Chapter 13 Chapter 9 The Revival of Natural Law and Value Oriented Jurisprudence
From the middle of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, natural law theory was at a low ebb in most civilized countries in the West.To a large extent, it was replaced by the evolutionary interpretation and legal positivism of the historical legal school.Historical and evolutionary views of the law attempt to explain law causally in terms of ethnological factors or in terms of some evolutionary forces that drive law along a predetermined line.Legal positivists, especially analytic jurists, sought to prevent philosophical or speculative consideration of the nature and purpose of law, and to limit the scope of jurisprudential inquiry strictly to the technical analysis of the positive law enacted and enforced by the state. aspect.Attempts to study the aims and ideals of legal regulation tended to disappear in contemporary jurisprudence and legal philosophy, and philosophical research on the ultimate value of legal ordering virtually ceased at the end of the nineteenth century.
In the 20th century, however, there was a revival of natural law thinking and value-oriented jurisprudence.In fact, some elements of legal idealism have been seen in some viewpoints of sociological jurisprudence.Joseph Kohler believes that the purpose of legal control is to promote the development of culture, but he takes a completely relativistic attitude towards the ethical values that laws aimed at promoting cultural development should serve.Roscoe Pound defined the purpose of law as the orderly arrangement of human behavior through political organization of society to maximize the satisfaction of human needs.Although he was sympathetic to the rise of a new philosophy of value, his own legal theory was limited to a quantitative discussion of interests that needed to be satisfied or demanded to be adjusted through the art of legal "engineering."Although legal realism in the 20th century was also clearly aware of the practical role of value judgments and social policy considerations in the legal process, it was still reluctant to construct a rational and objective theory of legal purposes and social ideals.
In Germany, Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938 AD) was the first to attempt to create a modern philosophy of natural law based on a priori inferences.As a philosophical disciple of Kant, he is convinced that certain a priori cognitive categories and forms of people constitute their cognitive perception of phenomena, and these categories and forms cannot be obtained by observing reality.Stammler believes that there are pure forms of thinking in the human mind, which enable people to understand legal concepts independently without considering the specific and changeable manifestations of law in history.
However, Stammler departs from Kant on the following issue.He decomposed the concept of law into two components: the concept of law and the idea of law.Kant defines law as the sum total of conditions under which the freedom of one person can coexist harmoniously with the freedom of all others.Stammler argues that this formula is incorrect because it mistook the concept of law for the idea of "just" or just law.He pointed out that the concept of law must be defined in such a way that it can include all possible realizations and forms of law in human history.Stammler believes that he has discovered such an all-encompassing definition of law, the following formula: "The law is the inviolable, arbitrary collective will." There are a large number of different elements in this formula.Law is the collective will, which means that it is an expression of social life.Law is an instrument of social cooperation, not a means for the satisfaction of purely subjective individual desires of no social value.Furthermore, the law is an expression of the arbitrary and supreme collective will.Once a legal rule is established, it has coercive force.Legal rules are binding regardless of whether individual citizens wish to abide by them.This fact, says Stammler, distinguishes law from customs and social conventions, because customs and conventions merely attract citizens to obey them, they have no absolute coercive power in themselves.Finally, legal rules contain an element of inviolability.This means that, so long as the rules are valid, they are strictly binding not only on the citizens who are subject to them, but also on those entrusted with making and promulgating them.According to Stammler, here lies the difference between law and despotic power.If those in power do not regard the issued order as an objective and effective adjustment of human affairs, but only as the satisfaction of immediate subjective desires or impulses without normative force, then autocratic power will Come down on our heads.
Starting from the concept of law, the Stammler circle separates the idea of law.The idea of law is the realization of justice.Justice requires that all legal efforts should be directed towards the goal of achieving the most perfect harmony with respect to social life possible under the prevailing and local conditions.This harmony can only be achieved by matching the desires of the individual with the goals of society.According to Stammler, the content of a legal rule is just if it helps to reconcile individual ends with social ends.As Stammler thought, the ideal of society is to realize "a society composed of people with free will".The word "free" used in this formula does not refer to an act of will directed by one's subjective and selfish desires.In Kant's terms, a free act is one that can be objectively and rationally justified from the standpoint of the public good.
Stammler emphatically emphasized that his social ideal can only be used as a formal method of determining whether the content of a particular law is just, and cannot be used as a general substantive method for judging the "justice" of specific regulations. standard.In fact, Stammler's formula has been dismissed as something hollow.However, it is undeniable that, contrary to the methodological premises established by himself, Stammler deduced from his social ideal certain absolute requirements of "just law".He pointed out that to realize this social ideal, legislators must bear in mind the following four basic principles:
1. The content of a man's will should never be subject to the arbitrary power of any other.
2. Every legal claim must be made in such a way that the person who undertakes the obligation can still retain his human dignity.
3. Members of the legal community must not be arbitrarily excluded from the community.
4. The power of control conferred by the law can be justified only if those affected by the law can preserve their personal dignity.
What is the substantive significance of these above-mentioned "principles of respect and participation" that Stammler called?They imply that each member of society should be seen as an end in itself, and not as an object of the subjective arbitrary will of others.No one should use another person merely as a means to his own end. "The control of one's desires by respecting others, and that others strictly do so: this must be considered a principle for the realization of the above-mentioned social ideal".This view of a society of free men who regard each other as an end in itself is quite close to Kant's conception of law, but there are two differences.First, a society of individuals replaces free individuals themselves, and this means that Stammler's formula is less individualistic than Kant's.Second, in terms of the diversity of positive law, Stammler's abstract formula provides more space than Kant's definition of natural law.Stammler pointed out that "the substantive content of no legal rule can be determined a priori." In his view, two legal systems with very different legal rules and principles may both meet his social ideals. .This ideal does not imply a specific system of natural law, but merely represents a broad standard for testing the justice of positive legal rules.It is at best a "natural law with variable content".It can be said that it has little in common with the eternal and unchanging classical natural law.
Like Stammler, the Italian legal philosopher Giorgio Del Vecchio (1878-1970 A.D.) also strictly distinguished the legal concept from the legal ideal.He insists that legal concepts are logically prior to judicial experience, that is, they constitute an a priori basis.According to his point of view, the fundamental characteristics of law are, first, to coordinate the actions of different individuals objectively according to certain ethical principles; second, it is bilateral, imperative, and coercible.
