Chapter 22 Chapter 18 Technology in the Judicial Process

The framers of the constitution determined the constitution as a fundamental law governing human political organizations.A constitutional document sets forth and articulates the principles upon which a nation's form of government is built.A constitution regulates how the powers of the state are assigned and distributed among the various institutions exercising national sovereignty; it regulates the manner in which said powers are to be exercised; basic obligations), and precisely because of this, the Constitution is the supreme law. In countries where the power to interpret the meaning of constitutional provisions is entrusted to an independent judiciary, this branch of government has a noble task.Since judgments concerning the application of constitutional norms to questions of government and its relations with citizens often have a great influence on the happiness and prosperity of the regime, it is difficult to avoid the consequences of a constitutional judgment for the life and welfare of the people without serious and serious attention. The above-mentioned responsibilities set for the judiciary in the judicial field cannot be fulfilled due to the political, social and economic impacts caused.How can general jurisprudence help those powers that undertake this duty?

In the field of interpreting constitutional provisions, there are two basic problems.Neither problem can be resolved if we do not give some consideration to the ultimate purpose of legal ordering.The first question is whether, if the meaning of a constitutional provision is uncertain, it should be resolved by recourse to society's general understanding of it at the time the provision was enacted, or whether a constitutional provision should be interpreted in accordance with the knowledge, needs, and experiences to explain.The second question concerns the recognition of informal sources of constitutional decisions.It concerns itself with the question of whether the meaning and scope of a substantive constitutional mandate can be interpreted in terms of important policy principles not directly endorsed by the formal text of the constitution.We shall limit our discussion to the above two major issues of constitutional interpretation.

As far as the first question is concerned, the authority on the US Constitution can be divided into two camps with very clear positions.For the convenience of terminology, we shall call the view advocated and defended by members of the first camp the theory of historical interpretation, and that held by the second camp the synchronic interpretation Said (the theory of contemporaneous interpretation).Justice Roger Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sanford, set out firmly and candidly the historical interpretation of the Constitution's provisions.In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, blacks were considered inferior rather than citizens; the Constitution did not include them in the citizenship clause; Provisions that gave federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits between citizens of different states denied blacks the right to sue in federal courts.In presenting his opinion, Justice Tanen laid down his philosophy of constitutional interpretation in the following passage:

We trust no one to think that a change in the opinion or sentiment of the public regarding this unfortunate race, in the civilized countries of Europe, or in our own country, should induce this Court to make a judgment in their favor on the words of the United States Constitution. a freer interpretation than the meanings intended by the Framers to ascribe to these terms when the Constitution was drawn up and passed.Any court called upon to interpret the Constitution would simply not accept the argument of free interpretation.If a provision of the Constitution is now held to be unjust, the Constitution itself provides for the manner in which it may be amended.But, until it has been corrected, it must now be interpreted in the sense in which it was adopted.It must be consistent not only in letter but in meaning, and confer on government the same powers, and preserve and secure for citizens the same rights and privileges; so long as it continues in its present form, it Not only need to be expressed in the same words, but the meaning and intent of the expression should be the same, and here the same means that it has the same words, meaning and intent when the Framers made the Constitution and the people of the United States voted to adopt it. conform to.Adoption of any other rule of interpretation would deprive the Supreme Court of its judicial character and make it a mere reflection of the will or passion of the moment.

This theory of interpretation was later developed by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell.In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Minnesota's 1933 Minnesota Moratorium Act, which confers immunity on mortgage debtors, on the basis that when the statute was passed The dire economic conditions that exist in the state legitimize the exercise of state police powers in such circumstances, and shield it from legal action against it under Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution, which prohibits derogation from contractual obligations. to attack.Justice Sutherland dissented in his trial dissenting opinion, noting that the contract clause was incorporated into the Constitution at an extraordinary time, precisely to stop statutes of the kind passed in Minnesota in 1933.He argued that the view of the framers of the Constitution—that any immunity from liability to debtors is unconstitutional, regardless of the existence of an economic depression—was strictly binding on the U.S. Supreme Court.In another case, Justice Sutherland laid out his theory of constitutional interpretation more systematically:

The meaning of the US Constitution is not changed by the ups and downs of the economic situation.We often hear people say in unprofessional language that the US Constitution must be interpreted in light of the current situation.It is quite true if this means that the American Constitution is composed of living words, i.e. words which are applicable to every new situation which they cover.But if this means that the terms of the U.S. Constitution do not mean today what they did when the Constitution was made—that is, that they do not apply now to a situation that they would have applied in the past—then This would deprive the Constitution of its essential elements; but this essential element is what keeps the Constitution of the United States in force until it is amended by the people (and not by their official agents), because it is the people who made the Constitution of the United States.

In the famous case of "McCulloch v. Maryland", Justice Marshall proposed a theory opposite to the above theory, that is, the theory of contemporaneous interpretation. .In that case, Justice Marshall declared that the U.S. Constitution "is designed to endure for a long time to come, and thus to adapt to the various crises in human affairs." Marshall's line of thought was relayed in the Blaisdell case, in which he rejected Sutherland Justice's historical interpretation: to the moratorium of payment of rights) is an unrecognized question a century ago, or to insist that the contemporaneous conditions to which this provision of the United States Constitution refers refers to the conditions of our time, it is impossible to answer our questions. The problem faced. If the statement that the U.S. Constitution meant what it meant when it was adopted is what it means today, it means that the great clauses of the U.S. Constitution must be governed by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution It is a fallacy to interpret them according to the conditions and views of their time." The Washington Supreme Court also pointed out in support of Justice Hughes' view that "the constitutional provisions should be interpreted in accordance with the and encompasses changing conditions of social and economic life."

If we are to arrive at a proper judgment of the merits of these competing arguments, it is necessary to bear in mind Justice Brandeis' decision in Burnett v. Burnet v. Corondo Oil and Gas Co.), a distinction made when expressing his dissent.In that case, Judge Brandeis found it necessary to distinguish between the interpretation of constitutional provisions and the application of constitutional provisions.The justices of the Supreme Court, including Mr Justice Sutherland, generally agree that a constitutional provision interpreted in a sense consistent with its original understanding must always be applied to new situations and new circumstances. Factual circumstances, although these circumstances and circumstances may not have been encountered by the framers of the Constitution at the time.Therefore, after the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution has received an authoritative interpretation that the clause prohibits unreasonable differential treatment and discriminatory treatment, the question of whether a certain discriminatory law violates this clause must be determined according to the relevant reasonable general beliefs.After the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution has been construed to prohibit the imposition of substantial burdens on interstate commerce, the question of whether a particular burden in such commerce is significant enough to warrant judicial intervention must be based on the The context of the country's trade situation is assessed.However, even on questions concerning the application of constitutional provisions rather than their interpretation, judges may also be less sensitive to whether they should be bound by earlier precedents (i.e., precedents dealing with substantially the same factual situations). A disagreement occurred.

