then this is the same as declaring his own monopoly by his own will. This presents a legal right.So even if a family has hunted alone in a hunting area for a century, but has done nothing to improve the hunting area; then, if there are new outsiders who want to hunt here now, the family is not morally correct. Injustice cannot be opposed at all.Therefore, the so-called preemptive right is just that people have to pay for something after they have enjoyed it for free, that is, they also demand the right to continue to enjoy it exclusively. This is completely groundless in morality.For those who stand alone on this right, the later newcomer has a better reason to refute him: "Just because you have enjoyed it for so long, it is now for others to enjoy it." A thing that cannot be worked, neither improved nor secured against accidents, cannot morally afford a well-founded exclusivity.Possession of such things may be due to the voluntary surrender by all other parties in return for other contributions of the possessor, but this already assumes a community bound by traditional customs, a state. —Morally justified property, as we have deduced above, by its very nature confers on every man unlimited power over his possessions, as he has unlimited power over his own body. , so he can transfer his property to others by means of exchange or gift, and others have the same moral right to possess the property as he does.

Fundamentally speaking, injustice is either violence or conspiracy, and from the point of view of moral essence, the two are just the same thing.First of all, as far as murder is concerned, it doesn't make any difference whether I use a dagger or poison.Injure a person in a similar way, and the result is the same.The injustice in other situations can all be reduced to me. As the perpetrator of injustice, I always force other individuals to serve my will instead of his will, and act according to my will instead of his will.This is achieved in a violent way through physical causality in the body, and in a conspiratorial way through the formation of motives, that is, through cognitively tested causality, so that I give his will some False motives, to make him think that by them he is obeying his own will, when really he is obeying mine.Since cognition is the medium of motivation, all I can do is to make his cognition wrong, and this is lying.The purpose of deceit is always to influence the will of others, not just to influence his knowledge; It is within this scope to affect his cognition.This is because my deceit starts from my will, and this deception itself also needs a motive, but such a motive can only [control] the will of others and cannot [stop affecting] others' free, free will. for the sake of knowledge; for such knowledge [others] can never have any influence on my will, and therefore can never move my will, can never be the motive of those ends which my will has, but only the desires and actions of others. , [asking others to do something] is such a motivation.It is only because of this, and therefore only indirectly, that the knowledge of others can be such a motive.This is true not only of all deceit that is manifestly motivated by selfishness, but also of deceit that arises from pure mischief--to take pleasure in the painful consequences of another's mistake thereby contributing to it--but .Even pure bragging, because it can gain greater respect or better evaluation from others, and it is also intended to have a greater and easier influence on other people's desires and actions.Simply refusing to tell a truth, that is, refusing to say anything at all, is not wrong in itself, but it is wrong to deceive people with any lie.Whoever refuses to point out the way for a person who has gone astray is not injustice to that person, but it is injustice to deliberately teach him to go wrong. —From the [reason] here stated, any deceit as a theory of deceit is just as right and wrong as an act of violence; To go to another individual, that is, to affirm my will by denying another's will, is the same as using violence. —But the most complete deceit is a breach of contract, because in the contract all the provisions are complete and clear.It turns out that when a contract is signed, the obligations assumed by others are directly and self-evidently the motive for my subsequent obligations.Mutually agreed terms are considered and formally exchanged.The authenticity of the declarations made by each in the contract, according to the [original] determination, is within their own control.If the other party breaks the contract, then he has cheated me.Moreover, since he only confuses my understanding with false motives, in order to control my will according to his intention, and to extend the dominion of his will to other individuals, he has committed an act of complete injustice [ ].All contracts are morally legal and valid based on this.

As far as the perpetrator of injustice is concerned, violence is less shameful than intrigue, because violent injustice springs from physical strength, which in every case shocks the world.The injustice of conspiracy is the opposite, and the cowardice of the person is revealed by the way of going around; so it degrades him physically and morally at the same time.In addition, coaxing and deception can be successful because the person who deceives him has to pretend to hate and despise the coaxing in order to win people's trust; of. —Scheming, treachery, and treachery, which everywhere arouse abhorrence, are based on the fact that faithfulness is the bond which reunifies from without the wills scattered in the multiplicity of individuals; Limits the consequences of egoism due to the dispersion of will.Treachery and betrayal tear this last, outer tether, and thereby provide unlimited scope for selfish consequences.