For Del Vecchio, the legal ideal is the idea of natural law. "Natural law is ... the standard by which we evaluate positive law and measure its inherent justice".Because he accepted the basic principles of Kant's ethical thought, he derived the natural law from the human nature as a rational being.For him, respect for the autonomy of the human personality is the basis of justice.Everyone can ask his fellow man not to treat him only as an instrument or an object.Del Vecchio was convinced that human evolution would lead to ever-increasing recognition of human autonomy and thus the gradual realization and eventual triumph of natural law.
The absolute worth of man, the equal liberty of all, the active and not passive right of every individual in association to participate in legislation, freedom of belief, and the true The general principles, summed up by Juris naturalis scientia, have already received important affirmations in actual judicial systems, and will soon or in a certain period of time gain more recognition, whatever they may encounter Such resistance and opposition.
Although Del Vecchio can be classified as a neo-Kantian in a general sense, he differs from Kant in his understanding of the purpose of the state.For Kant, the purpose of state power is limited to enacting and enforcing laws designed to protect the equal liberty of all.Del Vecchio, however, argues that the state is not necessarily indifferent to issues of economic, cultural, and moral life.The state can extend its management power to all aspects of human social life, and the highest duty of the state is to broadly promote social welfare.However, when the state performs this duty, it must always operate in the form of law, so that every action of the state is based on the law that reflects the general will.Accordingly, Del Vecchio departed from the vein of Kant's individualism and entered the realm of Hegel's philosophy of the state.However, when the orders of state power come into irreconcilable conflict with the most primitive and basic requirements of natural law and justice, he is willing to recognize the right of the people to oppose such orders.
German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch (Gustav Radbruch, 1878-1949 A.D.) started from the value philosophy of Neo-Kantianism, which is based on "is" (is) and "should" ( should) and deny that any judgment of what is "right" can be drawn from actual observation and feeling.However, when interpreting Radbruch's legal philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish two stages in the development of his thought.
Before World War II, Radbruch basically held a relativist view on law and justice.His ideological orientation is mainly: law is the sum of general rules of common life of human beings.The ultimate goal of law is to achieve justice.But he believes that justice is a rather vague and uncertain concept.It requires that equal people should be treated equally, while different people should be treated differently according to their different situations.This general principle leaves two issues unresolved: first, the question of standards for measuring equality and inequality; and second, the question of the special treatment due to equals and unequals.In order to grasp the substantive and concrete content of the law, the idea of justice must be supplemented by another idea, that of expediency.As for the question of the expediency of legal adjustment, it cannot be answered definitively and generally in a certain way.Such an answer would necessarily be colored by political and social beliefs or party views.One person or group may regard the development of the individual personality as the highest goal of law (individualism); another person or group may regard the attainment of national strength and prosperity as the highest goal of law (transpersonalism). ism); a third person or group may also see the advancement of civilization and culture as the most worthy goal of law (transpersonalism).Although Radbruch leans towards a transpersonalist view, he still believes that any choice between the above three arguments cannot be justified in the way of scientific argument.In his view, making this choice is really a matter of personal preference.But Radbruch also pointed out that it is clear that the legal system must not be used as a plaything of various conflicting political and social views.For the purposes of security and order, it is necessary to try to make an authoritative determination of what is right and what is wrong.The ideas of justice and expediency must therefore be supplemented by a third idea, that of legal certainty.This notion requires the state to enact and maintain a substantive and binding legal system.
We thus have three factors or principles, each of which contributes to some extent to the constitution of legal institutions: the ideas of justice, of expediency, and of legal certainty.According to Radbruch's point of view, the above three concepts "require each other, but at the same time contradict each other".For example, in formulating a rule of law, justice requires generality, whereas expediency may require specificity.For another example, the concept of legal certainty requires definite and stable laws, while justice and expediency require the legal system to adapt quickly to new social and economic situations.If one of the above three concepts is fully realized, the other two must be sacrificed or negated to a certain extent, and there is no one that can satisfactorily determine the proportional relationship between the three factors in the legal system. absolute standard.Different eras will explicitly emphasize one of the above three principles.Before World War II, Radbruch himself believed that in cases of irreconcilable conflict between these principles, legal certainty should take precedence. "It is more important to end the conflict between legal views than to decide it justly and expediently".
After experiencing the huge social changes of the Nazi era and Germany's defeat in World War II, Radbruch began to revise his previous theoretical views.In his view, in order for the law to be worthy of its name, the law must satisfy certain absolute requirements.He declared that the law required some recognition of individual liberty, and that laws in which the state completely denied individual rights were "absolutely wrong laws."
In addition, Radbruch also abandons another of his previous views, that is, when there is some kind of irreconcilable conflict between justice and legal certainty, positive law must take precedence.He believed that legal positivism made Germany unable to resist the atrocities of the Nazi regime, so it was necessary to admit that completely unjust laws must give way to justice.He modifies his formula concerning the relation of positive law to justice as follows: "Unless a rule of positive law violates justice to such an intolerable degree that it becomes effectively 'illegal law' and must therefore be subject to justice, the Even when the positive law is unjust and contradicts the public good, priority should be given to the positive law rule because it is duly enacted and backed by the power of the state.Through this formula, Radbruch turned himself towards a milder form of natural law theory in his later years.
Neo-Scholasticism is a modern philosophical movement that originated in Catholicism.In this section we only discuss its implications for legal philosophy.As far as this topic is concerned, Neo-Scholasticism has been particularly active in France, Germany, and the United States in the past decade or so.