The focus of this controversy is mainly in the area of ​​judicial interpretation of the meaning of constitutional provisions.If the framers of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution intended at the time to prohibit all violations of the validity of the contract, could the justices of the Supreme Court later hold that, because of strong and convincing principles of public policy and moral Reasons, certain practices that infringe the validity of the contract can be supported?If the framers of the U.S. Constitution intended at the time that Congress be completely incapable of interfering with freedom of speech and assembly, could the Supreme Court later allow certain acts of Congress that restricted freedom of speech and assembly because such restrictions were deemed Is it absolutely necessary in terms of national security and self-preservation?Here we are confronted with a problem of extremely well-defined scope and of primary importance.

In trying to find solutions to the above-mentioned problems, one has every reason to start from the assumption that a generation devoted to the construction of a permanent framework of government and social organization will necessarily be hindered by inexperience and limited vision. Negative impact, which will be clearly reflected in the long-term operation and operation of the constitutional system they created.This inability to foresee some of the consequences and conditions of a new system is in fact a cognitive limitation from which even the most gifted and brightest cannot escape.If we assume that the framers of a constitution, even though they were experienced and respectable men, were not at all aware of this limitation of their judgment, and attempted to exhaust their time-bound interpretation of the constitution and precisely impose it on their descendants, then such an assumption is obviously unwise.On the contrary, we should assume that they did not intend to prevent future generations from solving their problems in their own way, so long as this solution was consistent with the general spirit and basic purpose of the constitutional system they formulated.Since they are trying to establish a lasting pattern of social life when they realize that social conditions are always in flux and are always subject to unpredictable chance, it is assumed that they regard the fundamental laws they have formulated as A complete solidification of the status quo that existed when the law was passed is also patently unreasonable.Mr. Justice Cardoso declared that "what a constitution states or ought to state is not rules applicable to the past, but principles for an ever-extending future".We can say that Cardoso's views reflect not only those of himself, but those of every open-minded, intelligent, sensible framer of the Constitution.We must therefore conclude that, in the event of a substantial and substantial change of circumstances, if what a later court seeks to determine is the probable intention of the founders of the United States of America, or of any other nation—if It would not have been injustice to the founders that they had foreseen our present condition, rather than the intent expressed by these men in their time as to the meaning of a constitutional clause.

However, the above points about constitutional interpretation should be tempered with certain restrictive considerations.Even if the promulgation of a constitution can rightly be interpreted as a mandate for future interpreters of the constitution, that is, as a living document designed to deal with different future situations, such Authorizing orders are not supposed to extend to interpretations that completely destroy the spirit of the Constitution, nor can they transform the provisions of the Constitution into something contrary to their original meaning.We can use some examples to illustrate the difference between amending constitutional provisions through the process of interpretation and violating constitutional provisions.One might argue that a constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of speech and the freedom of the press cannot be construed, under the freedom of interpretation permitted, to constitute speech that poses a serious threat to national security, such as the publication of a troop transport ship sailing in wartime , or make statements that tend to divide the country into hostile sides or warring camps, such as those that incite racial or religious hatred and conflict.We have every reason to believe that the purpose of guaranteeing freedom of speech is to ensure that the public can engage in full and even vigorous debate on all matters of its concern; The intention of disseminating information of interest or of permitting the dissemination of speech liable to cause riots or civil commotion is passed on