Chapter 24 Part II The World as a Preliminary Treatise on the Will §24

Learning from the great Kant, we already know that time, space, causality, in their entire regularity and in all their formal possibilities, are present in our consciousness, completely independent of objects. .Objects appear in it, constituting its content.In other words, starting from the subject as from the object, one can discover time, space, and causality; therefore one has an equal right to call them the mode of intuition of the subject, or the nature of the object, as long as it is the object (i.e. Kant's so-called phenomenon), that is, the word of appearance.One can also regard these forms as an inseparable boundary between object and subject, so that all objects must appear in these forms, but the subject also fully possesses these forms and sees them fully without the object that appears.But if the objects that are to appear in these forms are to have a meaning other than empty phantasms, then these objects must refer to something, must be the expression of something that is no longer the same as the object itself. It is an object, a representation, and only relative, that is, something that is only for the subject [etc.]; It is the form of what it confronts; that is to say, this thing is no longer an appearance, but a thing in itself.So one can at least ask: what are those representations, those objects, apart from the fact that they are representations, objects of the subject?If it could be anything else, then what is it in this sense?What is its side that is completely different from the appearance?What is the thing-in-itself?That is—the will, which is our answer [to these questions], but I will not mention it for the time being.

Regardless of what the thing-in-itself is, Kant's correct assertion says: time, space, and causality Universal expression) is not a determination of the thing-in-itself, but can only be added to it after it has become a representation; that is to say, [these things] belong only to appearances and not to the thing-in-itself.For since the subject is fully aware of time, space, and causality from itself, without reference to any object, and can make them valid; these things must be added to the representation as a representation, and not to the thing that is still there. on things to become representations.These things must be forms in which representations become representations, and not properties of [themselves] which take these forms.These things necessarily accompany the mere opposition (not in concept but in fact) of subject and object, and thus can only be more detailed determinations of the fundamental form of cognition, the fundamental form of which The universal determination is the very opposition of subject and object.So whatever is in the phenomenon, in the object—which in turn is determined by time, space, and causality, because these things can be represented only by means of time, space, and causality—is also formed by juxtaposition and succession. Multiplicity determined, change and continuity determined by the law of causality, matter which can be represented only on the presupposition of causality, and finally everything which can be represented by means of matter,—all this in What is essentially the whole does not belong to what appears, what enters the form of representation, but only attaches itself to this form.Conversely, that which is in phenomena not determined by time, space, and causality, which cannot be reduced to these, which cannot be explained by them, is precisely that which appears, that which is itself. What is directly self-disclosed in it.According to this, what cognition has for cognition, that is, the form of cognition, acquires the most complete possibility of cognition, the highest clarity, clarity and thoroughness of investigation, but this is not what is not itself. Representations are not objects, but things that cannot be known until they [first] enter these forms, that is, things that can only be known as representations and objects can have.Therefore there is only that which is entirely dependent on being known, which is fundamentally dependent on that which is representation, and which as this (not upon what is known and which later becomes representation) is all that is known. There is no part of it, so it can be found both from the subject and from the object. Only this can provide a sufficient, truly and completely without residue. clear understanding.But this something exists in nothing but in the forms of all appearances which we are conscious a priori; (Our only concern here is intuition.) The relevant forms are time, space and causality.Fully grounded in these modalities [time, space, causality] is the whole of pure mathematics and pure a priori natural science.Therefore, it is only in these sciences that [man's] cognition does not discover the dark [mystery], does not touch the unfounded (unfounded, that is, the will), and cannot touch the unextendable.In this sense, as has been said, Kant, besides logic, first, and even alone, calls this knowledge science.But on the other hand, these knowledges tell us nothing but empty relations, the relation of one representation to another; they tell us only the form, without any content.Every content which these knowledges acquire, every appearance which fills those forms, already contains something which in its entirety is not fully knowable, which cannot be fundamentally explained by anything else, that