Although neo-scholastic jurists have put forward some legal theories with different emphases and meanings, they hold certain basic beliefs in common.The most important of these beliefs is that natural law is prior to and superior to positive law.Of course, what they think of as natural law is completely different from the classical natural law in Western legal philosophy.It drew its intellectual support from a different source, namely, the scholasticism of medieval Catholicism, and especially the legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Perhaps the main difference between classical and Thomistic natural law lies in the fact that Thomas' natural law is made up of very broad and general principles, whereas many classical natural lawyers developed very specific and nuanced natural law system.In this regard, Neo-Scholasticism clearly follows the tradition of Thomas' natural law.Neo-Scholasticism rejects the view that natural law is an immutable system of particular and concrete legal norms; it is content to formulate some broad and abstract principles.For example, the Swiss Neo-Thomist Victor Cathrein defined the highest principle that must govern human behavior as: "In your relationship to God, to your fellow man, and to yourself, you As a rational being, respect the order that suits you." Of this principle—as applied to legal ordering—most important is the acknowledgment of the suum cuique principle (that is, to give everyone his due the rules).Catherine believes that natural law only contains certain very basic principles, and must be embodied and implemented through the positive law of the state.Heinrich Rommen also believes that the content of natural law in the strict sense only contains two self-evident principles, which are the principle of "upholding justice and avoiding injustice" and another ancient principle : "Give everyone what they deserve".On the basis of these two principles, he held that the two legal institutions, private property and inheritance, must be regarded as having the nature of natural law, but natural law "does not ask whether these two legal institutions are feudal, It is still a system in which private ownership, collective ownership, and public ownership coexist.”Of course, the highest maxims of natural law forbid such manifest injustice as the killing of innocents; moreover, these maxims require the granting of certain liberties and the right to found a family.The French commentator Louis Le Fur asserted that there are three principles of natural law: fulfillment of freely concluded contracts, compensation for unjust injury caused to others, and respect for authority.Jacques Maritain also pointed out, "It is by the power of human nature that there is such an order or arrangement, which can be discovered by human reason, and if human will and desire are consistent with human basic and necessary In harmony with its ends, it must act according to that order or arrangement. The unwritten or natural law is such an order or arrangement." Maridant's classification of those rights derived from natural law is better than Roman's. category is broader.However, according to Malidan, these rights are not necessarily absolute and unlimited; generally speaking, in order to promote the public interest, these rights are subject to the control of positive law.
Belgian jurist Jean Dabin (born 1889) made an extremely important contribution to neo-Thomist legal thought.Daban conceives of the legal order as "an order imposed by the government in order to achieve in the relations between men a certain - the purpose of civil society and the maintenance of civil society as an instrument for the realization of this purpose - order. The sum total of the rules of conduct established by civil society, or at least fixed by civil society".Daban attaches great importance to the causality of rules in law and the coercion as the substantive elements of the positive law system. In this regard, he tends to the positivist viewpoint.On the other hand, he also exhaustively analyzes the goals of legal control based on justice and public interest.In Daban's view, the public interest contains the value of all human beings.It requires protection of the lawful activities of individuals and groups, and of public service agencies to aid or implement private innovation efforts.The state should use legal means to coordinate and adjust conflicting economic activities, and to resist uncontrolled competition caused by excessive laissez-faire and waste.
In Daban's view, what is inconsistent with morality cannot be included in the public interest.This maxim constitutes the link between Daban's thought of the public interest and his theory of natural law.He deduced natural law from human nature expressed in the basic tendencies of those who are governed by reason.More specifically, Daban seems to see natural law as some minimum ethical requirement imposed by reason.
What happens when positive law is inconsistent with minimal ethical requirements?Daban points out that "everyone admits that the law of the state which contradicts the law of nature is evil, not even worthy of the name law." To a large extent, this statement should be seen as a neo-Thomist and neo-scholastic The general position of doctrine, according to which laws that are profoundly immoral—as distinguished from laws that are merely unjust—must be regarded as invalid laws.
Daban's theory of justice discusses three different forms of justice: commutative justice, distributive justice, and legal justice.The first kind of justice refers to the proper adjustment of relations between individuals, especially in accordance with those principles aimed at the award of adequate damages in contract and tort cases, the recovery of stolen or lost property, the return of unjust adjustments made through legal remedies such as interests.Distributive justice determines what members of a group should receive from the group; it legislates the distribution of rights, power, honor, and rewards, whereas legal justice is concerned with what members of a group should give to the group.Its purpose is to "decree in the public interest", that is, to determine the obligations and responsibilities of members of society to the society as a whole, such as taxes, military service, participation in public service, obedience to laws and legal orders.Daban pointed out that "the real reason why legal justice is the most necessary for the public interest is that the purpose of law is the (national or government) public interest. Only in legal justice can law and morality achieve unity. degree.” Although legal justice comes into play only when the other two forms of justice are unable to solve the problem, legal justice takes precedence when it is in irreconcilable conflict with the latter.
Closely linked to neo-Thomist natural law is institutional or institutional theory, first proposed by Maurice Hauriou (1856-1929 AD).After Oriu's death, Georges Renard (1876-1943 AD) explained the theory in great detail.
Oriu defined the concept of "organization" as follows: "Organization is a concept of work or career that can be legally realized and persists in a social environment." In order to realize this concept, the Powers based on certain institutions.In addition, among the members of social groups aimed at realizing this conception, there arises the phenomenon of communication directed by authorities and regulated by procedural rules.Liner also adopted the same line of thought and defined organization as "the exchange of ideas between people".
Organizations are considered symbols of a "permanent view" of law.A person is bound to die, and contracts between individuals are of a transitory nature.An organization, such as a country, the Catholic Church, Harvard University, or the British Ministry of Commerce, etc., may last a long time.Long after the death of an organization's founders, the ideas that organization was working toward will live on and prevail.This notion is entirely independent of those individuals who happen to belong to the organization at any given time.It is worth noting that Rina found the most perfect definition of organization in the first article of the former Italian "Fascist Labor Charter": "The Italian nation is an organization with purpose, life and mode of operation. its purpose, life, and mode of activity as individuals or as a group."
Riner draws a stark contrast between organizations and contracts.The test of a contract is the idea of equality; a contract serves only the subjective ends of two or more individuals.On the other hand, the standard of organization is the concept of power.An organization implies division, inequality, command and bureaucratic hierarchies.It requires the subordination of individual purposes to the collective goals of the organization.Subjective rights, which are typical in contract law, are restricted in organizational law.The main organizing principle of an organization is identity, not contract.Membership and qualifications are determined objectively and authoritatively.Liner pointed out that this does not mean that the members of the organization lose their independent personality, but only means that the common interests of the organization must be higher than the individual subjective interests of individual members.Riener acknowledges that members of organizations lose their freedom to some extent, but he argues that they gain from security what they lose in freedom.
According to the theory of organization, the state is the most prominent manifestation of the phenomenon of organization.Advocates of this theory, however, do not see the state as an all-intelligent, omnipotent totalitarian entity.They believe that other organizations also enjoy considerable autonomy and independence for state intervention, and these organizations are effective counterweights to state power.Among these organizations, the first is the family, which is the oldest organization; the second is the synod, that is, the church; the third is professional groups, associations, trade unions, employers' associations, etc.Every individual belongs to some non-state organization, and the autonomy of various organizations guarantees him a certain freedom, because no organization has complete and unlimited control over him.The theory of organization is against statism, and against socialism that reduces the individual to a mere cog in the machinery of a centralized state.This theory embraced corporatist or syndicalist pluralism, and also believed in the autonomy of institutions; this autonomy was, of course, subject to the police power of the state.
