Chapter 55 Book IV The World as Will Revisited §55

The will as itself is free.This can be deduced from the fact that we regard the will as a thing in itself, as the inner content of all phenomena.Phenomenon, on the contrary, we hold that it always obeys the principle of sufficient reason among its four forms.And since we know that inevitability and consequences come from known causes are exactly the same thing, and they are two concepts that can be used interchangeably; then everything that belongs to phenomena, that is, to the subject and object that is known as an individual, is on the one hand. is the cause, and on the other hand is the effect; and in this attribute as effect must always be determined, so [the object] must be what it is, and cannot be [both what it is] and something else.Therefore the whole content of nature, and all its phenomena, are necessary; the necessity of every part, every phenomenon, every state of affairs is verifiable, because each must have its cause, as an effect. And depend on this reason.This admits of no exceptions, and follows from the infinite validity of the principle of sufficient reason.But on the other hand, this same world appears to us in all its phenomena to be the objectivity of the will, which itself is neither phenomenon nor representation or object, but a thing-in-itself, and therefore neither What obeys the principle of sufficient reason does not obey the form of all objects, so it is not an effect determined by a cause, so there is no necessity.This means that the will is free.The concept of freedom is therefore a negative and negative concept, because its content is only the negation of necessity, that is, the negation of the relation of effect to cause in the law of reason.Here, the point of unity of a great contradiction - the unity of freedom and necessity - is very clearly before us.This contradiction has been discussed frequently recently, but as far as I know, it has never been explicitly and properly discussed [this issue]. [Actually,] everything is absolutely necessary as appearance, as object; but the same thing in itself is will, which is always completely free.Phenomenon, the object, are inevitable, unchangeably determined in the causal chain, and the causal chain cannot be interrupted.But the whole actual existence of the object, the mode of existence, is the idea, and the idea revealed in the object is directly the manifestation of the will.In other words, the property of this object is directly the manifestation of the will.If [only] on the side of the freedom of the will, the object could not have actually existed at all, or could have been essentially something else entirely, then the whole chain of causality, since it is itself The manifestation of the will, of which the object is a link, would be another causal chain.But since the object already exists, having produced it, it enters into the series of causality, in which it is forever determined to be necessary; and therefore it can neither be anything else, that is to say, [temporary ] has changed again, and can no longer withdraw from this series, that is to say, it cannot disappear again.Man, like any other part of nature, is an object of the will, so everything that is said here is also valid for man.Every thing in nature has its power and physical properties, and these react in a certain way under certain actions to form the characteristics of every thing.In the same way man has his character, and from this character motives derive their actions with necessity.Man's empirical character is revealed in this way of behavior, but man's cognitive character, the will itself, is also revealed in the empirical character, and man is the determined phenomenon of this will itself.But man is the most perfect phenomenon of the will, which in order to exist, as was shown in the second book, must be illuminated by such a high degree of knowledge that even in the form of representations The following perfectly and appropriately reflects the essence of the world.This means that the realization of the idea, the mirror of the world, becomes possible, as we have already recognized this portrayal in the third book.So in a human being the will can achieve complete self-consciousness, a clear and complete awareness of its own essence and how this essence is reflected in the whole world.Really possessing such a high level of awareness, as we have seen in the previous article, is the [source] from which art emerges.But at the end of all our considerations, when the will applies this knowledge to itself, the possibility of annulment and self-denial of the will still arises in its most perfect appearance; What has been seen, but the freedom proper to things in themselves, now also appears in appearances.When this "freedom" cancels the essence of the phenomenon, but the phenomenon continues to exist in time, it creates a contradiction between the phenomenon and itself, and thus just expresses the phenomenon of holiness and self-denial. .But all this can only be fully understood at the end of this cave. —It is here only to mention in general terms how man differs from all other phenomena of the will by virtue of freedom, that is, by virtue of its independence from the law of sufficient reason.This freedom or independence originally belongs only to the will as a thing-in-itself, and is incompatible with appearances; but in man, freedom can also appear in appearances in a certain possible way, but at this time The "freedom" of human beings necessarily presents itself as a self-contradiction of phenomena.In this sense, not only the will in itself, but even man can indeed be called free, so that he can be distinguished from all other creatures.How to understand this point can only be understood with the help of everything in the following texts, and we can only ignore it completely at present.This is because we must first guard against the fallacy that individual, definite human behavior is not under the domination of necessity; and the so-called not under the domination of necessity means that the power of action is not as good as the power of cause. Or the conclusions deduced from the premises are so reliable.Freedom of the will as a thing-in-itself, as has been said, does not pass directly into phenomena, even if they have reached the highest degree of obviousness, that is, even if In the individual rational animal, in the individual man, the freedom of the will does not transfer to phenomena.Although this personality is a phenomenon of free will, he is by no means free, because he is already a phenomenon determined by the free will of the will.And when the personality man enters the form of object and the principle of sufficient reason, he certainly develops the unity of will into the multiplicity of behaviors, but because of the desire itself to be unitary beyond time, the multiplicity of behaviors still appears as a natural force. All regularity manifests itself.But since in the personal man and in all his actions it is ultimately the free desire which stands out in the same relation to the whole as the concept is to the definition, each individual act of the personal It must also be counted in the account of free will, and individual actions directly express consciousness in this way.Therefore, as already stated in the second part, everyone thinks a priori (here according to his original feeling) that his own individual behavior is also free, which means that in any given situation Any action is possible under any circumstances; and only a posteriori, from experience and reflective reflection on experience, does he realize that his actions must spring entirely from the unity of character and motive.It is on account of this that every savagest man, as he feels it, will vehemently defend complete freedom of individual conduct; but the great thinkers of all ages, and even some of the more profound religious teachings, have denied this free.But whoever understands that the whole essence of man is will, and that man himself is only the appearance of this will; also sees that this appearance has a form which is necessary for it by the principle of sufficient reason, and which can be known from the subject, and this form is here. It is also formed as the law of motivation; then, he will feel that doubting the inevitability of an action must occur under the existing character and present motives, which is tantamount to doubting that the sum of the three interior angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. ——Bornestley in his book "On the Necessity of Philosophy" has fully explained the necessity of individual actions; but this necessity coexists with the freedom of will in itself, that is, outside the phenomenon, It was not confirmed until Kant made the distinction between the knowing character and the empirical character*.This is Kant's great contribution, and I fully accept his distinction; for the knowing character, when present in a certain individual, is the will as a thing-in-itself; When it is presented from time to time in the form of behavior, and it is presented from space in the form of form, this is the phenomenon itself that appears here.In order to make the relationship between the two easier to understand, it is best to use the expression already used in the introduction, that is, to regard each person's understanding character as a timeless, and thus indivisible and unalterable will activity; And this volitional activity unfolds in all forms of time, space, and reason, and the dispersed phenomenon is the empirical character; for example, it appears with experience in a person's entire behavior and life. Empirical character. [For example] a whole tree is but the phenomenon of one and the same impulse repeated; this impulse manifests itself most simply in the fibres, and repeats itself in the fibrous assembly as leaf, stem, branch, trunk; It is easy to see this impulse.In the same way, all the actions of man are repeated and varied expressions of his knowing character; [we] can get his empirical character from the induction produced by the sum of these expressions. —Besides, I do not intend here to repeat Kant's excellent statement in disguise, but merely to assume that it is well known.