to the framers of this constitutional guarantee.But on the other hand, the interpretation of the Free Speech Guarantee that enables the Legislature to suspend the Guarantee on mere excuses or on the grounds of the public interest is clearly contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Guarantee Yes, even though prevailing views about the value of free speech may have changed significantly.In such a situation, only a new constitution or a broad amendment could legitimize that new attitude to free speech.Likewise, under a constitution founded on the general principle of the separation of powers, the courts are bound by a limited domain which, on certain persuasive considerations and with just measures to prevent the abuse of power, The practice of approving the statutes that combine government powers does not necessarily exceed the jurisdiction of judicial interpretation.But on the other hand, the recognition of a combination of powers violates the constitutional law if such combination would seriously violate the fundamental principle of the separation of powers and undermine its foundation in a broad sphere of public life. this basic requirement.The consequence of the above considerations is that while the flexibility and adaptability of a constitutional theory allow subsequent interpreters to take into account the changing needs of different periods and enable them to respond to emerging and unprecedented problems, the protection of a constitution Necessary for the essence and its fundamental integrity, this flexibility and adaptability must have limits of scope.To make truly fundamental changes to a constitution, it must be amended, not interpreted. The second question we shall discuss here is closely related to the first above.The question concerns whether courts have the power to incorporate exceptions or limitations to expressly stated constitutional provisions in order to provide for competing or at least partially conflicting constitutional principles not directly embodied in the constitutional text. middle.This problem often arises when the Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution.For example, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution requires states to accord complete fidelity to the public statutes, litigation records, and judicial proceedings of other states.In interpreting the meaning of the clause, the U.S. Supreme Court held that although the command of perfect good faith is expressed in unmistakable terms in the constitutional text, it is not all-encompassing and there are some exceptions , for example, a state enforcing the public statutes or judgments of another state may prefer the laws or policies of the sister state to the laws or policies of its own state.In these exceptions, the Supreme Court has taken the position that, in a limited sense, the idea of ​​sovereignty must be considered as balancing the constitutional imperative of perfect good faith, although this interpretation requires The Constitution makes interpretations that cannot be justified in the text of the Constitution.In the same manner, the Supreme Court held that the guarantees of freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, enshrined in absolutely unqualified terms in the First Amendment, were subject to the normative powers of Congress, which Expressed in the necessity of restricting free speech in order to prevent the emergence of a serious danger of a threat to some other interest falling within the constitutionally protected purview of Congress.Thus, in Dennis v. US, the judges held that, in order to protect the security of the country, the revolutionary claims of communists could be prohibited by statute of Congress.However, the constitutional provisions as the fundamental law do not entrust the power to protect national security to Congress. Therefore, to a large extent, the recognition of Congress’ power to protect national security must come from the non-substantial source of the Constitution. . Some justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, among them eminent Justices Black and Douglas, have disagreed with the practice of most other justices on the Terms that protect a particular public interest still attempt to balance conflicting public interests.Accordingly, Mr. Justice Black held that, under the First Amendment, individuals "are guaranteed a purely express right to express their own views on matters of the public interest at hand"; The field of compromise introduces compromise".Justice Mr. Douglas declared in 1953 that the First Amendment's command is, "No law shall abolish ... the rights of citizens. The matter is beyond the power of the legislature to regulate, control, or limit." Advocates of the absolutism of free will, however, seem to have forgotten the fact that "although