Chapter 59 Chapter 59 Urgent Order for Reinforcement

The casualties of the Japanese 11th Army were strikingly similar to those of the Nationalist 10th Army.For the first time in the history of the postwar war, the Japanese army recorded the casualties of the Japanese army after the second general attack closer to the facts. "After our army launched a general offensive again, except for winning a very small number of positions as last time, there was still no progress, and the casualties were even more heavy. There are very few original captains of the two divisions; The infantry team has become a non-commissioned officer acting as the captain, barely supporting the end of the battle. In the second general attack, another regiment captain and six captains were killed one after another. However, the future of the attack is still not optimistic. So the attack stopped again. "

This is a very rare historical material, the first time the Japanese army admitted the real situation of the failure.The Japanese military history related to the Hengyang Defense Battle is the most special and rare part of the Japanese Army’s No. 1 Operation, which is very rare in Japanese military history.The war historian's tone is dejected.It can be seen that the heroic battle and brilliant record of the 10th Army of the National Army greatly dealt a blow to the arrogance and arrogance of the Japanese army.Indeed, it proves that the dream of the Japanese army's decisive victory in the No. 1 battle was almost shattered at the head of Hengyang, an ancient cultural city of the Chinese nation.

A brigade of the Japanese army is equivalent to a reinforced battalion of the national army. "There are very few captains left," and "most infantry regiments have become represented by non-commissioned officers."It shows the heavy casualties of Japanese officers.There are also squadron leaders and squad leaders below the team leader. Only after the casualties of these two levels of officers have been exhausted will the non-commissioned officer act as the team leader.It can be seen from this that the Japanese army did not pay the price of sacrificing soldiers in the battle of Hengyang, but the price of the fate of the entire brigade, the entire regiment, the entire brigade, even the division, and the army.Otherwise, why were there so many casualties of officers, especially those of high rank!

The casualties of the soldiers can be seen from the casualties of the officers, and the brutality of the battle can be seen from the casualties of the soldiers.The war history of the Japanese army strangely bypasses the total number of casualties in the entire Battle of Hengyang, and only announces the casualties from the beginning of the battle in Hengyang to July 20, that is, the end of the second general offensive: the total number of Japanese casualties is 19,286, of which Officers were 798; casualties totaled 3,860 killed in battle and 264 officers.By the end of the entire Hengyang campaign, the Japanese army did not release all its casualties.

However, judging only from the number of casualties announced by the Japanese army, it is enough to see that the Japanese army has greatly changed its usual practice.Compared with the Battle of Changde more than half a year ago, the Japanese army announced that 1,503 people were killed in battle, while 35,400 Chinese corpses were announced. With such a casualty ratio 20 times higher than that, the Japanese army's self-confidence, morale, and combat effectiveness can be maintained.Only in this way can it be understood that the casualty figures announced on July 20 appear in the Japanese military history. It is precisely because of the unprecedented cruelty and tragedy of the Hengyang Battle that the Japanese military history cannot be recorded and published according to its routine.

In the early 1980s, Japanese delegations visited Hengyang many times to pay homage to the Japanese soldiers who died in battle.In the book "Unforgettable Trip to Xiangjiang" written by Japanese friend Husband Wada, there is such a documentary text: "In this war, more than 20,000 Japanese soldiers died and nearly 60,000 were injured. The two human-centered divisions in Kyoto and Osaka were almost devastated." It also mentioned that "the casualties on the Chinese side were only one-third of the Japanese army." The book also revealed that the battle of Hengyang and the The other two famous defeats of the Japanese army are compared, that is, the battle of "Imphal" in India in the same year and the "Battle of Kadalkanal Islands" in the Pacific battlefield in 1943.It is believed that these three failures "are typical tactics of the incompetence of the Japanese Army's senior commanders and the ruthlessness of the staff officers."

After the setback in the second general offensive, the Japanese army's offensive mentality was severely hit.The powerful spiritual power called up by Operation No. 1 declined rapidly, and morale was extremely low for a while.The Japanese base camp was extremely dissatisfied, and the Chinese dispatched troops were extremely disturbed.Two days later, earthquake-like news came from Japan, and the Hideki Tojo cabinet announced the downfall.This marks the failure of the Japanese army's powerful faction to form a cabinet. With the fall of Saipan, the U.S. military has obtained a springboard to directly attack the Japanese mainland.Faced with such a precarious domestic political situation and the rapidly deteriorating battle situation in the Pacific battlefield, the commander of Japan's China Expeditionary Force Hata Shunroku was deeply worried about the situation in Hengyang.If that's the case, wouldn't all previous efforts be wasted?For this reason, he stepped up the deployment of new troops and military supplies to support the 11th Army, and at the same time strictly ordered Yokoyama Yong to go to the front line of Hengyang to supervise the battle.If the 11th Army can't capture Hengyang City in the next few days, Yokoyama must cut his belly to thank the emperor!

Hengyang is at stake.Fang Xianjue had to call for help repeatedly. Originally, long before the start of the war in Hengyang, they were in charge of fighting on the periphery of Hengyang. On the Hunan-Guizhou Railway, there was the Huang Tao Department of the 62nd Army, which was under the command of Li Yutang, the deputy commander-in-chief of the 27th Army; Li Tianxia's Department and Shi Zhongcheng's Department of the 74th Army were under the command of Wang Yaowu, commander-in-chief of the 24th Army Group.The above armies are ready to reinforce the 10th Army at any time to relieve Hengyang.

The 62nd Army was originally controlled by Commander Yu Hanmou of the Seventh Theater, and served as the general reserve of the theater, stationed in Wengyuan, Yingde, and Qingtang in the mountainous area of ​​northern Guangdong.Since September 1943, the army was ordered to prepare to receive American equipment, that is, to send officers above the deputy division commander to the U.S. military training center in Ramgarh, India; Learn the command methods of using US military weapons and joint operations of various arms.But until May 1944, no American equipment arrived.At this time, the battle of Changheng began, and the front line was in a hurry.Chairman Jiang ordered Yu Han to mobilize the 62nd Army to quickly march to the vicinity of Santang in Hengyang to gather and stand by.