Chapter 19 Book II The World as a Preliminary Treatise on the Will §19

When we said in the first book that our body, like all other objects in the world of perception, was only a representation of the knowing subject, we [was] contentious; but now we see that in every What in man's consciousness distinguishes the representation of his body from all other representations which are otherwise identical to it.The difference is that the body also appears to consciousness in quite another manner, different in kind, which is marked by the word will.And it is this double knowledge we have of our own body that points us to the key to understanding the body itself, its actions and movements according to motives, and its influence upon external actions [etc.]; in a word, It gives us the key to understand what the body is in itself, not as appearance, but outside appearance.This is not our immediate understanding of the nature, action, and influence upon which all other real objects are.

It is precisely because of this special relation to such a body that the knowing subject is an individual. [Of course,] if it is not seen in this special relationship, the body is only an appearance to the knowing subject, no different from all other appearances.But the relation by which the knowing subject becomes an individual is therefore only between each subject and the only one of all its representations, to which the subject does not merely regard it as a representation. , but at the same time is conscious of it in quite another way, that is, as will.However, if the subject is detached from this special relationship, from two completely different double cognitions of the one thing that is identical [with itself], then this one thing, the body, remains a representation, nothing more than other appearances, then, in order to get a clue in this respect, the knowing individual must either assume that this single appearance is different only in that his knowledge of this appearance alone has such a double relation, only in this An object of intuition which he simultaneously has the possibility of apprehending in two ways, but this [may] be explained not by a difference between this object and all others, but by the different relation of his cognition to it. is explained in terms of his relation to all other objects.Either it must be assumed that this single object is essentially different from all others, that it alone of all objects is both will and representation, while the others, on the contrary, are mere representations, that is, illusions; so his body It is the only real individual in the world, that is, the only phenomenon of will and the only direct object of the subject. ——As for the other objects, seen only as appearances, they are the same as his body, that is, they fill the space just like the body (the [space] can only exist as appearances), and function in space.This, of course, can be positively proved from the law of causality, which is a priori proper to representations, and which does not permit an effect without a cause; Leaving aside the fact that there is an identical cause, then people are still within the scope of mere appearances, and the law of causality is only valid for appearances, and it can never go beyond it.As to whether objects, which are known to the individual only as representations, are phenomena of a will like his own body, this, as has been said in the previous chapter, is the question of the reality of the external world. original meaning of the question.To deny this is what theoretical egoism is about.It is from this that this kind of egoism regards as illusions all phenomena other than one's own individuality, just as practical egoism does exactly the same thing in practice, that is, it only treats itself as a real person, And regard all others as illusions, and treat them only as illusions.It is true that theoretical egoism can no longer be refuted by reasoning, but it is by no means reliable in philosophy except as a skeptical sophistry, that is, in addition to bringing false appearances.But as a serious belief, such theoretical egoism is to be found only in madhouses; and as such, one has to deal with it with a course of therapy rather than by disproving it with inferential proofs. .That being the case, we shall not dwell on it any longer, but regard it as the last bastion of skepticism, ever to be contested.Our cognition is always bound to individuality, and it is because of this that it has its limitations.In fact, it is this limitation that creates our need for philosophy.If the inevitable result of our understanding is that each person can only be "one" but can understand everything else, then we are the ones who strive to expand the field of knowledge through philosophy. 157 will combine here and The skepticism [proposed] by theoretical egoism that we oppose is treated as a small frontier fortress; although it can never be attacked, it is fortunate that its defenders can never be rushed out, so people can go without worry. In the past, there was no danger in leaving it behind.

Accordingly, we shall hereafter use as a key the knowledge we have now grasped, that is, our double knowledge of the nature and function of our body, obtained in two completely different ways. In order to explore the nature of any phenomenon in nature: and all objects are not our own bodies, and therefore are not known in a double way in our consciousness, but are just appearances, and those objects should also be as described above. We can judge by the resemblance of the body; therefore, on the one hand, it is assumed that these objects are exactly the same as the body, they are also representations, and thus are of the same kind as the body; on the other hand, if one puts their actual existence as the representation of the subject On the one hand, then, the remaining [side] must, in its essence, be the same thing as what we call will in ourselves.After all, can we attach any other kind of actual existence or reality to the rest of the world of objects?Where do we find the elements that make up such a world?There is nothing [that] we [can] know, nothing that we can conceive of, except will and representation.If we were to attach to this world of bodies the greatest reality we know, which exists immediately only in our representations, we would give it that reality which each of us has in our own body, Because the body is the most real thing for anyone.But if we analyze the reality of this body and its activities, then, except that it is our representation, all we encounter in the body is the will.In addition, the reality of the body is thus exhausted.Nowhere, therefore, can we find another kind of reality to attach to the world of objects.If the world of objects is to be anything but our appearance, then we must say that it is not only appearance, that is, in itself, in its innermost essence, we are That which is directly found in oneself as will.I said "in its innermost essence", then we first have to further understand this essence of will, so that we know how to distinguish will from things that do not belong to will itself but belong to its multi-level phenomena.Such is the case, for example, of being accompanied by "knowledge" and conditioned by motivation.We will see later that these things do not belong to the essence of the will, but only to the distinct phenomena of the will as animal or human being.Therefore, if I say that the force which causes the stone to fall to the ground is, in its essence, in itself, outside all appearances, also will, people will not have such grotesque ideas about this statement, It is said that the stone also moves according to a known motive, because the will is manifested in this way. ——But from now on, we will prove in more detail and more clearly what has been explained initially and in general, and point out its grounds and develop it fully.