Chapter 4 Section 02

one two The logic now employed helps, not so much in the pursuit of truth, as in fixing and consolidating many of the errors built upon popular notions.So it does more harm than good. one three The syllogism is not applied to the first principle of science, and it is futile to apply to the intermediate principle; this is because it is not enough to match the subtlety of nature.Therefore, it only compels people to agree on propositions, but does not grasp the things themselves. ① Fleur pointed out that this is equivalent to what Aristotle called "the last principle"; formula to prove.

- translator one four A syllogism is composed of propositions, propositions are composed of words, and words are symbols of concepts.So if the concept itself (which is the root of the matter) is confused and drawn too hastily from the facts, then its superstructure cannot be solid.So our only hope lies in a true induction. ① Here is the first mention of true induction.Refer to Articles 104, 105, and 106 of Volume 1; note 17, Critique of Ordinary Induction in Articles 69 and 105. - translator One five ① Many of our concepts, whether logical or physical, are not sound. "Noumenon", "property", "active", "passive" and "essence" are not sound concepts in themselves; others such as "light", "heavy", "concentrated", "thin", "wet", The concepts of "dryness", "becoming", "destroying", "attracting", "repelling", "element", "matter", "form" and the like are even more unsound.They are all conceived out of thin air, and they are all ill-defined. ① This article and the next article should be read together with the 60th article in the first volume. - translator

one six Others of ours belong to a narrower class of concepts, such as "man," "dog," "dove," etc., and others to the immediate perception of the senses, such as "cold," "hot," "black," "White," etc., are not of such substance as to lead us astray; but even these notions are sometimes confused by the fluidity of matter and the mixing of things with each other.As for all the other concepts hitherto employed, they are mere fantasies, not drawn out of things in a proper way. one seven This arbitrariness and whimsy are no less in the formation of principles than in the formation of concepts; There are much more in the deduced principles and lower propositions. ① Fleur pointed out that this refers to the induction method based on simple enumeration, which is different from the scientific induction method that Bacon himself wanted to replace.See volume 69 and 1052. - translator

one eight Some of the discoveries hitherto made in science are bordering on popular concepts, rarely scratching the surface.In order to penetrate into the interior and depths of nature, concepts and principles must be derived from things by a more certain and surer way; a better and more exact method must be introduced for intellectual action. one nine There are only two ways to drill and find the truth.One way is to fly from the senses and the particular to the most general principles, the truth of which is regarded as fixed and unshakable, and from these principles to judge, and to discover some intermediate axioms.This is a popular method now.The other way is to derive principles from the senses and the particular, by a gradual and uninterrupted ascent, till at last the most general principles are reached.This is the correct approach, but it has not been tried so far. ①①See John Mill (J.S.Mill)'s criticism of this point, see his "Logic" Book VI, Volume 5

Chapter Five. (See volume 22, 1042.——Translator) twenty The understanding, left to its own course, will naturally take that course (that is, take the former path) that exactly coincides with the logical order.For the mind always longs to leap to a higher generality, in order to rest there; and so soon wears off experimentation.But this defect is indeed aggravated by logic, because logical arguments have order and seriousness. ①①The words "logic" in this article were originally dialectica in Latin. - translator twenty one The understanding, if left to its own course, will, in a sober, quiet, and serious mind, especially if it is not hindered by accepted doctrines, try a little on the other, that is, the right way, But dabble; for understanding, unless directed and aided, is not a rival, unworthy against the mysteries of things.

two two Both paths start from the senses and the particular, and end in the highest common; but there is an infinite difference between them.The former glances at experiences and particulars, while the latter attends to them properly and in sequence.Also, the former builds up some abstract, useless, and universal things at once at the beginning, while the latter gradually ascends gradually to the prior and better known things in the natural order. ①