Chapter 9 Part I The World as Representation §9

Concepts constitute a special class of representations, a class quite different in kind from the intuitive representations we have heretofore considered, and which are found only in the human mind.Therefore, we can never acquire an intuitive and truly self-evident knowledge of the nature of concepts, but only an abstract and inferential one.As long as the experience is experienced as the real external world, and the external world is just the representation of intuition, then it is required to confirm the concept in experience, or to put the concept in front of the eyes or in front of the imagination just like the object of intuition. The text is wrong.Concepts can only be thought, not intuited; only the effects or consequences of human use of concepts are truly the objects of experience.Such consequences are language, and planned action, and science and all that arise from it.Speech, as the object of external experience, is obviously nothing but a well-established telegraph, conveying arbitrary [agreement] signs with the greatest speed and the most subtle differences of pitch.What do these symbols mean?How to explain it?Do we immediately translate words into imaginary pictures when someone talks?Could it be that following the lexical and grammatical changes that flowed in like a river, these picture packages flew past our eyes like lightning, moving, interlinking, reorganizing, and echoing?If so, what a commotion and confusion must be in our minds when we hear a lecture, or read a book!In fact, interpreting symbols does not work this way at all.The meaning of words is known directly, is grasped accurately and clearly, and generally does not involve imagination.This is reason speaking to reason, and reason speaking within its own domain.What rationality conveys and accepts are abstract concepts, non-intuitive appearances, and these concepts are available again and again after being formed once. Although they are relatively small in number, they include, imply, and represent reality. Innumerable objects in the world.Only from this can it be explained why an animal, although it has the same speech organ and intuitive representation as we do, can never speak or understand speech.This is precisely because words refer to that particular class of representations whose subjective counterpart [object] is reason, [animals do not have reason,] so no words can have meaning or explanation for it.This being the case, language, and all other phenomena belonging to reason, and all other things that distinguish humans from birds, can only be explained from this one and simple source; and this is the concept, the abstract , non-intuitive, universal, not individual representations that exist in time and space.Only on rare occasions do we pass from the concept to the intuition, and form for ourselves phantoms as vivid representations of the concept, but this phantom can never be adequately representative and fully correspond to the concept.This is what I specifically explained in Section 28 of the "Law of Reason", so I won't repeat it here.We should take what was said there and what Hume said in his Philosophical Essays, No. 12 (p. 244) and what Hedel said in Hyper-Criticism, No. 1, p. 274 (again , it is a poorly written book) Compare those words.As for Plato's ideal form, which is made possible by the unity of imagination and reason, it will constitute the main subject of the third book of this book.

Although there is a fundamental difference between concepts and intuitive representations, the former has a necessary relationship to the latter; without this relationship, concepts are nothing.This relation thus constitutes the whole essence and actual existence of the concept. [What kind of relationship is this?It turns out that reflective thinking is necessarily a copy and copy of the original intuitive world; although it is a very unique copy, the materials used are also completely different.It is therefore quite appropriate to call the concept 79 "the representation of representations."Here too, the principle of sufficient reason has a special form.In what form is the principle of sufficientity governing the representation of a class, so long as the class is a representation, this form must also constitute and encompass the whole essence of the class; as we have seen, time is always It is just "sequence", nothing else; space is always part, nothing else; matter is always causality, nothing else.In the same way, the whole essence of the class of concepts or abstract representations lies in only one relation, that relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in concepts.And since this is the relation to the ground of knowledge, the abstract representation has all its essence only in its relation to another representation which is its ground of knowledge.Although this other representation is at first a concept or an abstract representation, and even this latter concept can only have an equally abstract ground of knowledge; We end with a concept that is grounded in intuitive cognition, because the whole world of reflective thought is based on the intuitive world that is the ground of its cognition.The class of abstract representations is thus distinguished from the others in that in other classes [of representations] the principle of sufficient reason always requires only a relation between [the representation] and another representation of the same kind; In abstract representations, [to] finally require a relation between [this representation] and a representation of a different kind.