French jurist Leon Duguit (1859-1928 A.D.) put forward a natural law theory with a strong sociological color.This theory is quite different from the natural law theory of the Enlightenment, because Digi does not recognize any natural or inalienable rights of the individual.His aim was to replace the traditional system of legal rights with a system that recognized only legal obligations.Di Ji pointed out that each individual has a certain task to perform in society, and his obligation to fulfill this duty can be enforced by law.According to this theory, the only right an individual is supposed to have is the right to perform his duties forever.As Corwin aptly puts it, this theory is "the inversion of Locke's theory".
Despite Di Ji's emphasis on social duty, he opposed any absolute notion of state power.He proposes to remove all sovereign rights and other attributes of sovereignty that traditional public law theory has ascribed to states and their institutions.Di Ji said that the ruling authorities are like citizens, with only obligations but no rights.Their activities should be strictly limited to the fulfillment of certain social duties, the most important of which is the organization and maintenance of public utilities.The duty of government officials is to protect the continuous development of public utilities.Dijk argues that this goal can be most effectively achieved in a syndicalist structure of the state by broadly decentralizing power among utilities and establishing their respective autonomy .
According to Di Ji, the social function of law is to realize social solidarity.This is the core concept in Di Ji's legal theory. "The fact of social solidarity is indisputable, and in fact undisputable; it is an observable fact which cannot be the subject of dispute. . . — that is, the irreducible constituent elements of any social group”.Therefore, Di Ji does not regard social solidarity as a rule or order of behavior, but as a basic fact of human coexistence.
However, the fact of social solidarity is transformed into a normative principle in Digi's "rule of law" (regle de droit).The rule of law requires everyone to contribute to the full realization of social solidarity.It also places an obligation on rulers and ruled to refrain from any action motivated by ends that are inconsistent with the realization of social solidarity.The rule of law as Diji envisioned constitutes an explicit limit to the power of all ruling authorities.Any regulations or administrative orders that run counter to the principles of social solidarity and social interdependence are invalid.Dijk proposed the establishment of a court composed of representatives of all social classes, which would be entrusted with the task of interpreting authoritatively the concept of social solidarity and adjudicating whether a statute complied with this supreme requirement.
Di Ji publicly stated that he wanted to create a completely positive, realistic and empirical legal theory, and exclude all elements of metaphysics and natural law.In fact, as Geny pointed out, the social solidarity-based rule of law constructed by Di Ji has moved away from legal positivism and empiricism.His theory is metaphysical in nature, and must be relegated to a particular socialized conception of natural law.