In the thesis for which I was awarded in 1840 I dealt thoroughly and at length with this important chapter on the freedom of the will, and in particular I exposed the origin of the illusion by which it is always supposed to be possible to discover something in self-consciousness. The absolute freedom of the will provided by this experience, that is, an absolute freedom from inner and outer motives, is regarded as a fact in self-consciousness.At that time, the award-winning essay was very wisely issued in response to this point.Having, therefore, pointed out to the reader the tenth section of this essay and of the prize-winning essay "Two Fundamental Questions of Ethics" which accompanies it, I shall place here the first edition of [the book] on the The incomplete treatment of the necessity of action is deleted, and a brief analysis will be substituted to explain the above-mentioned hallucination; So it was not [earlier] presented in the above winning paper.

It turns out that the will, as a true thing in itself, is actually a primitive and independent thing, so there must also be a primitive, dogmatic feeling in self-consciousness that accompanies the acts of will already determined here: Apart from this point, there also arises [simply] an empirical freedom of the will from the separate and subordinate position of the intellect to the will mentioned in Book II, Chapter 19, especially in point 3 ( Transcendent freedom of the will which is not proper to the will), that is, the illusion of freedom in individual acts.It turns out that [man's] intellect learns of the decisions of the will only empirically after the fact, and therefore has no data [judgmental] as to how the will will be decided at the moment when the choice is undecided.This is because the understanding of the character does not come down to intellectual cognition, and when the motive is present, there can only be one decision because of the knowing character [capacity], and therefore it is a necessary decision.Only the empirical character, because of its individual activities, is sequentially known to the intellect.Thus, from the point of view of the knowing consciousness (intelligence), it seems equally possible for the will to make two opposite decisions in a present situation.This statement is equivalent to when a vertical pole loses its balance and starts to swing, people say: "This pole can fall to the right or to the left." But this can only have a subjective meaning. Just saying "from what we know" [the pole can fall either to the left or to the right]; for objectively the direction of the fall is necessarily determined when [the pole] begins to tilt.Therefore, the determination of [man's] own will is not determined only by the spectator of this will, his own intelligence, and at the same time, it is not determined only relatively subjectively, that is, to the subject of knowledge.On the contrary, in the decision itself and objectively, how to choose at the moment of each choice before it is immediately determined and necessary; but this determination enters consciousness only because of the subsequent choice.We can even get an empirical illustration of this, for example: when we are faced with a difficult and important choice, we need a condition that has not yet arisen but is only expected [to make a decision], so that we The negative [wait-and-see] attitude has to be suspended because nothing can be done yet.We then consider how we would make up our minds if the circumstances which permitted us to act freely to make up our minds were presented.In some [possible] choices, it is generally rational and far-sighted considerations that will say more favorably for one resolution, while direct desires and dislikes will speak more favorably for another resolution.While we are still forced to adopt a passive [wait and see] attitude, it looks as if the rational side will prevail; but we can also foresee how attractive the other side will be when the opportunity for action arises .Until this opportunity arises, we try to bring the motives of both sides into the brightest focus with calm considerations for and against, so that each motive may influence the will with all its power, so that when the time comes, it will not happen. Misleading the will by ill-considered intellect.Not to cause the will to make decisions which it would not have made if all [motives] had worked in balance.But such explicit display of opposite motives is all that the intellect can do in making a choice.As for [one's own] real decision, the intellect can only passively wait for it to emerge with a nervous curiosity, just as one's intellect looks at the decision of another's will.Therefore, from the point of view of the intellect, from the standpoint of the intellect, the decisions of both [reason and desire] must be equally possible, and this is precisely the illusion of empirical freedom of the will.It is true that, empirically, a decision enters the realm of the intellect entirely as the final decision of a matter, but it still arises from the inner nature of the individual will, from the conflict of the knowing character in the will and present motives, and thus Also produced with complete necessity.At this time the intellect can do nothing more than to light up vividly the nature of some motives from all sides.The intellect cannot determine the will itself, because the will itself, as we have seen, is not at all within the reach of the intellect, nor even within the reach of the intellect.