is, by nothing else. ground; and at this point cognition immediately loses its self-evident ground, and sacrifices complete clarity.This elusive thing is nonetheless the thing-in-itself, that which is essentially not representation, not the object of knowledge; it is only knowable in those forms.The form is originally irrelevant to it, and it can never be completely [fused] with the form, can never be reduced to the naked form, and since the form is the principle of sufficient reason, it cannot be thoroughly investigated. .Thus, even if all mathematics give us knowledge of [what is called] quantity, place, number in phenomena, in a word, a detailed knowledge of the relations of time and space, even if all etiology gives us the complete knowledge of Those are the conditions of lawfulness, that is, those conditions to which phenomena, with all their determinations, appear in time and space, but in spite of them there is nothing except [to mention] why every definite phenomenon happens to necessarily occur. There is nothing [other] taught [us] in the here and now, or out of the here and now; so we can never penetrate into the inner nature of things by virtue of these, so something always remains, That which must not be presumed to be explained, but which must be assumed, viz., the forces of nature, the fixed modes of action of things, the properties of things, the characteristics of each phenomenon, etc., [also] that which does not depend on the form of phenomena, does not That which depends on the laws of sufficient reason without ground, which has nothing to do with the form but which enters the form and appears according to these laws.These laws precisely define this occurrence, not the thing that appears, only the "how" of the phenomenon, not the "what" of the phenomenon, and only care about the form, not the content.Mechanics, physics, chemistry tell [us] the rules and laws by which forces act, the impenetrable forces, gravity, forces of solids, forces of liquids, cohesion, elasticity, heat, light, chemical affinity , magnetism, electricity, etc., [and the so-called law is] the law, the rule that these forces obey every time they appear in time and space; but these forces themselves, however much they pretend, are still performance] stealth properties.For this is precisely the thing-in-itself, which, when it appears, when it unfolds as appearance, is itself quite different from appearance, and though in its appearance is entirely subject to the principle of sufficient reason as form of representation, it itself can never be Reduction to these forms, and thus no final explanation can be obtained in terms of etiology, and there is no possibility of thorough investigation.After it has entered that form, that is, when it is a phenomenon, it is perfectly intelligible, but in its inner nature it does not have the slightest explanation by virtue of this intelligibility.Therefore, the more necessary a knowledge is, the more it contains things that allow no other idea178 or representation at all, such as those relations of space, the more clear and sufficient these relations are; the less purely objective content, or less of any real reality.Conversely, the more there is in knowledge that has to be understood purely by accident, the more that comes to us as mere empirically known, the more there is in it what is truly objective, practical. something; but at the same time there is also something more inexplicable, that is, something that can no longer be derived [from] anything else.

It is true that all ages have etiology which misunderstands its goal and attempts to reduce all organic life to chemical or electrical actions; ); again the mechanical action is partly reduced to the object of motion, which is the unity of time and space for the possibility of motion, and partly reduced to the geometrical object, that is, the position in space (for example, people-and they are also correct of a purely geometrical way to find that the decrease of an action is proportional to the square of the distance or to find the theory of levers, probably in the same way).In the end, geometry can be reduced to arithmetic, and arithmetic, since it has only one direction, is the most understandable form of the principle of reason, the easiest to see comprehensively, and a form that can be investigated to the bottom.The method pointed out here in general is exemplified by the following: Democritus' atom [theory], Descartes' vortex [theory], Le Sage's mechanophysics.Near the end of the last century, Le Sage attempted to explain chemical affinities and gravitation mechanically by means of action and reaction; a more detailed discussion of this can be found in Newton's Lucrece.This tendency is also the reason for Rael's use of forms and hybrids as animal life.Finally, belonging entirely to this category is the vulgar materialism which is now revisited in the middle of the nineteenth century and which, out of ignorance, considers itself a new creation.This kind of materialism, after clumsily denying the force of life, first explains life phenomena from some physical and chemical forces. produced by mechanical action.This is to reduce all the forces of nature to action and reaction, and these are its "things in themselves".On this account, even light would have to be a mechanical vibration or fundamental fluctuation of an imaginary ether supposed for the purpose; this ether, when it is concerned, beats the retina like a drum; Yes 483 trillion