Two American scholars, Harold Laswell (born 1902) and Myres McDougal (born 1906), worked together to develop a policy jurisprudence (a policy-science of the law).Their purpose is the same as that of Leon Digi, but to construct a theory of empiricism that negates metaphysical speculation.However, unlike Di Ji, they openly admitted that their approach to law represented a theory of value, not just a description of social facts.
The value system of Lasswell and MacDougall starts from the assumption that a value is a "desired event."Thus, since people desire power (power is defined as the power to participate in making important decisions), "power is undoubtedly a value in the sense that power is desired (or likely to be desired)" .Other categories of value or "preferences" that satisfy people's desires are: wealth, or domination over economic goods and services; happiness, or physical and spiritual perfection; enlightenment, or the discovery and transmission of knowledge; skill, or Acquisition of skills and development of talents; love, or the cultivation of friendship and kinship; integrity, or moral responsibility and moral perfection; respect, or recognition of worth, without discrimination of any kind except on the basis of ability.The values listed above can certainly be considered representative, but not necessarily exhaustive.They argue that since "in any cultural or human history the relative status of values has always changed across groups, individuals, and times," it is impossible to attempt to rank the aforementioned values in order of their importance.At the same time, they also believe that it is not feasible to establish the universal dominance of any particular value.Generally speaking, one must determine the value that dominates a group or an individual in a particular environment separately according to the specific situation.
Lasswell and MacDougall argue that law is a form of power value and "is the sum total of power decisions in society".Formally recognized powers, McDougall says, that combine decision-making with the kind of effective control that ensures that those decisions are carried out, are the essence of the legal process.This combination of formal power and effective control produces a series of decisions designed to promote social values consistent with social expectations.One of the basic requirements put forward by these two scholars is that members of society should participate in the distribution and sharing of value. In other words, the purpose of legal adjustment and trial is to enable people to share value more widely.The ultimate goal of legal control as conceived by Lasswell and MacDougall is to achieve a world community.在这个共同体中，以民主方式分配价值的做法得到鼓励和促进、一切资源都得以被最大限度地利用、保护个人的尊严被认为是社会政策的最高目标。
这两位学者认为，法律科学欲在全球范围内促进价值的民主化和致力于创造一个自由而富裕的社会，就应当最大限度地降低技术性法律原则（technical legal doctrine）——它被称为“权威的神话”——的作用。麦克杜格尔说，所有这类法律原则都有一种不妥的习惯做法，即“在成对相反的立场上漂移”。概念上的和原则上的自相矛盾是法律特有的，而且法律术语的意义是以这些术语被使用的语境、使用这些术语的人、以及运用这些术语的目的来确定的。因此，依靠原则并不能保证法律的确定性，并且常常会使被社会认为可欲的目的受到挫折。
因此，拉斯韦尔和麦克杜格尔建议，虽然不应当完全抛弃法律的技术原则，但却应当在很大程度上用一种“政策”的研究进路加以补充；应当根据民主生活的目标和重要问题来阐释关键的法律术语。法律判决应当被看成是“对社会进程中价值变化的突然事件的回应”。应当对所选择的解决方案给整个社会模式所可能产生的影响进行“目标思考”和功能考虑，并用之代替对定义和规则的强调。法律原则应当被归结为“象征的作用，它们的功能就是为使用它们的人的全部政策服务”。应当避免对法律与政策、formulations de lege lata与proposition de lege fereda做明确的界分。麦克杜格尔指出，“法律规则——无论是从习惯、惯例还是根据其他什么渊源派生出来的——在特定案件中的每次适用，事实上都要求进行政策选择。”虽然审判机关可以从过去的审判经验中寻求指导，但是它们却应当永远把关注点集中在它们做出的判决对其社会的未来所可能产生的影响方面。麦克杜格尔和拉斯韦尔认为，这样一种有关决策过程的未来取向方法比那种机械地操纵传统原则的方法要优越得多。