If a man, under the same circumstances, could do this one time and that another time; then his will itself must have changed between the two times, It is in the middle, because only in time can there be "change".If this is the case, then either will is a phenomenon, or time is a property of things-in-itself.In this light, the debate about the freedom of individual actions, about absolute freedom from inner and outer motives, revolves around only the question of whether the will is in time.If the will is a thing in itself, beyond time and every form of the principle of reason, as both Kant's doctrine and my whole exposition affirm it to be so; To act in the same way always under the same circumstances, not only is each vice a sure guarantee of countless others which the individual is bound to commit but cannot restrain, but also, as Kant Knowing that the character and motives are all known, then the behavior and movement of people in the future can be calculated in advance like solar eclipses and lunar eclipses.As nature is consistent in its fidelity to its principles, so [man's] character is.Every individual action must occur according to character, just as every [natural] phenomenon must occur according to natural law.As has been pointed out in the second book, causes in natural phenomena and motives in actions are mere accidental causes.The will, the manifestation of which is the whole of man's being and life, cannot [again] deny itself in particular cases; and whatever man wants as a whole will always be what he wants in particular cases.

Advocating the freedom of will in experience and the absolute freedom not restricted by internal and external motives are closely related to people's putting the essence of human beings in the soul.This kind of soul seems to be a thing that knows at first, but it is actually a thing that thinks abstractly, and because of this, it is also a thing that desires.In this way, people regard will as secondary; in fact, knowledge is really secondary.Will is even regarded as an act of thought and is equated with judgment; this is the case in Descartes and Spinoza.According to this statement, anyone is what he is by what he knows and then becomes his.He came into the world as a moral zero, and after knowing things in the world, he made a decision to be this, to be that, to do this, to do that.He can also take hold of a new mode of behavior as a result of the new knowledge, that is to say, become another person again.Furthermore, according to this argument, a person will first think a thing is good, and because of this knowledge, he will want it; instead of first wanting it, he will say it is good.From all my basic points of view, all this is a reversal of the actual relationship.Will is the first, the most primitive; cognition is only added later, and is subordinate to the phenomenon of will as a tool of it.Every man is therefore what he is by his will, and his character is the most primitive, since desire is the basis of his essence.He realizes what he is in the process of experience, that is to say, he realizes his own character because of the added knowledge.Therefore, he knows himself according to the nature of his will; he does not think that he desires according to his knowledge as in the old saying.Traditionally, as long as he considers what he likes most, he is what he is: this is the old saying of freedom of the will.So the old saying [the purport] is actually saying: In the light of knowledge, man is his own creation.I, on the contrary, say: Man is his own creation before there is any knowledge; knowledge is only added later to illuminate this creation.Man, therefore, cannot decide to be one or the other, nor become [again] another;In the old saying, people want what they know; according to me, people know what they want.

The ancient Greeks called the character "Edos", and the expression of the character, that is, the habit, "Ed".Both words are derived from "edos," that is, from the word "habit."The reason why they choose this word is to use the persistence of habit to describe the persistence of character.Aristotle said: "The word Eddos (character) is named after Eddos (habit), because the name ethics comes from 'practice is'." ("Great Ethics "Volume 1, Part 6, p. 1186, "Oydmus Ethics", p. 1220, "Nicodmus Ethics", p. 1103, Berlin Edition) Stoppaas once quoted such a sentence Saying: "Zeno's disciples likened habit to the source of life from which individual actions arose." (Vol. Letters to the Romans" 9, 11-24) the fate that came said.The point of view derived from this creed is obviously that man does not change himself, but his life and behavior, that is, his empirical character, are only the development of the cognitive character, which is fixed and can be recognized in childhood. Root development that does not change.It's as if when a person is born, his behavior in his life has been firmly determined, and basically it remains the same until his death.We also agree on this point, but there are some consequences arising from the unity of this completely correct view and the original creed of Judaism. This is where the greatest difficulty occurs, and the never-unsolvable Gaudian No headless knot.Much of the debate in the church revolves around this knot.It is true that such consequences are not what I want to bear and stand up for.In order to solve this problem, even if the apostle Paul himself used the parable of the bowl maker, it does not necessarily mean that he was really successful, because even if he was successful, the final result is still nothing more than:

"Fear the gods, [You] humans! The gods hold the dominion In their eternal hands. They can- Do whatever you want! " However, such investigations are originally irrelevant to our subject matter, and what is more in line with our day is to explain the relationship between character and the cognition on which all its motivations depend. Since motivation determines the appearance of character, that is, determines behavior, it affects character through the medium of knowledge.But understanding is changeable, often swinging between right and wrong, but usually it will be gradually corrected in the course of life, but the degree of correction is different.Then, people's behavior can also have significant changes, but people have no right to infer that people's character has changed.Whatever a person desires fundamentally, that is, his innermost essential aspiration and the goal he pursues according to this aspiration, cannot be changed by us by giving him external influence and teaching; Otherwise we would be able to recreate a human being.Sinaica put it very pertinently: "Intention cannot be taught".The Stoics advocated that "virtue can be taught", but on this issue Sinaica would rather put the truth above his [respected] Stoics.Only motives from without can affect the will, but these motives can never alter the will itself, for motives have power over a man only on the condition that he is what he is.All that motives can do, therefore, is to divert a man's direction, and make him seek in a different way from what he has always sought.Therefore, teaching and corrected knowledge, that is, external influences, can certainly tell him that he is playing tricks on the means, so that he can go on a completely different path from the previous one, and even in another completely different way from the previous one. The object comes up to pursue what he has pursued in his inner nature, but can never really cause him to want something different from what he has wanted before.What was wanted before remains the same, because it is only [this "to",] the desire itself, otherwise it would have to be cancelled.At the same time, the former, that is, the correctability of "knowledge" and thus of action, enables him to be in the real world, in the imaginary world, and consider the means separately.For example, if the goal is Mohammad's kingdom of heaven, then, to achieve this goal in the real world, use tact, violence and deception as means; to achieve this goal in the fantasy world, use self-denial, justice, charity, and worship of the Holy City Mecca as a means.But it doesn't mean that there is any change in his ambition itself, let alone any change in himself.Although his behavior has been very different from time to time, what he wants remains exactly the same. "Intention cannot be taught."

