Chapter 37 The bumpy and persistent ten-year transition

In the ten years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, many countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have popularized the saying "two unexpected": "The former regime collapsed so easily, even the opposition did not expect it; privatization was so difficult, even the Communist Party did not expect it .” Indeed, compared with the process of political reform, the economic marketization of Eastern European countries is much more difficult.Regardless of whether they engage in "shock therapy" or not, all countries have experienced a period of economic downturn, even the former East Germany, which was supported by West Germany, was no exception.However, the recovery situation is very different, and some countries have repeated.Among them, the former East Germany rebounded in the second half of 1991, Poland in 1992, Slovenia, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Albania in 1993, Bulgaria, Croatia and most other countries in 1994, and Russia except for a weak rebound in 1997. , So far it has not bottomed out, and the three Balkan countries including Luo, Bao, and Afghanistan have declined again.Looking at the recent situation, the International Monetary Fund believes that in 1998 Poland's economy had reached 117.2% of that of 1989, that of the Czech Republic was 95.6%, that of Slovakia was 101.4%, that of Hungary was 96.4%, and that of Slovenia was 98.3%.The figures of the World Bank are more optimistic: it believes that the per capita GDP of Poland in 1997 was 2.4 times that of 1990, that of the Czech Republic was 2 times, that of Slovakia was 1.37 times, that of Hungary was 1.26 times, and that of Slovenia was 1.12 times. The difference between the two estimates may be mainly It is whether to consider the "grey economy".And some household survey data can also be referred to: In 1989, the average food expenditure of Polish households accounted for 46% of income, and in 1996 it only accounted for 37.8%.In the past three years, the sales volume of private cars has increased by 500,000 units per year, and in the first eight months of 1999, it has increased by more than 400,000 units, setting another record.In a country with a population of only 38.6 million, this is undoubtedly considerable.Now two-thirds of households in Poland have private cars, and 35% of them have more than one.

On the other hand, the figures from Russia are shocking: the total economic aggregate has dropped by half, and the accusations about oligarchs getting rich and people impoverished are flooding the Russian media.The long-term financial crisis has made Russia worse.Over the years, there have been almost constant predictions about Russia's imminent famine, its inability to survive a severe winter, and its social explosion, except in 1995 and 1997. "The pessimists predict that the future will get worse, while the optimists believe that there can be no worse situation than the present." This is the "humor" circulating in Russian society.But something else makes people confused about the "Russian mystery": Contrary to many people's expectations about the "Weimarization" of Russia, the recent public mood in Russia has not been as good as that of Weimar Germany, which overthrew the Wilhelm Empire and turned to democracy after World War I. During the Republican period, due to the long-term economic recession and social instability, people's hearts are increasingly tending to "escape from freedom" and become more and more extreme, so they pin their hopes on strongmen, and finally elected Hitler, the leader of the opposition.Opinion surveys of various parties show that Russia has experienced "centristization" in the past year: the extreme left and extreme right such as Apilov and Zhirinovsky are no longer popular, and the left and right such as the Russian Communist Party and "Homeland" are also Declining, while Luzhkov and "Aya Lu" and other center-left and center-right influences are on the rise.Especially when the long-term economic crisis has reappeared and President Yeltsin's behavior has become increasingly surly and pathological, this kind of "centrism" that usually shows social emotional stability is even more puzzling. During the 1995 general election, Yeltsin advocated the establishment of two factions of the center-left and the center-right to "squeeze out" the extreme left and the extreme right, but he failed at that time, but today this idea seems to be close to being realized.Although the leaders of the center, left, center and right (Luzhkov, Yavlinsky, etc.) are all enemies of Yeltsin, but in those days, wasn’t Ye himself also an enemy of Gorbachev?

Some people say that everyone in Russia now makes things as bad as possible: the opposition is naturally willing to say bad things, and it is not surprising that the intellectuals and the media flaunt social criticism and cater to the public, but what about the government?Funny how the government likes to say bad things too!As Yeltsin has changed governments frequently in the past two years, each government likes to emphasize how bad the predecessor is and how severe the situation he is facing, in order to show his power to recover. He was kicked out of office, so this phenomenon of "government saying bad" was formed.

But in any case, it is a basic fact that Russia's economy is bad, and although the situation in Eastern Europe is better than Russia, there have also been downturns at the beginning of the transition.Various explanations have been proposed for this: The disintegration of "economic space" has exacerbated the difficulty of institutional transition.In Eastern Europe, the Economic Cooperation Council disintegrated, while Russia and other countries disintegrated the two economic spaces of the Economic Cooperation Council and the former Soviet Union at the same time. The economic chaos it caused was no less than institutional reform.

"Empire sequelae": The former Soviet Union, the former Czechoslovak Federation, and the former Yugoslavia are federations of various ethnic groups, and the core ethnic population does not have much advantage. Although the ethnic composition of other Eastern European countries is relatively simple, they are actually equivalent in the "big family". part of the empire.Once the empire under the condition of strong control is out of control, social reintegration will be very difficult, so that either the chaos will lead to civil war, or the people will introduce a new iron fist after a long period of chaos.And this kind of situation does not depend on "ism" and will not be determined by "culture". (gold) is similar to Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet army, etc., it is a social restructuring dilemma.It should be said that except for the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union, most Soviet and Eastern countries did not experience civil strife and new "iron fists" in the post-imperial era, which is already very rare.

Democracy and market economy have contradictions in addition to their conformity, which requires a process of adjustment.In Poland and other countries, complaints about "unions scaring away investors" once filled the media at the beginning of the transition.A Polish scholar said frankly to his Chinese friends: It is difficult for us to attract foreign investment compared to yours. Which boss would not want to set up a factory in a place where the government fully supports and workers cannot bargain? The choice of transition strategy is also an important factor.But it is difficult to simply classify them as "progressive and radical".Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states of the former Soviet Union, which are more "radical" than Russia, are in better condition than Russia, while Belarus and Ukraine, which are more conservative than Russia, are in worse condition than Russia.As far as Russia is concerned, after the "bombardment of the White House" in 1993, the radical democrats basically withdrew from the government and were replaced by technocrats. The trinity transition from mass privatization dominated by "distribution" to oligarchy dominated by "sales", from cosmopolitanism to nationalism and nationalism, whether this transition will be good or bad for Russia's development process is currently difficult to estimate .But the argument that attacks oligarchy but affirms nationalism and thinks oligarchy is the result of mass privatization is obviously not objective.In fact, oligopoly and nationalism are at the same time, and oligopoly is not the result of "privatized securities concentrated in the hands of a few people" at all, but the result of changing "dividing" into "selling".

The ten-year transition of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was bumpy and persistent.On the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is useful to review the lessons of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.