虽然这两位论者都认为他们的法律“政策科学”不应当被归为自然法理论，但是我认为，对他们作这样的归类也并不是完全不合适的。为他们所承认的上述八点价值在很大程度上与人们所具有的实际欲求极为符合，因而带有经验主义的性质，但是他们又主张全世界以民主的方式分享这些价值，而这个世界基于的基础则是以尊重人的尊严为最高价值，所以他们的思想似乎也具有某些自然法的特征。
除了拉斯韦尔和麦克杜格尔以外，美国另外一些思想家在近几十年中也开始把他们的关注点转向了法律制度所应当增进的基木价值。虽然自然法或正义取向的法律研究方法的复兴在美国尚未达到西欧那样的深度和广度，但是这种趋势在当下仍在日益加强。
埃德蒙·凯恩（Edmond Cahn，公元1906～1964年）思想中的许多重要方面都是与美国法理学中的现实主义运动紧密相通的。虽然凯恩也承认理性因素在司法中的重要性，但是他却认为，从广义上讲，法律过程是对具体的、特定的事实情形做出的一种直觉的伦理回应。
凯恩认为，应当从否定的方面而不是肯定的方面去探究正义的问题。凯恩提出，对正义理想所作的肯定性假定“被自然法的著述弄得如此之混乱以致于几乎不可避免地使人想到某种理想型关系、静止的状态或一套认知标准，因此凯恩更倾向于强调“不正义感”或“对不正义的感觉”（sense of injustice）。不正义感是形成人类生物性天资部分的“理性和移情作用”的一种混合物。正义实质上是补救或防止引起不正义感的一种过程。
不正义感是如何表现出来的呢？首先，也许是最重要的，促使不正义感产生的原因乃是在某个群体中形成了被该群体成员视为专断的和不具正当理由的不平等现象。“对不正义的感觉憎恶一切任意而不平等的现象”。法律引起的不平等必须站得住脚；当某法律区别对待不应区别对待的事物和人时，那么该法律就会变成不正义的法律。
对不正义的感觉也提出了另外一些要求，例如，要求承认人的价值和尊严、要求公正和认真的裁判、要求在自由与秩序之间维持适当的平衡和要求实现人们共同的预期。凯恩指出，上述最后一点要求可以两种不同的方式表现出来。第一，如果立法者或法官使人们对法律运作的一致性和连续性的正常预期落空，那么它就会表现出来。对实质性法律所做的任何溯及既往的修改如果影响了以正当方式根据早期法律而进行的交易和行为，那么这种修改便会引起不正义感。第二，如果发生相反的情形，即法律不能应对新的道德信念和新的社会需要，那么也可能产生类似的要求。因此，不遵守稳定性和一致性的承诺，以及违背其对社会和经济生活的新要求做出回应的担当，都可能使实在法成为不正义的法律。为了使法律成为正义的法律，法律就必须在毫无妥协的规则性与匆促的变革之间保持一种不确定的平衡。不正义感“既反对一成不变，又反对冒失的突变；它要求法律按照某种理智的设计进行发展”。
郎·富勒（Lon Fuller，生于1902年）把批判的矛头不仅对准了法律实证主义，而且还指向了法律现实主义。他指出，实证主义的观点一般来讲都是同道德怀疑主义相勾连的。“法律实证主义所隐含的基础通常来讲是这样一种信念，即人可以有效地描述法律是什么，但却不能根据个人的倾向去谈论法律应当是什么”。根据他的观点，撇开法律的道德语境去研究和分析法律是不可能的。他指出，法律现实主义者犯了与实证主义者同样的错误，即假设将“实然”与“应然”、实在法与道德做严格界分是可能的和可欲的。
对富勒来说，法律乃是为了满足或有助于满足人们的共同需求而做出的一种合作努力。每一条法律规则都有旨在实现法律秩序某种价值的目的。由于目的和价值之间存在着密切的联系，所以必须同时把目的既看成是“一种事实，又视作是一种判断事实的标准”。既然目的上的考虑和价值上的考虑都渗透在法律的解释和适用之中，因此他认为，在司法过程中也不可能主张“实然”与“应然”的二元论。
富勒坚持认为，对人类美好生活的原则的探寻必须永远是开放的和无限制的。他坚决反对那种把自然法看成是衡量人定法所必须依凭的一套权威的“高级法”原则的观点。他坚决主张说，任何试图预先制定一种永恒不变的自然法典的自然法理论，都是不能够接受的。
由于“自然法”这个术语与教条主义的和绝对主义的法律和伦理哲学有着广泛的联系，所以富勒建议用一个新的名称来描述那种古老的现象，即“尤诺米克”（eunomics）；他把这个术语的含义定义为有关“良好的秩序和可行的安排的理论或研究”。他告诫说，eunomics绝不能企图传授任何具有约束力的终极目的的真理性观念或教条，相反，它必须认清自己的主要任务，即提供一种有关手段方面的理论，而这些手段则是法律秩序为达到某种社会组织形式的目的所必须运用的。然而，它也可以不局限于关注社会目的的手段问题而努力以科学的方式指出有些社会目标是不可能达到的，因为人类无法为这些目标设计出可行的、容易操作的法律形式。富勒认为，人性中存在着某种恒定性和规则性，而这种恒定性和规则性对法律空想家和工程师那种试图创造崭新的社会形态的欲望设定了限制。
富勒认为，法律的完善，主要取决于它用来实现其目的的程序。“使法律成为可能的道德”要求满足下述八个条件：（l）必须制定一些能指导特定行为的一般性规则；（2）这些一般性规则必须予以公布，至少应当对这些规则所指向适用的人加以公布；（3）在大多数情形中，这些规则应当指向未来情势而不应当溯及既往；（4）这些规则应当明确易懂；（5）这些规则不应当自相矛盾；（6）这些规则不应当要求不可能实现的事情；（7）这些规则应当具有适当的稳定性，亦即不应当太过频繁地更改；（8）所颁布的规则与其实际的执行之间应当具有一致性。
富勒把上述八项条件看成是“有关自然法的一种程序观”。富勒认为，完全不能满足上述法律道德条件中的任何一项条件，并不只是会产生一个坏的法律制度的问题，而是会导致“一个根本不能被宣称为法律制度的东西。也许只有匹克威克（译注：匹克威克乃是狄更斯所著一书中的主人公）会认为，一个无效的合同仍然可以被视为是一种合同”。因此，富勒似乎认为，法律制度的内在合法性乃是建立在一种略带有结构性和技术性的要求之上的。然而，他又相信，达到这些要求的法律制度，其实质内容通常来讲也总是合理的和正义的。
杰罗米·霍尔（Jerome Hall，生于1901年）极为关注的乃是这样一个问题，即合理性和道德性是否是法律的“实质”问题，当然，他对这个问题的回答是肯定的。他力主采用一种限制性的实在法定义，这种定义将实在法这一术语局限于“实际伦理权力的规范”（actual ethical power norms），而将“纯粹权力的规范”（sheer power norms）排除在外。他确信，国家颁布的规范也可能不具有法律的性质，这是因为它们完全不具道德的内容。为了给建构一种民主的自然法（democratic natural law）奠定基础，霍尔建议，应当把民主理想纳入实在法的实质之中。“我们特别要把'被统治者的同意'以及民主进程所包含的所有东西纳入实在法的实质之中。这就是我们必须对传统自然法的实在法理论所做的基本修正”。
在霍尔看来，法律乃是“形式、价值和事实的一种特殊结合。”他指出，法律中的价值成分不仅表达了主观欲求和个人利益，而且还适合于理性的分析。“人们有时会做出与其欲求相反的行为，有时甚至会牺牲自己的利益，这是因为他们决定做正当的事情。然而，自然主义的教条则肯定会把苏格拉底谴责为一个白痴。”因为根据价值判断的怀疑论，“在目睹谋杀时感到高兴，正如对冒着生命危险抢救落水小孩的人表示强烈的愤怒一样，都是合理的。”的确，解决一个道德问题有时是非常困难的，但这一事实并不能证明如下的结论是正确的：客观评价是不可能的，或者用凯尔森的话来说，正义是一种“非理性的理想”（irrational ideal）。
