Chapter 122 The 180th Division was hit hard

At 7 o'clock in the evening on May 29, the sound of rain, lightning and thunder mixed with the sound of guns and guns. Hong Xuezhi left the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, and just returned to the residence of the Volunteer Army Logistics Department in Nantingli when Peng Dehuai called. "Deputy Commander Hong?" His voice was heavy and hoarse. "Mr. Peng, what's the matter?" "Come here immediately, something happened." "What's important?" "Come back when I tell you to come back, don't ask any more." Peng Dehuai said impatiently, and hung up the phone.

Braving the heavy rain, Hong Xuezhi drove more than 100 miles in the dark in a jeep and arrived at the headquarters of the Volunteer Army in the middle of the night. As soon as he entered the mine, he saw Peng Dehuai wearing shorts, shirtless, sweating profusely, and red eyes, pacing back and forth anxiously. The two communicated quickly, and it turned out that something went wrong with the 180th Division. During the retreat, the 180th Division was intercepted and surrounded by the enemy, suffered heavy losses, and was almost wiped out.This is one of the few major battle defeats in the PLA's military history that can be compared with the Battle of the Xiangjiang River of the Central Red Army during the Long March, the Battle of Yunling during the Southern Anhui Incident during the Anti-Japanese War, and the Battle of Jinmen of the PLA in the War of Liberation.

According to data from the Academy of Military Sciences, nearly 7,000 people from the 180th Division were captured during this campaign.Accounted for nearly 70% of the total number of prisoners of war in the entire Volunteer Army.There are many reasons for the annihilation of the 180th Division, but judging from the research of military and military history experts inside and outside the military and some materials declassified in recent years, the main reasons are as follows: The teacher was indecisive at critical moments, and lost ground.The 180th Division was upgraded from the local troops of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region in the later period of the Liberation War. It did not fight many tough battles in the war.After the troops arrived in Sichuan, they had received instructions to prepare for localization.When they were quickly reorganized and dispatched to North Korea, many backbones had been lost, and a large number of recruits and Kuomintang uprising officers and soldiers had been incorporated.Since the commander of the division was studying at the Nanjing Military Academy, political commissar Zheng Qigui was changed to the division commander.As the division commander, Zheng Qigui has an indecisive character. When the troops are in serious danger, he panics and loses the confidence to correctly judge the situation and command decisively.

The troops were in danger, and Zheng Qigui couldn't make up his mind for a long time, and everything had to wait for the instructions of his superiors.Discovering that the troops were surrounded and afraid of being direction-finded by the U.S. military, he instructed to destroy the code, destroy the radio station, and implement radio silence.As a result, I couldn't contact my superiors, and my superiors couldn't get in touch with him. According to Hong Xuezhi's recollection, when the 180th Division was found to be very dangerous, all the radio stations of the entire Volunteer Army Command, the 3rd Corps and the 60th Army called the 180th Division together, but they couldn't get in touch.

The three chiefs, including Peng Dehuai, were so anxious that they were like ants on a hot pot. Bad command, missed opportunity.According to the memories of the commander who broke out of the 180th Division, when he found out that he was surrounded by the U.S. military, the chief of staff suggested that the troops should be gathered in time and retreat in time to prevent being encircled. But at this time, Mr. Zheng did not comment for a day.The main reason is that they are afraid of not conforming to the instructions of their superiors.In fact, when the U.S. tanks arrived at the rear, if they were determined and resolutely broke through, the entire division would be able to stand out, because the U.S. troops that entered the rear of the 180th Division at that time were only a fast detachment composed of a small number of tanks and armored vehicles, and their purpose was to maintain contact with the volunteers. Neither found nor formed a complete encirclement of the 180th Division.

A day later, the main force of American infantry arrived and really closed the encirclement.Even at this time, the mutual gap between American forces is very large, and there are still many gaps that can be exploited. In this way, in three days, the commander of the 180th Division has not made up his mind, seeing the opportunity to break through gradually lost. At that time, the Division Party Committee had two plans for the direction of the breakthrough: one was to concentrate the main force of the division to the north and take a shortcut to break through; the other was to go east and then north to break through in a detour.

A breakout to the north was finally taken.Since the U.S. military has discovered that the 180th Division is surrounded, it has carried out key interceptions in the north, and the effect of breaking out of the encirclement can be imagined. In terms of breakout methods, one is to disperse the breakout and the other is to concentrate the breakout.Finally, a decentralized approach was adopted.As a result, a large number of wounded had to be abandoned, and the entire division only had more than 3,000 soldiers.Among them, the 538th regiment took the whole regiment to break through the siege, and the whole regiment had more than 1,000 people. It was the only unit of the 180th division that maintained a complete organizational system.

The 27th Army, the 12th Army and other troops that successfully broke through the siege all adopted concentrated breakthroughs. When encountering enemy interception, they first moved to the flanks and then broke through to the north. Of course, improper handling and ineffective command by the commander of the 3rd Corps to which the 180th Division belongs are also important reasons.At that time, the Volunteer Army Command sent a telegram of the campaign transfer to each corps, but Wang Jinshan, the deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, showed carelessness and carelessness at this time. He neither proposed a specific plan according to the situation of the corps, nor arranged how to deploy the troops. , but forwarded the telegram from the Volunteer Army Command to the various armies, and ignored everything.

In this way, Wang Jinshan led the headquarters of the Corps to transfer, and the subordinate troops transferred by themselves, and turned off the radio during the transfer. The Volunteer Army Command contacted them, but they could not be reached. The 60th Army contacted them, but could not.Wei Jie, the commander of the 60th Army, recalled afterwards that after seeing the dangerous situation of the 180th Division, he immediately asked whether the 180th Division of the Corps should retreat, but he could not be contacted.Considering the overall situation, the 180th Division had to be left alone behind the enemy and missed the best time to jump out of the encirclement.

Mr. Peng was furious because of this, and scolded Wang Jinshan, thinking that Wang Jinshan was simple-minded and completely lacked the qualities that a senior commander should have. What caused the 180th Division to make wrong decisions was also the instruction telegram from the superior.At that time, the Volunteer Army Command and the Corps respectively sent power to the 60th Army, asking the 180th Division to cover the transfer of the main force of the Corps, and they must stick to the south of Chuncheon. This telegram killed the 180th Division. According to Wei Jie and Zheng Qigui, the commander of the 180th Division, they wanted to run away immediately when they saw the U.S. troops turning around from their flanks, but they never dared to give up their positions in consideration of the telegram request from their superiors.Later, the military department called to ask him to break out of the siege, but the 3rd Corps sent a telegram, requesting that the wounded must be properly disposed of, and the wounded were not allowed to be abandoned.This made it difficult for the commander of the 180th Division to make up his mind to break through.At that time, the 180th Division had more than 1,000 wounded, and hundreds of them could not be taken away.When the division party committee held a meeting to study the problem of breaking out, there was no way to deal with the wounded, and the meeting lasted for a day without making up its mind.

It can be seen that the 180th Division was surrounded and wiped out, and the responsibility is not on one side. This lesson is too painful.