For a motive to work, it needs not only to be present but to be known: for, according to a good expression of the scholastics, mentioned once before, "motives are not motivated by their existence, but by their existence." It acts on the basis of its known existence.” For example, to make the interrelationship of self-interest and sympathy in someone come to light, it is not enough that the person has some wealth and sees the poverty of others; He must also know what he can do for himself and others with his wealth; not only as long as the pain of others appears before his eyes, he must also know what pain is, and of course he must know what enjoyment is.When this person encounters this kind of opportunity for the first time, he may not be able to know it as thoroughly as when he encountered it the second time; Those situations are actually different, that is to say, the part of the situation that depends on his understanding of this opportunity is already different. —[On the one hand] ignorance of real and real situations cancels the effect of these situations, on the other hand, situations that are all fantasies can work as well as real situations; and not only on a single illusion, Rather, it works permanently as a whole.For example, if a person has been truly convinced that any good deed will be rewarded a hundredfold in the next life, the efficacy and effect of his faith will be exactly the same as a long-dated check of good credit, and he He can give alms out of this selfishness, just as he can give to others out of this selfishness when he changes his views.He hasn't changed. "Willing cannot be taught." When the will remains unchanged, it is through this great influence of knowledge on behavior that [man's] character gradually unfolds and reveals its different outlines.Thus, with age comes a variety of character; with violent youth may come a calm, temperate manhood.Evils of character, especially, will become more pronounced with age; but sometimes the passions indulged in youth are tamed later on of their own accord;It is also because of this that we are all innocent in the "beginning of man", which is nothing more than saying that neither we nor others can see the "evil" in our nature [at that time] That's all.The "evil" in nature emerges only after there is a motive, and the motive is recognized with the [growth] of the years.When we [young Gao] finally know ourselves, it is a completely different self, different from the one we think a priori, so we are often surprised by this self.

Remorse never arises from a change of will (which is impossible), but from a change of perception.Whatever I once desired, in its essence and original will, must still be what I desire, for I myself am the will, and the will is beyond time and change.Therefore, I can never regret what I have wished, but I can well regret what I have done; for I may be induced by wrong ideas to do something against my will, and [afterwards] Seeing this through with a more correct understanding is remorse.This is not only for the wisdom in life, for the choice of means, for the judgment of whether the purpose is in line with my original intention, but also for the true ethical meaning.For example, I may engage in some behaviors that are too selfish and not in line with my personality. This is because I mistakenly exaggerate the difficulties I am in or the cunning, hypocrisy, and viciousness of others, or I am too hasty to dry up.And to haste is to act without consideration, determined not by a motive clearly recognized in the universal, but by an intuitive motive, by the immediate impression and the emotion aroused by it.

determined by feeling.These emotions were so intense that I failed to make real use of my reason; so here too the reply of thought merely corrected the perception from which the remorse arose, which each time expressed itself by making up for the past as far as possible.But it must also be pointed out that some people deliberately arrange some hasty situations in order to deceive themselves, when in fact they are secretly deliberate actions.This is because we are not deceiving or flattering anyone else by using such subtleties, but only ourselves. —Also the reverse of the above example can happen: too much confidence in others, insufficient knowledge of the relative value of means of subsistence, or some abstract dogma in which I have lost faith, can lead me to do something less Being selfish and not in line with my personality prepared another kind of regret for me.Remorse therefore always corrects the perception of the relation between the action and the original intention. —As far as the idea of ​​will manifesting itself in space, that is, only in form, the matter already dominated by other ideas inevitably resists this will—here the other ideas are the various The forces of nature - often do not allow the form here to struggle for clarity to come out completely pure, vivid or beautiful.In the same way, if the will manifests itself only in time, that is, only in deeds, it encounters a similar obstacle in cognition.Cognition often does not supply the will with correct data, so that the occurrence of behavior cannot be completely and accurately consistent with the will.This leads to remorse.Remorse therefore always arises from a corrected perception, not from a change of the will; changing the will is also impossible.As for the uneasiness of conscience for what has been done, it is not remorse at all, but the pain of knowing oneself, that is, knowing oneself as will.Uneasiness of conscience is based precisely on the certainty that one always has the original will.If the will is changed, the uneasiness of conscience is only repentance, and the uneasiness of conscience is automatically canceled.For since the past expresses certain aspects of a will, it can no longer excite conscience if the will that does it is not the will of the penitent [now].We shall also elaborate on [the problem of uneasiness of conscience] later on.