霍尔始终是一位法律实证主义的强有力的批判家，因为这种实证主义竟然宣称能够在无视自然法理论和社会学法学之有效因素的情形下对法律现象提供一种完全彻底的解释。他主张一种“整合性的”法理学（integrative jurisprudence），它把对法律的分析研究同对法律有序化的价值成分的社会学描述和认识结合了起来。霍尔认为，把法理学的各个方面统一起来的结合点在于“行动”（action）这个概念。“作为行动的法律”（law-as-action）主要依靠的虽然是法律规则和法律概念，但是如果不对法官、行政人员、执法人员日复一日的实践进行研究，人们便不能理解作为一种社会制度的法律。这种实践在某种程度上有时会符合、而有时会在某种程度上背离法律的概念结构。把法律视作行动的观念还把人民大众遵守和服从法律规定、平民百姓同法律工作者之间的互动关系等问题纳入了法理学的研究范围。
菲尔姆·诺思罗普（Filmer Northrop，生于1893年）赞同霍尔的观点，认为对法律进行科学的评价是可能的。他认为，对法律规范做出科学意义的评价，应当在两个不同的层次上展开。首先，应当对国家所颁布的实在法是否符合一个民族或文化的活法（living law）进行考察。只有当实在法符合一个民族的社会需要和法律需要并从一般意义上讲能够为他们所接受和遵循时，它才能作为一种有效的法律制度发挥作用。诺思罗普指出，现在世界上各民族或族群的活法并不是统一的，而是多元的和大相径庭的。这决不意昧着一种文化在社会学上的“实然”便构成了判定其法律制度善与恶的终极标准。“判断当今人的行为和文化制度的那种规范性理想，绝不可能是人的行为和社会制度的实际意义上的'实然'；否则的话，现状就会是完美无缺的且不再需要进行任何改革和重构了”。根据他的观点，适用于文化和文化人的善恶标准是构成一种文化之基础的自然和自然人的哲学的真伪标准。诺思罗普认为这种自然及自然人的哲学便是自然法，它包括“内省的或意识的原始材料，它们先于所有的理论和文化，对于任何文化中的任何人的经验而言，它们是给定的”。他论辩说，伦理学只是适用于人的行为和人际关系的那种为经验所证实的自然哲学罢了。被希特勒政府作为行事基础的道德原则，必须被判定是恶的，因为希特勒的行为是（至少部分是）那种能为科学方法证明是谬误的自然人哲学观的结果。
诺思罗普认为，现代世界的自然法既不能根据亚里士多德－托马斯的自然法观念，也不能根据洛克和杰斐逊的自然权利哲学为基础，而必须以得到现代物理学、生物学和其他自然科学（包括心理学）支持的自然和自然人的观念为基础。诺思罗普还坚持认为，必须根据这种自然法理论所可能提供给我们的科学基础来建立一种确保人类生存的行之有效的国际法。从长远来看，只有一个真正普遍的自然法才能缓和或缓解当今世界活法多元化所造成的敌对和紧张，并在各民族之间产生维护世界和平所不可或缺的一定程度的相互理解。他认为，“垂死的”实证主义“法律科学”——强调法律强力和权力政治——不足以给我们提供妥善地解决原子时代强加在人类头上的严重问题所必需的工具和激励。
约翰·罗尔斯（John Rawls，生于1921年）所撰写的大著（Theory of Justice），试图在一种现代化的外衣下复活社会契约论和康德的法律哲学，并试图用它们来反对边沁和穆勒的功利主义。一位评论家认为，“揭示了个人自由和尊严的价值是如何取得一种独立地位的，而这种地位并不是从社会利益的最大化中派生出来的”。象康德一样，罗尔斯把自由定义为拘束的不存在，而且在他提出的两个基本正义原则中，第一个原则就要求“每个人都应当具有这样一种平等权利，即和所有其他人所享有的同样的自由相并存的最广泛的基本自由权项”。罗尔斯实际上还超越了康德，因为他通过下述原则而把平等的概念纳入了其正义理论之中，“社会和经济的不平等应当被安排得：（1）对最不利条件者最具助益，符合正义的补偿原则；（2）在机会平等的条件下，地位和官职对所有人开放”。为了满足每个人的利益，存在着这样一个问题，即应当设计出什么样的社会和经济不平等呢？罗尔斯认为，应当根据“原始地位”（这是罗尔斯的新社会契约论的专门概念）这个假设性概念来解决上述问题。如果可以设想，有理性的人通常所关注的是增进他们自己的利益但同时却对具体情况下有关平等或不平等的决定会影响他们本身的特定方式处于无知状态，而且他们会认为某些分配物品、权利、地位、职务的原则是公平的和正义的，那么一个关于分配正义的特定决定便因此是合法的。但是，这里仍存在着一种可能性，即向平均状况迈进一步的同时也可能导致自由的减少。如果那种情况发生，罗尔斯认为，自由的价值应予以优先的考虑。
我们还可以从一些现代社会学法学和心理学法学的论著中发现人们对法律有序化中的价值成分的日益强调。菲力普·塞尔茨尼克（Philip Selznik，生于1919年）提出，法律社会学应当象关注法律规范和法律制度的生成渊源一样去关注法律制度所追求的价值目标。因此，社会学“应当对自然法哲学有一种相当亲和的关系。”社会学不应当把法律仅仅看成是一种以文化为条件的规则的体系，而且还应当把它看作是一种发展道德和满足与道德有关的需求的手段。简而言之，应该考察法律对人类福利所具有的潜在作用。阿尔伯特·艾伦茨维格（Albert Ehrenzweig，公元1906～1974）则从一个不同的角度出发将价值哲学纳入了其精神分析法理学的脉络之中。塞尔茨尼克所侧重强调的乃是人类精神的一致性和人性的普遍特征，而艾伦茨维格则把法律制度主要看作是旨在缓和个人正义观念冲突的事业。他相信，正义感是所有男人和女人生来具有的，但根据西格蒙德·弗罗伊德的一般心理学理论，他又把正义感的对抗现象和不一致的表现（各种“正义”）主要看作是个人早期发展阶段时无意识因素的产物。当然，艾伦茨维格并不否认人们就法律制度所服务于的基本价值有可能达到某种程度的一致性。
希特勒第三帝国跨台后，价值取向的法律哲学在德国和奥地利得到了迅速的复兴。杰出的德国法学家古斯塔夫·拉德布鲁赫（Gustav Radbruch）从价值相对主义到明确（尽管是以一种相当温和的方式）接受自然法思想的这一转变，强有力地推动了这种思潮的发展；这种思潮强调指出，法律的作用在于保护人的尊严、自由和个人生活与社会生活中的其他实质性价值。海尔姆特·科因（Helmuat Coing，生于1912年）的法律哲学在方法论方面明显地受到了埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl）、马克斯·舍勒（Max Scheler）和尼科拉·哈曼（Nicolai Hartmann）所倡导的现象学的影响。现象学是一场哲学运动，它承认客观上存在受制于直觉认知的价值领域。就科因法理学的内容来看，它乃是对古典的个人自由主义和经济自由主义哲学的一种重述，当然也作了某些修正。
科因认为，国家的义务便是保护个人的基本权利和自由，其中包括肢体的完整、个人隐私、个人名誉的维护、私有产权、反对欺诈和哄骗、言论和集会的自由。科因承认，不可能无限地和绝对地实现这些权利。它们要服从增进公共福利所必要的某些限制，但是这些权利的核心和实质却不能受到限制。科因认为违反自由和正义这一最高原则的法律，并不是无效的，然而在极端的情形下，它却可以证明人民或执法当局所采取的积极的或消极的抵制是正当的。
构成现象学运动之基础的价值哲学也成了海因里希·亨克尔（Heinrich Henkel）、卡尔·英格希（Karl Engisch）和莱因霍尔德·齐普鲁斯（Reinhold Zippelius）等论者的研究的基础。但是，上述三位论者却与科因不同，因为他们在法律价值问题上所采取的乃是一种较为相对主义的文化取向的立场，而不承认那种极端的主观主义价值论。