In the association of our mode of consideration, we have found that as the content of the concept of injustice, it is a certain attribute of a person's behavior in which he so expands the affirmation of the will manifested in his body. so that this affirmation would negate the will manifested in another's body.We have also indicated, in some only general instances, where the limits of the range of injustice begin; at the same time, we have determined the order of injustice from the highest to the lower degrees by a few principal concepts.According to this, the concept of injustice is original and positive; the opposite concept of justice is derivative and negative.Because we must not limit ourselves to words, but should speak conceptually.In fact, if there is no injustice, there can be no justice at all, that is to say, the concept of justice only includes the elimination of injustice.Any action, as long as it does not exceed the above-mentioned limits, that is, it does not negate the will of others to strengthen the affirmation of one's own will, is included in this concept.So far as purely moral determinations are concerned, the above-mentioned limits divide the whole sphere of [all] possible actions into injustice and justice [two aspects].An act is not injustice as long as it does not intrude into the affirmative scope of another's will while negating it in the way analyzed above.For example, when others are in need and do not help them, or when they face others' hunger and stand by, it is cruel and inhumane, but it is not injustice. [On such occasions] all that can be said with sufficient certainty is that whoever has gone so far as to be unkind and cruel, it is also quite certain that, so long as his desire demands it and no coercion prevents it, any He can also do injustice.

However, from the point of view of the concept of justice as a negation of injustice, the concept is mainly used in the case of resisting injustice with violence; and there is no doubt that the original generation of the concept comes from this situation.This kind of resistance cannot be injustice in itself, so the resistance is just; although the violence performed during the resistance seems to be injustice in itself, it is only here that it is just because of the motive of the action, and it is also just. That is what becomes righteous.If, in affirming his own will, an individual goes so far as to intrude into the sphere of the affirmation of my own will as a personality, which I [possess] in essence, and thereby negate my affirmation of this will, then I resist this The violation is the negation of this negation.To this extent, on my part, apart from affirming the will that is inherently, necessarily and originally manifested in my body, and which is contained and included in the mere appearance of my body, there is no Nothing is done; so it is not injustice but justice.That is to say: I thus have a right to negate another's negation [to me] with the force necessary to cancel the other's negation; .As intrusive foreign violence against him, it is not injustice to resist, and is therefore entitled to resist with a reaction somewhat superior to that of foreign violence; What is essential in myself as such a person, since I have already expressed myself within the sphere of the "affirmation of the will" (this is the arena of the struggle) without intruding into this sphere of others, this It is just the negation of negation, it is just affirmation, not itself is negation.Therefore, since my will is manifested in my body, and I preserve myself with my own strength without denying the will of any other who abides by the same boundary, I can not force the will of others who deny my will for injustice. Not to carry out this negation is to say that within this limit I have a coercive power.

In all cases where I have the right to coerce and have the complete right to use violence against others, as the situation requires, I can also use tricks to deal with other people's violence without injustice, so it is just within the scope of my coercive power. In fact, I do have the right to lie.Therefore, whoever assures a street gangster who searches his possessions that he has nothing left with him [even if it is a lie] is perfectly just.In the same way, whoever tricks a robber who broke in at night into the cellar with a lie and locks the robber inside.It is also just.Whoever is taken captive by kidnappers, for example, by the Rabanesks [North Africa], has the right to murder them not only with open violence, but also with deceit, in order to restore his liberty. —Therefore, a promise squeezed out by direct violence against the body has no binding force at all, because the person who endures such coercion has every right to free himself from the tyrant by killing, let alone by Way to cheat.Anyone who cannot get back the robbed property by force, but by trickery, is not committing an injustice.If someone loses the money that was taken from me, then I even have the right to use false dice on him, because the [money] I win from him turns out to be mine.Whoever denies this must necessarily deny the legitimacy of tricks in war, for it is even a deceit out of deeds, an example of what Queen Kristin of Sweden said when she said: "People's words cannot be counted at all, and their actions can hardly be trusted."-In this way, the boundary between justice and injustice is indeed a narrow gap.Besides, I think it superfluous to prove that all this is in perfect agreement with [our] above statement of the injustice of lying and violence; all this may also be used to illustrate the peculiar theory of [compulsory] haste of lying.