Knowledge, as the medium of motivation, does not affect the will itself, but affects the appearance of the will as an act.This influence establishes the distinction between human and animal behavior due to the different ways of knowing.Animals only have intuitive representations, while humans have abstract representations—concepts—because of their rationality.Although human beings are motivated by the same inevitability as animals, they are superior to animals in that they have complete decision-making power.This power of determination is also often recognized as freedom of the will in individual actions, and it is nothing else than the possibility of a conflict, thoroughly contested, between several motives, the stronger of which takes the form of necessity. Determine the will.To do this, however, motivation must take the form of abstract thought, for only by means of this form is it possible to have a truly deliberate balance, that is to say, to weigh opposing reasons and act upon them.The animal can only choose between motives that appear intuitively before it, and so this choice is also limited to the narrow range of its current intuitive perception.The necessity, therefore, of motives determining will—which is the same as that of causes determining effects—can be directly expressed intuitively only in animals, because here too the spectators directly witness these motives and their effects.Not so with man, where motives are almost always abstract appearances, invisible to the beholder, and even in the actor himself, the inevitability of the action of motives is hidden behind conflicts between motives.This is because only in abstraction are several representations possible to be juxtaposed in consciousness as a chain of judgments and inferences, and to influence each other independently of all time constraints, until the strongest of them overwhelms the others and determines the will. .This is complete discretion or deliberate weighing.This is what makes man superior to animals.Because of this weighing ability, people endow people with freedom of will, mistakenly thinking that human desires are the result of intelligence activation, and do not need some kind of impulse as the basis of intelligence; but in fact, motivation is only based on certain impulses of people. In fact, it can only be activated under the premise of a certain impulse of the person.In human beings, this definite impulse is individual, that is, [each person] has a character.One can see in Two Fundamental Questions of Ethics (first edition from p.禽意向的不同，因此我在这里指出这一段作为参考。