the liberties enshrined in the First Amendment are essential, their exercise must be indispensable and consistent with other rights guaranteed by the Constitution of our country".Thus, virtually everyone would agree that the right to a fair trial by an impartial, impartial judiciary is fundamental to a truly free society, even though it is not included in the text of the Constitution. Not expressly expressed in the above terms.Experience has shown that this right is most likely to conflict with the liberties protected by the First Amendment in situations where the public, through the media or otherwise, exerts strong pressure on the judiciary to bend it to the will of a particular social group conflict.As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in Pennekamp v. Florida: There can be no free society without freedom of the press, yet freedom of the press is not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free society.The scope and nature of the constitution's protection of freedom of speech must be understood from the above-mentioned perspective and used in accordance with it.The independence of the judiciary is nothing more than a means to achieve the end of a free society, and whether an independent judiciary can properly perform its duties also depends on whether it can properly recognize or treat the freedom of the press.For the judiciary cannot function properly if it is reasonably believed that what the press is doing is preventing the judiciary from judging according to its function only on the facts of the cases before it.The judiciary is independent only if the courts are able to enforce the law without outside pressure, whether through rewards or threats of snubbing. It can be seen that the above two conflicting values ​​are rooted in the structure of our constitutional life.If these two values ​​conflict, then the judiciary needs to make reasonable adjustments and coordination.Likewise, the right of government to protect itself against the deliberate use of force to overthrow it must generally be considered a part of government, in view of the human reaction of men to threats to their existence. an inherent right, regardless of whether it is expressly sanctioned by the Constitution.It is not unreasonable, however, to think that the government has lost that right if it has violated its duty by degenerating its regime into a state of complete despotism or anarchic chaos.If the constitutional system in question is a system of a free society that firmly protects the freedom to criticize the government severely, it is of course self-evident that the right to suppress revolutionary activity must be limited to acts that pose a serious threat to national security Reasonable. In order to form an adequate perspective on these important questions, it is necessary to bear in mind that the positive law that a society possesses can never encompass the "living law" structure of the society as a whole.A society is always run on principles which flow from the spirit and nature of its institutions and which are essential to its effective functioning, even though these principles have not been endorsed by the legislature or the Constituent Assembly formal statement.For reasons of legal clarity and stability, the status of social positive law must generally be given precedence over the status of informal sources of law, but there are still situations in which a mutual adjustment must be made between formal and informal sources of.This is especially true in the field of constitutional law, where, for example, the entire organized way of life of a country is affected by the decisions of the courts on important issues; constitutional values, which may, at later stages of development in the life of this country, become in great need of judicial protection.In short, a written constitution is always incomplete.We must, however, insist that courts give the highest priority to the positive rules of the Constitution, and only when the demand for the recognition of some unspecified principle in particular cases has been of great force, Only then can one think that the positive rules of the constitution should give way to some unwritten principle (such as the principle of national security, self-defense, or irresistible necessity). As Roscoe Pound has pointed out, one can conceive of four different ways how courts might deal with change in the law brought about by statute: (1) Courts may well incorporate it into the legal system, since it provides not only a rule to be applied, but a principle upon which reasoning is based; and it may also be held that, since it is more directly at present Expressing the general will, it has higher authority over the same general questions than rules made by judges; and since it can also be used as a basis for analogical