From all that has been said, then injustice and justice are only moral prescriptions, that is, prescriptions that are valid both in terms of human action considered as such, and in the inner sense of the action itself.This is directly present in consciousness, on the one hand, because injustice is connected with it by an inner pain, that is, a consciousness which the injustice feels simply, [awareness] that his affirmation of his will is too strong. , so far as to negate the will phenomenon of others; it is also because [awareness] that he as a phenomenon is certainly different from the recipient of injustice, but in the ontology itself he is the same thing as the recipient.A further elucidation of the inner meaning of unease of conscience can only come later.On the other hand, the sufferer of injustice is also painfully aware that his will has been denied; He refers to satisfying these needs by the strength of one's own body.At the same time he realizes that he can resist the negation in every way not for injustice, as long as he has the strength to do so.This purely moral sense is the only sense that righteousness and injustice have, but with man as a man and not as a citizen; and so it remains in the state of nature without all existing laws, and It constitutes the basis and content of all existing regulations.This is what is called the law of nature, but rather the law of morality; for its force does not govern the injured side, external reality, but only [man's] conduct and This arises from man's self-knowledge, his own will--this is called conscience--; the law of nature, in the natural state, cannot in every case be external, valid for other individuals, cannot be used in every case. One occasion prevents might from taking the place of justice as ruler.In the state of nature it depends on each man only that he does no injustice on any occasion, but never that he does not suffer injustice on any occasion, and [whether he suffers injustice or not] depends on his occasional external force. .The concepts of righteousness and injustice, therefore, are valid for the state of nature and are by no means conventional; but there they are valid only as moral concepts, so that each person may know his own will for himself.The will to life affirms itself in individual human beings, with very different degrees of intensity.On the scale of intensity these moral concepts are like the freezing point on the thermometer, a fixed point, the [critical] point at which the affirmation of one's own will becomes the negation of another's will, that is to say, due to injustice Rather, it is pointed out that the intensity of the will is combined with the degree to which cognition is limited in the principle of individuation (which is the whole form of "knowledge" in the service of the will).But if one puts aside or denies [his] consideration of the purely moral nature of human action, and considers action only in terms of external operations and effects, he may of course also follow Hobbes in the distinction between right and wrong. The definition of justice is said to be a traditional custom, arbitrarily adopted regulations, and therefore also a regulation that does not exist outside the current law.And we can never use external experience to make him understand what [is] never part of external experience.For example, the above-mentioned Hobbes has a statement that very prominently marks the characteristics of his completed empirical mode of thinking.In his "Principles of Geometry" he denied all really pure mathematics, and stubbornly asserted that points have extension and lines have breadth.But we can never point out a point without extension, a line without breadth. We cannot make him understand the transcendental nature of mathematics, just as we cannot make him understand the transcendental nature of legal principles. Recognition is closed.

Then, pure jurisprudence is a chapter in morality, and it is directly related only to the doing of actions, not to the receiving of actions.It turns out that only action is the expression of will, and morality only examines will.The acceptance of action is a naked "state of affairs", and morality can only consider the acceptance of action indirectly, that is, just to prove that what happens just to avoid injustice is not injustice. —The content of this chapter on morality should be to establish a precise limit as to how far the individual may go in affirming the will which is objectified in his body, without denying the will which is manifest in another. The same will in the human body, and then stipulates that actions beyond this limit must be injustice, so they can be resisted without being injustice.Therefore, the focus of investigation is always one's own actions.