此外，人的这种熟虑权衡能力又是属于使人的生存比动物的生存更为痛苦的那些东西之内的，因为我们最大的痛苦根本不是作为直观表象或直接感受而存在于当前的东西，却是作为抽象的概念，恼人的思虑而存在于理性之中的东西；至于逍遥于这些之外的则是只在当前“现在”中生活的，从而也是在可羡的无忧无虑中生活的动物。 上面已论述过人的权衡能力有赖于抽象中的思维能力，也就是有赖于判断和推理。既是使笛卡儿又是使斯宾诺莎走入迷途的好象就是这[“有赖于”的]依赖性，他们把意志的决断和肯定否定的能力（判断力）等同起来。笛卡儿由此引伸而认为不受制于动机的自由意志也要为一切理论上的谬误负责。斯宾诺莎又和他相反，认为意志必然被决定于动机，有如判断的必然被决定于根据。后面这一说法本来有它的正确性，却又是作为前提错误，结论正确[的推理]而出现的。 前已指出人禽各自为动机所推动的方式不同，这种差别对于人禽双方的本质所发生的影响都很深远；而且双方的生存所以彻底而又显著的不同也大半是这一差别所促成的。当动物总是只从直观表象而具有动机时，人却努力要完全摆脱这种动机的作用而只以抽象表象决定自己。人由此得利用他理性上的特权以取得最大可能的优势；他摆脱了现在，他不是趋避眼前随即消逝的苦乐，而是考虑苦乐双方的后果。除开一些根本无多大意义的行动外，我们在绝大多数场合都是被抽象的，从思想中产生的动机所决定而不是被眼前印象所决定的。因此我们觉得只在眼前一时忍受任何个别的匮乏颇为轻易，而任何有意的刻苦却困难得可怕，因为前者只涉及转瞬即逝的现在，而后者却和此后的将来攸关，因而还包含着无数次的匮乏在内；有意刻苦就等于无数次的忍受匮乏。因此，我们苦乐的原因所在大半不是实际的“现在”而是抽象的思虑。这思虑才是常使我们难于忍受的东西，才是给我们制造烦恼的东西。动物界的一切痛苦和这种痛苦相比是微不足道的。我们也常因这种痛苦而不感到自己生理上的创痛。在我们有激烈的精神痛苦时，我们甚至于还制造一些肉体的痛苦；其所以如此，只是在于以此使我们的注意力从精神痛苦转移到肉体的痛苦上来。因此，人们在精神极度痛苦时要扯下自己的头发，要捶胸抓脸，要在地上打滚，而这一切无非都只是一种手段，用以驱散一个觉得难以忍受的思想。正因为精神痛苦比肉体上的痛苦要大得多而能使后者不被感觉，所以绝望的人或是被病中苦恼所折磨的人，即令他从前在舒适状态中一想到自杀这一念头就要颤栗退缩，现在却很容易濒于自杀。同一个道理，忧虑和伤感，也就是思想上的一些玩意儿，比肉体上的创痛更容易伤身，损害身体也更为严重。据此，厄披克德特说得对：“使人烦恼的不是事物本身，而是人们对于这事物的信念或意见。”辛乃加也说得好：“虚声恫吓我们的事物多于实际胁迫着我们的事物，并且我们在见解上感到痛苦的次数也多于在实际上感到痛苦的次数。”（《信札》第五篇）倭依仑斯壁格尔以自己上山时笑，下山时哭的做法也很中肯地讽刺了人的天性。还有孩子们在把自己弄痛了的时候，每每不是为着痛而哭，却是在人们对他表示怜爱时，为了由于怜爱唤起的痛这个思想而哭。在人的行为、生活和动物的行为、生活之间有着一些那么巨大的差别，那都是由于各自的认识方式不同而来的。此外，明确而坚定的个性之出现也是以在几个动机中唯有借抽象概念才可能作出的选择为先决条件的，这又是人类和几乎只有种性的动物之间的主要区别。原来只有在事先作出选择之后，在不同个体中各别作出的不同决断才是这些个体的个性之标志，这种个性也是人各不同的。可是动物的行为却只取决于眼前印象的有无，假定这印象对于这动物的族类本来就是一个动机的话。因此，就人来说，无论是对自己或对别人，最后唯有决断而不是单纯的愿望才是他的可靠标志。不过无论是就自己或就别人说，决断也只有通过行动才会固定下来。愿望则只是当前印象的必然后果，不管它是外来刺激的印象或内在情愫的飘忽印象，所以愿望是直接必然而未经考虑的，是和动物的动作一样的。因此，愿望也和动物的动作一样，只表现种性而不表现个性，即是说只提示凡是人可能做出什么，而不是说感到这愿望的这个人可能做出什么。实际行动既是人的行为，就总需要一定的考虑；又因为人一般都掌握着自己的理性而有冷静的头脑，即是说人是按思考过的抽象动机才作出决断的；所以唯有[实际行动] 是他行为上可悟知的最高规范的表现，是他最内在的欲求的结果，对于他的验知性格所处的地位等于一个字母对于一个词的关系；而他的验知性格又只是他的悟知性格在时间上的表现。因此，凡在神志健全的场合，使良心感到负担的是[人的]所作所为，而不是愿望和想念，只有我们的所作所为才把一面反映我们意志的镜子高举在我们面前。前面提到过全未经考虑的，真是在盲目激动中干出来的行动，在某种意义上是单纯愿望和决断之间的一种中介物，所以这样的行动可以由于真正的悔悟，不过也得是在行动中表现出来的悔悟，而从我们意志的写照中抹掉，好象抹掉画错了的一根线条似的；而这张写照就是我们一生的全部过程。——附带地作为一个奇特的比喻，在这里指出愿望和实际行动的关系同电的分布和电的传导的关系有着完全偶然的，但精确相当的类似性，可说是适得其所罢。 对于意志自由和与此相关的问题作了这一整套的考察之后，我们随之而发现：自在的意志本身在现象之外固然是自由的，甚至可以说是万能的，但是这意志在它个别的，为认识所照明的那些现象中，亦即在人和动物之中，却是由动机决定的；而对于这些动机，每一各别的性格总是以同样的方式作有规律而必然的反应。至于人，我们看到他借后加的抽象认识或理性认识而以抉择力超出动物之上，可是这种抉择力只是把人变成了动机相互冲突的战场，却并没有使他摆脱动机的支配。因此，这抉择力固然是个性得以完全表出的条件，却并不是个别欲求的什么自由，即是说不能作为对于因果律的独立性来看，因果律的必然性是普及于人和任何其他一个现象的。于是理性或认识借概念而在人的欲求和动物的欲求之间造成的区别，也就止于上述这一点而已，不再超过一步。可是当人抛弃了在根据律之下对个别事物之为个别事物的全部认识，而借理念的被认识以看透个体化原理时，还可能出现完全另一种在动物界不可能有的人类意志现象。这时作为自在之物的意志专有的自由就有真正出现的可能了，由于意志自由的这一出现，现象就进入自我否定这一词所标志着的某种自相矛盾了，最后现象的本质自身也自行取消了，——意志本身的自由也在现象中有这种特有的、唯一直接的表现，这是在这里还不可能说清楚的，而是要到最后才是我们考察的对象。 不过我们由于当前的剖析既已明确了验知性格的不变性，它只是超乎时间的悟知性格的开展；又已明确了行为是从悟知性格和动机的融合中产生的这一必然性之后，我们首先就得排除一种为了有利于邪恶嗜欲而很容易从这里引伸出来的推论。