reasoning, it also takes precedence over rules made by judges. (2) Courts may subsume it fully into a system of law which, like any other rule of law, may be relied upon for reasoning by analogy, but on the same general issues courts may regard it as a rule made by judges. Have equal or equal authority. (3) Courts may refuse to incorporate it fully into the legal system, but simply implement it; or they may refuse to rely on it as a basis for reasoning by analogy, but interpret it freely to include the whole of what it purports to cover. field. (4) The court can not only refuse to use it as a basis for analogical reasoning or refuse to apply it directly, but also interpret it in a strict and narrow sense, applying it strictly only to those situations explicitly referred to by it. The view of Roman law reflected in Justinian’s Encyclopaedia basically conforms to the first method described by Pound.Roman jurist Julian (Julianus) pointed out, "Not all special circumstances can be stipulated in laws and Senate bills, but when their meaning is clear in a certain situation, the person exercising jurisdiction must apply the rule by analogy, and exercise the judicial power in this way." Another famous Roman jurist, Ulpianus, also pointed out in the same way, "As Pedius (Pedius) That said, anything that is adopted by law has a good chance of being extended, by way of interpretation, or at least by adjudication, to other cases involving the same social purpose." Added a suggestion, "In order to protect the intent of the law, the law should be interpreted freely." After the development of Roman law to a considerable extent, the attitude towards regulations has gradually been inherited by the modern Roman legal system.In general, Roman law rejected a theory of interpretation according to which the words of a statute themselves should provide the only basis for determining the content of the statute.The Roman legal system tended to believe that the main purpose of interpreting a statute was to establish the intent or purpose which formed the basis of the statute in question.On the whole, the Roman legal system was not inclined towards "the plain-meaning rule," according to which a statute had to be applied whenever the words appeared to be clear and unambiguous, Regardless of what the statute's framers intended to mean by them, and without resorting to outside help that would help clarify their meaning.Furthermore, the Roman legal system also preferred to allow the extension of statute provisions to situations that, although the wording of the provision could not cover them in the broadest sense, they did. do fall within the principles or social purposes contemplated by the statute.This method is known as the analogy method.Thus, if the law confers on the executor a certain right of action, the court is likely to grant administration as long as the general purpose of the law applies to the administrator and there is no justification for limiting that right of action to the executor only. persons have the same right of action, although this is not provided for in the law at all.If the law does not deal generally with liability arising from the default of performance of debts, but establishes such liability for sellers, buyers, landlords, lessees, principals, and trustees, no one can argue without exception. When the reason for this principle is limited to the above-mentioned categories of persons, the principle may be extended to other debtors. Samuel Thorne has pointed out that, during certain periods of English medieval history, the common law view of statute interpretation was no different from that of Roman law and the Roman legal system in general: statutes were frequently Extended application to situations not expressly provided for by them.Conversely, when applying a statute that is worded too broadly to a particular complex factual situation would create intractable problems or injustice, judges are free to follow the statute's wording. Decide. In the early 14th century, common law judges enjoyed great latitude in how they treated statutes, and it was not uncommon for the judiciary to make substantial changes to statutes.In Thorne's words, regulations were seen at the time as "policy proposals that could be treated with indifference to their precise content." Statutory norms were also gradually deemed inappropriate, but the emerging principle of equitable interpretation of statutes still allowed free interpretation of statutes in accordance with their purposes and allowed analogies to operate within moderate limits.Plowden, the publisher of the judgment, stated in 1573 that "the purpose of the statute should be more concerned and pursued than the rigid wording of the statute, because the wording of the statute refers to things that are beyond the The extent of