But in the external experience viewed as a state of affairs, the suffering of injustice also appears.In the suffering of injustice, as has already been said, the will-to-live confronts itself more clearly than anywhere else.This antagonism arises from both individual multitude and egoism, both of which are conditioned by the principle of individuation; and for the knowledge of the individual this principle is the form of the world of representation.We have also seen above that a large part of the essential pain of life has its inexhaustible source in this individual confrontation. The rationality common to all these individuals, however, does not make them see the individual like animals, but also makes them abstractly aware of the whole in relation; and it soon teaches them to understand the source of pain, Let him devise means of alleviating pain, or if possible canceling it; that is, teaching everyone to make the same sacrifice, and the common good for all will more than pay for it.Injustice, so pleasant to the selfishness of one individual when it arises on certain occasions, has its necessary counterpart in the suffering of injustice in another, to whom it is a great deal. pain of.Thus, when reason, which considers the whole, steps out of the one-sided standpoint of the individual to which it belongs, and for a moment casts off its fascination with that individual, it sees that the enjoyment of injustice in this individual is every time taken in another. In addition, I also saw that since everything is at the mercy of chance [chance], so the pleasure of perpetrating injustice, everyone is afraid of himself, will be better than suffering injustice. The pain of justice is harder to come by.Hence reason perceives that, either to relieve the pain which permeates all, or to share it as evenly as possible, the only best way is for all to give up those enjoyments which are pursued by injustice, and to give to all Eliminate the pain of suffering injustice. ——So this method, this method, due to the use of reason, is not difficult to be thought out by the selfishness of working according to the method to get rid of its one-sided position, and then gradually complete it, which is the state contract or law.As I have here indicated the origin of the state, so Plato has expressed it in the Republic in this way.In fact, this alone is essentially the only origin of the state, determined by the nature of the matter.There is no country in any country that can have another origin, for it is this mode of occurrence, this purpose, that makes a country a country; It does not matter that savages are independent of each other (anarchy), or that a group of slaves is ruled by the strong at will (tyranny).In both cases there is no state, until the common agreement is established, and the state is not born; and according to this agreement, more or less free from anarchy or despotism, the state follows. more perfect or less perfect.The republic tends to anarchy, the monarch tends to absolutism, and the middle way of constitutional monarchy, which was conceived for this purpose, tends to rule by a parliamentary