因为我们既要把性格看作超乎时间的，随而也是不可分的，不变的意志活动在时间上的开展或悟知性格在时间上的开展，而一切本质的东西，亦即我们生活行事的伦理含义又不可移易地被决定于悟知性格，且随之而必然要表现于悟知性格的现象中，表现于验知性格中；同时又只有这现象的、非本质的东西，亦即我们生活过程的外在结构，才是依赖动机得以表出的那一些形态的；那么，人们就可推论说：致力于性格的改善或为了抗拒那些邪恶嗜欲的力量而努力，就都要是徒劳的了，还不如屈从这种无法改变[的情况]更为适宜，对于任何嗜欲，即令是邪恶的，也要立即欣然相从了。 ——可是这种说法和不可摆脱的命运之说有着完全相同的破绽，人们把由此作出的推论叫作“懒汉逻辑”，近些时又称为“土耳其人的信仰”。对于这一点的正确驳斥，据说是克利西波斯所提出的，也是西塞罗在《论命运》一书第十二章、十三章中曾加以阐述过的。 虽然一切都可以看作是命运注定的，不容更改的，这也不过是由于原因的锁链[而如此]。因此没有一个场合可以肯定后果是没有它的原因而出现的。所以并非干脆就是这事态[本身]，而是393这事态作为先行原因的后果，才是被决定的。所以命运所决定的不单是这后果而是还有那些中介物，即这后果注定是作为它们的后果而出现的中介物。那么，如果这些中介物不出现，则这后果肯定也不会出现。两者总是按命运的注定而出现，不过我们总要到事后才体会到这种注定罢了。 如同事态总是随命运[的安排]，也即是按无穷的原因链锁而出现一样，我们的作为也将总是按我们的悟知性格而发生的。但是和我们不能预知事态的出现一样，我们对于自己作为的发生也没有先验的理解；我们只是后验地，从经验上既认识别人又认识我们自己。随悟知性格而俱来的[理之当然]，既然只有在对邪恶的嗜欲作过漫长的斗争之后我们才能作出一个善良的决断，那么，[在决断之前]这一斗争必须先行而静待其结局。对于性格的不变性，对于我们一切作为所从流出的源泉的单一性所作的反省思考，不可误导我们为了偏袒这一面或那一面就抢先在性格的决断之前[先有成见]；在随斗争而继起的决断中我们自会看到我们是哪一种人，把我们的作为当作镜子照一照自己。从这里正可说明我们用以回顾已往生活历程的满意或内疚[情绪]。两者都不是从那些过去的作为还有什么实际的存在而来的；那些作为是过去了，是往事了，现在已不存在了。那些作为对于我们所以还有着巨大的重要性是从它们的意义上来的，是从那些作为是性格的写真，是反映意志的镜子，我们看这面镜子就认识我们最内在的自我，认识意志的内核[这些事实]上来的。因为这不是我们事先，而是事后才能经历到的，所以我们就得乘时挣扎斗争，以便使我们在看到我们用自己的作为织成的这幅写照告成时，会有最大可能的安慰而不是使我们惶恐悚惧。不过这种心安理得和神明内疚的意义，如已说过，还要在本文后面好远的地方才能探讨。在这里还有下列一个独立自成章片的考察。 在悟知性格和验知性格之外，还有不同于这两种的第三种性格要谈一谈，这就是人们在生活中由于社会风习而具有的获得性格。人们在赞许一个人时说他有品格，或是在责备一个人时说他没有品格，那就是指获得性格而言。——虽然人们可能认为验知性格作为悟知性格的现象是不变的，并且和每一自然现象一样，在其自身都是前后一贯的，人也正因此总是必然要现为和自己等同的，前后一贯的，那么就没有必要由经验和反省思考而人为地来为自己获得一种性格了。可是事实却不如此，尽管人很可以经常是他自己，但他并不是时时刻刻都了解自己的，而是直到他在一定程度上获得了真正的自我认识为止，每每是把自己认错了的。验知性格作为单纯的自然冲动，其自身是非理性的。并且验知性格的外露还要受到理性的干扰，人越是有冷静的考虑和思维能力，干扰越是巨大。这是因为考虑和思维总是责以人作为种性根本应具有的是什么，责以人在欲求和事功中根本可能的是什么。这样一来，就使这人要借自己的个性而理解他从一切事物中唯一欲求的是什么，唯一能做的是什么，增加了困难。他发现自己对人类的一切企向和能力都有些禀赋，但这些禀赋在他个性中的不同程度却是他没有经验就不能明白的。并且即令他现在只抓那些单是符合他性格的一些企向，他，特别是在个别关头和个别情绪中还是会感到一种激动恰是指向相反的，因而是不能调和的企向；如果他要从事原来那些企向而不受干扰，就必然要压制后来感到的这些企向。这是因为我们在地面上所有物理性的道路总是一条线而不是一个面，在生活上也是如此；当我们要抓住而占有一条道路时，就必然要放弃左边右边的其他无数条道路而听之任之。如果我们不能对此下决心而是象孩子们在新年赶集似的，走到哪儿看见有趣的东西就想伸手，那就会等于是把一条线型的路变成一个平面那样的错误企图。那是走“之”字路，就如我们夜间随着磷火的闪光忽而这边，忽而那边，结果是哪儿也到不了。——或者另外用一个比喻：按霍布斯的法学所说，人对任何一物原来都有一份权利，但又是对任何一物都没有独占的权利；可是一个人仍可由于他放弃一切其他事物而获致一些个别的事物。别的人则又相反，他从这个人既已选定了什么这一方面出发也是同一个[取一舍万的]作法。在实际生活中就正是这样。我们在生活中也只有放弃一切不相干的要求，对一切别的东西弃权才能真正严肃地、幸运地追求任何一个一定的企图，不管所追求的是享受，是荣誉，是财富，是科学，是艺术或是美德。因此仅有欲求和才能本身还是不够的，一个人还必须知道他要的是什么，必须知道他能做的是什么。只有这样，他才显出性格，他才能干出一些正经事儿。在他未达到这个境界之前，尽管他的验知性格有着自然的一贯性，他还是没有性格。并且他虽整个地必然是忠于自己，必然要经历他的人生道路一直到底，他却是被自己的恶魔所牵制，他不会走一条笔直的路，他会要走一条左弯右拐的曲线，会要摇摆不定，走失大路，迂回转折，会要替自己准备懊悔和痛苦。这一切都是因为他事无巨细，都只看到自己眼前有这么许多人所能做，所能达成的东西，而不知道其中唯有什么是和他相称的，是他所能完成的，甚至不知道什么是他所能享受的。因此他会为了某种地位和境遇而羡慕一些人，其实这些都只是和那些人相称而不是和他的性格相称的，他果真易地而处，还会要感到不幸，甚至要忍耐下来也不可能。和鱼只有在水中，鸟只有在天空，鼹鼠只有在地下才感到舒适一样，人也只能在和他相适应的气氛里感到舒适；例如官廷里的那种空气就不是每一个人都能呼吸的。