times per second is red, 727 trillion times per second is purple and so on.So colorblind [people] are probably the ones who get punched countless times per second, aren't they?Fifty years after the appearance of Goethe's theory of pigments, there is still such a crude, mechanical, Democritian, clumsy, and truly monolithic theory, which really suits some people's appetite, These people still believe in Newton's homogeneous theory of light and are not ashamed.They will find that what one can forgive a child (for Democritus) cannot forgive an adult [modern man].There may even be a day when these doctrines fall in disgrace, when everyone slips away and pretends he wasn't there.We shall shortly come to this error of reciprocal reduction of the primordial forces of nature, and leave it here for the time being.Even assuming that this kind of argument can work, then everything is indeed explained, the root cause is traced, and finally even reduced to a formula; then, this formula is the most sacred thing in the temple of wisdom. , according to the law is lucky to [bring people] here.But all the content of the phenomenon also disappears and only the empty form remains.What appears is reduced to how it appears, and this how must also be known a priori, and thus is entirely dependent on the subject, and therefore only for the subject, so that in the end Just illusion, just appearance, always the form of appearance.It is impossible to ask the thing-in-itself.Assuming this makes sense, then, in this way, the whole world really emanates from the subject, and in fact accomplishes what Fichte apparently intended to accomplish with his braggadocio. —But this will not work. In this way, people build illusions, sophistry, castles in the air, not science. [However] there have been successes in reducing many complex phenomena in nature to individual primitive forces: and every success is a real progress.Forces and properties of matter that were at first thought to be different have been derived from one another (for example, magnetism from electricity), and the number of these forces has thus been reduced.If etiology, thus recognized, presents all the original forces of nature, and establishes the laws by which their phenomena appear in time and space in line with causality, and the modes or laws by which [these phenomena] mutually determine their status; Then etiology will achieve its goal.But [in spite of this] some original force remains, an insoluble residue as a content of the phenomenon which cannot be reduced to its form, and therefore cannot be derived from another by the principle of sufficient reason. what gets explained. —Because in everything in nature there is something absolutely unfounded, impossible to explain, for which there is no reason; way, its essence.Although every individual action of a thing may point to a cause, from which it follows that it must act precisely here and now;Even if the thing had no other attributes, even if it were a speck of dust in the shadow of the sun, the intangible must at least be manifested by gravity and impenetrability.I say that the incalculable is to dust what the will is to man, and like the will, is in its essence indefensible to any explanation; yes, the incalculable itself and the will are same.For every expression of the will, for every individual act of the will here and now, [one] can certainly point to a motive, and the will must act with this motive, on the premise of the individual character.But [why] man has this character, [why] man [why] desire at all; [why] among some motives [why] is this motive alone and not others, and any motive [so] activates the will, etc., for these [problem], there was never a root cause that could be pointed out. [This,] in man is his inscrutable character, which is assumed in explaining actions by motives, in inorganic bodies it is its essential property, its mode of functioning.The manifestation of this mode of action is induced by external influences, and it itself is the opposite, but it is not determined by anything other than it, so it is also unexplainable. 181 Its individual appearances, the only ones by which it becomes visible, are subject to the principle of reason, and are themselves groundless.This is basically what the scholastics recognized correctly long ago, and have called it the form of substance. (See Suarnez's "Metaphysical Debate" Debate XV, first paragraph) The idea that the most frequent, most common, and simplest phenomena are the [phenomena] that we can most [can] understand It is a huge and popular mistake, because these phenomena are only the most common to us, and we have become accustomed to them although we are ignorant of them [and no longer seek to understand]. [Actually] a pebble falling into the ground is as inexplicable as the motion of an animal.It has been said that starting from the most general forces of nature (such as gravity, cohesion, impenetrability), it was supposed that from these common forces of nature those forces which act infrequently but only in combination (such as chemical properties, electricity, magnetism), and then from these forces to understand the life of organisms and animals, and even to understand human cognition and will through these forces.Men are silently content to start with many hidden properties, and have given up how to understand them, because what they want is to build on them, not to explore them from below.This approach, as has been said, will not succeed.