group. [Really] to build a perfect state, one must start by creating characters whose nature is such that they will sacrifice their own welfare to the common good.However, before this is achieved, there is already a method that is not satisfactory without minor benefits. That is to say, if there is such a family whose welfare is inseparable from that of the country, then, at least in the main In terms of affairs, it is absolutely impossible to advance one without advancing the other.Here lies the strength and virtue of hereditary monarchy. Since morality deals only with just or injustice, and can point out precisely the limits of his conduct to a man who has roughly resolved not to do injustice; political science, that is, the doctrine of legislation, does the opposite, We only talk about the unrighteous acceptance; and if it is not because the unrighteous doing has its inevitable counterpart every time, there must be unjust receiving, and it will never be concerned about the unrighteous doing.The suffering of injustice, as the enemy that legislation opposes, is the focus of legislation.Furthermore, if it is conceivable that there is an injustice done, which is not connected with the injustice suffered on the other hand, the state will never prohibit it in the first place. —Furthermore, since the will, the intention [of man], is the object of moral investigation and the only reality [in morals], it must aim at injustice, which can only be checked or prevented by external force. A resolute will to act is morally synonymous with injustice that has actually been done; and before the moral judgment such an intention is condemned as injustice.The state, on the contrary, pays no attention at all to mere will and intention itself, but is only concerned with [actual] actions (whether still conceived or realized), which have other meanings. The counterpart is suffering.Therefore, as far as the state is concerned, actual actions and state of affairs are the only reality, and intentions and intentions are only investigated so that the meaning of actual actions can be seen from these.Therefore the state will not forbid any man to have in his mind always [an evil intention] of murder, poison, and murder against others, so long as the state has known that the fear of the sword and the rolling wheel will constantly prevent that evil intention from really working.The state does not have such a stupid plan to eliminate the psychological tendency of illegal behavior and eliminate malicious intentions; besides every kind of motivation to realize illegal behavior, there must always be one of the unlucky punishments. More weight, used to dispel the motive of wrongdoing.So it seems.A penal law is a register as complete as possible, [detailing] the counter-motives of all conceivable crimes. — Both [crime and reaction] are assumed in the abstract, in order to be practically applied when they arise.Politics or legislation [matters] then, for its own sake, would turn to morals and jurisprudence, that chapter of jurisprudence which, besides defining the inner meaning of righteousness and unrighteousness, prescribes precisely