由于对这一切缺乏足够的理解，有些人就会去做各种会要失败的尝试；在个别场合对自己的性格施加压力，而整个的又仍必然要服从自己的性格。并且如果他是这样违背着自己的天性，即令他辛勤地达成了什么也不会使他有所享受，即令他学会了什么也依然是死的，[不能活用]。甚至在伦理方面的行为，如果不是由于一个人纯洁，直接的冲动，而是由于一个概念，一个教条而产生的，就他的性格说又是过于高尚的，那么这一行为就会由于后来自私的懊悔而在这个人自己的眼里也要丧失一切的功劳。“意欲是教不会的。” 我们总要通过经验才体会到别人的性格没有可塑性；[可是]直到具有这体会之前，我们还幼稚地相信可以用合理的表象，用请求和恳祷，用榜样和高贵的品质随意使一个人背弃自己所属的类型，改变他的行为方式，脱离他的思想路线，甚至“增益其所不能”。同样，我们还相信对于自己也可以这样作。我们必须从经验学会认识我们欲求的是什么和我们能做的是什么。在没有认识到之前，这些是我们所不知道的，我们也就说不上有性格而常常要由外界的硬钉子把我们碰回到我们自己[原来]的轨道上来。——如果我们最后终于学会了认识这些，那么我们也就已经具有世人所谓品格的获得性格了。因此，具有获得性格就不是别的而是最大限度完整地认识到自己的个性。这是对于自己验知性格的不变属性，又是对于自己精神肉体各种力量的限度和方向，也就是对于自己个性全部优点和弱点的抽象认识，所以也是对于这些东西的明确认识。这就使我们现在能够通过冷静的思考而有方法地扮演自己一经承担而不再变更的，前此只是漫无规则地[揣摩]使之同化于自己的那一角色；又使我们能够在固定概念的引导之下填补自己在演出任务中由于任性或软弱所造成的空隙。这样我们就把那由于我们个人的天性本来便是必然的行为方式提升为明白意识到的，常在我们心目中的最高规范了。我们是这样冷静熟虑地按之而完成那些行为方式，就如我们是[重新]学会了这样作的似的；同时我们不会由于情绪上一时的影响或当前印象而搞错，不会由于中途遇到细微事故的苦恼而被阻，不会迟疑，不会动摇，不会没有一贯性。我们现在就再不会和新来的生手一样要等待，要尝试，要向周围摸索以便看到我们究竟欲求的是什么，能做的是什么；我们已是一劳永逸地知道了这些，我们在每次要作选择的时候，只要把一般命题应用到个别场合上，立刻就得出了结论。我们现在是在普遍性上认识了我们的意志，我们不再让自己被一时的情绪或外来的挑动所误，而在个别场合作出在全局中和意志相反的决断。我们也同样认识了自己各种力量和猾点的性质、限度，从而我们就可以为自己减少很多的痛苦。这是因为除了使用和感到自己的力量之外，根本没有什么真正的享受，而最大的痛苦就是人们在需要那些力量时却发现自己缺乏那些力量。如果我们已探得了我们的优点和弱点的所在，我们就会培养，使用，从各方面来利用自己有突出特长的自然禀赋，自己只向这些禀赋有用的地方，效力所及的地方钻，但断然要以自我克制[的功夫]来避免我们气质上禀赋很少的那些企向，要防止自己去尝试本不会成功的事。只有到了这个地步，一个人才能经常在冷静的熟虑中完全和自己一致而从来不被他的自我所遗弃，因为他已经知道能对自己指望些什么了。这样，他就会常常享有感到自己长处的愉快而不常经历到要想及自己短处的痛苦。后者是羞辱，也许要造成最大的精神痛苦；因此人们看到自己的不幸比看到自己的不行要好受得多。——如果我们既已备悉自己的优点和弱点，我们就不会想炫示自己所没有的力量，不会买空卖空，[冒充能手]。因为这样的花招最后还是达不到目的的。这是因为整个的人既然只是他意志显出的现象，那就再没有比自己从反省的思维出发而要成为不是自己的别的什么更为颠倒的了，因为这是意志和它自己的直接矛盾。摹仿别人的属性和特点比穿别人的衣服还要可耻得多，因为这就是自己宣告自己毫无价值。就这方面说，认识自己的存心，认识自己每一种才具及其固定不变的限度乃是获得最大可能的自慰一条最可靠的途径。因为无论是就内在情况或外在情况说，除了完全确知哪是无可改变的必然性之外，我们再也没有更有效的安慰了。我们已遭遇了的坏事还不如想到也许有某些情况可以避免这一坏事更使我们痛苦，因此，除了从必然性的观点来看往事，我们就没有更有效的安慰了。从这种观点出发，一切偶然机缘都现为支配[一切]命运的一些工具，而我们就随而把这已发生的坏事看作是由于内外情况的冲突无可避免地引将来的，而这就是宿命论。[譬如]我们叫苦叫屈的一直闹着，其实也只是以为尚存希望可以以此影响别人或是激起自己空前紧张的努力。可是孩子们和成年人在他们一经看清楚事情根本无可挽回时，都很知道适可而止。[这叫做：] “胸怀满腔怨愤， 却要勉强按纳。 " 我们好像捉将来关在笼里的大象一样，[开始]总要猛烈的叫嚣跳蹦腾挪几天，直到它看到这是徒劳无益的，然后又突然处之泰然地拿脖子来就象轭，从此永远驯服了。我们好像国王大卫一样，当他的儿子一天还活着时，他就不停地以恳祷去烦扰耶和华，自己也装出无可奈何的样子；可是他儿子刚一死去，他就再也不想到要这样做了。因此，所以有无数人若无其事地忍受着无数慢性的不幸，如残疾、贫困、出身低微、丑陋、居住条件不堪等；他们对于这些甚至无所感觉，好像伤口已结了疤似的。这只是因为这些人已明知这些情况由于内在和外在的必然性已没有改变的余地了，而较幸运的人们就不理解这些人怎么能够忍受这些不幸。无论是外在的或内在的必然性，除了对于这些必然性的明确认识之外，再没有什么可以如此融洽地消除人们对它们的怨愤了。如果我们一劳永逸地既认识了我们的优良属性和长处，又认识了我们的缺点和短处，而以此为绳准来确定我们的目的。对于力所不能及的则处之以知足不强求的态度；那么，在我们个性可能的范围内，我们便由此而最稳妥地摆脱了一切苦难中最尖锐的痛苦——自己对自己的不满。这种痛苦是不认识自己个性，是错误的臆测，和由此产生的不自量力的当然后果。把奥维德的诗句转用于鼓励自知之明这艰苦的一章倒是非常适合的： “这是精神最好的帮手，一劳永逸 它拉断了缠住人心、折磨人的捆索。 " 关于获得性格就谈到这里为止。这种性格对于正式的伦理学虽不如在世俗生活上那么重要，但是这种性格的阐述仍可和悟知性格、验知性格的论述鼎立而作为第三种与之并列。对于前面两种性格我们曾不得不从事较为详尽的考察，这是为了我们便于弄明白意志在它的一切现象中是如何服从必然性的，而它本身如何同时又是自由的，甚至是可以称为全能的。