虽然在第二次世界大战以前，凯尔森的纯粹法律理论和维也纳圈子的逻辑实证主义对奥地利的法律思想具有支配性的影响，但是在第二次世界大战后，自然法思想在奥地利仍得到了复兴。阿尔弗雷德·维德罗斯（Alfred Verdross）和雷纳·马西科（ReneMarcic）以极为精妙的和不同的形式提出了对亚里士多德和托马斯法律哲学思想的现代诠释。他们对法律和正义的思考极为繁复，所以很难加以概括，而且令人遗憾的是，他们的主要著作至今没有被翻译成英文。
以存在主义（existentialism）著称的哲学运动也对法律哲学产生了影响，尽管它对法律有序化的问题的影响，仍是个遭到质疑和颇有争议的问题。德国法学家沃纳·梅霍佛（Werner Maihofer）和埃里奇·费克纳（Erich Fecher）从存在主义的前提出发研究了法律哲学，而丹麦学者乔治·科恩（Georg Cohn）则提出了一种司法过程的观点，这种观点乃是以这个哲学运动对审判和法律推理所具有的意义（他所认为的那种意义）为基础的。与现象哲学一样，存在主义对法律中的价值（区别于纯粹经验的或逻辑的）因素给予了极大的关注，但是它对旨在建构一种以绝对而不变的规范为基础的自然法体系所作的各种努力却持怀疑态度。
现象学和存在主义对法律哲学的影响也可见之于影响极大的墨西哥法律哲学家路易斯·雷加森斯·西克斯（Luis Recasens Siches，生于1903年）的著作中。他赞同德国哲学家马克斯·舍勒和尼科拉·哈曼的观点，认为价值是理想型目标，并不存在于空间和时间之中，但是它们仍可以主张一种客观的和先验的效力。诸如真、善、美、正义和安全等价值，都属于这一理想的范围；我们无法通过经验或感觉认知获得它们，但却可以通过直觉过程去感触它们。人是一个属于两个世界的公民，一个是自然的世界，另一个是价值的世界，而且人还致力于在这两个世界之间架起一座桥梁。
根据雷加森斯·西克斯的观点，法律本身并不是一种纯粹的价值，而是一个旨在实现某些价值的规范体系。它的首要目的是实现集体生活中的安全；人类之所以创制法律，乃是因为他们想使他们的人际关系与财产关系得到保护和具有确定性。然而需要指出的是，尽管雷加森斯·西克斯认为安全是法律的首要目标和法律存在的主要原因，但对他来说，安全却不是法律的最高目标。法律的最高目标和终极目标乃是实现正义。安全和不可违背的规律性实属于法律概念的一部分，但正义却不是。如果法律秩序不表现为一种安全的秩序，那么它根本就不能算是法律；而一个不正义的法律却仍然是一种法律。
根据雷加森斯·西克斯的观点，法律评价的任务乃在于寻找制定实在法内容时所应考虑的价值标准。他认为，激励所有立法的最高价值应当是对个人的保护。他断然否认超个人主义的和集体主义的哲学，因为这类哲学认为人是生产文化事物的一种工具或服务于国家目的的一种工具。对他来说，法律的作用只在于保护自由、人身不可侵犯、最低限度的物质满足，以使个人得以发展其人格和实现其“真正的”使命。
在前述章节中，我们已经详尽地探究了法理学领域的某些方面，当然还有一些方面尚未论及。尽管我们只讨论了思想家们从文明早期直至当下所提出的无数法学理论中的一部分，但我们在这些法律观点中却洞见了大量的疑异和分歧。关于法律控制所应达到的目的以及行使这种控制所应采取的方法的问题，法律哲学家们似乎还未取得实质性的一致意见。那么我们是否应当对探寻法律的终极真理抱失望态度，并放弃寻求指导司法的理念与原则呢？法理学学者们是否能比仅仅表述某种促使其想象并抓住其感情的有关法律理想的个人偏好做得更多呢？我们是否能够在前述章节所审视的大量复杂的法律理论中找到一条贯穿其始终的线索呢？
人们可以注意到，上述法律理论中的绝大部分观点所关注的都是通过法律的社会控制所应追求的最高目标，就此而言，它们都是规范性的。换言之，它们所处理的乃是法律生活的“应然”问题而不是“实然”问题。这个概括不仅可以适用于大多数自然法理论、适用于超验的唯心主义哲学、适用于功利主义，而且也同样可以适用于社会学法学的一些观点。这些不尽相同的法理学流派就法律控制所要达到的确当目标和目的提出了繁复多样的观点。平等、自由、服从自然或上帝的意志、幸福、社会和谐与社会连带、公共利益、安全、促进文化的发展——所有这些和其它一些价值被不同时代的不同思想家宣称为法律的最高价值。我们是否有可能在这些似乎不一致的观点间做出理性的选择？或者，我们是否必须断言这些观点只是提出这些观点的论者们各自主观且非理性的偏爱，因而认为它们不具有客观的效力呢？
经过比较认真的思考以后，我们就会看到，整个状况并没有乍看上去那般令人沮丧。如果我们接受这样一个命题，即“真理是任何特定时间人们经验的总和”，以及根据新的、更为广泛的经验来看，过去的真理会显得既片面又不完全，那么与非理性的求全责备相比，我们就会对评价法律哲学的历史和现状问题获得一种更好的认识角度。法律是一个带有许多大厅、房间、凹角、拐角的大厦，在同一时间里想用一盏探照灯照亮每一间房间、凹角和拐角是极为困难的，尤其当技术知识和经验受到局限的情况下，照明系统不适当或至少不完备时，情形就更是如此了。我们不用象逻辑实证主义者所主张的那样，认为从科学的观点看，历史上的大多数法律哲学都应当被打上“胡说”的印记，相反，我们似乎可以更为恰当地指出，这些学说最为重要的意义乃在于它们组成了整个法理学大厦的极为贵珍的建筑之石，尽管这些理论中的每一种理论只具有部分和有限的真理。随着我们知识范围的扩大，我们必须建构一种能够充分利用人们过去所做的一切知识贡献的综合法理学（synthetic jurisprudence），尽管我们最终仍可能发现，我们所描述的法律制度的整体图式必定也是不全面的。
杰罗米·霍尔从一种与本书相似的方法论和认识论的前提出发也提出了强烈的呼吁，要求当今的学者努力创建一门“整合的法理学”（integrative jurisprudence）。他严厉地批判了法理学中那种“以单一因素去阐明复杂现象的谬误”，尤其是那种试图将法学理论中的价值因素、事实因素和形式因素彼此孤立起来的企图。霍尔认为，今天所需要的乃是对分析法学、对社会和文化事实的现实主义解释以及自然法学说中有价值的因素进行整合，因为法理学中的上述各部分既密切相关、又相互依赖。德国法律哲学家埃里奇·费克纳也追求类似的目标，他对影响法律发展的种种“理想”因素和“现实”因素进行了极具意义的探索，而且还对法律秩序各种因素之间的联系和关系做出了极具意义的论证。
我们应当认为这样的想法和努力是合理的和建设性的。我们的历史经验告诉我们，任何人都不可能根据某个单一的、绝对的因素或原因去解释法律制度。一系列社会的、经济的、心理的、历史的和文化的因素以及一系列价值判断，都在影响着和决定着立法和司法。虽然在某个特定历史时期，某种社会力量或某种正义理想会对法律制度产生特别强烈的影响，但是根据惟一的社会因素（如权力、民族传统、经济、心理、或种族）或根据惟一的法律理想（如自由、平等、安全、或人类的幸福），却不可能对法律控制作出一般性的分析和解释。法律是一个结构复杂的网络，而法理科学的任务就是要把组成这个网络的各个头绪编织在一起。由于这是一个巨大且棘手的任务，所以为了适当地践履这个任务，在法理学学者之间进行某种劳动分工也实是不可避免的。
只需列举为数不多的几个例子就足以说明进路单一的、维度单一的法律理论只具部分效力，而且在整体上也是不充分的。就法律控制的目的而论，越来越清楚的是：平等、自由、安全和公共利益都不应当被假设为绝对价值，因为它们都不能孤立地、单独地表现为终极和排他的法律理想。所有上述价值既相互结合又相互依赖，因此在建构一个成熟和发达的法律体系时，我们必须将它们置于适当的位置之上。主张理性本身或宣称经验本身应当成为我们司法的指导原则，也同样都是片面的。正如庞德所恰当指出的，在法律的生命中，“理性同经验一样都具有各自的作用。法学家们提出了特定时空之文明社会的法律要求，亦即有关关系和行为的各种假设，并用这种方法为法律推理得出了各种权威性的出发点。经验在这个基础上为理性所发展，而理性则受到经验的检验”。
历史法学派在丰富法律知识方面做出了重大的贡献，因为它指出，一个民族的精神在创建一个伟大的法律制度时会发挥它的作用。例如，人们很