People often call those concepts mentioned above that are related to intuitive cognition not directly but indirectly through one or even several other concepts as "universals"; The concept of is called "special phase".The latter appellation does not quite correspond to the concepts it refers to, since these concepts are always abstract universals and never mere intuitive representations.These two titles were originally produced in a vague consciousness when trying to explain the difference between the two; since there are other explanations here, it is not a bad idea to continue to use them.The first category, that is, examples of "universals" with special meanings, include concepts such as "relationship", "virtue", "discussion", "beginning" and so on.The latter category, that is, "special phase" whose name does not quite match the reality, has these concepts: "person", "stone", "horse" and so on.If such a metaphor is not too figurative and thus absurd, one can properly say that the latter category of concepts is the ground floor of the building of reflective thinking, while the first category of concepts are the layers above it. building.

A concept contains a lot, that is to say, many intuitive appearances, and even some abstract appearances, all have a relationship with it based on cognition, that is, they must be thought through it.This point, however, is not necessarily the basic attribute of concepts as people generally say, but is actually only a derived and secondary attribute; although it is a necessary attribute in terms of possibility, it is not always present in reality. Attributes.This property arises from the fact that the concept is the representation of a representation, that is, from the fact that the whole essence of the concept consists only in its relation to another representation.But the concept is not this other representation itself; this other representation often even belongs to a different kind, is an intuitive representation, and can therefore have temporal, spatial, and other determinations, and can have many more at all, in Concepts are not associated with the relation thought.It is for this reason that representations, though not essential, can be thought of by the same concept, that is to say, can be included in it.But this "capability to know everything in one" [the ability] is not an essential property of the concept, but only an accidental property of it.So there can be concepts which can only be used to think of a single real object, but are still abstract, general representations, and are not therefore individual, intuitive representations at all.For example, someone who only knows a certain city from a geography book, the concept he gets from this city is the kind of concept mentioned here.Although only this city is considered here, there may still be some partially different cities that all apply this concept.So it is not that a concept is general because it is abstracted from some objects; rather, it is the contrary.It is because generality, also known as "individual non-determination", is [something] that concepts have in essence as rational abstract representations, and different things can be thought of with the same concept.

From what has been said, it also happens that, since concepts are abstract representations rather than intuitive representations, and are therefore not quite definite representations, each concept furthermore has what is called a sphere or sphere of meaning; and even if it is The same is true where the concept applies to only one real object.Thus we find that the signification circle of each concept has something in common with the signification circles of other concepts, namely, that what is thought in one concept is at the same time what is thought in the other concept; And vice versa, what is thought in the other concept is what is thought in the other; and though at the same time they are really distinct concepts, each, or at least one of the two, is Contains what the other concept does not.Every subject and its predicate are in such a relation, and knowing this relation is called judging.It is a very meaningful idea to illustrate those circles of meaning with a diagram of space.Pluc was the first to have this idea, and he used a square: Lambert, although he was behind him, still used straight lines stacked one above the other; Ojle was the last to use circles. , this approach was a satisfactory solution.But on what grounds the interrelationships of concepts have this exact resemblance to their spatial figures, I cannot say.Henceforth, the interrelationships of all concepts, even in terms of their possibility alone, that is, a priori, can be illustrated graphically by such a diagram; this is an advantageous situation for logic.The diagram is as follows:

1) The meaning circles of the two concepts are exactly the same, such as the concept of inevitability and the concept of inferring consequences from known grounds, the concepts of ruminants and artiodactyls, and the concepts of vertebrates and red blood animals (because some arthropods [also have red blood ], this point is debatable): These are all alternate concepts, illustrated by a circle, which means both this concept and that concept. 2) The circle of meaning of one concept completely includes 82 circles of meaning of another concept. 3) A circle of meaning includes two or more circles of meaning, and these included circles of meaning neither contain each other but jointly fill the big circle that includes them.