the signifiers of these words, and the extent of these things, is exactly what the maker of the statute intended; therefore, an Act of Parliament can best be interpreted by its purpose, not by its words.” P. Loden also pointed out that "when the words of a statute prescribe one thing, they prescribe all other things in equal measure," arguing that legal remedies at the time Similar situations should also be adjusted according to the same principle. In the 18th century, in his book "Commentaries on the Laws of England" (Commentaries on the Laws of England), Blackstone still expressed the principle of equitable interpretation of law in a strictly limited and carefully worded way. admit. Unreasonable though it may be if Parliament expressly prescribes that a certain thing should be done, I know that no constitutional provision in general form confers on the power to control the situation; Nor is there a single example commonly given which demonstrates that a judge has the power to strike down a statute when its principal purpose is unreasonable; for that would place the judicial power above that of the legislature. , thereby subverting the entire ruling structure. Immediately afterwards, he added an important qualification to this recognition of the supremacy of parliament, "If the general wording creates some incidental problem and the problem happens to be unreasonable, then the judge can respectfully conclude that It concluded that Parliament did not foresee this consequence at the time, and that the judge therefore had a right to interpret the statute equitably and to disregard it only on this point." Blackstone gives the following example of the judiciary's equitable Correcting the statutes, "If an Act of Parliament vests a man with power to decide all cases that arise at the estate of Dale; however, if there arises a case in which he himself is a party, then any man may The Act cannot be construed as extending its application to the case, since it would be unreasonable for any person to adjudicate a dispute in which he himself is a party." However, Blackstone also pointed out that if Parliament's intention can be properly inferred that confers that right on a person without exception, the statute should be construed as applying to that case. In the nineteenth century, what was left of the principle of equitable interpretation of statutes was completely destroyed in England.It is thought today that the judge's business is merely to determine what Parliament has said in its statutes and to apply the language of the statutes to the cases before him.In difficult cases, it is considered ultra vires for a judge to add missing points to a statute (unless the statute would be meaningless without such additions) or to add equitable exceptions.It is held that the true meaning of the statute corresponds to that conveyed to the judge by the express meaning of its words, and that the judge should, as far as possible, give full force to the literal meaning of the words used in the statute.The judge's goal is to seek out the legislature's intent in the words used in the statute, even if the consequences of such an interpretation may be harmful.The duty of the courts is "to state the law as it stands and to leave the question of relief, if at all necessary, to others."Even an appeal to the history of an Act of Parliament as a means of helping to determine the meaning of that Act is generally not permissible. In the United States, the law of statutory interpretation is also in constant flux.Conflicting tendencies are at work in the courts, so it is difficult to draw a general picture of what should be considered the prevailing attitude toward statute in the United States.Karl Llewellyn has pointed out that the vast array of interpretive norms available to American courts contains a range of objections and contradictions, and that one can in fact find a rule of statutory interpretation to support whatever the court wishes. result.然而，尽管在法律解释这一领域中，当今仍然存在着大量的不确定性和混乱状况，但是某些发展趋势和发展方向还是显而易见的，而这可以使人们谨慎地预见到法规解释法则在美国可能具有的前景。 在美国的法律史上曾有过这样一段时期，当时法院认识法规的方法就是我们在本节的开篇部分介绍的庞德所描述的第四种方法。当一条法规包含有一种背离普通法的立法性改革时，法院不仅可以拒绝将它作为类推推理的依据，而且还可以用最为狭义的和限定最为严格的方式解释该法规的术语。他们在这个方面的态度同弗里德里克·波洛克（Frederick Pollock）爵士于1882年所描述的英国法院的态度颇为相似。波洛克认为，这种态度“很难得到圆说，除非它是以这种理论为基础的，即议会通常会使法律朝更坏的方向转化，而且法官的职责就是要使议会干扰所带来的危害限于尽可能狭小的范围之内。” 今天，美国联邦法院和许多州的法院在接受制定法方面的态度，从整体上看，已没有上个世纪那么敌对了。美国法院，特别是美国最高法院，在对待那些赋予为普通法所不知的权利以补救的法规（如最低工资法规，社会治安法规或劳工赔偿法规等）时，往往采取了一种比较自由和开明的态度。这似乎可以表明，美国法院已倾向于采纳庞德所列举的第三种法规解释的方法。大量运用可以反映某一法规立法沿革的委员会报告和其他资料，也是美国法院的习惯做法之一。但是，当某一制定法规定的措词极为明确的时候，那么在确定立法意图时是否还允许诉诸一些有益的外部帮助呢？对于这个问题，美国的司法实践仍处于举棋不定的状况。许多州的法院采取了这样一种立场，即当某一法令含义明确的时候、又当（仍从该法规本身来看）它明显只能有一种解释的时候，法院对该法规就必须做出这种解释，而毋需探究其立法沿革。 美国最高法院在涉及含义明确的规则时做出的裁决，并不总是连贯一致的。把立法意图置于法规字面含义之上的最为引人注目的判决例证，可能是著名的“三位一体教会”（TrinityChurch）案。1885年，美国国会禁止人们以那种同尚未移居美国的外国人缔结劳务合同的手段去鼓励外国人移居美国。