the demarcation between them, but only for the sake of it. Taking advantage of the reverse of that chapter, all limits which morality holds to be insurmountable unless one wishes to inflict injustice are regarded as limits which one cannot allow others to pass unless one wishes to suffer injustice, that is, one is thus entitled to keep others from There rushes back the boundaries.Therefore, this boundary should be consolidated by law as negatively as possible.Hence, if historians are called, rather playfully, clumsy prophets, jurists are clumsy moralists; In the chapter on inviolable rights, that's clumsy morality. The concept of "injustice" and the negation of "injustice" and the concept of "justice" are originally moral [nature]; And become legal [nature].This, together with the jurisprudence of Kant, who quite erroneously deduced from his categorical imperative that the establishment of the state is a moral duty, has repeatedly in recent times given rise to the very curious fallacy that the state is a A facility for the promotion of morality.The state arises from the pursuit of morality, and thus the state is established against egoism.As if the inward intention, the eternally free will, the only thing that can be called moral or immoral, can also be modified from without, and can also be changed by external influences!An even more erroneous "theory" says: In the moral sense, the state is the condition of freedom, and thus of morality; but freedom lies beyond phenomena, let alone beyond human facilities.The state, as has been said, is neither fundamentally opposed to all egoism, nor to its self-interest; on the contrary, the state just goes from a one-sided standpoint to a general standpoint, from which all people have self-knowledge and act according to their own methods.是而总括起来的共同的自私中产生的，是专为这种利己主义服务而存在的；是在纯粹道德性的不可期，亦即纯出于道德理由的正义行为不可期这一正确前提之下建立起来的，要不然国家本身也就是多余的了。所以国家不是为了反对利己主义，而是为了反对利己主义那些有害的后果，亦即反对从自私的个体的众多性中，在他们一切人彼此互施中产生而损害他们福利的后果，又以此福利为目的而建立的。因此亚里士多德就已说过：“国家的目的是大家生活得好，而生活好就是生活幸福和美好。”（《论共和国》，Ⅳ ，还有霍布斯也完全正确地、卓越地分析了国家的这一起源和目的。同样，一切国家秩序的那一古老基本原则：“公共福利应是法律的第一条”也标志着同一起源。——国家如果完全达到了它的目的，它就会产生这样一个现象，等同于普遍都是彻底平正的居心在起作用似的。可是这两种现象的内在本质和起源[在两者之间]却是相反的。即是说在后面这一场合是没有人想要施行非义，而在前面那一场合却是没有人想要承受非义，并且是为了这个目的，一切适当的办法都已用上了。这就是同一根线得以从相反的方向来描画；而一头带上了口罩的猛兽也会和一头草食兽一样不会伤人了。——可是要超过这一点而进一步，国家就无能为力了；国家不能演出一种好像是从普遍的互惠互爱中产生出来的现象。这是因为如我们刚已看到的，国家由于它的本性就不禁止非义[或不法]行为，假如是根本没有非义的承受在另一方面与之相应的话，只因为这是不可能的事情，国家才禁阻一切非义[或不法]行为。那么反过来，国家按它以全体幸福为目的的倾向，也将要乐于致力使每人都蒙受人类仁爱各种各样的美意和善行，要不是这些美意善行的事业在具体实施中也有一种对应物的话。可是在这种场合，国家的每一公民就都会想充当那被动的角色，没有一个人会要想充当主动的角色了；并且也没有一个什么理由可以责成某人应在某人之先来充当这主动的角色。因此，可以加以强制的只是消极的东西，那也就正是法律；而不是积极的东西，那也就是人们在好心肠的义务或不完全的义务这类名称之下所理解的东西。 如已说过，立法从道德借来纯粹法学或讨论义与非义的本质和界限的学说，以便为了那和道德不相干的立法目的而从反面来利用这种学说，并按以制订现行法律和建立维护立法的工具，建立国家。所以实际的立法就是从反面来应用的纯道德的法学。这种应用可以尊重每一特定的民族固有的条件和情况而见之于实施。但是，只有现行立法在本质上是彻底按纯粹法学而规定的，并且要立法的每一条款都能在纯粹法学中找到根据，然后所产生的立法才真是积极的正义；而这国家也才是一个道义的集体，才是名副其实的国家，才是道德上容许的设施，不是不道德的设施。否则相反，现行立法就会是为积极的非义奠定根据，立法自身就会公开自承是由强制而成的非义。属于这一类型的是任何一种专制政体，是大部分回教国家的政体；甚至许多宪法的某些部分也属于这一类型，例如入身所有权，强制劳役等等。纯粹法学或自然法，更好是叫做道德的正义，固然总是要由于倒转方向才成为任何道义的现行立法的基础，等于纯粹数学是任何一支应用数学的基础一样。为了这一目的，纯粹法学和哲学一样，也有它要向立法传播的最重要的几点：1）说明义与非义两概念内在的和本来的意义，以及两概念的起源，两概念在道德上的应用和地位。