4) Two circles contain part of each other. 5) The two circles are located in a third circle, but they do not fill the third circle. This last case refers to all those concepts whose spheres of meaning have no direct commonality [with each other], but there is always a third, often much wider concept, which encompasses both. All the connections of concepts can be attributed to these situations, and all the teachings about judgments, such as the conversion, symmetry, mutual correlation, and mutual repulsion of judgments (see the third picture for this point), can be derived from this.Similarly, the attribute of judgment can also be derived from this, which is what Kant called the category of understanding; but the form of hypothetical judgment is not only the connection of concepts, but the connection of judgments, and should be an exception.Modes are exceptions, however, and this, as well as every property of the judgments on which the categories are based, is explained at length in the appendix of this book.As for the [various] possible conceptual connections listed above, there is only one point that needs to be pointed out, that is, all kinds of connections can also be connected with each other in various ways, such as the connection between the fourth diagram and the second diagram.Only when one circle of meaning completely or partly includes another circle of meaning and at the same time is itself included in a third circle of meaning, do these circles of meaning together express the inference in the first diagram; A connection that leads to a judgment by which it is recognized that one concept is wholly or partly contained in another concept and is likewise contained in a third concept, which in turn Contains the original concept.This can also show the opposite of this inference, it can show negation; and to express this negation graphically, of course, can only be that the two connected circles of meaning are not in the third.If many circles of meaning are included sequentially in this way, a longer chain of inferences results.This diagrammatic mode of conception, which has been carried out with great success in some textbooks, serves as the basis for the illustration of judgments, and of the whole syllogism, so that it is easy and simple to deal with these two aspects.This is because all the rules in both respects can thus be understood, derived and explained according to their origin.But it is unnecessary to burden the memory with these things, for logic has never been of practical use, but only of theoretical interest in philosophy.It turns out that although we can say that logic is to rational thinking what continuo is to music; if we relax the scale, we can also say that ethics is to virtue, or aesthetics is to art; It is the study of aesthetics that makes an artist, and no one acquires a noble character by studying ethics: it should be noted that long before Rameau there were compositions of correct harmony, which need not concern themselves with continuo, nor Can detect inharmonic sounds.Likewise, one does not need to know logic to be immune to false inferences.However, having said that, it should be admitted that although the continuo bass is not very useful for the identification of music, it is of great use for the practice of composition; to a lesser extent, even aesthetics and ethics, although the main On the negative side, too, there can be some advantages to [art, moral] practice, respectively; so these theories should not be completely deprived of their practical value.As for logic, even this [practical value] cannot be exaggerated.Logic is knowledge in the abstract, and it is known in the abstract for what everyone already knows in the concrete.Therefore, people seldom use logic to deny a wrong inference, and they seldom make a correct inference with the help of logical rules.Even the most learned logician himself completely leaves logic aside when he is actually thinking.This is illustrated below.It turns out that every science is composed of a general and therefore abstract set of truths, laws, and rule systems about a certain type of objects.Henceforth, the particular cases which arise among these objects are to be prescribed every time according to the general knowledge which is right once, every time, because it is easier to apply the general principles than to examine each individual case from the beginning. I don't know how many times.And this general, abstract knowledge, once acquired, is often more convenient than individual discussions of experience, and the opposite is true in logic.Logic expresses the knowledge about the working methods of reason in the form of rules, and it is the general knowledge obtained from the self-observation of reason and abstracting away the content of all things.This way of working is necessary and essential in reason itself, and if left to itself, reason will never deviate from these ways.In each particular case, therefore, it is better to let reason act according to its own nature than to subject it to a kind of knowledge, which is abstracted in the course of the work and which takes the form of a strange and foreign law. Knowledge should be easier and more appropriate.It is easier because, in all other sciences, the general rules are nearer and more familiar to us than the separate, case-by-case study of individual cases; The way of working is always nearer and more familiar to us than the general rules abstracted from this way of working; for it is this reason itself that thinks in ourselves .It is more appropriate because it is much easier to produce errors in this kind of abstract knowledge or its application than to act against its essence and nature in the "rational" behavior.Thus a peculiar situation arises: in other sciences, the general rules are used to test the truth of individual cases, but in logic, the opposite is true, and the rules are tested in individual cases.Even the most skilful logician, when he finds that the conclusions he draws in a particular case differs from what the rules say, prefers to find the error first in the rules and then in the conclusions he actually draws. .To get a practical use from logic is to say that what we have directly realized in individual things with the greatest validity, and then use inexhaustible painstaking efforts to deduce it from general rules; Hands and stamping also require teaching in mechanics, and one's own digestion also requires teaching in physiology.Whoever studies logic for practical purposes is like training a beaver to build his nest.Although logic has no practical use, it does not mean that there is no need to keep it, because it [originally] is a special kind of knowledge about rational organization and activities and has philosophical significance.As a self-sufficient, self-existing, complete, complete, and completely reliable discipline, logic has reason to study it alone, without support, and scientifically, and has reason to teach it in universities. .However, logic acquires its proper value only in connection with philosophy as a whole, when knowledge is considered, and rational or abstract knowledge.Therefore, the teaching of logic should not have a form that is too much concerned with a practical science, and should not only include some nakedly established rules to correct errors in judgments, inferences, etc., but should be more concerned with understanding rationality. The essence of conceptions, and examine in detail the principle of sufficient reason of cognition; for logic is nothing but the translation of this principle of sufficient reason; , but only logical or super-logical.At the same time as the law of sufficient reason for cognition, three other basic laws of thinking or super-logical truth judgments that are closely related to it should be proposed; and all the skills of reason are gradually developed from this.The essence of real thinking, that is to say, the essence of judgment and reasoning, is expressed from the connection of conceptual circles of meaning and in the manner indicated above in the form of a spatial diagram; then the "judgment" is extended through the construction of images and all rules of "inference".The only practical use one can find of logic is when one argues, rather than pointing out the other's actual mistakes, one uses logical terms to debunk the other's deliberately deceptive conclusions.Since logic has thus been devalued in terms of practical significance, and at the same time its connection with philosophy as a whole has been so emphatically presented as a chapter of philosophy, knowledge of logic should not be any less rare in the future than it is now. , because today anyone who does not want to remain in a shallow state in the main respects, and who does not want to rank himself among the ignorant and bewildered masses, must first learn speculative philosophy.This is again because the nineteenth century is a century of philosophy; but this does not mean that this century already has philosophy, or that philosophy has taken over; There is, therefore [also] an urgent need for philosophy.This is the mark of a highly developed culture, even a firm rung on the ladder of cultural ascent through the ages.