该规定的但书将职业艺术家、演讲学者、歌唱家和家庭仆人排除在该规定的适用范围之外，但却没有提及传播福音的牧师。一家教会同一位英国牧师缔结了一份有关该牧师前来美国并出任该教会的教区长和牧师的合同。在他来到美国并接受了他的工作以后，政府试图对该教会科以（该法令所规定的刑罚）罚款处罚。然而，最高法院却拒绝只按字面意思解释该法规。最高法院在考虑该法令的名称（仅指“劳务”）及其目的而不是其语词以后，得出结论认为，所有可资利用的资料都表明了一个意图，即该法令只试图对从国外引入廉价的无技能的劳动力加以控制。 但是另一方面，在“庄·富克诉怀特”（Chung Fook v.White）一案中，同是美国最高法院，却在解释某一制定法规时采取了一种极为狭义的和拘泥文字的释义态度。一项法规规定，当一个已归化的公民让他的妻子或未成年的孩子来美国同他一起生活时，即使在他归化以后他所娶的妻子或所生的未成年的孩子患有传染病，也应当被准许前来美国，而不用先住院治疗。该法院认为，此项特权不适用于一个在本国出生的公民，因为该法令（无疑是由于疏忽）只提及了归化公民。该法院指出，“由于该法规的语词含义是清楚明了的，所以即使它不公正地歧视了在本国出生的公民或者它导致的结果是残忍的和无人性的，一如那些极有说服力的主张那样，对此予以救济的问题是国会的事情，而不是法院的事情。”尽管存在着这种偏狭的判例，但我们却可以说，当今最高法院判例中的趋势是朝侧重目的的法规解释政策的方向发展的。在“美国诉美国货运协会”（United States v.American Trucking Association）一案中，该法院在下述文字中猛烈抨击了正统形式的含义明确规则： 当（明确的）含义导致荒谬的或无益的结果时……本法院会撇开其语词含义而去考虑该法令的目的。然而，经常会发生这样的情况，即当明确的含义未产生荒谬的结果而仅仅只是产生了一种与整个立法政策明显不相符合的不合理的结果时，本法院所遵循的也只是其目的而不是其文字措词。当我们可以获得有助于解释该法规中的语词含义的资料时，那么禁止使用这种资料的“法律规则”肯定是不存在的，而不论根据“表面考察”这些语词的含义是多么清楚明了。 罗斯科·庞德勇敢地预言道，“我们业已跨入的法律发展进程，一定会使我们采纳第二种方法，并最终会使我们采纳第一种假设的方法（如同在本节开篇时所论及的）。这种发展的可能性源于这样一个事实，即成文法律正在美国的法律制度中起着日益重大的作用，而且普通法法官在美国历史早期阶段对立法改革所表现出来的怀疑态度，也正日趋被那种对法规的更为肯定的态度所取代。 在对待编纂法或制定法时，我们从普遍的经验中获知，一条法规的语词往往不能完整地或准确地反映该法规制定者的意图和目的。当立法者试图用简洁但却一般的术语表达其思想时，那些在过去曾属于整个意图范围中的情形，在当今则几乎被完全切割出去了；但是另一方面，对于为法定语言所经常适用的情形，只要立法者在先前就已经意识到该问题，那么他们肯定会确定一种例外。在按字面含义解释法规可能会导致一个不公平的判决的时候（而且如果立法者在先前就熟悉该案件的事实，那么连他本人也决不会同意这种判决），还必须要求法官去服从法规语词，这样做是否必要或是否可欲呢？ 一个可以用来支持按字面含义解释法规的论点，是建立在这样一种考虑基础上的，即这种解释理论能使法律具有确定性和明确性。当一个人为了了解他的权利与义务或其他人的权利与义务而研读法规时，应当能够使他信赖该法规文本，而不应当强迫他对立法者在通过此法规时脑子里所真正思考的东西进行费力的考查。当这个论点适用于一个平民或商人时，初一看，这个论点似乎具有特别的说服力，因为平民或商人对于钻研其所关心的法规的立法沿革来讲，根本没有相关的手段。然而，我们也能就这个论点所提出的问题做出答复。首先，普通人很少研读法规；如果某一法规的内容对于他们的私人事务或商业事务特别重要的话，那么他们通常会向律师或某个其他通晓该问题的人进行咨询。第二，即使这些普通人研读法规，大量案例中的语词含义对他们来讲也是不清楚的，反过来讲，就是清楚，也会引起他们误解的。许多法规中都含有专门的法律术语，而这些术语则未必就是不解自明的。甚至在使用日常语言中的语词时，这些语词也往往可以作广义或狭义的理解。在这种状况下，如果法规解释要服从智力平平的人所能理解的那种通俗自然的语言含义标准，那么这种解决问题的方法就显然过分简单化了。 然而另一方面，有人也可能会宣称，尽管普通人倾向于用含义明确的方法作为立法语言的取向并不能证明诉诸字面解释理论为正当，但是律师的利益则要求采用这种方法。一些能力超群的论者曾指出，如果试图通过使用当时的立法准备资料来探究立法目的，那么这种努力过程中就会充满陷井和圈套。这些论者还指出，那种试图发现统一的立法意图的工作，从很大程度上来看，只不过是一种虚幻的徒劳无益的工作，因此就一般情形而论，更可取的乃是让法官用合理解释法规的手段去发现他们自己所应采纳的解决解释问题的方法。 那种劝告法官在使用立法背景资料时要有约束的原则，是很有些道理的，但是它的那些警告性告诫有时则是言过其实了。非常明显，一个立法机关的众多成员甚或一个立法委员会的成员，对于某一法规的有效范围或目的往往也是众说纷纭和意见分歧的，而且他们还会就某条成文条款或规定的适用范围问题发生实质性的分歧。正如哈里·W·琼斯（Harry W.Jones）所指出的，“如果'立法意图'被期望来表示上下立法两院的全部成员对法规术语所作的一种一致的解释，那么显而易见，它只是一个纯属虚构的概念而已。”但是，琼斯也指出，通过对委员会的报告以及对在立法辩论期间被接受或遭否定的动议修正案的历史进行考察，人们往往能够发现，在讨论过程的某个阶段，委员会成员或其他有关立法者实际上也曾就某一特定规定或一些规定的实质性含义达成过谅解。再者，对当时的立法准备资料进行研究，往往还可以把引起该立法法规产生的一般舆论氛围、使它得以通过的一般社会状况以及立法机关所试图加以调整的特殊“损害行为”都明显反映出来。通过揭示该法案背后的动力即政治目的、社会目的或经济目的，这些背景资料还能为确定一般性立法意图提供重大帮助。然而，我们也必须承认，如果这种立法意图根本没有得到规定，亦即是说，如果它在被选定来实现它的法规术语中完全未得到反映，那么法官就有正当理由拒绝实施这种依靠诉诸外部资料而辨析出来的立法意图。 如果法官对一条法律规则所被认为具有的那种含义存有疑问，假定他会去查阅当时的立法准备资料并将这种资料作为他确定该规则意图的一种线索，那么就会发生这样一个问题，即他是否受立法者在该法则通过时所持的观点之约束。该法官是否必须遵循对该法规的那种历史解释呢？或者他是否有权按照立法者（如果他于审判该案时在场的话）可能表达的观点来审判这个案件呢？后一种见解在1573年时为普洛登所采纳： 为了在一条法规的字面含义按照衡平法可以伸缩之时做出一个正确的判断，可以采取这样一种好方法，即当你仔细考察这项法规时，你可以假定立法者在场，并假定你向他提出了你想知道的有关该衡平原则的问题，然后，如同你想像如果他在场他所会作的回答那样，你必须自己做出这样一种回答……。如果立法者会遵循该衡平原则，那么你可以不考虑该法规的语词……就可直接效仿该立法者去采纳这一衡平原则，因为你的所作所为只不过是立法者所会采取的做法，而且你的做法并没有与法律相背离，而是与法律相符合的。 这种方法的弊端在于这样一个事实，即确定立法者在审判之时可能会对有关法规采取的看法同该法规通过时立法者所采取的观点是有区别的，所以这是一件碰运气的工作，其结果也肯定只是推测性质的。另外，如果有可能在审判时向不同的立法者征求有关该法规解释的看法，那么他们很可能会做出不同的反应。因此，法规解释工作是否应当以这样一个不确定的和难以把握的标准为基础呢？ 如果法官对法规用语的含义和范围产生疑问，一般来讲，他们应当通过使用他们可资利用的各种帮助和资料来确定立法目的，然后再将如此发现的立法目的予以实施。这一规则应当起支配作用，即使在通过法规时普遍的社会形势自那时起发生了某些变化，以及它曾指向的损害行为或恶行在涉及该法规解释的裁决予以宣布时已在相当程度上发生了变化。这种做法可能会产生这样一种裁决，即从公平与正义的角度来看，这种裁决很可能会遭到质疑，但是这一方法却有助于在探究有关立法意图时防止过分的主观性。 另一方面，如果某一法规赖以为条件的社会情势、习俗和一般态度自该法规通过之时起已发生了一种显著的、实质性的和明确的变化，那么法院就应当达致一个不同的结果。在这种情形中，法官应当能够做出一种可能性极大的假定，即这种明确显著的情势变化不可能不对法律制定者产生影响。因此，如果一条区分男人与女人民事地位的法规，是在法律上男女不平等现象被认为是那个社会制度所具有的一个必要的和有助益的先决条件的时期颁布的，那么我们就应当假定那些制定该法规的立法者倾向于赋予该法规以一个宽泛的适用范围。在那种主张男女不平等的社会态度已经让位于男女实质性平等的观念以后，法院就有充分的理由把那个法规局限适用于尽可能狭窄的范围。如果这种方法产生了人为的歧视性待遇，那么法院在一些情形下可以用来摆脱此种困难的一个方法——除了废除该法规以外——就是以其完全过时为理由而根据正当程序条款拒绝给予它以持续效力。 如果由法官做出某种纠正行为乃是在解决某个法律纠纷中达致公平合理的结果所不可或缺的条件，那么人们就有充分的理由主张法官有权对忽略的要点予以补充并对在制定成文规则时所出现的明显过宽的情形加以纠正。因此，如果人们能够发现把遗产管理人排除在有关法规的法律术语之外纯属立法者之疏忽大意而别无他由，又如果扩大适用该法规不会导致不公平的结果，那么我们就很难理解为什么法院不能将赋予受托人、受信托人以及遗嘱执行人以某种民事诉权的法规扩大适用于遗产管理人。反过来讲，如果严格适用法规语词会导致一个完全不合理的或荒谬的结果，那么就应当准许法院将衡平法上的例外植入该法律规则之中。例如，让我们假定，一条法规规定，任何人未得到其欲离开的国家的同意，不得进入美国。如果一位妇女在得到了必要的准许之后，带着一个她在旅途中出生的婴儿到了美国，那么法院是否应当要求移民当局明确按照该法规语词只准许该母亲进入美国，而却拒绝让她的婴儿进入美国呢？尽管该案件中的答案当是清楚明了的，当是我们仍应当坚持认为，法官为了基本正义要求而背离法规的字面含义的权力，必须局限于那些根本需要予以衡平救济的案件，而且法官在将一个衡平法上的例外植入某一法规时滥用自由裁量权的情形，也应当成为有关当事人提起上诉的根据。 我们在这里所采取的观点，可能会受到批评，因为它支持对立法机关的权力进行过当的司法干预和侵犯。有人可能会说，尽管完善法官造的法很可能被认为是司法机关合法权限范围内的事情，但是随意对待法规的做法则必须被认为是一群并不具有这种权力的人在不适当地僭取立法权力。 然而，上述批评缺乏说服力。一个通情达理的立法者会意识到他自己所制定的法律中肯定会有不足之处。他也会知道，制定法规则几乎不可能被表述得如此之完美无缺，以致所有应隶属于该立法政策的情形都被包括在该法规的文本阐述之中，而所有不应隶属于该法规范围的情形亦被排除在该法规语词含义范围之外了。再者，我们也不能假定，由一些通情达理的人组成的立法机关会坚持要求对纠正小错误及不当之处的事情也享有排他性权利。如果立法机关要求这种排他性权利而且得到了这种权利，那么立法机关就会始终忙于修正其自己颁布的法律，而且常常是忙于修正一些微不足道的要点；这显然是不切实际的，因为还有其他的和更为迫切的政治要求压在当代立法者身上，而这些要求已足以使他们穷于应对了。