2）财产所有权的引伸。3）契约的道德效力的引伸，因为这是国家契约的道德基础。4）国家的起源和目的的说明，说明这一目的对道德的关系，以及随这一关系[如何]通过方向倒转，按目的而移用道德的法学到立法上来。5）刑法的引伸。——法学的其他内容不过只是这些原则在一切可能的生活关系上的应用，是义与非义间界限的详细规定，所以这些关系都是在某些一定的观点和标题之下加以分合的。在这些[如何分合]特定的论点上，所有的纯粹法学教科书都颇为一致；唯独在那些原则上则说法极不相同，因为这些原则总是和某种哲学相联的。在我们既已按我们的哲学体系简单而概括地，然而也是坚定而明确他说明了[上面]那些重点的前四点之后，还有刑法[这一点]也正要用同样的方式来谈一谈。 康德提出了一个根本错误的主张，他说在国家之外就没有完整的所有权。根据我们上面的引伸，在自然状态中也有财产，附带也有完整的、自然的，亦即道德的权利。这种权利，不行非义就不能加以损害，但拼着一切而加以保护却不是非义。与此相反，在国家之外没有什么刑法，那倒是确实的。整个刑事处分权都只是由现行法奠定基础的。现行法在[人]犯法之前就对这种犯法[行为]规定了刑罚，而刑罚的恫吓作为反动机，就应该在分量上超过那一犯法行为的一切动机。这种现行法应看作是这国家一切公民所批准，所承认的。所以现行法是建基于一个共同契约之上的，在任何情况之下国家的一切成员都有义务遵守这一契约，也就是在一方面有用刑的义务，在另一方面又有受刑的义务。所以强制受刑是有理由的。从而刑司的直接目的，在个别场合是把法律当作契约来遵守的。可是法律的唯一目的是吓住[人]不要侵犯别人的权利，因为只是为了每人都有保障而无须承受非义，人们才结集为国家，才放弃施行非义而承担维护国家的重责。所以法律和法律的执行——刑罚处分——基本上是着意于未来而不是着意于过去的。这就是刑罚和报复的区别，后者的动机革是在已经发生了的事故上，也就是只在过去作为过去上。一切以痛苦加于人来伸雪非义，而对于将来又别无目的[的行为]，就都是寻仇报复，并且是除了看到人们自己在别人身上造成的痛苦而以之安慰自己所受过的痛苦外，不能再有其他目的。这种事情是恶毒的，残忍的，是伦理上不能为之辩护的。人以非义加于我，并非使我有权以非义加于人。以怨报怨而别无其他意图，既不是道德的，也没有任何理性上的根据可以把它说成是合理的；而提出报复权作为刑事处分权一个独立的最后的原则，那是意义空洞的。所以康德的学说把刑罚看作单纯的报复，只是为报复而报复，是完全没有根据而错误的见解。然而这种见解像幽灵似的，总还是在许多法学家的著作中以各种各样的华丽词句出没，而结果都是些空泛的废话，如说：罪将以受罚而得赎或是两抵而取消等等，等等。但[事实上]任何人都无权把自己捧出来充当一个纯粹道德的审判员和报复者；而以自己加于人的痛苦来找别人的过失算帐，也就是责成别人为过失而忏悔。这反而是一种最不自量的妄自尊大，正是为此，所以《圣经》上说：“上帝说报复是我的事，我会要报复的。”人很可以有权为社会的安全谋划，不过如果要行得通，就只能依法禁止所有那些以“犯罪”一语标志出来的行为，以便用反动机，亦即用有威慑性的刑罚，来预防；但这种威慑性如遇[犯罪行为]仍然要出现的场合，就只有付之执行才能有效。刑罚的目的，或更恰当些说刑法的目的，就是吓住不要犯罪，而这是一条如此普遍公认的，甚至自明的真理，以至[这真理]在英国皇家检察官于刑事案件中至今还使用的那古老控诉程式中就已说出来了，原来那控诉程式的结尾说：“如果这被证明了，那么你，即上述某某，应以法定的痛苦加以处分，以便在永久永久的将来制止别人再犯同样的罪”。——目的是为了将来，这才使刑罚不同于报复；并且只在刑罚是为了法律的有效才付之执行的时候，刑罚才有这一目的。刑罚也恰好只是由于这样才能对任何未来的情况宣称为不可幸免的。才为法律保留了吓住不犯罪的作用，而法律的目的就正在于此。——在这儿康德派又少不了要反驳说，根据这种见解，被罚的罪犯就“只是当作工具”使用罢了。但是所有康德派这样不厌倦地跟着说的这句活：“人们只可一贯把人当作目的，决不可当作手段对待”：人固然听起来像是一句有意义的话，因而对于所有那些想要一个公式，用以免除他们一切深思[之劳]的人们，这也是非常适合的一句话；然而在光线[充分的地方看清楚些]，这不过是极空泛，极不确定，完全是间接达到他原意的一句话。在任何一个场合应用这句话，都需要先加以特别的说明，特别的规定和限制；[单是]这样笼统地使用却是不够的，[能]说明的也不多，并且还是有问题的。既已依法判处死刑的杀人犯现在就必须只是当作工具来使用，而且[人们]完全有权这样做。这是因为公共治安，国家的主要目的，已被他破坏，如果法律还不生效的话，公共治安就会被取消了。而杀人犯，他的生命，他本人，现在就必须成为使法律生效的工具，以便由此而成为恢复公共治安的工具，并且为了履行国家的契约[人们]也有充分的权利把他作为这样的工具。[因为]这个契约，就这杀人犯过去是一公民说，也是他参与过的；而根据这个契约，他曾为了享有他生命的安全，他的自由和财产，也是为了一切人的安全，早就把他[自己]的生命、自由和财产作为抵押品了；现在[因为他破坏契约]就要没收他这份抵押品了。 这里提出来的，对于健全理性直接可以明白的刑罚理论，在主要的方面诚然不算什么新的思想，而只是几乎被一些新的谬论所排斥的思想；并且也[只]是在这一情况下才有必要[再]尽量明确地加以论述。在本质上，这一理论已包含在布芬陀夫在《论人民与国家的职权》第二卷第十三章中对这一点所说的那些话里面。还有霍布斯的见解也同这理论一致，可参看《利维坦》第十五、第二十八章。在我们的时代大家知道费尔巴哈曾大力主张这一理论。甚至在古代哲人的说法里就已有这个理论，柏拉图在《普洛塔戈拉斯》（蚩槐布禄根[或双桥]版第114页），其次在《戈琪亚斯》（第168页），最后在《法律沦》第十一卷（第165页）就曾明确地加以阐述了。辛乃加以寥寥数语说出了柏拉图的意见以及有关一切刑罚的理论：“一个高明的人施行惩罚，不是为了错误已经铸成，而是为了不使错误再发生。”（《论愤怒》Ⅰ，第16页。） 那么，我们在国家里就认识到一种工具，那以理性装备起来的利己主义就是企图通过这一工具来回避它自己的，它自己对自己发生的恶果，于是每人就都来促进全体的福利，因为他已看到其中也包括着他自己的福利。如果国家完全达到了它的目的，那么在一定范围内，国家由于其中统一起来的人力，也会知道逐步征服其余的自然界以为己用；最后由于消灭了各种祸害，也可能有近乎极乐世界的某种情况出现。但是事有不然，一方面国家还停留在离这目标很远的地方，一方面永远还有生活在其本质上始终具有的无数坏事，依然和前此一样把生活笼罩在痛苦中，[因为]在这些坏事中，即令[其余]一切的都已消除，最后还有那空虚无聊会要立即进占其他坏事刚退出去的每一阵地。再一方面就是个体之间的争端也不是国家完全消除得了的，因为这种争端，[一旦] 大规模的被禁止了，小规模的又起而代之来作弄人。最后还有埃瑞斯[这位女神]，幸而把她从[国家]内部赶走了，最后她就转移到外面去：作为个体问的争执而被国家制度驱逐了，她又从外面作为国际战争而卷土重来。于是，人们在[国内]个别场合用英明的措施使她不得享有的血祭，现在她就立即大规模地做一次总的来讨取，好像讨取别人该她的积欠似的。再假定这一切一切由于建立在数千年经验上面的聪明智慧，最后也都克眼了，消除了，那么，最后的结果将是这一整个行星上人口的真正过剩，这个结果的可怕的祸害现在还只有大胆的想像力才能加以臆测。