Although logic has little practical use, it cannot be denied that it was created for practical purposes.I explain the origin of logic [the science] in this way: When the eloquence of Elijah, Macquarie, and Sophism was developing and gradually becoming a hobby, almost every time Controversy leads to confusion; this makes them feel that there must be a procedure to guide the debate, and for this purpose, there is only a scientific method of demonstration.The first thing to point out is that the two parties in the debate must agree with each other on a certain proposition involved in the argument.The first step in the debate process is to formally announce these mutually recognized propositions and place them at the beginning of the discussion.At first, these propositions only involved the research materials, and then people found that how to restore this commonly recognized truth and how to derive their own claims from it also obeyed certain formulas and rules.On this point, although there is no prior agreement, they have no objection; it can be seen that these formulas and laws must be inherent in reason, and the procedures in the nature of reason itself must be the formal aspect of discussion.Although this did not meet with doubts and objections, it occurred to a mind fond of systems, he thought: If these formal aspects of all debates, these invariable legal procedures of reason itself, are also related to deliberation. Like those commonly recognized propositions in terms of material, they are also stated in abstract propositions, and placed at the beginning of the discussion as an inalienable criterion in the debate itself, so that people must always have a basis and reference; then It would be a great good, it would be the consummation of the dialectical method.That's it, all things that were just obeyed unanimously and tacitly in the past, or things that were doing so instinctively, now people have to consciously recognize it as a law and formally declare it.During this period, people gradually found appropriate names of varying degrees for the basic propositions of logic, such as the law of contradiction, the law of sufficient ground, the law of the excluded middle, and the law of existence and non-existence; Negative premises lead to no conclusion", "inferences from consequences to grounds are invalid", etc.One can only achieve these things slowly and with great difficulty; before Aristotle everything was incomplete.This can be partly seen in some of Plato's dialogues, where the way of revealing logical truths is still clumsy and far-fetched.It can still be better seen from the reports of Sextus and Empiricus on the controversy of the Macquarie School, that they not only disputed some of the simplest laws of logic, but also used the terms used to express these laws. The way is also so stretched (Sy. Empiricus: "Against Mathematical Words" Volume VIII pp. 122 and subsequent pages).Aristotle collected, sorted out, and revised the existing achievements at that time, so that it has an incomparably high degree of integrity.If one sees in this way how the progress of Hellenistic culture aroused and prepared Aristotle's studies, one will be reluctant to believe the Persian writers.Saying that Liston found complete logic in the Indians, he sent it back to his uncle Aristotle.Jones is very partial to this statement, which he conveyed to us ("Asian Studies" Vol. IV p. 163).As for the disputable people of the scholastics in the sad Middle Ages, who had no practical knowledge but lost their minds in formulaic sentences; that is why they were so enthusiastic about Aristotelian logic that they were even enthusiastic about those translated into Fragments of the Arabic language, and immediately made the center of all knowledge; that is easy to understand.The prestige of logic has declined since then, but its credibility as a self-sufficient, practical, and vitally necessary science has retained, and has been preserved to the present, and, in our time, Kant has Taking the foundation stone of his philosophy from logic, his philosophy revived a new interest in logic.From this perspective, that is, as a means of understanding the nature of reason, it is reasonable to have such an interest in logic.