再者，即使最终做出了必要的修正，受字面含义解释法规的原则束缚的法官在此同时所造成的不公正现象却依旧无法得到纠正。 根据上述考虑，我们必须指出，一个立法机关应当以默许的方式把对法规的字面用语进行某些纠正的权力授予司法机关，只要这种纠正是确保基本公平和正义所必要的。只要这一权力能够以审慎的节制的方式行使，只要司法机关避免对法规作重大的修改（这是英国中世纪某些时期的法律的特点），那么把有限的衡平法上的纠正权力授予法院就不会导致对规范体系或规范体系的实质性部分造成破坏。当我们在同时认识到那个按字面含义解释法规的时代根本没有能够有助于达致那种为主张含义明确解释原则的倡导者曾希望能够实现的法律安全之程度的时候，这种认识便给那些支持将正义考虑重新引入法规解释规则的论点增加了说服力。 在前文的一节文字中，我们曾得出了这样一个结论，即在英美法律体系下，司法先例在当今被认为是法律的正式渊源。但是另一方面，我们也曾指出，由于法院在对待早期判例所确立的法律规则时采取自由的方式（如用重新表达、限定、扩大、缩小或改变这种规则的种种方法），所以同法规相比，先例必须被认为是一种效力较弱、权威性较低的法律渊源。因此，我们并未授予我国的法官以修正法规文本的权力，然而我们却允许他们重述或修正法官制定的法律。在本节中，我们将更为详尽地分析我国法律制度赋予司法先例的权威性待遇及程度的问题。这一分析将主要关注两个基本问题：（1）遵循先例原则之含义及其限度；（2）推翻先例之效力的问题。而与之紧密相关的一个问题即应当如何确定一个案件的判决理由（ratio decidendi）的问题，我们拟在下一节中予以讨论。 遵循先例乃是用来意指英美先例原则的一个最为普通的术语。该术语是拉丁语stare decisis et non quieta movere（即遵守先例、不扰乱确立的要点）的缩略语。如果用一般的方式来表述，遵循先例乃意味着某个法律要点一经司法判决确立，便构成了一个日后不应背离的先例。如果用另一种方式来表述，那就是说，一个直接相关的先前案例，必须在日后的案件中得到遵循。 在遵循先例规则得到严格一致适用的法律制度中，法院决不能无视或不顾先例，即使对于被要求在某个诉讼案中适用该规则或原则的法官来讲，那个作为该规则或原则的根据的先例似乎业已陈旧，甚至是完全不合理的。遵循先例原则的这一要素常常遭到外行与法律工作者的抨击。外行抨击该原则的一个范例乃是经常为人们征引的江奈生·斯威夫特（Jonathan Swift）所著的（Gulliver`s Travels）一书中的一段话。“这些律师有这样一条准则”，格列佛说，“即凡是有前例可援引的事再发生，就算是合法，因此他们特别注意把以前所有违反公理、背叛人之理性的判决记录下来。他们管这些判决叫作先例，时时引以为据来替不法行为辩护；而法官也总是根据先例来处理案件。”一些法学家和法官也同样指责说，先例原则导致了极度的保守主义。 既然信奉先例原则明显会促使法律僵化和恪守现状，那么我们就必须追问遵循先例原则的优点及值得称道的方面究竟是什么。我们可以列举出下述五个确有助益的因素来支持遵循先例原则： 1.该原则将一定的确定性和可预见性引入了私人活动及商业活动的计划之中。它能使人们在进行贸易活动和安排他们个人的事务时具有某种把握，即他们不会被卷入诉讼之中。它为他们预测社会的其他成员可能会如何对待他们的方式提供了某种根据（假定这些社会的其他成员是遵守法律的公民）。没有这种可预见性的要素，人们便无法确定他们的权利、义务和责任，从而也不能确定他们在干什么事时是不用担心受到强制性的制裁的。如果每一项业已确立的规则都容易在一夜之间即被废除，那么人们便永远不会知道是和解争议还是将争议呈诉法院，而且在这种事态下，诉讼案会增长一千倍。 2.遵循先例为那些给私人以咨询的律师进行法律推理和法律咨询提供了某种既定根据。如果一个律师不具有一些可以帮助他预见诉讼案所可能导致的结果的有助益的工具，那么他对他的当事人来讲便不会有什么用处。用威廉·琼斯（William Jones）爵士的话来讲，“除非法院受先例之约束，否则不是律师的老百姓便不会知道如何行事，而在许多情形下，就是律师也无法知道如何提供咨询”。 3.遵循先例原则有助于对法官的专断起到约束作用。它对于那种容易产生偏袒和偏见的既软弱又动摇不定的法官来讲，可以起到后盾的作用。通过迫使他遵循（作为一种规则）业已确立的先例，该原则减少了使他做出带有偏袒和偏见色彩的判决的诱惑。“如果美国废除了先例原则（同时制定法只具有相对有限的适用范围），那么在未被制定法所规定的整个人际关系领域中，法官就会按照他们个人的旨趣和他们个人的是非观去自由行事。”这种状况无益于维持人们对法律的尊重，也无助于保持公众对司法机关的廉洁公正性所具有的信任。人们之所以愿意把司法判例视为有约束力，其中的一个重要原因便是人们假定它们是以客观的法律规定为基础的并且是以不受主观偏见和个人情感影响的推理为基础的——尽管上述状况在法律制度的运作实施中并不总是能够达致的。 4.遵循先例的惯例还可以增进办理司法业务的速度，从而促进司法工作的效力。遵循先例可以节约时间并节省法官的精力，与此同时还可以减少诉讼当事人的诉讼费用。它使法院在一个法律问题每次重新提出时就重新考察该问题的做法成为不必要。法官卡多佐先生指出，“如果过去的每个判例在每个新案件中都要被重新讨论，而且一个人无法在其他走在前面的人所奠砌的可靠的基础上砌他自己的砖，那么法官的劳动就会被增加到几乎使他垮掉的地步。” 5.先例原则还得到了人之正义感的支持。用卡尔·卢埃林的话来讲，先例在法律中的效力得以提高，乃是通过“那种奇妙且几乎是普遍的正义感而实现的。这种正义感强烈要求，在相同的情形中，所有的人都应当得到同样的对待。”如果甲因其隐私遭到毫无理由的干涉而在上个月得到了救济，那么在这个月拒绝给乙以这种救济就是不公正的，如果乙所陈述的事实同一个月前甲所描述的事实基本相同。 然而，在同正义的关系中，先例原则却存在着一个经常为人们所论及的弱点。当某个问题再一次发生且又需要审判的时候，一个左右法院审判的先例有可能被认为是过时了。在前一次审判与后一次审判的期间内，占支配地位的正义观念有可能发生显著的变化。可能反映了历史早期观点的前一个判例，有可能拒绝受理以侵犯隐私权为基础的诉讼；而对于一位当代法官来讲，该先例则可能是显失公平的，因为我们关于侵犯个人隐私的观念在此期间已发生了很大变化，并变成了一个较为敏感的、较容易引起人们关注的问题。 假定平等与正义之间存在着一种紧密关系，那么我们就必须认识到，遵循先例所关注的平等乃是在一个过去的判例与现在的判例之间的那种平等。但是另一方面，正义则可能因社会观的变化而要求修改平等标准。尽管遵循先例增进了时间上的平等，亦即是说，平等对待甲于1760年就其案件提起的诉讼同乙于1960年发生的诉讼案中所获得的判决，但是正义所关注的，较为严格地说，则是空间上的平等，即按照当代价值判断进行权衡的方法来平等对待两个人或两起情形。再者，一个早期的判决有可能是一个水平差的无能的法官做出的，因此人们可以用正义与合理方面的考虑作为废除这个判例的依据。 当法官遇到一个过时的或不合理的先例时，他能有何作为呢？他是否可以以该判例与我们当下的是非观念不相符合为理由而无视或不顾该先例呢？抑或他是否必须为了稳定性而牺牲正义并奉行此一不受欢迎的先例呢？ 1966年以前，英国上议院和美国最高法院就上述问题采取了两种彼此冲突的立场。英国上议院于1898年裁决道，它完全受其自己做出的判决的约束。这一原则是在“伦敦街有轨电车公司诉伦敦市议会”（London Street Tramwalys Co.V.London City Council）一案中确立的。在该案中，英国上议院裁定道，“本院就法律问题所作的判决是终决性的，而且……除议会法令外，任何规定都不能对本院判决中所被指称的错误情形做出纠正。”撰写该案判决理由的霍尔斯伯里（Halsbury）伯爵在证明该规则为正当时作了下述评论，“我并不否认会产生一些特别棘手的案件，而且在同行中也可能会存在一些认为某某判决是错误的看法；但是由于判决的不同使得每个问题都要被重新论证进而使人们的交往变得极不确定，所以事实上也就没有什么真正的终审上诉法院可言了；同这种不方便——灾难性的不方便——相比较，偶尔同那种可能是抽象正义的东西相冲突，又能算什么呢？”然而在1966年，英国上议院又改变了其立场。上议院议长加德纳（Gardiner）宣布说，“议员们……都认识到，过于呆板地奉行先例，可能会在某个特定案件中导致不公正，而且还可能会限制法律的适当发展。因此，他们试图修正当下的实践，而且在将本院先前的判例通常视为有约束力的同时试图背离早先的判例，只要这样做被认为是正确的。” 在美国，人们从未将遵循先例认为是一种不可抗拒的命令，而是认为遵循先例的义务是受有关推翻早期先例的权利限制的。尽管某一管辖区内的低级法院被认为是受中级法院或最高上诉法院的判例约束的，但是各州的最高法院以及联邦最高法院却都为自己保留了背离它们早先确立的规则的权利。然而，为了法律稳定，他们通常也不会轻率地运用这一特权。法官卡多佐先生指出，“奉行先例应当是规则，而不应当是例外”。法官布兰代斯（Brandeis）先生也指出，“遵循先例，通常来讲是一个明智之策，因为在大多数情形中，确立一项可适用的规则要比纠正一项可适用的规则重要得多。”然而，当有必要防止有危害的错误一直因袭下去时或在某个早期判例同时代要求完全不一致的情形下，法院有时也会推翻它自己的判例。总的来讲，美国最高法院对于否弃一个已成为财产法或贸易法中的既定规则的先例之倾向程度，要低于它按照联邦宪法推翻一个涉及法规效力的案例之倾向。用大法官斯通的话来讲，“不论遵循先例原则有时是多么适当甚或是多么必要，它在宪法领域中却只有有限的适用性。”在宪法领域中，使法律与社会秩序的能动发展同步展开，是特别重要的，因为用立法手段纠正涉及宪法的判例简直是不可能的。 美国对待先例的态度，看上去要比英国上议院于1966年以前所遵行的政策更为可取。既然维持稳定性并不是法律制度的唯一目标，那么就应当给予法官以否弃那些完全陈腐的、根本不明智的且与社会福利大相径庭的早期判例的权力。“如果法官不幸曲解了他们那个时代的习俗，又如果他们那个时代的习俗己不再是我们这个时代的习俗了，那么他们就不应当将其后继者的手脚束缚住，使他们无能为力。”对于那些反映一种异常现象的、无法成为整个法律制度结构中一部分的或与法律制度的一些指导原则不相符合的先例，也应当赋予法官以同样的灵活处理的权力。弗兰克福特法官在“赫尔弗林诉哈洛克”（Helvering v.Hallock）一案中着重强调了最后一点；他在该案判决书中指出，“我们承认遵循先例体现了一项重要的社会政策。它反映了法律的连续性成分，并植根于人类满足合理期望的心理需要之中。但是，当遵循先例同一个适用范围更广泛的、在实质上更合理的且为经验证明是优先的原则发生冲突时，遵循先例就只是一项政策性原则，而不是信奉最新判例——而不论它是怎么个新法、怎么个有问题——的一项机械准则。”然而，在赋予法院以推翻其判例的权利的时候，我们应当明确这样一点，即法院在行使这种权利时，应当确使否弃一项早期规则所导致的损害比保留它所导致的损害要小，即使该项规则是一项可受质疑的规则。在涉及到否弃业已确立的先例的每一个案件中，法院都必须慎重地把法律制度稳定性和连续性的利益同改革和完善法律制度的利益予以平衡。 根据一个仍占支配地位的原则而否弃某个先例的做法，会产生一个令人遗憾的结果，即一个推翻先例的判例会