Apart from this aspect, such buildings are always suspended.Those instructions, explanations.What is the use of reverting at last to an unknown [number], which is tantamount to the first question at the outset?Do people understand the inner nature of the universal natural forces better than the inner nature of an animal?Are not both equally unexplored?Both of these two essences cannot be investigated, because they are groundless, because they are both the content of the phenomenon, they are both the something of the phenomenon, and they cannot be reduced to the form of the phenomenon. According to law.But for us, our goal is not in etiology but in philosophy, that is to say, not in the relative knowledge of the world but in the absolute knowledge of the world, [so] we are taking a road in the opposite direction, that is, starting from We start from what is immediate, most fully known, absolutely familiar, and closest, in order to understand that which is farther away from us, and which we know one-sidedly and indirectly; phenomena, in order to understand those less complete and weaker phenomena.Of all things except my own body I know only one side, the apparent side; and its inner nature, even if I know all the causes from which its changes come, is still closed to me, is a deep secret.Only by comparing what happens in myself when a motive impels me and my body makes a movement, with what is my own inner nature of change determined by external grounds, can I understand nothing. An understanding of the way in which an organism changes according to causes, so as to realize what its inner nature is; and knowledge of the causes of the appearance of this nature, can only show us its laws of entering time and space, and nothing else. of.The reason why I can make this comparison is that my body is the only object of which I know not only one side, the apparent side, but also a second side, the side called will.I should therefore not believe that if I could reduce my own organism, and then my knowledge, my will, and my actions from motives, to actions from causes; action, I will have a more thorough understanding of my own knowledge, will, etc.; but as long as what I am looking for is philosophy and not etiology, I must first start from our own behavior generated by motivation. Learn to comprehend in essence the simplest and most common motions of inorganic bodies, which I have seen to be caused by causes, and to recognize in kind the unresolved forces which manifest themselves in all bodies in nature What is in me as will is the same, but differs in degree.This is called: the fourth class of representations presented in the "Law of Reason" should be the key for me to understand the inner nature of the first class of representations, and from the law of motivation, in its inner sense, I must learn to understand the law of causality.

Spinoza says (Letter No. 62) that a stone thrown into the air, if conscious, would think that it flew by its own volition.I only add that the pebble [or] is right.Throwing [the action] is to it what motive is to me; what it manifests in the above-mentioned states as cohesion, gravity, permanence is also in its inner essence what I recognize in myself as will. The thing is the same, and if the stone has knowledge, this is what it will recognize as will.When Spinoza said this, he paid attention to the necessity for the stone to fly, and he wanted to transfer this necessity to the necessity of a person's individual will activity.He is also right to do so.In contrast to him, I examine the inner nature.This inner essence, as the premise of the inevitability of all phenomena (that is, the consequence from the cause), endows this inevitability with meaning and validity; it is called character in humans, and physical nature in stone.Both are the same thing, [however], if immediately known, it is called will.In stone, it [only] has the lowest degree of visibility and objectivity, while in human beings, it [has] the strongest degree of visibility and objectivity.Even St. Augustine recognized with right perception this which is equal to our will, in the upward impulse of all things, and I cannot help quoting here his naive statement on the matter, when he says: " If we were animals, we would love physical life and what corresponds to the meaning of this life, and that would be enough for our happiness; Pursue something. Similarly, if we are trees, then we cannot be conscious of anything, can not be loved by motion, but we still seem to pursue something, and by this pursuit we can be fruit-bearing, and To get richer fruit. If we are stone, or water, or wind, or fire, or something of that sort, devoid of any sense and life, yet it is not that we lack desire for our own place and order , for, like a desire, weight is as decisive in a body, either by gravity to descend, or by lightness to rise, for a body is driven by its weight, just as the mind is driven by desire, Wherever you go, go there.” (Kingdom of God XI, 28)

It is also worth pointing out that Ojle once realized that the essence of gravity must be reduced to the object's inherent "inclination and greed" (that is, will) ("Shang Gongzhu Shu" No. 68 letter).It was this view that made him dislike the concept of gravitation used by Newton. He quite intentionally tried to revise this concept according to the previous Cartesian theory, that is, to derive gravitation from the impact of a kind of ether on objects, thinking that this would "Be reasonable, and be at ease with people who like clear and easy-to-understand fundamentals."He wanted to see attraction exiled from physics as a hidden property.This view is only in line with the lifeless conception of nature as the counterpart of the immaterial soul in the age of Ujleh, but in terms of the basic truth I have established, it is worth noting that there is still At that time, when this eminent man saw this truth shining from a distance, he was anxious to turn back in time, and because he was afraid to see all the basic views of the time threatened, he even went back to the old and overthrown. Nonsense for asylum.