Strictly correct conclusions result from correct observation of the interrelationships of the concept circles of meaning, and only when one circle of meaning is included in another circle of meaning, which in turn is included in a third circle, can the second circle be admitted. One lap is included in the third lap.On the contrary, there is a kind of persuasion based on only superficially looking at the various relationships in the meaning circle of the concept, and then making one-sided regulations according to one's own intention [such a method]; the main thing is this: if the concept under investigation The circle of meaning is only partly contained in another circle, and partly contained in another completely different circle, and the speaker will describe the concept as being all in this circle or all in there according to his own intention. within a circle.For example, when talking about "passion", one can generalize it at will under the concepts of "maximum force", "the most powerful motive in the world", or under the concept of "irrational". under, and this can be summarized under the concepts of "weakness" and "weakness".One can continue to use this method and start from scratch when it comes to any concept. [For example,] the signification circle of a concept is almost always accompanied by several other signification circles, each of which contains within its scope a part of the first circle, while each also includes something else. [At this time,] people only explain one of the meaning circles to summarize the first concept, while the rest are ignored or concealed.All persuasion, all clever sophistry rests upon this device; for logical devices, such as simulacra, deception, deception, and mockery, are evidently stupid[not applicable] in practice. .I do not know whether until now the essence of all sophistry and persuasion has been reduced to the ultimate ground of their possibility, or has been confirmed in the proper essence of concepts, that is, in the rational way of knowing. Arguments; therefore, having come here with my statement, though the point is not difficult to understand, I would like to illustrate it diagrammatically in an annexed table.The diagram is intended to show how the circles of meaning of concepts are intricately interlinked, so that there is room for any transition from each concept to this or that circle of meaning.I only hope that people will not be deluded by the attached schedule, and give too much importance to this small, incidental statement, beyond what the nature of the matter could have.As an illustrative example, I have chosen the concept "travel".The meaning circle of this concept is partially nested within the scope of the other four meaning circles, and the lobbyist can transition to any one of them at will.The other four are partly incorporated into other circles of meaning, and some are incorporated into two or more. Here again, lobbyists can choose their path arbitrarily, and always regard it as the only path.In the end, depending on his intentions, he can achieve "beneficial" (good) or "harmful" (evil).But as one goes round by round, one must only follow the direction from the center (the known main concept) to the edge, and not vice versa.This sophistry may take the form of a continuous conversation or of a strict inference, depending on the preference of the listener.Basically most scientific arguments, and especially philosophical arguments, are similar in this way; otherwise there would not be so many things in the ages that are not only wrong, (because the fallacy itself has another source) and It has been explained and proved to be considered fundamentally wrong in the future, such as Leibniz-Wolfer's philosophy, Ptolemy's astronomy, Stahl's chemistry, Newton's color theory, and so on.